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ABSTRACT
Great Powers often adopt coercive strategies, threatening or using limited force to
convince weak states to comply with their demands. While coercive strategies have
succeeded in just over half of asymmetric crises since World War I, there remain a
number of cases in which weak states have chosen to resist. With their tremendous
military advantage, why is it that Great Powers so often fail to coerce weak states? While
a high probability of victory in war gives them the leverage to make high level demands
of a weak target, concession to such demands can threaten the very survival of the weaker
state, its regime, or its regime leadership. Perceiving its survival to be threatened at any
level, a target will likely resist, so long as it has the means to do so.
Commitment problems have also been cited as an explanation for why states cannot reach
peaceful agreements. Yet Great Powers have, in fact, largely been able to overcome
commitment issues in asymmetric conflicts by forming coalitions, by involving third
party Great Powers in negotiations, making incremental tit-for-tat concessions, and taking
diplomatic measures to reduce the target's audience costs.
Finally, externalities such as international norms against invading a sovereign state
without first seeking resolution through the United Nations have increased the costs to a
Great Power for employing a brute force war strategy. In such cases, in fact, a Great
Power may first choose a coercive strategy designed to fail in order to obtain justification
for its preferred strategy of war.
To reach these conclusions, I introduce a game theoretic model for asymmetric coercion,
calculate equilibrium conditions, and formulate hypotheses for coercion failure based on
survival and commitment issues. I create a data set of 116 asymmetric cases from 1918
to 2003 and then conduct ordered probit regressions to test predictions of survival and
commitment hypotheses. I then conduct extensive qualitative case studies from the
recent asymmetric conflicts between the United States and the states of Iraq. Serbia, and
Libya.
Thesis Supervisor: Barry Posen
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
Acknowledgments
This research would not have been possible without the support of my dissertation
committee: Barry Posen, Ken Oye, and Robert Art. As a National Security Fellow at the
Kennedy School of Government in 2005, I attended an MIT Security Studies Program
Wednesday Seminar and, in so doing, discovered the ideal intellectual environment for
my pursuit of a doctorate in international relations and security studies. Barry has been a
superb mentor, acknowledging my prior military experience while holding me to the
exacting analytical standards he requires of all his graduate students. Ken's brilliant
methods course and stimulating conversations have been instrumental to my
understanding of the methodological challenges I faced in the study of asymmetric
coercion. Bob generously agreed to serve on my committee and I have benefited greatly
from his experience and extensive knowledge of coercive diplomacy.
I am also indebted to other MIT faculty members including Stephen Van Evera, Roger
Petersen, Taylor Fravel, Stephen Ansolabehere, Fotini Christia, Harvey Sapolsky, David
Singer, Gabe Lenz, Owen Cote, and Vipin Narang who have all given invaluable
guidance at various stages in this lengthy journey. I thank Barbara Geddes, Ken Schultz,
and Todd Sechser for providing me access to their databases, Andrew Bennett and Robert
Powell for their advice and feedback, and the encouragement and friendship of my
colleagues at the United States Naval War College, Josh Rovner, Colin Jackson, Karl
Walling and Brad Lee. I am especially indebted to Stephen Chiabotti and the USAF
School of Advanced Air and Space Power Studies for funding and to John Maurer at the
Strategy and Policy Department of the United States Naval War College for the financial
support and time to complete this project.
I have found the toughest critics yet staunchest supporters among my fellow graduate
students. I count myself lucky to have had the opportunity to spend time with, learn
from, and count as friends Joshua Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, Tara Maller, Will Norris, Paul
Staniland, Caitlin Talmadge, Andrew Radin, Nathan Black, Kentaro Maeda, Rachel
Wellhausen, Keren Fraiman, Jon Lindsay, Stephanie Kaplan, Sameer Lalwani, Austin
Long, Daniel Altman, Gautam Mukunda, Ben Friedman, Peter Krause, Kelly Grieco,
Brendan Green, Negeen Paghadi, and Jill Hazelton.
A special thanks to my children, Clayton and Sadie, for their support and confidence and
the joy they bring to our home. To my amazing chief editor and beautiful wife Bonnie,
thanks for the countless hours spent correcting and improving this text and, more
importantly, for making it all worthwhile. Finally, I praise the Lord for sparing my life
over Kosovo and giving me the strength and perseverance to see this project through.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
2. Theory of Asymmetric Coercion and
Explanations of Coercion Failure
3. Quantitative Analysis
4. United States vs. Iraq
5. United States vs. Serbia
6. United States vs. Libya
7. Conclusion
Select Bibliography
102
156
262
367
453
482
Chapter 1: Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been engaged militarily
against much weaker states in conflicts in Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S., as a Great Power with vastly superior military
capability, has invaded and imposed its will in over half of these conflicts. Invasion,
however, is a costly and risky venture and in the modern world, the material gains from
conquest appear limited. It was in this context that the U.S. opted for limited air strikes
in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. Although these coercive strategies were to
deliver less ambitious objectives, they also cost less in U.S. blood and treasure. Coercion
held the promise of foreign policy gains while avoiding the hefty costs of invasion and
occupation. And, as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan, occupation can prove even more
costly than invasion.
Great Powers routinely target weak states by adopting a variety of strategies to
achieve their foreign policy objectives, which may range from relatively minor policy
changes on the part of the weak state to higher demands for homeland territory or regime
change. The United States has been the Great Power most frequently involved in these
asymmetric conflicts, being responsible for a third of all crises since the end of World
War I and for almost all such lopsided conflicts since the end of the Cold War. In
asymmetric crises, Great Powers most often choose a strategy of coercion, threatening or
using limited force to convince target states to comply with their demands. For coercion
to succeed, however, the target must concede to the demands of the powerful challenger.
Though coercive strategies have succeeded in just over half of all asymmetric crises,
there still remain a significant number of cases in which weak states have resisted and the
crises have been decided by brute force invasion or ended in a foreign policy failure for
the Great Power. With such an enormous advantage in military power, why do Great
Powers so often fail to coerce weak states into doing their will?
With its vast military superiority, a Great Power's probability of victory and its
expected outcome from an asymmetric war are great. As a result, a powerful challenger
has the coercive leverage to make high level demands of a weak target state. Such
demands, however, if conceded, may threaten the survival of the target state. And even if
demands do not threaten state survival, the very act of conceding may well threaten the
survival of the target regime, as it may be perceived as weak by a domestic opposition
group plotting revolt. Concession may also prove to be costly for the target's leader,
weakening his control over the ruling regime and threatening his own survival. As a
consequence, when a target state perceives its survival to be threatened at any level, it
will likely resist, so long as it has the means to do so.
In asymmetric conflicts, only the Great Power has the military power to threaten
the survival of the weak state. As such, it is the Great Power that determines whether to
accommodate a weak state over the issue at hand or to escalate the conflict into a crisis.
If the powerful challenger chooses the latter, it then has a range of foreign policy options
available, from non-military strategies of diplomacy, inducements or sanctions, to
military strategies of coercion or brute force. A rational challenger chooses coercion
when the expected outcome, i.e. the net of benefits to costs, is greater as compared to
other foreign policy options. This is only the case, however, when it assesses the target
as likely to concede to its demands. Since a target will not likely concede to its own
demise, the objectives that a Great Power can obtain through coercion are lower than
those that it can gain from a brute force strategy. The challenger's high costs of a brute
force war, however, which involve invasion and occupation, are usually greater than the
more moderate costs associated with coercion. Therefore, Great Powers often prefer
coercive strategies with limited aims and lower costs to the more costly option of brute
force war.
When considering the coercive demands it will make of a target, a rational
challenger recognizes and refrains from making demands likely to be resisted by the
target. When it assesses its demands as too high, the challenger can either lower its aims
and/or increase its threats. Alternatively, if the target is still likely to resist and the issue
is sufficiently important, the Great Power should adopt a brute force strategy to achieve
its objective. Yet, in the real world, Great Powers often do adopt coercive strategies
which fail.
Why states fail to resolve their conflicts peacefully, why wars occur, and how
wars terminate remain critical questions in international relations. Academic research has
focused either on how states, regimes, and individual leaders fail to behave rationally or
why states cannot rationally reach agreements either to prevent or to end war. In recent
years, commitment problems have increasingly been cited to explain why states cannot
reach peaceful agreements. This commitment argument proposes that Great Powers
operating in an anarchic international environment cannot make credible promises to
abide by the terms of an agreement, even when it is in their ex ante interests to do so.
Given the great disparity in power in asymmetric conflicts, commitment problems are
particularly likely to arise for a Great Power, a conundrum dubbed Goliath's curse. I
Sechser, Todd S. (forthcoming) "Goliath's Curse: Asymmetric Power and the Effectiveness of Coercive
Threats" International Organization
Targeted states at the negotiating table understand that once the terms of an agreement
have been implemented, incentives may then exist for the Great Power to make additional
demands. Expecting that concession to an initial demand will only lead to further
demands, the target resists.
Yet in the majority of the asymmetric crises since the end of World War I, weak
states have conceded to the coercive demands of Great Powers. Great Powers have, in
fact, largely been able to overcome commitment problems through a variety of measures
including the formation of coalitions, the inclusion of third party Great Powers in
negotiations, the offering of incremental tit-for-tat concessions, and efforts to reduce the
audience costs of a target's leadership for making concessions.
To understand why coercion fails it is essential not only to explain why weak
states resist, but also why Great Powers do not always recognize situations in which
coercive strategies are likely to fail and why they do not instead adopt alternative foreign
policy options such as accommodation or a brute force strategy of war. Misperception,
miscalculation, and uncertainty explain why a Great Power may mistakenly or unluckily
choose a coercive strategy which subsequently fails. There are other cases, however, in
which a Great Power chooses to coerce with the belief that such a strategy will almost
certainly fail and is counting on the target's resistance to provide a justification for war.
Externalities stemming from international norms against invading sovereign states
without first seeking resolution through the United Nations increase the cost for a Great
Power to adopt a brute force strategy without a casus belli. This was the situation in the
lead-up to the Gulf War in late 1990 when the Bush administration demanded Iraq abide
by the UN Security Council Resolution to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. Saddam
Hussein's refusal provided justification for the subsequent U.S.-led invasion of Kuwait. 2
In sum, a Great Power may first adopt a coercive strategy designed to fail in order to
decrease the diplomatic and domestic costs for its preferred strategy of a brute force war.
In the next section, I begin to further develop these explanations for coercion
failure and in the final section, I outline the chapters which follow.
ASYMMETRIC COERCION THEORY
In this section I lay the foundation for a theory of asymmetric coercion by first
defining key terms, identifying explanatory variables of demands and threats, and
organizing these concepts into a typology of coercion. This provides a method for
classifying the universe of coercion cases into a coherent framework for both quantitative
and qualitative analysis. I also define the dependent variable offoreign policy outcome
and examine limits on coercive force and alternative foreign policy options:
accommodation, inducements, economic sanctions, and brute force military operations. I
conclude this chapter by examining explanations for coercion failure and develop criteria
for testing two hypotheses for coercion failure.
TERMS, DEFINITIONS, AND A TYPOLOGY OF COERCION
Asymmetric Conflict
This research focuses on interstate conflict, for which the distribution of power
between states is such that the powerful can threaten the survival of the weaker, but not
2 Sometimes such a strategy does not succeed. In the lead-up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the U.S.
made coercive demands that Iraq abandon its WMD or face regime change. When Saddam chose to abide
by the UNSC resolution, this denied George W. Bush justification for war. Bush chose to invade,
regardless, and accepted the condemnation of the international community.
vice versa.3 A powerful state is one capable of a conventional military invasion to
occupy a weak state.4 While asymmetry is primarily determined by relative military
power, other factors such as distance, geography, and climatology can affect the ability of
the powerful state to project its military might.
By contrast, the weaker state cannot threaten the survival of the powerful state
though vital security interests may still be at stake. For example, following September
1 I1 h further terrorist attacks has remained a vital security concern for the United States
but is still not a survival issue.5 While another attack would prove painful, even the worst
case scenario of a terrorist group detonating a nuclear device in a metropolitan area, even
in Washington, D.C., would not result in the demise of the United States. 6
An additional insight into the dynamics of asymmetric conflict recognizes that,
while the powerful state may have the military advantage, the weaker state generally has
higher interests at stake which can translate into greater resolve. Resolve is a measure of
the willingness of a state to suffer the costs of war.7 In asymmetric conflicts the interests
of the powerful state are by definition limited, but for those of the target state are total
' Derived from the seminal work by Andrew Mack (1975) "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" World
Politics 27:2 181. Mack focuses on the asymmetry between an external state and a non-state actor.
4 In this dissertation I do not consider asymmetry caused by nuclear weapons, for two reasons. Though the
U.S. and other Great Powers possess the capability to destroy a state through a barrage of nuclear weapons,
the nuclear option has been reserved almost exclusively for deterrence and only rarely against weaker
states for compellence. Since cases of compellence comprise 90% of asymmetric crises, cases of nuclear
compellence in asymmetric crises is rare. One example of nuclear compellence was the Soviet Union's
threatening missile strikes against Israel, as well as France and England, during the Suez crisis in
November of 1956. International Crisis Behavior project crisis 152 Suez nationalization,
www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb
5 For further discussion on the differences between survival and vital interests see Freeman, Chas W (1997)
Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington 9-14
6 Allison, Graham (2004) Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe New York: Times
Books and Mueller, John (2006) Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National
Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them Free Press
7 Rosen, Steven (1972) "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in Bruce M. Russett ed., Peace, War,
and Numbers Beverly Hills: Sage. 167-83
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when its survival is threatened. Thus the powerful state's military advantage in some
cases may be offset by the weaker state's greater interests at stake which generates
greater resolve to resist and to suffer.9 Asymmetric conflicts are thus not solely
concerned with relative differences in state's military power but also the interests at stake
and the costs which states are willing to endure.
Definition and Typology of Coercion
In an asymmetric conflict, the powerful state often finds coercion to be an
attractive option.' 0 Coercion is an instrument of statecraft employed to achieve foreign
policy objectives. While prominent theorists vary in their definition of coercion, the
definition I adopt as most suitable for this project emphasizes that coercion threatens
force or uses limited force to convince a target to comply with demands." Coercion
8 Mack, Andrew (1975) "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" World Politics 27:2
9 Though the target typically has asymmetric interests and greater resolve than the challenger, this is not
always the case, particularly when demands do not threaten target survival. For example, in 2003 Iraq was
willing to allow UN inspectors back into country to verify that Iraq had abandoned its Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) program. Saddam's resolve to maintain the ambiguity over his defunct WMD
program did not outweigh the resolve of the Bush administration to use the issue of Iraqi WMD as its casus
belli for invading and overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime.
0 1 defer until later in this chapter alternative options to coercion, namely accommodation, inducements,
sanctions, and brute force military operations.
" This definition is consistent and integrates prominent theorists' definitions of coercion. Thomas
Schelling defines coercion in terms of a punishment strategy where coercion is "...the threat of damage, or
of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply." Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and
Influence Yale University Press, New Haven, 3. Alexander George focuses on the more indirect use of
violence in his definition of coercive diplomacy as "...the use of intimidation of one kind or another in
order to get others to comply with one's wishes.. .The general intent of coercive diplomacy is to back a
demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent
enough to persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand." George, Alexander and
William Simons (1994) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy WestView Press, Boulder, 2. Thomas
Freedman focuses on the freedom of the target of coercion to make decisions when he defines coercion as
"...the potential or actual application of force to influence the action of a voluntary agent." Freedman,
Lawrence (2004) Deterrence Maiden, MA: Polity Press 27. Robert Pape focuses on the calculations made
by the target of coercion in his definition of coercion as "...efforts to change the behavior of a state by
manipulating costs and benefits." In addition for Pape "...'coercion' is the word I use to refer to the same
concept as Schelling's 'compellence."' Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 4. Finally Daniel Byman's focus is on behavior change by the target in his definition of "coercion
as the use of threatened force, and at times the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an
adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would." Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman (2002)
consists of an explicit or tacit ultimatum which informs the target what it must
accomplish and what violent consequences will ensue should the target's response not be
to the challenger's satisfaction.
The typology I develop consists of the three primary characteristics of coercion:
the nature of the demand, the level of the demand, and the type of threat (Figure 1.1).
This typology provides a framework for classifying cases and identifying and coding
explanatory variables.
Type of
Threats
Nature of
Demands
Homeland/Regime Change
Level of Demands
Figure 1.1: Typology of Coercion
The Dynamics of Coercion. American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 30. My contribution is to point out this change in behavior is linked to the
challenger's demands, similar to what Clausewitz refers to for war, "...to compel our enemy to do our
will." Clausewitz, Carl von (1976) On War edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, Book I, Chapter I, 2, 75
Nature of Coercive Demands: Compellence and Deterrence
A coercive strategy consists of both demands and threats. As to demands, they
can be either compellent or deterrent in nature. Much has been written on the difference
between compellence and deterrence. For this study, the key difference is whether the
resulting concessions are observable. With compellence, demands are for the target to
make an observable change in its behavior. Compellent demands include actions such as
"stop", "go back", "give back" or "give up." Two compellent demands were made in
October of 1998 when the United States insisted Serbia reduce its deployed troops to pre-
crisis levels and allow international monitors into Kosovo. Both the reduction in troop
levels and admittance of monitors were observable Serbian concessions directly linked to
U.S. demands.
By contrast, deterrent demands require the target to continue in its current actions.
The deterrent demand is simply "don't". With nuclear deterrence, for example, the
demand is "don't launch your nuclear weapons." The causal link between a challenger's
demands and target compliance is obscured, however, by the negative nature of the
demands. Deterrent demands thus provide a target's leader with plausible deniability
which lowers both audience and reputation costs. 13 Target leaders can comply with
demands while claiming they had never planned to take any aggressive action. Deterrent
" Schelling, Arms and Influence 69-78 provides the best explanation of the difference between
compellence and deterrence and Posen, Barry (1996), "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters"
International Security, 21:1, 80 provides an excellent description of why compellent demands are both
greater demands and more difficult to communicate than deterrent demands.
13 Audience costs refer to the costs a leader suffers primarily by a domestic audience as a result of making
concessions. James Fearon includes an international aspect to audience costs, however the main point of
audience costs is that the costs are suffered domestically by the leader. Reputation costs are the expected
future costs suffered by the target as a result of revealing its willingness to concede to the demands in the
current crises. James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,"
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), p. 581.
demands are thus relatively more palatable to the target, allowing it to more easily
concede.
Unfortunately, this unobservable quality which makes compliance more likely
also makes it more difficult for the challenger (and researchers) to determine whether it
was the deterrent strategy which caused the target to comply. Deterrence can be
expensive in terms of diplomatic and military commitments, making it essential to know
the effectiveness of the strategy in gaining the desired outcome. In sum, while this Janus
nature of compliance may make deterrence more effective, it also makes it more difficult
to assess.
The advantage of differentiating compellence and deterrence according to the
observable quality of target compliance is that it avoids the problem of assessing
compliance in terms of the status quo. Conventionally compellence has been defined as
changing the status quo while deterrence maintains the status quo.' 5 The problem with
this approach is that states often differ in their perception of the status quo and a demand
which may be intended by the challenger as deterrent may be perceived by the target as
compellent. For example, the United States pursued a policy of containment with Iraq
following the 1991 Gulf War. The U.S. established no-fly zones and deployed forces in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey to deter Iraq from further internal and external
aggression. However, from Iraq's perspective, U.S. demands were compellent,
impinging on its sovereignty by demanding its military be removed from designated safe
zones in the north and south and allowing UN inspectors access to confirm the
dismantlement of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program.
14 1 credit Ken Oye with providing me with this insight.
" George, Alexander and William Simons (1994) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy WestView Press,
Boulder, 8
A final challenge in identifying the nature of a coercive demand lies in real world
cases where there are elements of both compellence and deterrence. This is particularly
true for compellent cases since, along with the explicit demand for the target to make an
observable change, there is the accompanying implicit deterrent demand: "and don't do it
again."
In sum, the combination of challenger and target disagreement over the status quo
nature of demands and the fact that real world cases of coercion often contain both
compellent and deterrent demands makes it difficult for the researcher to classify cases.
However, this obstacle can be partially surmounted by focusing on the nature of the core
demands made and assessing whether target concessions to these demands are
observable.
Level of Coercive Demands: Policy Change, Extra-Territory, Homeland, and
Regime Change
A second characteristic of coercive demands deals with the level of demands
made. I adopt and modify the Correlates of War (COW) project coding which
categorizes the level of demand as policy change, territory, or regime change. I further
differentiate territorial demands as either extra-territory or homeland territory, since
homeland territory typically holds a higher value for states. Demands for policy change
and extraterritorial concessions are generally less costly for a target than higher level
concessions of homeland territory or regime change, either of which is more likely to
threaten the survival of a state, of its regime or of its leadership.
16Faten Ghosn and Scott Bennett "Codebook for the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incident Data, 3.10 27
September, 2007" http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ p.6. COW also codes reparation, which I code as policy
change if this includes monetary or capital reparations and territory if territorial reparations.
In addition, in real world cases, it is not unusual for the challenger to make
multiple demands. For instance, during the 1990s after the Gulf War, the U.S. made
three demands of Iraq. Two demands were for policy change: that Iraq abide by the
southern no-fly zone restrictions and the northern safe haven and that Iraq dismantle its
WMD program. A third demand for regime change, made law by the U.S. Congress in
1998, declared the removal of Saddam Hussein to be a national security objective.1 7
Though this was the largest demand to be made of Iraq, containment and abandonment of
WMD remained the core U.S. foreign policy objectives. In sum, classifying cases based
on the level of demands depends on identifying the challenger's core demands, i.e. those
objectives which, once achieved, would result in the end of the crisis. 1
Type of Coercive Threats: Punishment and Denial
Regardless of the nature or level of demand, in order to be viable a threat must be
credible enough to induce the target to comply. Two types of threats provide different
coercive mechanisms for changing a target's behavior: punishment and denial.19
Punishment is "...the threat of damage, or of more damage to come."2 The
coercive mechanism is the threat of future punishment which must be sufficiently large
and credible to convince the target that it is preferable to concede now rather than to
endure further pain. Punishment strategies are aimed at altering the target's cost benefit
assessment. An advantage of employing a punishment strategy is that, when successful,
it is less costly for the challenger than alternative strategies of denial or brute force
" Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/lLA.htm
18 An alternative approach is to code each demand as separate cases. This is the approach taken by
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg (2007) Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered, 3'd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
19 Snyder, Glenn (1958) Deterrence by Denial and Punishment Center of International Studies Research Monograph
No.1: Princeton
20 Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and Influence New Haven: Yale University Press, Arms and Influence 3
invasion. In fact, if threats alone are sufficient to induce concessions, the actual costs are
quite low. Even when limited strikes are employed in a punishment strategy, the
challenger's costs are usually lower than the costs of invasion. For example, the air-only
campaign over Kosovo cost the United States no combat fatalities and only a few aircraft
destroyed or damaged.
The challenge for operationalizing a punishment strategy is to identify which key
elements of the target to threaten (i.e. the targeting of the target state). I adopt a
Clausewitzian framework for the state, disaggregating it into its regime (or government),
its military, and its population. 21 A punishment strategy may threaten all three elements,
but I will discuss only the regime and population. First, with regard to the regime, a
challenger may directly attack either its infrastructure (buildings, facilities, assets) or its
leadership. An example of the latter is an air power decapitation strategy aimed directly
at regime leadership.2 3 As a punishment strategy decapitation succeeds if the expected
cost of strikes, i.e. the-leader's death, convinces the regime leadership to make
concessions while it is still viable and in power.
21 Clausewitz, Carl von (1976) On War edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton
University Press Bk 1, Chl:28, 89.
22 A challenger adopts a punishment strategy when it threatens a target's military with the intent of
increasing the expected costs for resistance. There are two causal mechanisms that can result in target
concession. First, the target leadership values its military and, through cost benefit analysis, may decide to
make concessions on the issue at stake in order to preserve its military capabilities. The initial air strikes of
Operation Allied Force are an example of an unsuccessful punishment strategy aimed at military forces.
Planned for three nights of strikes predominantly against Serbian military facilities, these attacks were not
sufficient to convince Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to concede Kosovo. A second causal
mechanism involves a challenger's attacks on target military forces aimed at sparking a military uprising to
overthrow the regime or to convince the regime to concede in order to preempt a military coup. An
example of this can be found in the U.S. defeat of the Iraqi Army in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, which
sparked the March uprising. Initiated by defeated Shiite soldiers returning from the battlefield, the uprising
very nearly overthrew Saddam Hussein and his Baath party.
" I have not discovered a case of a successful threatened decapitation strategy. Interestingly in all three
conflicts I examine, Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, the U.S. strikes the residences of their leaders.
24 If decapitation succeeds by killing the regime leadership then this is a brute force not a coercive strategy.
Second, a challenger can threaten the population, in which case two causal
mechanisms can then convince the regime to concede. Giulio Douhet theorized that air
strikes against the population would cause them to rise up and overthrow the regime.2 5
Presumably, a new regime would be more likely to then concede to the challenger's
demands. Alternatively, to prevent such a revolt, the target's leaders may become
convinced that concession is necessary. The motivation of preempting a war weary
Serbian population before they voted him from office influenced Slobodan Milosevic in
his decision to concede Kosovo in 1999.26
The alternative coercive strategy to punishment is that of denial.27 Here the
challenger attacks the target's ability to defend the object at stake. If the challenger can
convince the target the situation is so hopeless that it can no longer defend the objective,
the target has the incentive to concede rather than incur further losses from continued
fighting. While punishment strategies are aimed at what the target values, the objective
of denial strategies is to alter the balance of power by attacking a target's defenses. As
such, denial strategies against an enemy's hardened defenses require a more extensive
expenditure of force to convince the target of the futility of resistance. Should the
conflict be over an issue which the target highly prizes, a denial strategy can prove nearly
as costly as a decisive military victory.28
25 Douhet, Giulio (1998) The Command of the Air Air Force History and Museums Program: Washington
D.C. 57
26 See Chapter 5.
27 Shimshoni, Jonathan (1988) Israel and conventional deterrence: border warfare from 1953 to 1970
Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 6 and Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win.: Air Power and Coercion
in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press 18-19
28 Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press
15. Even if a denial strategy includes invasion, it still may prove effective if target concessions avoid the
costs of occupation.
A critical aspect of an effective coercive threat is that it must be perceived as
credible by the target. Both the capability and the will of the challenger play into this
perception.29 Capability refers to the challenger's military capacity to back up its threats
with force and its relative power advantage over the target. Should the target resist, does
the challenger have the military power projection capability to punish the target into
compliance or to deny it the ability to defend itself?
The other half of the credibility calculation is the willingness of the challenger to
incur the costs of carrying out its threats. An example of an incredible threat would be
that of a U.S. ground invasion of Kosovo after President Clinton's public declaration in
early 1999 that no such action would be considered. It was clearly a strategic blunder to
remove the uncertainty over U.S. intentions. However, even if Clinton had not done so,
the higher expected combat losses for invading Kosovo made a denial strategy less
credible than the alternative punishment strategy of an air-only campaign.
A final consideration of punishment and denial threats concerns their
effectiveness. Robert Pape claims that only denial strategies work for "important"
demands of homeland territory or regime change.3 0 He claims punishment strategies,
short of nuclear weapons, do not generate sufficient levels of pain to effect a change in a
target's decision-making. Undetermined, however, has been the effectiveness of
punishment strategies when lower level interests are at stake, such as policy changes over
humanitarian rights or extra-territorial concessions. In the case studies for Iraq, Serbia,
and Libya, punishment strategies employing primarily airstrikes and/or sanctions
29 Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell Press,
2005) p. 1. Press uses the terms power and interests to express the same idea as that of capability and will.
30 Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win.: Air Power and Coercion in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press
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succeeded in obtaining such lower level demands. In the case of Kosovo, a punishment
strategy even achieved higher level objectives by targeting the Serbian population and
elite, eventually convincing Milosevic to concede what Serbia still considers to be part of
its homeland.
The Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Outcome
A state engages in coercion to obtain its foreign policy objectives. The degree to
which it achieves these objectives determines whether its foreign policy is a success or a
failure. The dependent variable of foreign policy outcome compares the challenger's ex
ante objectives with the results from the conflict. A foreign policy outcome is deemed a
success if the challenger achieves its core objectives and a failure if it does not. The
expectation that a challenger achieve all of its demands, however, is too strict a standard.
First, given the uncertainty over interests, capabilities and resolve, a challenger has an
incentive to bluff by making greater demands in order to gain a better bargained outcome.
Further, a strategic actor realizes that, in the course of negotiations, it will likely need to
concede on some points in order to reach an agreement. Such public concessions by the
challenger can provide a target's leader with the means of saving face, thus reducing
some of the audience and reputation costs incurred by acceding to the remaining
demands. As a result, as with any negotiation, the challenger brings to the bargaining
table higher demands than it will likely achieve, some of which it is willing to sacrifice in
favor of an agreement.3'
Further discussion on the operationalization for the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome is
deferred to the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3. Two points, however, are worth noting here. First, the
dependent variable is not simply a measure of what the challenger obtains. Coding foreign policy outcome
in this manner would provide a gross assessment which would not factor in the value the challenger places
on the gains it makes, which are determined by its interests, nor would it deduct for the costs of obtaining
Limitations on Coercive Force and Alternative Foreign Policy Options
Having identified characteristics of the dependent and explanatory variables, the
next step is to examine the strategic interaction which translates coercive demands and
threats into foreign policy outcomes. Prior to specifying a model of asymmetric
coercion, however, two factors require further examination: what are the limits on the use
of force for a strategy to still be considered coercive and what alternative foreign policy
options are available to the challenger.
Limits on the Use of Force
By definition, coercion entails the threat offorce and the limited use offorce.
Force is produced by military means and includes a range of violent actions from small
arms fire to air strikes. Yet to be determined is the level of force a strategy can employ
and still be considered coercive. What counts as "limited" force is a key discriminator
between three of the dominant coercion theorists: Alexander George's coercive
diplomacy, Thomas Schelling's compellence, and Robert Pape's coercion by denial.32 In
the following analysis, I examine the limits they place on the use of force and then define
them. Achieving a high level outcome, such as a territorial concession or regime change, does not
necessarily translate into greater success. If the challenger's interests are non-vital, then the additional
costs of obtaining concessions may make such an outcome less desirable than lower level gains achieved at
a lower cost. Coding foreign policy outcome by the degree to which the challenger achieves its ex ante
core objectives addresses this problem by incorporating the challenger's valuation of its interests, along
with its expected benefits and costs. Second, the dependent variable does not evaluate the efficiency of the
challenger's strategy nor does it compare the effectiveness of coercion to other available foreign policy
options. These alternative dependent variables would require analyzing how the challenger executes its
strategy as compared to either a hypothesized "flawlessly" executed strategy or an alternative "better"
option. See Baldwin, David A. (1999) "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice" International
Security 24:3 80-107. While there is merit in analyzing the mistakes made in executing a strategy, such
counterfactual argumentation is fraught with uncertainty, making objective evaluation difficult for a single
case, and impractical for a large number of cases.
32 George, Alexander and William Simons (1994) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy WestView Press,
Boulder, Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and Influence Yale University Press, New Haven, and Pape,
Robert (1996) Bombing to Win Ithaca: Cornell University Press
my threshold for asymmetric coercion in terms of limited punishment strikes and denial
attacks short of invasion or decisive battle (see Table 1.1).
LIMITS ON THE USE OF FORCE
Theorist/Work Coercion Limits on Force
Alexander George Coercive Diplomacy - Extremely limited, only threats of force
Limits of Coercive - Only exemplary/symbolic military action
Diplomacy
Thomas Schelling Compellence - Limited, punitive strikes to communicate
Arms and threat of more strikes to come
Influence
Robert Pape Coercion by Denial - Resticted, no attacks on civilians
Bombing to Win - Unlimited attacks on military forces
Phil Haun Asymmetric Coercion -Limited, punitive strikes to communicate
Asymmetric threat of more strikes to come
Coercion -Limited strikes against military short of
ground invasion/decisive battle
-Threats of ground invasion
Table 1.1: Coercion Theorists' Limits on the Use of Force
The-most restrictive form of coercion is Alexander George's coercive diplomacy
which limits military action to ... texemplary or symbolic use. Actions such as
increasing alert levels, mobilizing or deploying forces, or military exercises signal the
credibility of a challenger's threat without engaging in violence. The credibility of a
threat is "...the perceived likelihood that the threat will be carried out if the conditions
that are supposed to trigger it are met. A highly credible threat is one that people believe
will be carried out; a threat has little credibility if people believe it is a bluff."3 4 The
intent of coercive diplomacy is therefore to "...back a demand on an adversary with a
threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to
" George, Alexander and William Simons (1994) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy WestView Press,
Boulder, 10-1l
3 Press, Daryl G. (2005) Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats Cornell Press:
Ithica, 10
persuade him [the target] that it is in his interest to comply with the demand.",3  Coercive
diplomacy is a strategy to avoid war which succeeds when demands are met and no force
is actually employed.
For Thomas Schelling, however, threats alone are often insufficient to coerce.
"Unhappily, the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it." Here
the purpose for the limited employment of force is to generate an "...expectation of more
violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get it at all." 36 In Arms
and Influence, published in 1966, he includes the then ongoing U.S. air campaign against
North Vietnam, which had commenced in 1965.37 At the time of his writing, these
attacks were quite restrictive, though clearly beyond that of a symbolic military action.38
Whereas George favors coercive threats as a substitute for war, Schelling views
compellence as a limited, punitive war strategy and a substitute for the more violent
conventional war fighting strategy of taking objectives by brute force.
The level of violence employed in Schelling's punishment strategy is limited to
only that force necessary to credibly communicate the threat to the target. Excessive
force is not only inefficient but counterproductive as it exhausts the challenger's reserves
of latent violence available to produce pain in the future. Therefore, the use of force must
be restricted to only that which is necessary to convince the target that it is in its best
interest to comply. 39
3 George, Alexander and William Simons (1994) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy WestView Press,
Boulder, 2
36 Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and Influence Yale University Press, New Haven, 3
31 Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and Influence Yale University Press, New Haven, 175
38 The early phase of Operation Rolling Thunder, which Schelling was aware of, attacks were restricted
from Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor.
39 Schelling identifies the expected pain from future strikes as the causal mechanism for a target's
concessions. He fails, however, to recognize an alternative causal mechanism: the expected economic costs
to the target generated from previous strikes. For example, by June of 1999, NATO air strikes against
For Robert Pape, only denial strategies leveled against a target state's military
capabilities are effective. Punishment strategies targeting the civilian population do not
gain "important" territorial concessions. Such actions simply cause unnecessary
suffering and divert critical military resources like air power away from the decisive
battle. Therefore, military force should be restricted to attacking the target's defenses
only.40 Compared to the coercive threats of George's coercive diplomacy or limited
strikes of Schelling's compellence, the wartime application of Pape's denial strategy is
far more costly and, in many cases, requires invasion. And for Pape, the line between a
denial strategy and a bruteforce strategy is ambiguous, as the distinction only becomes
evident ex post with coercion succeeding if the target concedes while it still has some
means to resist.4 1 And the degree of success for the challenger is measured by the
difference between the actual costs incurred from the denial strategy and the expected
costs of taking objectives by force.
The threshold of violence distinguishing coercion from brute force war in my
theory of asymmetric coercion falls between that of Schelling's compellence and Pape's
denial. Like Schelling, I include as coercive strikes against a target's population that
signal the threat of additional strikes to come. For example, in May of 1999 the U.S.
increased the number of air strikes aimed at Serbia's infrastructure. This threat to
Serbia's economy proved to be a key factor in Milosevic concession of Kosovo. I further
include Pape's denial attacks against a target's military defenses as coercive measures.
bridges and the electric grid had degraded Serbia's transportation networks and energy sources and
disrupted its economy. Only a concession to U.S. demands would bring about an end to the war which
would enable Serbia to rebuild its economic capacity. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was
compelled not only out of the fear of the damage from future air strikes, but also to stop the economic
losses accruing as a result of the damage from previous air strikes, which could not be repaired while the
war continued.
40 Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win Ithaca: Cornell University Press 68
4' Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win Ithaca: Cornell University Press 15
Unlike Pape, however, though denial strategies may well threaten invasion I do not
consider an invasion, once commenced, as coercive. 42 Such action significantly
increases the expected costs and risks of conflict and is better viewed as a brute force
strategy.
Threatening invasion versus an actually invasion is analogous to the distinction
George draws between threatening force and actually employing violent force. This logic
can be further extended to the nuclear realm. Though nuclear weapons factor into few
cases of asymmetric conflict, a similar distinction can be made as to determining whether
they are coercive or not. 43 The threat of nuclear attacks aimed at a countries population,
countervalue, or its military, counterforce, I consider coercive, whereas an actual nuclear
attack would not be as such action significantly increases the expected costs and risks of
conflict and is better viewed as a brute force strategy.
Alternative Foreign Policy Options: Accommodation, Inducements, Sanctions, and
Brute Force
Up to this point, coercion has been the only foreign policy option considered for
the challenger. The decision to adopt a coercive strategy, however, implies that the
challenger expects to gain more by that choice than from the other available options. 44
Alternative foreign policy options include non-military strategies of accommodation,
42 Pape's definition of coercion allows an invasion to be coercive so long as the target conceded while it
still had the means to resist.
43 Nuclear weapons are not employed frequently in asymmetric conflicts for three reasons. First, nuclear
weapons have only been available since the end of WWII. Second, nuclear weapons are primarily used by
Great Powers to deter other Great Powers. By contrast the threat of a nuclear attack has rarely been used to
compel a weak state. An exception is the Soviet Union threatening a nuclear attack against Israel, as well
as Great Britain and France, in 1956 to end the war over the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt.
Third, the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons except in retaliation or defense of a Great Powers
homeland has decreased the credibility of a Great Power's threat to use nuclear weapons to back up its
compellent demands against weak states.
44 Baldwin, David A. (1999) "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice" International Security 24:3
80-107
inducements, and economic sanctions in addition to the military strategy of brute force.
Before examining these alternative strategies, I make three observations concerning the
challenger's foreign policy decision. First, as previously noted, there is the difficulty of
comparing the strategy adopted from those not chosen. This counterfactual exercise
requires calculating the expected costs and benefits for actions not taken. While ex post
evidence abounds on the excesses and shortfalls of the chosen strategy, no such
observations are available for alternative strategies foregone. Also, since conflict
outcomes are probabilistic, the fact that a chosen strategy failed (or succeeded) is
insufficient proof that the policy choice was the incorrect (or correct) one. As a result,
such analysis, laden with uncertainty, proves difficult to support and the plausibility of
the results is easily assailed.
Second, strategies may be employed as substitutes or complements. States often
approach conflicts with mixed strategies, combining both non-military and military
policies. States have long adopted sanctions during war. It is more difficult to evaluate a
strategy when its effect is only indirectly reflected in the outcome of a complementary
strategy. For instance, the value of an arms embargo may only be fully determined by
observing the target's reduced military effectiveness when directly engaged by the
challenger.
Third, foreign policy tools may have both short- and long-term objectives. In the
short run, the challenger's aim is to end the conflict with the best possible outcome, given
the foreign policy tools available to it. However, a long-term objective may be to reduce
future conflict through persuasion, by convincing the target to change its preferences to
those amenable to the challenger. While the focus in this research is on the contribution
alternative foreign policies make to the short-term aim of resolving an ongoing conflict, I
also recognize the role of foreign policy in removing the sources of long-term conflict.
Accommodation
Accommodation, or appeasement, is the challenger's option to unilaterally decide
not to contest the target over the issue at hand with the expectation that such action will
avoid further conflict.45 "Appeasement is a response to a strategic problem. One state
decides to make concessions to another as a way of dealing with the strategic situation
confronting it." 46
The conventional criticism of accommodation is that unilateral concessions prove
counterproductive, only increasing the adversary's power while eroding the challenger's
reputation for resolve. As a result, further conflict is made more, not less, likely. 47
However, in the case of asymmetric conflict, this argument loses some of its force. With
Munich, appeasement by Britain and France led to Nazi Germany's absorbing the
military capabilities of Czechoslovakia, which had an impact on the balance of power in
Europe. By contrast, in asymmetric conflicts accommodation by the Great Power does
not alter the already great imbalance of power and since the challenger typically already
has less resolve than the target, it is unclear whether accommodation necessarily leads to
further conflict.
45 Since appeasement is infamously associated with the September 1938 Munich Conference and Neville
Chamberlain's ill-fated effort to prevent war by conceding to Hitler the annexation of the Sudetenland I
adopt Alexander George's use of the term accommodation. George, Alexander and William Simons (1994)
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy WestView Press, Boulder, 7. On appeasement see Treisman, Daniel
(2004)"Rational Appeasement" International Organization 58:2 345 Watt, D.C. (1965) "Appeasement:
The Rise of A Revisionist School?" The Political Quarterly 36:2, 191-213, Beck, Robert (1989) "Munich's
Lessons Reconsidered" International Security 14:2 161-191
46 Powell, Robert (1996) "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement" American Political Science
Review 90:4, 750
4 Treisman, Daniel (2004)"Rational Appeasement" International Organization 58:2 345
More favorable arguments for accommodation point to conditions, under which
cooperation and norms of equity may prompt a state to believe its concessions will be
reciprocated. 4 8 Others point to situations such as periods of power transition, whereby a
challenger may have little recourse but to accommodate.49 Again, these arguments are
not particularly germane to cases of asymmetric conflict, in which power transition is
unlikely and the challenger already views the target as an adversary, rendering norms of
reciprocity less applicable.
The relatively low number of international crises as compared to the much larger
universe of potential crises suggests that accommodation is, in effect, the most common
foreign policy choice. Accommodation is the default strategy which a Great Power
passively adopts when it chooses to do nothing and thereby avoid a crisis. This appears
reasonable, particularly when non-vital interests are at stake and the cost of adopting a
non-military or military, coercive or brute force strategy outweighs the expected benefits
to the challenger.
Finally, while accommodation is usually considered a substitute for coercion, with
the possible exception of unconditional terms of surrender, most negotiated settlements
include some element of accommodation. The benefit of accommodation is that this
strategy, when successful, avoids the costs of coercion or brute force. Accommodation
does have certain drawbacks though, as the challenger foregoes the claims it has to the
issue at stake and by doing so may also suffer reputation and audience costs for revealing
its weak resolve.
48 Dimuccio, Ralph (1998) "The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms,
and Problems" Journal of Peace Research 35:2 45-259 Beck, Robert (1989) "Munich's Lessons
Reconsidered" International Security 14:2 161-191
49 See Rock, Stephen (2000) Appeasement in International Politics University of Kentucky Press,
Treisman, Daniel (2004)"Rational Appeasement" International Organization 58:2 345, and
Inducements
Inducements are side payments meant to convince the target to concede to the
issue at stake. In mixed strategies, inducements are the "carrots" of a "stick and carrot"
strategy employed to sweeten a deal. The challenger may make concessions in another
area or make promises concerning future actions. For example, in the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the United States secretly agreed to link the withdrawal of Jupiter Missiles from
Turkey with the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. In addition, the United States
publicly promised to make no further threats of invasion of Cuba, a policy still in effect. 0
Inducements differ from persuasion in that the target does not change its
preferences. Ceteris parabus, if inducements are discontinued, it is likely the target will
reverse its behavior. Inducements also have a similar problem to accommodation, in that
incentives provided by a challenger may be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
Economic Sanctions
States benefit from international trade and finance. An alternative foreign policy
tool to military coercion is the threat of the loss of these benefits through economic
sanctions. Sanctions can take three different forms all of which threaten a target state's
economy or security: trade, finance, or arms embargos. Trade sanctions restrict the flow
of goods and services. The target is punished by the decrease in the availability of goods
to purchase and in the demand for its own goods. Such sanctions work best when the
target relies heavily on the challenger for trade.5 The critique against such sanctions is
50 Allison, Graham T. (1971) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis New York Harper
142
5 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg (2007) Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics
that, used alone, they cannot produce significant concessions.52 Further, the effects of
trade sanctions are more often felt by the target population rather than the target regime.
Though economic sanctions do not directly use force, they can prove even more deadly
particularly to a target state's weak and poor. In some cases, trade sanctions can actually
serve to solidify a regime's domestic control on power, as was the case with U.S.
sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s.53
Financial sanctions work like trade sanctions by limiting a target's sources of
financial services. In addition, they can be used to freeze a target's financial assets held
in the challenger state or in other states that cooperate with the challenger. The
challenger retains control of those assets, promising to release them once the target agrees
to demands. For example, the U.S. froze $8 billion in Iranian assets, which it then
leveraged in negotiations to release U.S. hostages in the 1979 Iranian Hostage crisis.5 4 A
critique against financial sanctions is that, in today's electronically connected financial
world, it is much more difficult to identify and freeze a target's assets.
Finally, arms embargos are often overlooked as a form of economic sanction.
Embargos restricting the flow of weapons, ammunition, parts and supplies decrease the
target's military capabilities and are, therefore, most effective for denial strategies. Used
alone, an embargo is not likely to achieve foreign policy objectives, but it can effectively
complement a military strategy.
52 For critique of economic sanction effectiveness see Pape, Robert, (1997) "Why economic sanctions do
not work" International Security 22:1, 90-136, Elliot, Kimberly (1998) "The Sanctions Glass: Half full or
Completely Empty" International Security 22:4, 50-65. For effectiveness of the threat of economic
sanctions see Drezner, Daniel (2003)"Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion" International Organization
57:3, 643-659
5 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg (2007) Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics
1 Christopher, Warren, Oscar Schachter, John Hoffman, Harold Saunders, Richard David (1985) American
Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis New Haven, Yale University Press
In sum, economic sanctions are non-violent means for convincing a target to
change its behavior. As with any foreign policy option, sanctions have limitations and
drawbacks. Still, they are a tool commonly employed by Great Powers, either
independently or in conjunction with military force.
Brute Force Strategy
A challenger employs a brute force strategy when it seizes an objective by
overpowering its adversary, where its military engages the enemy in order to overcome
its defenses. 5 For the challenger this traditionally involves the costly and risky war
fighting tasks of invasion and occupation. Unlike coercion, with brute force no
concessions are required of the target, as it essentially has no choice in the matter.
Schelling contrasts brute force and coercive strategies in that military force must be
exercised in order for a brute force strategy to succeed, whereas coercion is most
successful when force is merely threatened.56
While it is easy to distinguish brute force from a punishment strategy, it is less
straightforward when compared to a denial strategy. A denial strategy threatens the use
of brute force and communicates this threat through the actual use of sufficient force to
convince the target that resistance is futile. Denial succeeds when the target concedes,
allowing the challenger to avoid the full costs of the brute force strategy.
When bargaining breaks down and neither coercion (by denial or punishment),
nor sanctions, nor inducement succeeds in gaining target concession, the only option
available to the challenger to achieve its objectives is that of brute force.
5 Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and Influence New Haven: Yale University Press 6
56 Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and Influence New Haven: Yale University Press 3
EXPLAINING COERCION FAILURE
As I will demonstrate in Chapter two, a rational challenger only chooses a
coercive strategy over other foreign policy options, if it determines the target is likely to
concede to its demands. This being the case, what explains cases of coercion in which
the target resists and coercion fails? 57 I examine this question in two parts. First, under
what conditions is a target likely to resist being coerced? And second, in recognizing
such conditions, why would a rational challenger go on to adopt a coercive strategy?
Why a Target Resists
In the real world, coercion does not always succeed, as weak target states do not
always concede, even when pitted against Great Powers. In Chapter 3, I present evidence
drawn from the interstate crises which took place between 1918 and 2003. Despite its
overwhelming military might, the powerful challenger succeeded in convincing the
weaker target to concede in only 56% of the cases. What explains this apparent
discrepancy between theory and practice? Below I offer five explanations for why a
target resists.
I: Misperception and Miscalculation based on Psychological, Cognitive, Group Bias,
Non-unitary Actor, and Bounded Rationality Explanationsfor Target Resistance
An important body of international relations scholarship over the past four
decades has examined how humans and groups are limited in their desire or ability to
5 Rationality here means actors have stable preferences over outcomes and that the challenger and target
when given the same information will make identical calculations of probabilities, costs, and benefits. If
coercion fails then the challenger suffers the costs of coercion and then must adopt another strategy, which
is more costly than having chosen the alternate strategy to begin with.
behave rationally. 58 Psychological and cognitive biases often lead decision makers to
misperceive and miscalculate capability and resolve, demands and threats, probabilities
of victory, and the costs of fighting, any or all of which can cause coercion to fail. In
addition, rational decision making can be limited, particularly during crises, causing the
challenger and target to draw different conclusions from the same information. Finally,
organizational and group dynamics further explain why states do not always behave as
unitary rational actors.
Such non-rational explanations for why states, regimes, and leaders do not behave
rationally provide ex post explanations for coercion failure in specific cases. For
instance, in 1991 Saddam Hussein, and to a lesser extent the U.S., misperceived the
enormous disparity in Iraqi and U.S. military power, which led the Iraqi leader to grossly
miscalculate the probable outcome of the Gulf War.
The problem with attempting to systematically assess these non-rational
explanations is that such behavior can, in some degree, be found in all conflicts.
Unfortunately, these explanations do not provide ex ante predictors for which crises are
likely to end in coercion success or in failure. Therefore, while I acknowledge that non-
rational behavior is common in decision making, I do not develop a theory of asymmetric
coercion based upon it, nor do I draw testable hypotheses from it. Instead, in Chapters 4
through 6, I analyze crises for evidence of non-rational behavior and evaluate the degree
to which it impacted the outcome. I find that, while non-rational factors are quite useful
58 For psychological bias and misperceptions see Robert Jervis (1968) "Hypotheses on Misperception,"
World Politics. 20:3 454-479. For bounded rationality and satisficing behavior see James March (1994) A
Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen, New York: Free Press. On cognitive dissonance see
Deborah Larson (1985) The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation Princeton 24-65, For
organizational and bureaucratic models see Graham Allison (1969) "Conceptual Models of the Cuban
Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review 63:3 689-718.
for explaining the initiation and the length of a crisis, they are less helpful in explaining
crisis termination.
II: Rationalist Explanations for Target Resistance: Uncertainty and Private
Information
Uncertainty and private information concerning the interests, military capabilities
and resolve of both the challenger and the target provide a second explanation for why a
target may resist. If a challenger and a target are privy to different information, even if
both are rational, they may reach differing assessments of the other's interests,
capabilities, and resolve. If these estimates differ to the extent that the challenger's range
of demands it is willing to offer does not overlap with the demands which the target is
willing to concede then coercion will fail.
A rational challenger and target should reveal to each other the information they
possess so that both actors can make identical assessments and thus avoid a negotiation
breakdown. However, there are incentives for the challenger and the target to
misrepresent and withhold information and thereby accept the risk of coercion failure in
order to increase its expected outcome. 59
It is not difficult to develop a hypothesis for uncertainty as an increase in
uncertainty increases the likelihood of coercion failure. However, it proves far more
troublesome to test. In actual coercion cases, there is little observable data with which to
make comparisons as to the level of information possessed by each actor, particularly as
it affects the target's decision making process. As a result, attempts at evaluating the
59 Fearon, James D. (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 381
degree of asymmetric information in a crisis tends to devolve into a tautological
argument, i.e. asymmetric information is deemed significant because coercion failed.60
III: Rationalist Explanations for Target Resistance: Issue Indivisibility
Issue indivisibility recognizes that there are certain issues over which a target state
is unwilling to negotiate, preferring resistance to any peaceful settlement.61 James Fearon
acknowledges issue indivisibility as a theoretically viable rationalist explanation for
bargaining failure, but dismisses it as inconsequential for modern international politics.
He argues, though does not provide evidence, that "...issues over which states bargain
typically are complex and multidimensional; side-payments or linkages with other issues
typically are possible... War-prone international issues may often be effectively
indivisible, but the cause of this indivisibility lies in domestic political and other
mechanisms rather than in the nature of the issues themselves." 62 Robert Powell takes it
even further to claim that issue indivisibility is, in fact, no more than a commitment
problem. 63
Those who argue for issue indivisibility as a rational explanation for war point to
specific religious sites or attributes of a particular territory as integral to a nation's
60 1 attempted to test this hypothesis on uncertainty in an early draft of the Iraq case study, but eventually
abandoned this effort due to a lack of sufficient observable data for all the cases.
61 On issue indivisibility see Toft, Monica (2006) "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist
Explanations for War" Security Studies 15:1, 34-69, Hassner, Ron E. (2003) "To Halve and to Hold:
Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility" Security Studies 12:4, 1-33, Kirshner,
Jonathon, (2000) "Rationalist Explanations for War?" Security Studies 10:1, 144
62 Fearon, James D. (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 382 Robert
Powell carries this argument further by asserting that, even if an issue is indivisible, this does not explain
bargaining failure. "Even if a disputed issue is physically indivisible, one should not think of bargaining
indivisibilities as a conceptually distinct solution to the inefficiency puzzle. There are still outcomes (or
more accurately mechanisms) that give both states higher expected payoffs than they would obtain by
fighting over the issue. The real impediment to agreement is the inability to commit. Powell, Robert (2006)
"War as a Commitment Problem" International Organization 60:Winter 178
63 Powell, Robert (2006) "War as a Commitment Problem" International Organization 60:1, 169-203
identify, an issue which cannot be viewed as divisible.64 But, regardless of whether issue
indivisibility is more logically considered a separate explanation for coercion failure or
viewed as a commitment problem, the number of crises, in which issue indivisibility is
evident, is relatively small. In the case studies I examine, only in the case of Kosovo, the
historic birthplace of Serbia, which Slobodan Milosevic proclaimed he would never
surrender, does issue of indivisibility appear relevant. And even then Milosevic
eventually conceded the territory. As a result, I do not develop or test a hypothesis for
issue indivisibility.
IV: Rationalist Explanations for Target Resistance: Credible Commitment Problems
A popular rationalist explanation for a target's resistance arises when a challenger
cannot make credible a promise to refrain from making future demands. This is the case
when the target believes an agreement will only lead to additional demands from the
challenger. In an anarchic world without a hierarchical power to enforce agreements,
even if the challenger and the target prefer a negotiated outcome to war, the target knows
there is no one to force the challenger to abide by the terms agreed upon. And if the
expected outcome of the agreement shifts the balance of power in the challenger's favor,
this only provides an incentive for it to make still further demands. The situation thus
creates a commitment problem for the challenger in that it would be better off, ex ante, to
accept a negotiated settlement which avoids the costs of war, but it cannot credibly
promise not to make future demands ex post. 65
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For asymmetric conflicts in which the balance of power is already tilted heavily in
the challenger favor, a target's concessions may not cause a noticeable shift in power.
They may, however, reduce the challenger's uncertainty over the level of the target's
resolve. Information revealing a weakly resolved target may have the same affect as a
shift in the balance of power, causing the challenger to reassess whether to make
additional demands.66 The inability of the challenger to rule out further demands
increases the target's reputation costs for making concessions in the crisis at hand. If
these reputation costs are sufficiently great, they can preclude a negotiated settlement.
This last insight produces a testable hypothesis for commitment problems. An
increase in a challenger's commitment problems increases the likelihood of coercion
failure. This is likely to be the case when a challenger has the means to back up
additional demands with credible threats. But this, by definition, is always the case in
asymmetric conflicts, where Great Powers have the balance of power heavily in their
favor. This asymmetry causes weak states to resist Great Powers, a reaction which has
been dubbed Goliath's Curse. 67
One shortcoming of a commitment hypothesis based on the logic of Goliath's
curse is that it expects all coercive strategies by Great Powers in asymmetric conflicts to
fail. And yet, as I demonstrate in Chapter 3, coercion has been successful in 56% of
asymmetric crises since World War I. The commitment hypothesis, therefore, correctly
predicts only 44% of crises outcomes. A possible remedy is to develop a proxy variable
for commitment which provides variation in its prediction of coercion outcomes. Such a
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proxy can be developed from an insight provided by Sir Julian Corbett, who observed
"that limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the
amount of that strength which they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive
point."68 For asymmetric conflicts, what counts is the military force a Great Power can
deploy against the target state. I therefore evaluate the commitment problem in
individual cases by assessing whether the deployed military forces of the challenger are
sufficient to credibly back up further demands.
V: Rationalist Explanations for Target Resistance: Survival
A final rational explanation for coercion failure is that of target survival. A target
state will likely refuse demands which threaten its survival so long as it has the means to
resist. In Chapter 2, 1 will show why it is rational for a target to resist a challenger, even
when the probability of victory for the target is quite low, so long as the expected
outcome for resisting is greater than that of conceding to its certain demise. This
situation is particularly germane to asymmetric conflicts in which the challenger's high
probability of victory makes it more likely to make demands which threaten a target's
survival.
The target survival hypothesis suggests demands which threaten a target's
survival increase the likelihood of target resistance and coercion failure. As with the
other explanations for coercion failure, it is difficult to identify testable criteria and avoid
tautological argumentation. I will focus on four characteristics of a state's sovereignty:
68 The war is limited for the Great Power, though not necessarily for its target. Corbett, Julian (1988),
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control over its own government, control of its population, control over its homeland
territory, and the viability of its economy.69
In practice, it is difficult to make a counterfactual assessment as to whether
conceding to a set of demands would, in fact, lead to the demise of a target state. Instead,
I examine whether the challenger's core demands threaten the target state's regime,
population, homeland territory, or economy. If concession to demands seriously
threatens any of these four central elements, I assess target survival to be at risk. The
drawback to this approach is that it may misidentify a state's survival as threatened when,
in fact, it is not. For instance, Serbia considered Kosovo as part of its homeland territory,
yet conceding control over it did not result in Serbia's death. Despite such potential false
positives, this method of coding survival still proves effective in making predictions of
coercion outcomes.
Relaxing the Unitary Actor Assumption for the Target State
In practice, there are relatively few asymmetric crises where state survival is at
risk for a target conceding to coercive demands. More numerous are examples of a
regime or its leadership being threatened internally. While a domestic cause for target
resistance is not strictly a rationalist, unitary actor explanation for coercion failure it does
often occur. And, more importantly, as I will demonstrate in Chapters 4 through 6 it is
impossible to explain the decision making of Iraq, Serbia, or Libya without taking into
account the domestic threats on Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Mu'ammar Al-
Qadhafi, and of their regimes. I therefore relax the unitary actor assumption on the target
69 For a useful discussion on state death see Fazal, Tanisha M. (2004) "State Death in the International
System" International Organization 58 (Spring) 31 1-344
state in order to assess the impact of the threat to survival of the target state's ruling
regime and its leader.
Regime Survival
A regime's survival may be threatened domestically in two ways. First, a weak
regime may be threatened by civil war, in which opposition groups attempt to overthrow
the government. A regime may therefore resist a challenger's demands since conceding
would reveal the regime as weak to domestic opposition groups waiting for an
opportunity to seize power. This is the logic of omni-balancing, where the internal
structure of weak states is more appropriately described as anarchical rather than
hierarchical. 70 A rather obvious observation is that a regime's survival can only be
threatened by revolt if a domestic opposition group actually exists. For example, no such
organizations were present in Libya to threaten Qadhafi's regime prior to the rise of
radicalized Islamic groups in the mid-1990s.
Second, for a regime whose basis for power is determined by voters, the regime
may also be threatened at home by elections. Acknowledging a policy failure can prompt
the population to punish the ruling party at the ballot box. This dynamic is the principal-
agent problem of audience costs, which I describe in greater detail under regime
leadership survival. Though Serbia was not a democracy, Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist
Party of Serbia (SPS) was elected to power and was therefore vulnerable to being voted
out of office, as was demonstrated in its loss of power in the national elections of 2000.
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Regime Leadership Survival
Finally, though the survival of a given regime may well be assured at the
domestic level, the survival of its leader may not be. Indeed, in terms of coercion failure,
a leader may resist a challenger state's demands if he expects his position to then be
threatened from those within his own regime. This vulnerability to his power is the basis
for audience costs.71 The logic of audience costs is derived from a principal-agent model,
where the leader is the agent charged with carrying out the policy preferences for the
principals which make up the regime. Principals can either reward or punish the leader
by keeping him in or removing him from office. Principals have limited information to
judge the leader's performance and must extract how well the leader adheres to their
preferences on the basis of whether his policies succeed or fail. If policies fail, the
principals punish the leader by removing him from power. Audience cost is the leader's
expectation as to whether he will be removed from power by the principal for making a
concession.
The level of audience costs varies with the number of principals within the regime
and how powerful they are, relative to the leader. Democracies are likely to generate
high audience costs because of the relative ease of replacing a leader at the polling booth
and the greater transparency of democracies, allowing the principals to recognize when a
leader's foreign policy has failed. By contrast, while autocratic states do not have as
many principals as democracies, the potentially dire consequences for a dictator who
loses power makes his audience costs significant indeed. For authoritarian states,
Barbara Geddes has developed a categorization of three types: military regimes, single-
7' For more on audience costs see Fearon, James (1994) "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation
of International Disputes" American Political Science Review 88: (September) 577-92 and
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party regimes, and personalist regimes.72 Military and single-party regimes typically
have more principals involved and are therefore theorized as likely to have higher
audience costs than do personalist regimes. 73
The survival hypothesis therefore predicts coercion likely to fail if either the
target state, or regime, or regime leader's survival is at stake, so long as the target has the
means to resist. This last conditional statement of the target's ability to resist
acknowledges that there are cases between Great Powers and weak states in which the
weak state does not have the military capacity to put forward any resistance. For
example, in 1939 Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania had no means to resist the Soviet
Union's demands for homeland territory and ultimately regime change and so conceded
without a fight. Finland, on the other hand, did have the means to resist and did so, even
though the Soviet's limited territorial demands for basing rights were less onerous than
those placed on the other three states. Without the ability to mount a resistance, Latvia,
Estonia, and Lithuania preferred instead to concede to the inevitable and thereby avoid
the costs of war.
How Target Survival differs from Issue Indivisibility and Commitment Problems
A criticism of the survival explanation for coercion failure is that it can simply be
considered a sub-category of issue indivisibility. There is some validity to arguing
survival as an indivisible issue, as the premise of the survival hypothesis holds that states
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are not likely to make a concession that threatens their survival. 4 If a state will not
concede part of its survival, then the issue is indivisible. There are, however, two
problems with describing survival in issue indivisibility terms. First, indivisibility, by
definition, precludes the possibility of any concession being made. I discussed
previously, a state's existence depends on four conditions: control over its population, its
homeland territory, and its government, and the ability to maintain a viable economy.
Yet any or all of these four issues may, in fact, be conceded to a limited degree and still
not result in a state's demise. For example, Serbia survives today, even after conceding
all of Kosovo, a large part of its historic homeland. While survival may be viewed as
indivisible in theory, in practice each of the four elements may, in fact, be divisible at the
margins.
Second, over the past decade international relations scholars have come to view
issue indivisibility as synonymous with specific religious or nationalist territorial issues,
the most often cited example being the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount in
Jerusalem.75 Given the way issue indivisibility is now more narrowly characterized, it is
inappropriate and confusing to relegate such an important issue as state survival to a
subset of issue indivisibility.
A second criticism of the survival explanation asserts that it, at its essence,
describes the same causal logic for coercion failure as that used by the commitment
problem. Again, there is some validity to this argument. Asymmetric conflicts, by
definition, involve a powerful challenger with the capability of threatening the survival of
the weak target state. Therefore, a target state may resist a challenger's demands because
74 In an earlier draft of this chapter I included survival as an indivisibility issue.
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it believes a concession will likely lead to greater demands that will, in turn, threaten its
survival. The target resists now because it believes its survival will be threatened in the
future.
A weakness of this criticism is its failure to explain why the survival and
commitment hypothesis then make disparate predictions of the target's likely decision as
to resist or to concede to a demand which does not, in and of itself, threaten target
survival. While the commitment hypothesis expects the target to resist, the survival
hypothesis predicts the opposite, i.e. the target will likely concede to the original
demands since they do not threaten its survival, assuming the challenger has properly
matched threats to back up demands. If the survival and commitment hypotheses were
based on a similar logic, they would produce the same prediction as to a target's decision
making.
A second problem with this criticism is its inability to explain cases in which
challengers make high level demands that threaten target survival. The survival
hypothesis expects the target to resist as a concession would likely lead to its demise.
The logic of the commitment problem, however, breaks down in such a situation, as a
target conceding to its own death would not likely be concerned about additional
demands when it has no expectation of being around in the future. For such high level
demands, the survival and commitment hypotheses again make disparate predictions of
the target's response.
The key difference between the survival and commitment hypothesis is that the
survival hypothesis incorporates the equilibrium conditions of the asymmetric coercion
model I develop in Chapter 2. A rational challenger chooses to restrict its demands, even
when it has additional military force capable of backing up higher demands, when the
expected outcome of limited demands and threats exceed that of higher demands backed
by greater, and therefore more costly, force. By contrast, the commitment hypothesis
does not allow for such an interior solution to the challenger's optimization problem. It
instead assumes that the target will always expect the challenger to increase its outcome
76by raising its demands.
Why a challenger may choose coercion even when the likelihood of success is low
The previous section examined rational and non-rational explanations for why a
target might resist a challenger's coercive demand. What has not been addressed is why
a rational challenger would choose coercion if it assesses the target as likely to reject its
demands. If a target is likely to resist, then the challenger would be better off avoiding
the costs of coercion and adopting an alternative strategy. The previous explanations of
misperception and miscalculation, and uncertainty and private information apply equally
to the challenger as to the target. In addition, there are also two explanations based on
low costs for coercion and international norms of coercion which help us to understand
why a Great Power might choose a coercive strategy likely to fail.
Low Costs of Coercion
A challenger may adopt a coercive strategy even if it is not likely to succeed if the
costs of such a strategy are sufficiently low.77 This may be the best course of action
when the challenger actually prefers a brute force strategy but has not yet deployed
sufficient troops to take its objective by force. In such a situation it costs the challenger
76 The commitment problem assumes the challenger's expected outcome to be a monotonously increasing
function of demand and threat.
77 This assumes there is at least some uncertainty over the likelihood the target will concede.
little to threaten a denial strategy while preparing to invade anyway. Indeed, the very fact
that the challenger is both willing and preparing to invade makes the denial threat all the
more credible. If the target concedes, then the challenger avoids the costs of invasion. If
the target resists, the costs paid by the challenger have still been relatively low.
This occurred in the lead-up to the Gulf War in 1990 when President George Bush
made the decision in October to deploy hundreds of thousands of troops to build up the
U.S.-led coalition force for an invasion of Kuwait. The U.S. adopted a coercive strategy
with the demand that Iraqi unconditionally withdraw its army from Kuwait. Bush did
this even though he still did not think it likely that Saddam Hussein would concede.
High Costs ofAbrogating International Norms
A Great Power operates within the international system. As such, it is concerned
not only with the outcome of its conflicts with weak targets, but also with how other
states, especially other Great Powers, will likely react to its actions. If a Great Power
challenger threatens the interests of other states not involved in the conflict or violates
international norms of behavior, it can generate negative externalities. For the post
World War I era, international norms require that states work their conflicts through
international institutions. During the interwar period this was done through the League of
Nations and after World War II through the United Nations.
In its conflicts with Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, the U.S. justified its actions, with the
exception of the 1986 El Dorado Canyon airstrikes, through UN Security Council
resolutions. These resolutions were, in effect, coercive demands. There is now an
international norm for a Great Power to make its objectives known and then give the
target an opportunity to concede. It can be costly for a Great Power to ignore this norm.
For instance, the U.S. experienced a diplomatic backlash for its unilateral use of force
against Libya in 1986.
A Great Power thus has an incentive to avoid the costs of abrogating international
norms by working through institutions and adopting coercive strategies, even if such
strategies are not likely to succeed or the Great Power does not want them to succeed.
President George Bush went to the UN Security Council in November of 1990 to obtain
authorization to use all means necessary to remove Iraq from Kuwait. To obtain his
casus belli he agreed to a resolution which would have provided Saddam Hussein the
opportunity to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. After the costly U.S. preparations for
the brute force invasion which President Bush preferred, the idea of an eleventh hour
withdrawal, which kept Iraq's military power in tact, was for Bush the worst case
scenario.
In sum, a challenger may choose a coercive strategy that it believes is unlikely to
succeed if the costs of such a strategy are low or if the cost of flouting international
norms is high.
Organization of Research
The organization for the remainder of this research proceeds as follows. In
Chapter 2, I develop a model for asymmetric coercion. I then generate equilibrium
conditions to demonstrate that a powerful challenger only chooses coercion when this
strategy has a higher expected outcome than any other available policy option and when
the target is willing to concede to demands. According to this finding, coercion should
succeed at gaining the challenger's foreign policy objectives. In the real world, however,
coercion often fails, and in the remainder of Chapter 2, 1 examine within the framework
of the asymmetric coercion model the five rational and non-rational explanations for
target resistance which I introduced earlier in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, I examine real world cases of asymmetric conflict. I develop a
database of those asymmetric cases since World War I which pitted Great Power
challengers against weaker target states. I then produce descriptive statistics to assess the
frequency of asymmetric conflicts, how often Great Powers choose coercion over other
available policy options, and how often these strategies succeed. I compare the United
States against other Great Powers and also provide a comparison across time. I then
compare my findings with the results of previous researchers. In the second half of
Chapter 3, I operationalize key explanatory and control variables in order to conduct
regression analysis which tests the survival and commitment hypotheses.
In Chapters 4 through 6, I investigate three asymmetric conflicts between the
United States and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, respectively. In Chapter 4, I examine the
conflict between the United States and Iraq from August of 1990 to March of 2003. I
consider three crises during this period, the first being the crisis following Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait leading up to the Gulf War, the second crisis being the Iraqi Republic Guard's
deployment and then redeployment along the Kuwaiti border in October of 1994, and the
third crisis being the U.S. demand that Iraq abandon its WMD in the lead-up to the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in March of 2003.
In Chapter 5, I examine two crises between the United States and Serbia between
1992 until 1999. The first arose over the Bosnian Civil War from 1992 to 1995 and the
second over Serbian actions in Kosovo from 1998 to 1999.
In Chapter 6, I consider three crises between the United States and Libya from
1981 until 2003. The first crisis was triggered by Libya's support of international
terrorism and concluded in a stalemate. The second crisis was over Libya's involvement
in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 which crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland in
December of 1988 and ended with the extradition of two Libyan suspects to stand trial in
the Netherlands in April of 1999. The final crisis followed the September 11, 2001
bombing of the World Trade Center and Pentagon and arose from U.S. concern over
Libya's Weapons of Mass Destruction. This crisis concluded in December of 2003 when
Libya's leader, Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi announced that Libya would abandon its
WMD altogether.
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary in which I compile the quantitative and
qualitative findings in order to make an overall assessment and make policy
recommendations, along with recommendations for further research.
Chapter 2: Theory of Asymmetric Coercion and
Explanations for Coercion Failure
Great Powers routinely target weak states by adopting a variety of strategies to
achieve their foreign policy objectives, which may range from relatively minor policy
changes on the part of the weak state to higher demands for homeland territory or regime
change. In asymmetric crises, Great Powers most often choose a strategy of coercion,
threatening or using limited force to convince target states to comply with their
demands. 78 Coercion is an attractive strategy to the alternative of brute force war as it
holds the promise of foreign policy gains while avoiding the high costs of invasion and
occupation.
Yet for a coercive strategy to succeed, the targeted state must concede to
demands. While the weak state has an incentive to acquiesce in order to avoid punishing
sanctions, air strikes or invasion, the issues at stake are usually of a higher value to it than
to the Great Power and, therefore, more costly to concede. The demands made, in fact
may be so great as to threaten the very survival of the target state. The act of conceding
alone can appear weak and prove costly to a target regime under the scrutiny of armed
domestic groups plotting revolution. Or the regime's leader may also be humiliated by
making a concession and subsequently removed from power by members of his own
party. 79 As a consequence, states, regimes and their leaders deeply resent being coerced
and prefer to resist whenever feasible, whether over relatively minor policy changes or
much larger demands for territory or regime change.
78 See Chapter 3
79 James Fearon (1994) "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September) 581
Despite this resistance, the question remains as to why Great Powers, such as the
United States, with their tremendous military advantage, routinely fail to coerce weak
states into conceding to their demands. A powerful challenger should understand the
tension between a target's fear of overwhelming military might and a target's desire to
resist any coercive demand. Further, if it is a rational actor, a Great Power should only
engage in those coercive strategies likely to succeed, making only those threats which it
is willing to back up with credible force and issuing only those demands to which the
target will likely concede. In so doing, it avoids both policy failure and the high costs of
taking objectives by brute force. The record for Great Power outcomes in asymmetric
conflicts is mixed. While it has employed coercive strategies in 75% of asymmetric
crises since World War I, coercion has succeeded in only 56% of these cases.80 Why
have conflicts with weak states so often concluded with foreign policy failure or
invasion?
In the Chapter 1, I presented five explanations for why a target might resist a
powerful challenger's demands. These included non-rational explanations for
misperception and miscalculation, along with four rationalist explanations of uncertainty
and private information, issue indivisibility, credible commitment problems, and target
survival. I also introduced two additional reasons for a rational challenger to issue a
coercive demand even though the target is likely to resist: when the costs of coercion are
low and when there are external costs for adopting brute force strategies.
In this chapter, I develop a theory for asymmetric coercion in interstate conflict
to explain the strategic interaction between a powerful challenger state and its weak
80 See Chapter 3 for summary statistics of data drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Project
database from 1918 -2003.
target state. Specifically, I focus on compellence, a coercive demand for a target to make
an observable change in its behavior. With its survival unthreatened, the powerful
challenger maintains the latitude to vary both the coercive demands and the threats it
issues. The challenger optimizes its outcome by maximizing demands with minimal
threats, contingent on the target's willingness to concede. Such a strategy, while
achieving more modest objectives than those gained by brute force, does avoid costly
invasion and occupation.
I develop this theory of asymmetric coercion in three stages. In the introductory
chapter, I laid the foundation by defining key terms, identifying the explanatory variables
of compellent demands and threats, and organizing these concepts into a typology of
coercion. This provides a method for classifying the universe of coercion cases into a
coherent framework for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I also defined the
dependent variable offoreign policy outcome. I examined limits on the use of force
which could be still considered coercive as well as alternative foreign policy options of
accommodation, inducement, sanctions, and brute force. Finally, I examined
explanations for coercion failure and developed two testable hypotheses based on target
survival and the credible commitment problem of the challenger.
In this chapter, I begin by constructing a dynamic model of asymmetric coercion,
in which the challenger decides among strategies of accommodation, coercion, and brute
force. 81 The model demonstrates that a range of demands exists, in which both the
challenger and the target prefer coercion over brute force. 82 The challenger employs
costly signaling to communicate the credibility of its threats and to overcome the target's
81 I omit inducements and sanctions in order to keep focus on the dynamics of coercion.
82 The target always prefers accommodation to either coercion or brute force.
uncertainty over the challenger's resolve. In its iterative form, the model captures
strategic interaction and learning which leads the challenger to manipulate its demands
and threats until a settlement is reached.
In the latter half of this chapter, I reconsider the question of why coercion often
fails by examining the non-rational and rationalist explanations of coercion failure
through the lens of the asymmetric coercion model.
MODEL OF ASYMMETRIC COERCION
I now turn to the strategic interaction between challenger and target and develop a
dynamic model to explain how an optimizing challenger chooses and modifies its
demands and threats in cases of asymmetric coercion. This model incorporates the
insight that the challenger in asymmetric conflicts, whose survival is not threatened, has
the latitude to vary not only the demands that it makes, but also the level of military force
it employs to back up the threats that it makes.83 The challenger improves its expected
outcome by balancing demands and threats, considering the impact of threat level when
choosing demands and vice versa. Previous research in coercion and related sub-fields
assumes either the level of demands or threats to be fixed and examines the effect on
outcome by varying the remaining variable. 84
83 The varying of demands and threats is made between each stage of the iterative model. For a single stage
the demands and threats are set with the initial offer
84 Robert Pape (1996) Bombing to Win holds demands fixed in his coercion model by only evaluating those
cases where important/territorial issues are at stake. James Fearon (1995) in "Rationalist Explanations for
War" 10 holds constant for the threat level only considering the threat of war and probability of victory
being fixed. Another example of holding threat fixed is Suzanne Werner's "Deterring Intervention: The
Stakes of War and Third-Party Involvement" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4
(October, 2000) pp. 720-732. A final game theoretic example of holding demands fixed while varying
military force is Branislav L. Slantchev's "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises" American Political
Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 4 (November, 2005) pp. 533-547. I have not found to date any examples
where both demands and threats are allowed to vary.
In addition to providing a game theoretic model for coercion, this model also
provides a framework for policy makers and academics to better understand the crucial
link between the demands and the threats which are made and the impact their interaction
has on crises outcomes. Understanding this connection is critical for strategy
development and selection, as well as for employment and evaluation.
Assumptions
Developing any theory in international politics requires simplifying assumptions
as to the nature of the international environment and the actors who dwell therein. 85 1
begin with neorealist assumptions of an anarchic, self-help, international system with
states as the primary actors. I assume states to be unitary actors, though I later relax
this assumption for the target state and examine its regime and leadership.87 This allows
me to incorporate domestic power considerations which are particularly relevant in the
decision making of weak states. 88 I further assume that states (and later regimes) act
rationally. Given their constraints, they make decisions they believe will result in
"optimal" outcomes. 89 Optimal indicates the most desirable or satisfactory outcome,
based on the expected costs and benefits of a decision as compared to feasible
alternatives. 90
85 Kenneth Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics Boston: McGraw-Hill 7-10
86 Kenneth Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics Boston: McGraw-Hill
87 1 do not relax the unitary actor assumption for the challenger in order to keep the model tractable and
parsimonious. The qualitative chapters include cases where this unitary actor assumption breaks down in
regards to the United States. For an excellent example see the section in Chapter 5 on U.S. decision
making during the Kosovo crisis.
88 David, Steven R. (1991) "Explaining Third World Alignment" World Politics 43:2 233-256
89 In adopting a rational actor framework, I do not suggest that psychological, cognitive, or
group/organizational biases are unimportant. I address these factors when analyzing the reasons why states
do not act rationally as the cause for coercion failure.
90 Merriam Webster Dictionary 1 Ith Edition Springfield, MA 2004
I develop the asymmetric coercion model in four steps. First, I consider strategic
interaction in a simple, single stage model, introducing the concepts of reputation costs,
probability of coercion success once coercive diplomacy fails, signaling costs, the
target's costs of resistance, the challenger's costs of carrying out threats, probability of
bruteforce victory and the costs of bruteforce. Second, I calculate the equilibrium
condition, demonstrating that the challenger's optimal outcome is achieved when
demands and threats are limited. Third, I extend the logic to an iterative game, noting
that, for cases in which a compellent offer does not succeed in achieving objectives, the
challenger can learn and adjust its offer in subsequent stages. Conflict continues until
either the challenger accommodates, the target concedes, or the challenger gives up on
coercion and achieves its objectives by brute force. Finally, I calculate the coercion
range, within which both the challenger and target both prefer the coercive outcome to
the brute force outcome.
The Single Stage Model
Consider the following conflict between two states. 91 One state, the challenger,
has the military power projection capability to threaten the survival of a weak target state.
A dispute arises over an issue, which the target controls. The range of issues could vary
from relative minor matters, such as a target's policy towards an ethnic group within its
state, to larger issues, such as the control of territory or the nature of the regime in power.
To aid in conceptualization, consider a dispute over territory as depicted in Figure 2.1,
where the distance between 0 and I represents the territory the target initially controls.
91 See appendix for a formal presentation of the coercion model.
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Figure 2.1: Linear Representation of Conflict Issue.
Both states gain by controlling as much of the territory as possible. The
challenger has three foreign policy options available to it: accommodation, coercion, or a
brute force strategy of invasion (see Figure 2.2). 92 In the following sections, I explain
Figure 2.2, the coercion model in extended form, and examine the outcomes of these
three options. I then consider the conditions under which both the challenger and the
target prefer concessions to brute force.
92 In reality, the challenger has the additional option of inducements, economic sanctions or a mixed
strategy. For clarity I restrict the options to accommodation, coercion, or brute force.
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Figure 2.2: Asymmetric Coercion Model in Extended Form9 3
Accommodation and Reputation Costs
The challenger's first option is to accommodate the target. If the challenger
chooses this, it then receives nothing and the target gains all the benefits from whatever is
at issue (territory) with an outcome of [-rc, 1], respectively, where rc are the reputation
costs incurred by the challenger. The challenger's lack of resolve over the issue having
93 The following concepts are developed in greater detail in the remainder of the chapter, but are provided
here as reference. Probability of brute force victory is the likelihood that the challenger is able to take the
objective at stake by force. The cost of brute force is the expected costs endured by challenger or target in
the brute force operation. Challenger reputation costs are the expected costs in future conflicts as a result
of choosing accommodation. Target reputation costs are the expected costs in future conflicts for
conceding. Signaling costs are the challenger's costs for providing information to the target over the
credibility of its threat. The value of the issue at hand is normalized such that the most that can be
demanded is I and the least is 0. Demand is the percentage of the issue at stake which the challenger has
signaled to the target that if it concedes will end the crisis. Probability of coercion success is the likelihood
that the challenger's coercive strategy will succeed after the target has rejected the offer. The costs of
making good on threats is the expected loss to the challenger for following through on its coercive threats.
Costs of resisting are the target's costs for continued resistance to the challenger's demands. Asterisk on
Demand* and Threat* indicate these are optimized such that they provide a maximized outcome for the
challenger.
Challenger = [probability of brute force victory
Outcome - cost of brute force]
Target = [1 - probability of brute force victory
outcome - cost of brute force]
Challenger = [(probability of coercion success x
Outcome demands) - costs of making
good on threats - signaling costs]
Target = [(1 - probability of coercion success x
Outcome demands) - costs of resisting)
Challenger = [- reputation costs]
Outcome
Target = 1
Outcome
Challenger = [ demands
Outcome 
- signaling costs]
Target = [1 - demands
Outcome - reputation costs ]
been revealed, the reputation costs are any additional losses now expected as a result of
making this information public. 94
Coercion and Signaling Costs
The challenger's second option is to coerce the target, in which case the
challenger extends an offer consisting of a demand and a threat communicated by means
of a costly signal.95 Signaling costs are those costs a challenger bears for making
exemplary or limited uses of force to demonstrate the credibility of its threats. These are
sunk costs, since the challenger incurs them regardless of whether the target concedes or
not. For exemplary military actions, the operational expenses for deployments/exercises
are relatively low. For limited uses of force, signaling costs are much greater. Once the
challenger exercises force, there are not only larger operational costs, but also potential
combat losses, the inherent risk of conflict escalation, and the potential loss of prestige.
Signals are intentionally costly in order to communicate the challenger's resolve.
The challenger has the incentive to bluff by making threats it does not intend to keep in
order to gain larger concessions. The target, aware of this incentive, discounts such
cheap talk.96 Costly signaling overcomes this skepticism by demonstrating to the target
9 4Morrow, James (1999) "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment and Negotation" in
Strategic Choice and International Relations Princeton 78-1 14
9 Because of its power advantage I assume it is the challenger which initiates the crisis by making a
coercive offer. In order to keep the model parsimonious, I do not allow the target to make a counter offer,
but instead assume that in subsequent stages the challenger can incorporate information from a target into
future offers. An example of this is Libya's counter offer to the U.S. that the trial of the two Libyans
suspected of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing be held in the Netherlands instead of the U.S. or Great
Britain. The U.S. delayed for 6 years before issuing a second offer for just such a trial in the Netherlands.
96 Fearon, James D. (1992) "Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crises"
PH.D. dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 122
the challenger's willingness to incur costs that a less resolved challenger would not be
willing to endure.97
If the challenger wishes to raise the threat level, it must likewise communicate the
credibility of this increase by incurring additional costs. Signaling costs increase
significantly as the challenger crosses the threshold of violence by moving from
exemplary actions to limited strikes. Signaling costs again rise dramatically when
moving from limited strikes to major ground operations (see Figure 2.3). While minimal
threats may be made credible with relatively inexpensive diplomatic or symbolic military
signaling, greater threats may require limited force, a move which entails larger
operational costs and an increased risk of further escalation. Signaling costs are greatest
for major combat operations, for which the loss of troops is expected to be significant and
the power and prestige of the challenger are at stake.98
97 James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68-90. Note that if the challenger's overall costs
for military operations decreases, then the level of force required to effectively signal resolve increases.
For example, the United States development of modem airpower with precision bombing from medium
altitude which limits the threat to U.S. aircrew may actually decrease the effectiveness of signaling since
such limited strikes are less costly for the U.S.. I credit Barry Posen for this insight.
98 This assumption that the rate of signaling costs increase when crossing the threshold of violence and the
threshold of invasion is central to the finding that a challenger optimizes by limiting demands and threats.
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Figure 2.3: Signaling Costs by Level of Military Action
Target Concession
Once the challenger issues its compellent offer, the target has two options: to
concede or to resist.99 The target's outcome for conceding is the expected benefits it
retains (1-demands) minus any reputation costs.100 The target will choose to concede if
its expected outcome for conceding is equal to or exceeds that of resisting. 101
99 The model does not allow for partial concession by the target. In the real world this clearly happens, for
instance following the U.S. El Dorado Canyon airstrikes in April 1986 against Libya, Qadhafi partially met
U.S. demands which resulted in a stalemated outcome.
'OO Additional costs to the target are the losses incurred from the challenger's signaling. This is not
addressed for two reasons. First for symbolic signals the targets costs are negligible. The second reason is
that for signals generated by limited force the costs to the target are incurred prior to the target's decision
making and therefore are not part of the target's calculations. These additional costs would only matter if
the limited use of force destroyed a significant portion of the issue at stake.
'01 This research adopts the assumption common amongst bargaining literature that if the outcome for
concessions and resistance are equal that the target concedes. Also it is assumed that there is no additional
value for the target by resisting and demonstrating to others that it is tough enough to take a beating.
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Target Resistance: Probability of Success once Coercive Diplomacy fails and the Costs
of Resistance
If the target resists, the outcome of the crisis will be determined by the likelihood
the challenger will enact its threats and that these actions will then succeed in inducing
the target to cede to demands. This probability of coercion success once coercive
diplomacy hasfailed depends on the level and type of coercive threat employed (denial or
punishment). 0 2 Ceteris paribus, a denial strategy which threatens to seize an objective
with brute force has a greater probability of success than a punitive strike against a
recalcitrant target. The likelihood of the challenger achieving its aims when the target
resists can be viewed as a lottery, whereby the challenger succeeds with the probability of
coercion success (ps) and fails with one minus the probability of coercion success (1 - ps).
The target's expected outcome is a function not only of the challenger's
probability of success, but also of the target's costs of resistance. The costs of resistance
are the losses the target endures from the challenger carrying out its threats. For
punishment strategies, these losses are the economic, infrastructure, and civilian injuries
or deaths from punitive strikes. 103 For denial strategies, the costs of resisting are combat
losses and weakened defenses.
102 Probability of coercion success refers to the probability of the challenger's success. Probability of success differs
from the probability of victory calculation from the bargaining in war literature which is concerned with the outcome of
a war. Such calculations produced fixed variables given the assumption both states use all there available military
capability and does not consider alternative strategies. For an example see Fearon, James Fearon, James D. (1995)
"Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 379-414
103 Punishment could also be military losses which are not employed at defending the issue at stake.
Costs of Carrying out Threats
The challenger's outcome, should the target resist, depends on its probability of
coercion success, the value the challenger places on its objectives, signaling costs and the
costs of carrying out threats. The costs of carrying out threats are the additional costs
the challenger pays if the target resists. These costs differ from signaling costs intended
only to communicate the credibility of the threat. For example, the signaling costs of a
denial strategy are the operational costs and combat losses the challenger endures in
making strikes aimed at convincing the target that its defenses are ineffective and that it
cannot defend against a brute force attack, which is forthcoming. By contrast, the costs
of carrying out a denial threat are the operational costs and combat losses the challenger
incurs when the target resists. If the target never concedes, then the costs of carrying out
the denial threat equals the cost of brute force.
Optimizing Coercive Demands and Threats
Now consider the challenger's strategic decision as to the level of demands and
threats to include in its coercive offer. The challenger desires the optimal outcome to the
conflict. With a coercive strategy, this is reached by achieving the maximum demands at
the lowest threat level, contingent on the target conceding. This outcome avoids both the
decrease in benefits, should the target resist, and the costs of carrying out threats. 0 4
The challenger's optimal demand* is therefore the highest demand for which the
target is indifferent between conceding and resisting.'0 5 This equilibrium condition for
104 This assumes that the preferred outcome is greater than the reputation costs for accommodation.
105 Assume that the target accepts the offer if indifferent. Asterisk indicates a demand is optimal for the
challenger.
demand* is illustrated in Equation 1, where the target's outcome for conceding equals
that of resisting:
Target outcome for conceding = Target outcome for resisting
(1-demand*) - (reputation costs) = I - ((probability of coercion success) x (demand*))
- (cost of resisting)
Eq. 1.
The left-hand side of Eq. 1 is the target's outcome for conceding. This is the
residual after the challenger receives its concession (1 - demand*) minus the reputation
cost the target suffers for conceding. The right-hand side of Eq. 1 is the target's outcome
for resisting. This is what the target expects to retain by resisting, which is the value of
the issue (normalized) minus what is demanded, discounted by the probability that
coercion will be successful, all reduced by the cost the target expects to incur by
resisting.
Note in Eq. 1 that, as demand* increases, the target's expected outcome for
conceding and resisting both decrease, but the outcome for conceding decreases at a
faster rate than that for resisting, since the demand* is discounted by probability of
coercion success. The challenger therefore obtains its optimal outcome by increasing its
demands until the target's outcome for conceding just equals its outcome for resisting.
Solving for demand* by rearranging Eq. 1 reveals the relationship between
optimal demands and the costs of resistance, reputation costs and the probability of
coercion success:
demand* = cost of resisting - reputation costs
1 -probability of coercion success
Eq. 2.
The optimal demand* increases as the target's costs for resisting increase. This
captures the idea that the more costly it is for the target to resist, the greater the demands
the challenger can make. Demand* also increases as the challenger's probability of
coercion success rises. This indicates that the higher the likelihood that coercion will be
successful, the greater the demands the challenger can make. By contrast, demand*
decreases as the target's reputation costs increase. This indicates that the target is more
likely to resist demands if it believes that the expected future costs for making a
concession have grown.
Optimizing a Challenger's Coercive Threats
Calculating the optimal demand* is the first half of the challenger's optimization
problem. The demand* must be backed by a threat and signaling the credibility of that
threat is costly. A rational challenger prefers to make the lowest threat necessary to
achieve the demand*. The challenger's optimization problem then consists of
maximizing demand* at minimum signaling cost. A detailed solution to this problem is
provided in Appendix 2.A. The result demonstrates that, given the assumptions
regarding the costs of resistance, reputation costs and signaling costs, an interior solution
exists, whereby a challenger's optimal offer limits both the demands and the threats
made. The intuition is that while the challenger gains by increasing demands, the
signaling costs required for such demands grows exponentially, particularly when signals
cross the threshold of violence and the threshold for major ground combat. As the
challenger increases demands, it eventually reaches the point at which the marginal
benefits from further demands are more than offset by the increased costs of additional
signaling.
Iterative Stages: Strategic Interaction, Learning, and Information Updating
The single stage model of asymmetric coercion provides a framework for
understanding how a challenger decides among its foreign policy options of
accommodation, coercion, and brute force. It provides insight as to how the challenger
chooses its optimal demands*, threats*, and signals when it coerces. In addition, it
provides the expected outcomes for the challenger and target, when the target concedes or
resists. However, real world cases of coercion often consist of multiple rounds, in which
both the challenger and the target learn by receiving updated information on the other's
resolve and capabilities, which, in turn, affect estimates of the probabilities and costs of
coercion and brute force. New information may cause the challenger to update its offer
by adjusting demands and/or threats. The following example of a challenger employing a
denial strategy is useful for illustrating this point.
A challenger initially chooses to coerce if the expected outcome is greater than
that of accommodation or brute force. In order to set an initial optimal offer, it evaluates
the probability of coercion success, the costs of signaling the credibility of its denial
strategy, as well as the target's reputation costs and costs of resisting. Once the target
receives signals, such as air strikes against its army to demonstrate the challenger's
resolve and the vulnerability of the target's defenses, the challenger expects the target to
concede. I later consider explanations for why a target might reject this offer, but for
now it is sufficient to note that the challenger learns from a rejected offer that the
demands were either too high for the threats, the threats were too low for the demands, or
the signals were insufficient to make credible the threats.
When the target rejects the offer, the challenger then must make good on its
threat. These actions then succeed in convincing the target to concede the objective with
the probability of coercion success (ps). However, if the challenger's enacted threats fail
to convince the target to concede, the challenger updates its beliefs about subsequent
probabilities and costs of coercion and brute force. In this second stage, the challenger
again has the option of choosing to accommodate, adopt a brute force strategy, or update
its coercive strategy by adjusting its demands, threats, and signals. For instance, it might
decide to publicly mobilize additional troops or escalate the scale of strikes to signal an
increased threat. Upon receiving this new offer, the target likewise updates its
information and determines whether to continue resisting or to concede. This process
continues, with challenger updating its information and making subsequent offers until
the challenger accommodates, the target concedes, or the challenger takes the objective
by force. Figure 2.4 illustrates two stages of this iterative strategic interaction:
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Figure 2.4: Iterative Asymmetric Coercion Model: Two Stages
A real world example may help clarify this interactive learning. In late January of
1999 at Rambouillet, France the United States introduced demands for Serbia to
relinquish control of Kosovo to NATO troops. The U.S. backed these demands with the
threat of three days of limited air strikes which commenced in late March. When Serbia
still resisted, the U.S. adjusted both its demands and threats. In May, it lowered its
demand by allowing the UN Security Council to have authority in Kosovo rather than
NATO, by admitting Russian troops along with the NATO troops as peacekeepers, and
by removing any reference to a referendum for Kosovo independence. The U.S. also
increased its threat by ratcheting up its air campaign with additional aircraft, attacking a
broader range of Serbian targets. By early June, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic
conceded upon his conclusion that his strategy of resistance was no longer working and
that U.S. and NATO resolve was high, as were Serbia's costs for resisting.106
Brute Force, Probability of Brute Force Victory, and Costs of Brute Force
The third option available to the challenger is to reject both accommodation and
coercion and to adopt a brute force strategy to seize the objective by force. The
challenger's expected outcome for such a strategy is dependent on its probability of brute
force victory and the costs of brute force it will endure. The probability of brute force
victory (pv) is the likelihood that, if the brute force strategy is employed, the challenger
will be able to take its objectives.107 While the probability of coercive success considers
whether the implementation of coercive threats will achieve the challenger's objectives,
'06 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed account.
07 The probability of victory is not always the likelihood the challenger can conquer the target, but rather
that the challenger can take the conflict issue by force. For issues such as regime change the probability of
victory may entail conquest, while for lesser issues this may not be the case. For instance if the issue in
dispute is extra-territorial such as an island, the probability of victory is the likelihood the challenger can
seize the island, not that it invade the target state itself.
the probability of brute force victory predicts the likely outcome of the challenger's brute
force strategy. The costs of bruteforce are the expected costs for taking and holding the
objective by force. The target's brute force outcome therefore depends on the likelihood
it can defend the objective (1 - p,) along with its costs for so doing.
Challenger's Foreign Policy Choice: Coercion, Brute Force, or Accommodation
The challenger's decision to accommodate, coerce, or use brute force depends on
which option provides the greatest expected outcome. In this section, I examine the
conditions for which the challenger chooses coercion over brute force or accommodation.
Challenger's Comparison of Coercion versus Brute Force
First consider the challenger's choice between coercion and a brute force strategy.
The challenger selects coercion if the expected outcome exceeds or equals that of brute
force. This inequality is denoted as:
Challenger outcome coercion Challenger outcome of brute force
Demands* - signaling costs > probability of victory - costs of brute force
Eq.3.
Since the challenger sets the optimal demand* at the point where the target is just
willing to concede, the challenger's outcome for coercion is the benefits it receives from
coercion, which is simply demand* minus signaling costs. The challenger chooses
coercion so long as this outcome is greater than that of brute force. The brute force
outcome is the expected value of the issue which is the value of the issue (normalized to
be equal to 1) discounted by the probability that the challenger will take the objective (p,)
and then reduced by the losses endured by the challenger for implementing its brute force
strategy.
Rearranging Equation 3 and solving for the optimal demands* yields the range of
demands for which the challenger prefers coercion to brute force:
Demands* > probability of victory - costs of brute force + signaling costs Eq.4.
In other words, the benefits from coercion must exceed the expected outcome of the brute
force strategy plus the signaling costs the challenger incurs.
Target Preference between Concession and Resistance
Unlike the challenger, the weak target has no choice between a coercive and a
brute force strategy. Instead, the target only has the option of conceding or resisting if
the challenger chooses to coerce. As previously discussed, the target prefers conceding
to demands* rather than resisting so long as concessions produce a better expected
outcome. This is simply Eq. 1 expressed as the following inequality:
Target outcome for conceding > Target outcome for resisting
(1-demand*) - (reputation costs) 1 - (probability of coercion success) x (demand*)
- (cost of resisting)
Eq. 5.
Solving again for optimal demands* yields the demands which the target prefers to
concede rather than resist (Equation 2 as an inequality).
demand* < cost of resisting - reputation costs
1 -probability of coercion success
Eq. 6.
Combining equations 4 and 6 produces the coercion range, i.e. those demands for
which the challenger prefers coercion to brute force and the target prefers conceding to
resisting.
pv - ebfc + sc c x t- rt Eq. 7.
( -Ps)
The coercion range is depicted visually in Figure 2.5 below for optimal demands*
(x*), probability of brute force victory (pv), probability of coercion success (ps), the
challenger's costs of brute force (cbfe), the target's costs of resistance (ct), challenger
signaling costs (se), and target reputation costs (rt).108 Notice that the upper boundary of
the coercion range is the optimal demand*, i.e. the maximum demand for which the
target will still concede. And the lower bound of the range is the minimum demand for
which the challenger prefers coercion to brute force (see Appendix 2.A for proof). Note
that the probability of coercion success is depicted as being less than the probability of
victory. Since ps is a function of the threat, as the threat level increases, the probability of
coercion success converges towards the probability of brute force victory.
108 The coercion range is closely related to Fearon's bargaining range derived in Fearon, James (1995)
"Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 387. However, it differs from
Fearon's model since the challenger does not have the option of making a counter offer. It also
incorporates probabilities and costs of coercion as well as brute force, which reduces the coercion success
space compared to Fearon's calculation. See appendix for proof.
Target prefers conceding
x* < (c z - rJ)/(1 - pz)
CoercionRan
C
I I
cbfP
PV- cbfC+ s0
Coercion Range
-
p cbfc+ b c
Challenger prefers coercion
ge
x* =(et z - rt)/(1 pA'z)
Figure 2.5: Coercion Range
Accommodation versus Coercion or Brute Force
The final comparison juxtaposes the choices of coercion and brute force with that
of accommodation. The challenger chooses accommodation if the outcome for coercion
and for brute force is less than that of accommodation. This occurs when signaling costs,
the cost of carrying out threats or the costs of brute force outweigh the expected benefits
from target concessions. The objectives gained may have minimal value to the
challenger, as with non-vital interests, or weightier objectives may be too costly to
achieve. For example, homeland territorial demands gained through invasion and
occupation may be so costly as to exceed the expected benefits.
EXPLAINING COERCION FAILURE
In the previous section, I developed a model for asymmetric coercion which
derived the optimal demands, threats, and costly signals for a coercive strategy preferred
by a challenger over brute force or accommodation. The model also produced the
coercion range of demands which the challenger prefers to brute force and to which the
target prefers to concede rather than resist. Yet, in real world cases of coercion, targets
often do resist and these conflicts result in policy failures for the challenger or brute force
campaigns of invasion and occupation. Given the results for the asymmetric coercion
model, I review the five explanations introduced in Chapter 1 for why a target may resist
a coercive strategy. I also examine two explanations based on low costs of coercion and
external costs of brute force strategies for why a challenger might choose a coercive
strategy even though it believes coercion is likely to fail.
I: Non-Rationalist Explanations for Coercion Failure
Due to psychological and cognitive biases, decision makers often misperceive and
miscalculate capability and resolve, demands and threats, probabilities of victory, and the
costs of fighting to the extent that coercion fails. 109 In addition, rational decision making
can be limited, particularly during crises, causing the challenger and target to arrive at
different conclusions regarding the same information. In such cases a coercion range, in
which both the challenger and the target prefer coercion to a brute force strategy, may not
109 For psychological bias and misperceptions see Robert Jervis (1968) "Hypotheses on Misperception,"
World Politics. 20:3 454-479. For bounded rationality and satisficing behavior see James March (1994) A
Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen, New York: Free Press. On cognitive dissonance see
Deborah Larson (1985) The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation Princeton 24-65, For
organizational and bureaucratic models see Graham Allison (1969) "Conceptual Models of the Cuban
Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review 63:3 689-718.
exist. Figure 2.6, below, illustrates this disconnect. whereby the divergent estimates of
the challenger and the target cause them to arrive at coercion ranges without overlap. If
the maximum demand to which the target will concede (xt*) is less than the minimum
demand which the challenger will accept (pvc - cbfc +se), then there are no demands
which both target and challenger prefer to resistance and brute force, respectively." 0
Target's estimated Challenger's estimated
coercion range coercion range
Pst Pvt pse pVC
O Pvt- cbfet+ s x p cbfe+ se 1
Coercion fails since xt* < p,C - cbfc + sc
Figure 2.6: No overlap in coercion range due to differing
estimations by challenger and target
Rationalist Explanations for Bargaining Failure
James Fearon begins his seminal article, "Rationalist Explanations for War", with
the observation "...that wars are costly but nonetheless wars recur.""' Since all states
incur costs by fighting and would benefit from agreements which avoided such costs, he
argues that war, depicted as a brute force strategy within the asymmetric coercion model,
is a failure of states to negotiate a resolution. With brute force other foreign policy
options of accommodation or coercion have either not been chosen or, if chosen and
implemented, have failed to achieve their objectives. Though insightful, Fearon fails to
compare the costs of a brute force strategy to the costs of these alternative strategies.
" If the target's estimates are approximately the same as the challenger then the coercion range will be as
previously calculated in Figure 5. If the target's estimates are larger than those of the challenger this
actually increases the coercion range.
" Fearon, James (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 379
And, as demonstrated earlier, even when coercion succeeds, the challenger incurs
signaling costs and the target incurs reputation costs.
In his article, Fearon focuses solely on the costs of a brute force strategy, what he
refers to as the costs of war, while excluding from his discussion the costs incurred by
coercion. This error of omission is illuminated in his discussion of the ex post
inefficiency of war. He argues that a brute force war is always inefficient ex post, as both
states suffer and would have been better off having achieved a resolution which avoided
those costs.112
While technically correct, the term ex post inefficiency is misleading, as the
following bargaining example demonstrates. Consider a consumer purchasing an
automobile. She spends time on-line researching and more time and money traveling to
dealerships to test drive various models and negotiate with salesmen until she finds one
willing to supply a desirable car at an agreeable price. At the same time, the automobile
dealership expends advertising dollars on newspaper and television advertisements to
draw in customers. The efforts of the consumer and producer eventually conclude with a
deal being struck. However, note that this transaction is inefficient ex post. The
consumer would have been better off if she had avoided the costs in time and money to
locate her new car, and the dealership better off if it had not had to pay for advertising.
Like brute force war, the automobile market is ex post inefficient.
Yet while Fearon proclaims war as inefficient, economists have not adopted a
similar argument to decry the free market." 3 Why? Because ex post inefficiency simply
m12 Fearon, James (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 383
11 Fearon is not alone with this argument see Powell, Robert (2006) "War as a Commitment Problem"
International Organization 60:Winter 169, Reiter, Dan (2003) "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War"
describes an interaction, whether it be an international negotiation or a free market
exchange, which incurs transaction costs. All bargaining entails some transaction costs,
even if it is simply the time it takes to reach an agreement. Pareto efficiency is only
meaningful ex ante when expected outcomes can be compared, incorporating transaction
costs for all available options.
In fact, Fearon makes two implicit assumptions inappropriate for asymmetric
conflict: first, as just discussed, that the expected costs for brute force are always greater
than the alternatives of coercion or accommodation, and second, that the target state's
survival is not at stake.
Before addressing this second assumption on state survival, I first examine
Fearon's three rationalist explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and incentives
to keep information private, issue indivisibility, and commitment problems. I then derive
a testable hypothesis for a challenger's credible commitment problems.
H: Uncertainty and Private Information
Uncertainty and private information concerning the challenger's and the target's
interests, military capabilities, and resolve provide a second explanation for why a target
may resist being coerced. If challenger and target are privy to different information, even
if both are rational, they may reach differing assessments of the other's interests,
capabilities, and resolve. If these estimates vary sufficiently, such that the challenger's
range of acceptable demands does not overlap with what the target is willing to concede,
then coercion will fail in the same manner as it did with the previous non-rationalist
explanation (see Figure 2.6 above). The difference here is that the cause of coercion
Perspectives on Politics 1:1, 29, Gartzke, Erik (1999) "War is in the Error Term" International
Organization 53:3, 570.
failure is uncertainty resulting from private information rather than miscalculation or
misperception.
Fearon points out that states could avoid a negotiation breakdown by revealing to
each other their private information. There are incentives, however, for the challenger
and the target to bluff and misrepresent their intentions and capabilities in order to obtain
a greater expected coercive outcome even if this means accepting the risk of war. 14
III: Issue Indivisibility
Issue indivisibility is the idea that there are certain issues over which a target state
is unwilling to negotiate, preferring resistance to any peaceful settlement." 5 Those who
argue for issue indivisibility as a rational explanation for war have recognized specific
religious sites or the attributes of a specific territory as integral to national identity, a
matter which cannot be viewed as divisible."16 Fearon acknowledges issue indivisibility
as a theoretically viable rationalist explanation for bargaining failure, but dismisses it as
inconsequential for modern international politics. 17
Demonstrating how issue indivisibility leads to coercion failure in the coercion
model is a straightforward matter. If the target will make no concessions at all on the
114 Fearon, James D. (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 381
" On issue indivisibility see Toft, Monica (2006) "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist
Explanations for War" Security Studies 15:1, 34-69, Hassner, Ron E. (2003) "To Halve and to Hold:
Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility" Security Studies 12:4, 1-33, Kirshner,
Jonathon, (2000) "Rationalist Explanations for War?" Security Studies 10:1, 144
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issue at stake, then the maximum demand that the target will concede is equal to 0 (Xmax=
0). Figure 2.7 depicts this case, where the challenger's expected outcome for a brute
force strategy exceeds the maximum demand to which the target will concede (xmax).
Maximum target
will concede
Xmax = 0PSPV
0 p- cbf0 + s1
Challenger prefers brute force
if x < pv - cbfc+ s,
Coercion fails since xma < PV - cbfe +
Figure 2.7: Issue Indivisibility and Coercion Failure
IV: Credible Commitment Problems
A third rationalist explanation for coercion failure applies to cases in which a
challenger cannot make credible promises ex ante to refrain from making future
demands. The target believes concession will likely lead only to additional demands.
There are two explanations for how this may occur. First, there may be cases in which a
target's concessions reduce the challenger's uncertainty over the target's resolve. This
information causes the challenger to reassess the expected outcome of initiating a future
crisis with additional demands."18 The inability of the challenger to preclude making
118 Sechser, Todd S. (2007) Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in
International Crises dissertation Stanford University, 5
further demands increases the target's reputation costs for making concessions. If these
costs are sufficiently high, this reduces the demand* and may eliminate the coercion
range. This decrease in demand* can be seen below in Equation 2, where an increase in
reputation costs decreases demand*:
demand* = cost of resisting - T reputation costs
1 -probability of coercion success
Eq. 2.
An increase in a target's reputation costs decreases the level of demands for
which it will concede. Figure 2.8 demonstrates how the reduction in demand* shrinks the
coercion range.
Reduction in coercion range as
reputation costs increase
Sc
f-~ X PS PV
cbfc
x x
x* = (etz - I rt)/(1 - pz)
Figure 2.8: Impact on Coercion Range due to Reputation Costs
The relationship between a challenger's commitment problem and its impact on
the coercion range as shown above in Figure 2.8, generates the first testable hypothesis
for coercion failure.
Commitment Hypothesis: An increase in commitment problems increases the
likelihood of coercion failure
Commitment problems are more likely to occur when the challenger has the
military power available to back up additional demands with credible threats. But this is
always the case in asymmetric conflicts, in which Great Powers, by definition, have the
balance of power in their favor. The hypothesis of a weak state resisting a Great Power
because of this large discrepancy in power has been dubbed Goliath's curse.1 The
sheer magnitude of a Great Power such as the U.S. thus generates a commitment problem
that can result in coercion failure.
Unrefined, the commitment hypothesis predicts that all asymmetric conflicts are
likely to fail. Yet as I will show in Chapter 3, Great Powers succeed at coercion in 56%
of asymmetric cases. Without modification the commitment hypothesis does not provide
variation in its prediction of crises outcomes. A possible remedy that I employ is derived
from an insight of Sir Julian Corbett, who observed that what matters for Great Powers in
limited wars are the forces they are willing and able to deploy and ... bring to bear at the
decisive point." 2 0 For testing the commitment hypothesis, the question is whether the
Great Power has sufficient deployed power to credibly back up any further demands. If
the answer is yes, then a commitment problem is deemed to exist and the prediction of
the hypothesis is that the target will likely resist.
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A second explanation for commitment problems is based on a shift in the balance
of power, a point I will defer until after I discuss target survival as an explanation for
coercion failure in the following section.
Target Survival as a rationalist explanation for coercion failure
A final rationalist explanation for coercion failure not considered by Fearon, but
which I present, is that of target survival. Targets resist demands when concession risks
its own survival. Fearon, in his bargaining model, makes the implicit assumption that the
issues over which states negotiate will not threaten the target state's survival. He claims
that war is always inefficient ex post, since both states suffer and incur costs and would
be better off achieving a resolution which avoided those costs.' 2 But this is not always
the case, particularly in asymmetric conflicts where the range of demands which a
challenger prefers to brute force war may all lead to the demise of the weak target.
To demonstrate this, I return to the linear bargaining model (Figure 2.5) and
consider a dispute between a powerful challenger and a weak target over the issue of
territory which the target controls. This territory includes the target's homeland. Now,
the target may not require all of its territory in order to survive as a sovereign state, but it
does require some territory.'2 2 It needs a certain amount of land for its population to
inhabit and for its economy to remain viable. This being the case, there is a maximum
demand (x,) for territory which the challenger can make and to which the target could
concede and retain just enough land to survive. Figure 2.9 depicts this situation, where
no coercion range exists, since the challenger prefers the outcome of a brute force war (p,
121 Fearon, James (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 383
122 For example Serbia survived without Kosovo following the Kosovo crisis of 1999. See Chapter 5 for a
detailed analysis.
- cbfc +sc) to receiving Xnax, and the target cannot concede more than xmax, since this
would result in its demise.m
Challenger prefers brute force
if x < p cbfc+ s,
O Xmax pV- cbf0 + sC
Minimum target
requires for survival
Figure 2.9: Minimum requirement for target survival
A potential rebuttal to my survival argument was one given by Fearon in his
discussion on issue indivisibility. In it, he asserts that "...issues over which states
bargain typically are complex and multidimensional; side-payments or linkages with
other issues typically are possible."1 24 This argument, however, does not apply to cases
in which survival is at stake, as there are not likely to be any side-payments or linkages
123 Since the expected outcome for the target conceding to its own death is less than or equal to 0 then the
target prefers to resist and face a brute force strategy, even if the probability of victory for the challenger is
very high, as long as the expected outcome for brute force is greater than 0.
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which provide a settlement that a target would prefer over its own survival.m Given that
survival is a primary motivator for the interaction of states in international politics, this
explanation is systemic and not domestic.126
Survival is a rationalist explanation for why a target state resists demands and it
provides a second hypothesis for coercion failure.
Survival Hypothesis: Demands which threaten a target's survival increase the
likelihood of coercion failure
Targets are likely to resist demands which threaten their survival, even when their
probability of success for resisting or their probability of victory in a brute force war is
low, so long as they have the means to resist.
What is x,,,,L?
Theoretically, xmax is the maximum demand to which a target could concede on an
issue and still survive. But what issues threaten a state's survival and how much can a
state concede on a given issue and still survive?
I identify four issues which affect state survival. First is control over the state's
decision making. Demands threaten survival when they strip the state of its sovereignty
over policy. Tanisha Fazel, in her work on state death in the international system,
focuses on control over foreign policy as the primary indicator of a state's death.127
Demand for regime change which replaces the state's policy makers thus threatens a
state's survival.128 The second issue is a state's control over its population. Third is
125 Kirshner, Jonathon, (2000) "Rationalist Explanations for War?" Security Studies 10:1, 144
126 Waltz, Kenneth (1979) Theory of International Politics Boston: McGraw Hill, 92
127 Fazal, Tanisha M. (2007) State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and
Annexation Princeton: Princeton University Press
128 Here regime change is the replacement of the entire regime, not simply replacing the leader of a regime
with another of its members.
control over homeland territory. Fourth is a viable economy sustaining the population
and from which a state's regime can procure revenue.
Another characteristic, which is not in and of itself a survival issue, is that of a
state's military. Several countries such as Iceland, Panama, and Liechtenstein do not
have their own military forces, relying instead upon other countries for their defense. A
coercive demand made against a state's military may threaten survival but only
indirectly, if a concession makes the state's regime, population, territory, or economy
vulnerable to attack. For example, in late February 1991, President George Bush's
ultimatum for the Iraqi Army to withdraw from Kuwait within 48 hours would have
required Iraq to abandon a large quantity of its heavy weapons in a hasty retreat in order
to meet the deadline. Such a loss threatened Iraqi survival, as concession would have
exposed its population, homeland territory, and regime to invasion.
Identifying these four issues critical to state survival is an easier task than
determining how much a state can concede on a given issue. How much territory,
population, economy, or control over its policies does a state really require to remain
sovereign and viable? This is an extremely challenging task for analysis. For example,
in 1999 Serbia claimed, and still claims, Kosovo as part of Serbia's historic homeland.
Serbia withstood punishing NATO airstrikes before finally ceding control over it. In the
end, while the Serbs considered Kosovo a part of its homeland territory, Serbia still
survived as a state following the loss of it. Kosovo had, in fact, been insignificant to
Serbia in terms of the size of its territory, its Serbian population, its economy, and its
strategic location.
To avoid this difficulty in determining whether a set of demands would actually
result in the death of a state, I adopt an approach whereby demands which seriously
threaten homeland territory, the population, the regime, or the economy are defacto
considered a survival risk. For such cases, the survival hypothesis predicts that the target
state will resist if it has the means to do so and that coercion will fail. This method
avoids the tautological coding of demands as threatening survival when the target resists.
One drawback to this approach, however, is that it can produce false positives, as in the
case of Kosovo. Nonetheless, a focus on core demands and their threat to any of these
four survival issues provides a useable, albeit imperfect, method for testing the survival
hypothesis.
Relaxing the Unitary Actor Assumption on the Target State
In addition to state survival, a state's regime and the leader of that regime are also
concerned with their political survival.129 Though regime and leadership survival is a
domestic and not a rationalist, unitary actor explanation for coercion failure, it is a critical
determinant of a state's decision making. Relaxing the unitary actor assumption on the
target regime and regime leadership incorporates into the asymmetric coercion model the
concepts of omni-balancing and domestic audience costs, which I will discuss next. 3 0
129 For a discussion on political survival see chapter I of Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith,
Randolph M. Siverson, and James D Morrow (2003) The Logic of Political Survival Cambridge MA: MIT
Press
1 I do not relax the unitary actor assumption on the challenger state for three reasons. The first is
technical, relaxing both restrictions would prove overly complex for modeling without additional insight
gained. The second is that should the challenger's non-unitary actions lead to coercion failure, then this is
captured by the explanation of misperception and miscalculation due to non-unitary behavior. Third, much
research has been done on how non-unitary behavior by the U.S. can lead to the U.S. losing asymmetric
conflicts. See Mack, Andrew (1975) "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric
Conflict" World Politics 27:2, 175-200 and Merom, Gil (2003) How Democracies Lose Small Wars
Cambridge University Press
Regime Survival
A regime's survival may be threatened domestically in two ways. First, a regime
can be overthrown through revolution and civil war. Domestic opposition groups may
rise up in revolt and replace the regime with a government of their own. A target regime
may then resist a challenger's demands out of fear that concession will reveal weakness
and prompt armed groups to seize power. This is Steven David's logic of omni-
balancing, where the internal structure of such states is more appropriately viewed as
anarchical rather than hierarchical.' The likelihood that a regime will be overthrown for
making a concession I call the expected domestic costs of concession.
In the asymmetric coercion model, the expected domestic costs to the target
regime for conceding (dct) are in addition to the reputation costs the target state incurs.m
This has the effect of lowering the optimal demand* to which a target will concede,
thereby reducing the coercion range (see Figure 2.10). If the decrease in demand* is
large enough, the coercion range is eliminated and coercion fails.
Decrease in the
Coercion Range
PS PV
x* =(ct z - r)/ (1 -p,,z)
cbfc x* (et z - rt- de]/(1 - pz)
pV cbfc+ se
"3 David, Steven (1991) "Explaining Third World Alignment" World Politics 43:1 233-56
132 Reputation costs are expected losses due to the challenger or external third parties making additional
demands of the target, but not domestic groups.
Figure 2.10: Regime's domestic costs for conceding
In the case of democratic states, a regime may also be removed from power by
elections. A regime resists when it expects to incur audience costs for a concession that
can lead to its being voted out of office. I discuss more on domestic audience costs in the
next section on regime leadership survival.
Regime Leadership Survival
The regime leadership, like the regime, places a priority on its political survival.
The leader's hold on the regime is threatened when the leader concedes and thus reveals a
policy failure to members of the regime. Audience costs are defined as the expected
costs of conceding. The logic of audience costs is the principal-agent problem which I
discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
Domestic audience costs (act) are incorporated into the coercion model in the same
way as the regime's domestic costs for conceding, which I presented in the previous
section (see Figure 2.11, below). An increase in audience costs reduces the demand*
and, if significant, may eliminate the coercion range.
Decrease in the
Coercion Range
(-'--ThJPS PV
x*= (ct z - rt- dct]/(1 - psz)
cbfx = (etz - rt- dct - act]/(1 - psz)
p - cbf_+ s.
Figure 2.11: Impact of Audience Costs on Coercion Range
In sum, expanding the analysis on target survival by relaxing the unitary actor
assumption to include regime and regime leadership survival introduces the domestic
concepts of omni-balancing and audience costs to explain coercion failure. These
concepts also help us understand otherwise incomprehensible actions of states. For
instance, Saddam Hussein's orders in 2003 to only defend Baghdad, which left Iraq
defenseless against a U.S. invasion, can only begin to make sense by examining the
domestic threats to his leadership and regime.
Revisiting Commitment Problems and Survival Issues
Having introduced target survival, I now return to consider a second explanation
for how commitment problems can lead to coercion failure. There are certain issues a
concession by the target may result in a shift in the balance of power. For instance, a
concession of territory such as Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland, may well leave the target
more vulnerable to an attack by the Great Power. A concession of this magnitude would
shift the balance of power further increasing the challenger's probability of victory in a
subsequent conflict. Coercion fails if the shift in the probability of victory results in the
challenger's minimum acceptable demand exceeding xmax, the maximum the target
believes it can concede and still remain viable as a state (see Figure 2.12, below).
Increase in probability of victory
eliminates coercion range
Sc1  Sc2
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Figure 2.12: Impact of Shift in balance of power on Coercion Range
Why a Challenger Chooses a Coercive Strategy not likely to Succeed
The previous section examined five explanations for why a target might resist a
coercer's demands. Why then, would a challenger adopt and pay the signaling costs for a
coercive strategy that is likely to fail? The non-rational explanation of misperception and
miscalculation and the rationalist explanation of uncertainty and private information
previously discussed also apply to a challenger's decision to adopt a coercive strategy
that the target, in turn, resists. In these two situations the challenger makes its decision
with the belief that the target is likely to concede. There are, in addition, two
explanations that address cases in which the challenger rationally adopts a coercive
strategy, even though the target is likely to resist: when the costs of adopting a coercive
strategy are low and when there are external costs a challenger incurs for adopting a brute
force strategy.
Low Costs of Coercion and Uncertainty over Target Resolve
When a crisis arises and a challenger opts for a brute force strategy, there may be
a time lag between its decision and its ability to execute its strategy. This lag may be the
time needed to deploy sufficient military force. The challenger may elect to adopt a
coercive strategy in the interim until it is ready to invade. Since the challenger is already
incurring signaling costs through the deployment, additional diplomatic costs for making
its coercive demands known are, in comparison, quite low. Still, making a coercive
demand in this case is only rational if there is some uncertainty over the target's resolve
to resist. In Appendix 2.A, I evaluate the conditions under which uncertainty over a
target's resolve prompts a challenger to adopt a coercive strategy unlikely to succeed.
The intuition is that it costs the challenger little to make the coercive demands. If it fails,
which is likely, the challenger has wasted little as the coercive strategy did not preclude it
from continuing its preparations for invasion, but if it succeeds, the challenger gains
much by avoiding the high costs of war.
An example of such low costs of coercion is the strategy adopted by the U.S. in
1990 in the lead-up to the Gulf War. The U.S. took six months to build up its troop levels
in the Kuwaiti theater of operations in order to expel the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. In the
interim, the U.S. adopted a coercive strategy, first leveraging sanctions and then later the
threat of airstrikes and invasion. Adopting a coercive strategy was not costly, as the U.S.
was already preparing for a brute force invasion. If Iraq had conceded to all of the United
States' demands, the U.S. would have avoided the costs of the brute force invasion.13 3 In
the end, it cost the U.S. little to make the demands and may have actually reduced its
costs for invasion, as the following explanation on the external costs of brute force
strategies will elaborate.
External Costs for a Challenger Adopting a Brute Force Strategy
133 Saddam attempted to concede to the UN resolutions, but not to U.S. demands that Iraq withdrawal from
Kuwait in 48 hours and thus abandon its heavy weapons.
Crises between Great Power challengers and weaker target states do not take
place in a vacuum, but within the international system. As such, a rational challenger
should factor into its calculations not only the expected costs and benefits of its
interaction with the target, but also the affect such actions will have on third parties. If
adopting of a brute force strategy threatens the interests of other states, it can generate
negative externalities. For example, in the post World War I era, there has developed an
international norm that states first attempt to resolve their conflicts through negotiation or
to bring their disputes before international institutions, such as the League of Nations
and, later, the United Nations, before resorting to violence. States that abrogate this norm
by pursuing a brute force strategy without first attempting to negotiate a settlement incur
external costs. These costs may range from a general increase in tensions with other
states to a much greater risk if a third party is drawn into the conflict. It may therefore be
beneficial to a challenger to first engage the United Nations and adopt a coercive
strategy, even if the target will likely resist, as this may reduce the external costs of a
brute force strategy the challenger plans to undertake, once coercion fails.
An example of a failed attempt to reduce external costs can be found in the lead-
up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The U.S. and Great Britain failed in their efforts
to obtain a second UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to remove
Saddam Hussein from power. This was an ill-fated effort to reduce the costs for breaking
the international norm against invading a sovereign state.
Interestingly, in these cases, the coercive strategy is a success for the challenger
not if the target concedes, but if the external costs for the brute force strategy are reduced.
In fact, a target's concessions may be unwelcomed, as was the case in January 1991,
when the Bush administration's worst case scenario would have been an eleventh hour
concession by Saddam Hussein to UN resolutions on the eve of the Gulf War.' 34
CONCLUSION
This chapter began with the observation that, in asymmetric conflicts pitting an
immensely powerful United States against much weaker target states, the crises often
concluded with brute force wars rather than with concessions which would have avoided
the full costs of invasion and occupation. Why didn't the U.S. and its targets reach a
compromise? To answer this question, I developed an asymmetric coercion model
which produced the equilibrium conditions, under which a challenger would prefer
coercion to brute force or accommodation and a target would prefer concessions to
resistance. The model also incorporated the idea that a strategic challenger moderates
both the demands and the threats it makes in order to optimize its coercive outcome.
In the second half of this chapter, I returned to consider why a target resists
coercion. I reviewed a non-rational explanation for coercion failure due to miscalculation
and misperception and James Fearon's three rationalist explanations of bargaining failure
based on uncertainty and private information, issue indivisibility, and credible
commitments. I hypothesized that as the challenger's deployed military forces increase, a
condition making the commitment problem more likely, so to increases the chances for
coercion failure. Introducing a new rationalist explanation of bargaining failure based on
target survival, I hypothesized demands which threaten target survival increase the
likelihood of coercion failure. I then relaxed the unitary actor assumption on the weaker
state to allow for regime and leadership survival as factors in the target's decision
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making. Finally, I introduced the low costs of coercion and the external costs of brute
force as two rationalist explanations for why a challenger might choose to adopt a
coercive strategy even when it knows the target is likely to resist.
In the next chapter, I turn to international asymmetric crises since World War II
drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Project. I examine how often Great Powers
adopt coercive strategies and how often these strategies fail. I compare the outcomes
between the United States and other Great Powers and contrast my findings with those of
other researchers on coercion and coercive diplomacy. In Chapters 4-6, I then return to
the survival and commitment hypotheses I developed in this chapter and test them against
the outcomes of crises between the United States and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya.
APPENDIX 2.A
ASYMMETRIC COERCION GAME
Consider two states, the challenger (C) and the target (T). An issue with a
valuation of 1 is in dispute. The challenger makes demand (x) of the target, where x is
continuous and ranges from 0 to 1, (x c [0,1]). When x = 0, the outcome for C and T is
[-rc, 1], respectively, where rc are the reputation costs for C, setting x=0. Both players are
risk neutral and the valuation of the demand is vc(x) = x for the challenger and vt(x) = 1 -x
for the target. 3 5
C chooses demand (x) and threat (z). Threat levels range from 0 to Zmax
(z - [0, Zmax]), where z=0 is no threat and Zmax is the maximum credible threat the
challenger can make, based on the relative power of the two players and the value of the
issue to the challenger. The highest possible value for Zmax is 1, where the challenger
credibly adopts a brute force strategy to take the issue by force.
The challenger incurs signaling costs s(z) for making offer [x,z]. The signaling
cost function increases monotonically, is strictly convex and is a sunk cost, whether the
target concedes or resists. The challenger incurs costs to carry out threats ce(z) and the
target incurs the cost of resisting ct(z), should the target reject the offer. If z=1 then
cc(z) = cbfe, the challenger's cost of a brute force strategy, and ct(z) = cbft, the target's
cost of brute force. Assume ce(z)= cc x z, ct(z)= ct x z, where cc and ct are positive
coefficients.136 The target incurs reputation cost (rt) for conceding.
The challenger's probability of coercion success ps(z), which is the likelihood the
challenger will gain its objectives when the target resists, is an increasing function of
threat. This is the probability that C gains demands even though T resists. Assume
ps(z)= ps x z, where ps 6 (0,1) and for brute force z=1, ps(1) = p, where pv is the
challenger's probability of a brute force victory. 137
The game follows a sequential ultimatum protocol where C moves first, making a
take it or leave it offer of demands, threats, and signals (x,z,s). If x=0, z=0, s=0, then C
135 It clearly need not be that both players place the same value on the issue at hand. However making
assumptions on risk and valuation of the issue simplify the model without impacting the main outcome.
136 The assumption of linearity does not detract from the overall findings of the model.
137 This assumption is made for making calculations tractable, but it does not detract from the models
overall findings.
has adopted a policy of accommodation, and if x=1, z=1, s=0 then C has adopted a brute
force strategy. If C chooses a coercive offer (x , [0,1], (z , [0,1]), s > 0), then T moves
by either accepting or rejecting the offer. If T resists then the success or failure of C is a
lottery with C obtaining its demands with ps(z) and failing with (1 - ps(z)).' 38 See Figure
A2.1 for the game in extended form.139
[pv-cbfe, 1- p, -cbft]
Brute Force
C (x,z,s) T Resist ' ' [p,[z) x - s(z) -
Accommodate concede Lottery 1 - pS(z) x - Ct(Z)]
[re,1] [x - s~z),1 x - rtl
Figure A2.1: Coercion Game in extended form
Optimization of Demands and Threats
Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 for optimal demand* and the optimization problem for the
challenger can be rewritten in notational form in Equations IA, 2A, and 3A, below.
1x* - rt = 1 - psz(x*) - ctz Eq. 1A.
x* = (ctz - rt)/(1 - psz) Eq. 2A.
Maxz [(ctz - rt)/(1 - psz)] - s(z) Eq. 3A.
Solving the optimization problem by taking first order conditions for Eq. 3A in terms of z
results in
ct/(l -psz*) + ps(ctz* - rt)/(1 - psz*) 2 - se'(z*) = 0
which simplifies to
(ct - ps rt)/(l - psz*) 2 - sc(z*) = 0 Eq. 4A.
Estimating the signaling cost function using a Taylor polynomial results in
138 For the lottery the challenger's outcome = ps(Z)[ x - s(z) - ce(z)] + (1 -P,(Z))[ 0 - s(z) - ce(z)] = Ps(Z) X -
s(z) - ce(z). The target's outcome = ps(z)[ 1-x - ct(z)] + (1 -ps(Z))[ 1 - ct(z)] = I - Ps(Z) x - ct(z).
139 The model does not allow for a partial acceptance of the challenger's demands. However this situation
can be adapted to the model by thinking of the challenger's demand as the partial demand accepted by the
target. This assumes the challenger does not reject the target's partial concessions.
sc(z) = boz 0 + biz' + ... +b0Z = jni=o bizi Eq. 5A,
where bi is the coefficient for the z'th term.
The derivative of the signaling function in terms of z is
se'(z) = bi + 2b 2z + 3b3z2 ... + nbnz"~1 = Ini=o ibizi-I Eq. 6A.
Substituting Eq. 6A into Eq. 4A obtains the following:
(ct - ps rt)/(l - psz*)2 =o ibi(z*)'' Eq. 7A.
Solving for z* in general terms is not practical, however, for the case where n=2,
a solution set does exist. 4 0 First note that the derivative of the signaling function
simplifies to
sc' (z) = b1 + 2b 2z*.
To keep calculations more manageable assume b, 0. Substituting for sc' (z) in Eq. 7A
produces
(ct - ps rt)/(l - psZ*) 2 = 2b2z*
(ct - ps rt)/ 2b2 = z*(1 -pz*)2
(et - ps rt)/ 2b 2 = z*(1 - 2psz* + ps2z* 2
z* - 2psz* 2 + ps2z*3 _ (ct - Ps rt)/ 2b 2 = 0
z*3- 2ps-Iz* 2 + ps-2 z* - (ct - ps rt)/ 2ps2b2 = 0 Eq. 8A.
This equation can be expressed in general cubic terms as
Az* 3 + Bz*2+ Cz* + D= 0 Eq. 9A
where A=I, B = -2ps, C = ps 2 , and D = - (ct - rt)/ 2p,2b2.
Solutions for z* are derived using Tartaglia's method of depression of a cubic
equation. Table A2.1 provides a summary of the solution set for z*. The table depicts.
for varying levels of ps, the values which produce real values for z* where z* F_ [0,1].
Note that as ps increases, the range of values for z* decreases, demonstrating that the
greater the probability of success, the lower the threat required for x*.
14 0n=2 insures signaling costs increase exponentially. A solution for n=1 is not provided given the
assumption of the non-linearity of the signaling function.
Ps D - (ct - rt)/ 2ps2b 2  z*
0.01 [-9800.999, 0] [1, 0]
0.25 [-9, 0] [1,0]
0.5 [-1.1851851851, 0] [.66666, 0]
0.75 [-0.351165829, 0] [.44444, 0]
0.99 [-0.152603505,0] [.336, 0]
Table A2.1: Solution set for Eq. 9A for real numbers 41
Second Order Conditions Satisfied
To confirm this solution set is a maximum, take the second order conditions in
terms of z derived in Eq 8A:
3z* 2 - 4p,-iz* + Ps-2 < 0
(3z*- 1/ ps)(z* -1/ ps) < 0. Eq. 10A
Since ps P (0,1)and z* s [0,1], then (z* -1/ ps) < 0. For Eq. 1OA to be true requires
(3z* -I/p)>0
3z* >1/ ps
z*ps > 1/3.
The result confirms the solution as a maximum for values of z* and ps subject to their
product being greater than 1/3.
14 To read this chart note that the first column varies the value of the probability of success (ps) which is
the only variable which is contained in both B and C from the cubic equation Eq. 9A. Column 2 is the D
variable. It represents the range of values for D which produces a solution for z* which is a real number
between 0 and I (the allowable range for z). The values in column 2 and 3 were calculated using a cubic
equation calculator, http://www. 1728.com/cubic.htm , and verified with an excel spread sheet.
The impact on optimal demand due to changes in threat, probability of coercion
success, target costs for resisting and target reputation costs: Comparative Static
Results
From Eq. 2A, comparative static results derived by taking the derivative of x* in
terms of z, Ps, ct, and rt generate the following:
x* = (ctz - rt)/(1 - psz) Eq. 2A
6x*/6z = ct/(1 - psz) + ps(ctz - r)/(1 - PsZ)2 > 0 , for ctz > rt
6x*/6ps = z(ctz - r)/(1 - psz) 2 > 0 , for ctz > rt
6x*/6ct= z/(1 - psz)> 0
6x*/6rt= -1/(1 - psz) < 0.
This suggests that an increase in threat or probability of coercion success will increase the
optimal demands made, so long as the costs for resistance exceed the target's reputation
costs for conceding. It further suggests that a rise in the costs of resistance increases
optimal demands and that an increase in reputation costs for conceding decreases optimal
demands.
Coercion range where coercion is preferred to brute force by the challenger or
resistance by the target
The challenger's valuation of a brute force strategy where x = 1, z = as depicted
in Figure A2.1 is
vc(1,1) ve(victory) + vc(defeat)
ve(1,1) = pv (1 - cbfe) + (1 - pv)( 0 - cbfc) = pv - pv cbfe + pv cbfc -cbfc
ve(1, 1) =pv- cbfc.
The challenger chooses coercion over brute force when
vc(x*,z*,s(z*)) > vc(1,1)
x* - s(z*) > p_- cbfc
x* > pc ebfc +s(z*). Eq. 11A.
The target choices are concession or resistance. It chooses concessions when
vt(concessions) 2 vt(resistance)
vt(concessions) = 1 - x* - rt
vt(resistance) = 1 - psz(x*) - ctz
substituting
1 - x* - rt > 1 -psz(x*) - ctz
x* < (ctz - rt)/(1 - psz).
Note Eq. 12A is simply Eq 2A expressed as an inequality. Combining Eq. 1 1A
and 12A produces the coercion success range where coercion is preferred to brute force
for the challenger and where concession is preferred to resistance for the target:
pv- cwc +s(z*)< x* < (ctz - rt)/(l - psz). Eq. 13A.
In linear form, the coercion success range can be expresses as in Figure A2.2.
Coercion Range
Sc
cbfc
pV- cbfc+ s, c5
PS PV
x* < (ct z - rt) - paz)
Figure A2.2: Coercion Range
Uncertainty over Target Resolve
The target's likelihood of being highly resolved and therefore resistant to the
challenger's offer, is - e (0,1). The asymmetric coercion model can be depicted in
extended form in Figure A2.3 below:
Eq. 12A.
[p,-cbfc,
1 - p, -cbft] -N-ottery. [psWz X - SWz - ce(z),
1 - pS(z) x - ct(z)]
-ce T
:,s) C
[-rc,1] O~a [x - s (z),1 x - rt]
[p,-cbfe,
1- p, -cbft] Lottery, [p5(z) x - s(z) -
1- pS(z) x - ct(z)]
,s) C
[-rCe,1] v [x - s(z), 1 - x - rt]
Figure A2.3: Asymmetric Coercion Model with Uncertainty over Target Resolve
The challenger's valuation of its expected outcome for choosing coercion is
ve (coercion) = [target resists] + (1 - r)[target concedes]
and for choosing a brute force strategy
ve (brute force) brute force outcome.
The challenger prefers coercion to brute force when
ve (coercion) > vc (brute force)
4[target resists] + (1 - 1)[target concedes] > brute force outcome
-r[target resists - target concedes] > brute force outcome - target concedes.
Multiplying both sides by (-1) and solving for - produces the following inequality:
T < [target concedes - brute force outcome]/[target concedes - target resists] Eq. 14A.
Equation 14A is the ratio of the difference in the challenger's expectation of coercion
success and the expected brute force outcome, over the difference between coercion
success and failure.
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Substituting into Eq 14A values from Figure A2.3 for the challenger's three
outcomes of target concessions, resistance, and brute force produces the following
inequality:
- < [x* - s - pv + cbfc]/[ x*(1- ps) + ce] Eq. 15A.
Ceterisparibus, an increase in demands (x*), challenger costs of brute force (cbfe), and
probability of coercion success (ps) all increase the willingness of the challenger to coerce
a more highly resolved target, while an increase in signaling costs (s), probability of
victory (pv), and costs of carrying out threats (cc) decrease the willingness of the
challenger to coerce.
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Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis
Why do the coercive strategies of Great Powers against weak states often fail? In
the previous chapter, I developed a theory for asymmetric coercion, in which a rational
challenger has the choice among strategies of accommodation, coercion, and brute force.
I concluded that a challenger estimates the outcomes for the foreign policy options
available to it and chooses coercion when it is found to have the highest expected value.
For coercive strategies, the optimal expected outcome is obtained by adjusting demands
and threats contingent on the target's willingness to concede. I then examined five
explanations for why a target might still resist a challenger's coercive offer. These
included non-rational explanations of misperception and miscalculation as well as
rational explanations based on uncertainty, issue indivisibility, commitment problems,
and survival. I also examined two rational explanations for why a challenger may choose
coercion even if it knows its strategy is likely to fail: 1) when it is a relatively low cost
option while preparing for a brute force strategy and/or 2) there are high external costs
for adopting a brute force strategy without first attempting coercion.
I turn now to assess the assumption that the coercive strategies of Great Powers
often fail by examining real world asymmetric conflicts. In so doing, I address the
following questions: How often do asymmetric crises between Great Powers and weak
states occur? In such crises, how frequently do Great Powers choose coercion over other
available foreign policy options? How often is the Great Power successful at achieving
its foreign policy objectives? How often is it successful at coercion? How often do Great
Powers first choose coercion only to later adopt brute force strategies? How do the
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results for the United States compare to other Great Powers? And are these findings
consistent with results from previous related research?
Answers to the above questions will validate the relevance and importance of my
research agenda. Asymmetric conflicts are a recurrent phenomenon of the international
system. In these lopsided crises, Great Powers usually succeed at achieving their foreign
policy objectives and most often adopt coercive strategies to do so." Still, in many
cases, weak states do resist and these crises conclude either in a brute force invasion or as
a foreign policy failure for the Great Power.
The second objective of this chapter is to test the survival and the commitment
hypotheses for the coercion outcomes I developed in the previous chapters. The survival
hypothesis predicts a target will resist demands which threaten its survival so long as it
has the means to do so. By contrast, the commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will
fail when a powerful challenger cannot credibly promise not to increase demands in the
future, a situation more likely to develop when the challenger has already deployed
military forces capable of backing up further demands. I test these hypotheses against
asymmetric crises which have arisen since World War I in which Great Powers made
compellent demands of weaker states. I find that the survival hypothesis correctly
predicted the outcomes for two thirds of the cases, while the commitment hypothesis was
correct in less than half the crises.
I will first proceed by developing a data set for all cases of asymmetric interstate
crises. I code these cases according to the strategy the Great Power challenger chooses,
which allows me to examine the frequency of coercive cases and the nature of the
142 The ex ante objectives are the optimal demands that the powerful challenger has estimated the weak
target state will be just willing to concede.
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demands as compellent or deterrent. Second, I discuss my reasons for the coding criteria
for the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome. I also consider two alternative
dependent variables of coercion and coercive diplomacy outcome. I then assess the
success rates for Great Powers across countries and time and then compare my findings
with those from previous related research. Third, I make predictions for the outcomes of
all the cases, using the survival and commitment hypotheses. Fourth, I identify and code
key explanatory variables from the asymmetric coercion model for the challenger's
strategy, demands, threats, and signals. I also develop variables as proxies for survival
and commitment and include control variables which are relevant to conflict outcomes.
This allows me to conduct regression analysis and compare the survival and commitment
hypotheses while controlling for other factors which impact crises outcomes. I conclude
by examining my findings and identifying issues to assess in the qualitative cases in
Chapters 4 through 6.
THE DATA SET
My data set is drawn from the asymmetric crises since the end of World War 1.143
I select cases from the crises identified in The International Crisis Behavior Project
(ICB). The ICB database contains 455 interstate crises from 1918 to 2006.144 Since my
141I choose this time period for two reasons. First, the League of Nations was introduced an international
institution aimed at resolving state conflict. The League failed to prevent another world war, though, and
following WWII the victors founded the United Nations. Both institutions have been involved in a
significant number of asymmetric crises, and in many cases have authorized the use of force and sanctions.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg (2007) Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics. The second
reason for beginning with the end of World War I is more practical, based on the availability of data. I
identify Great Powers as the major powers identified by the Correlates of War majors2008. I.csv dataset
www.correlatesofwar org . This list includes the USA, Great Britain, France from 1816-1940 and 1945-
2008, Germany from 1925-1945 and 1991-2008, Italy from 1860-1943, USSR from 1922-2008, China
from 1950-2008, and Japan from 1895-1945 and 1991-2008
144 I only include cases until 2003 as the more recent asymmetric crises have not yet been resolved. The
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) database is an interactive version of the data and summaries originally
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interest is in dyadic cases between a Great Power and a weak state I utilize the research
of Kenneth Schultz and Jeffrey Lewis in their Coercive Diplomacy Database, with which
they expand the ICB database into 624 dyadic cases.145 From here, I eliminated crises
which are not asymmetric. I identified 116 asymmetric cases, in which Great Powers
challenged non-Great Power states (See Appendix 3A).146 I classified these cases as
either coercive or brute force strategies and, where coercive, I code demands as
compellent or deterrent (see Table 3.1 and Appendix 3A).147 The 116 cases average to
1.4 crises per year, which make asymmetric conflict a recurrent phenomenon in
international relations.
published in Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld (2000) A Study of Crisis Lansing MI: University
of Michigan Press, www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/ accessed 13 April 2010
145 I thank Kenneth Schultz and Jeffrey Lewis for providing me access to their data, including the crisis
summaries for each case which proved invaluable.
146 1 began with 208 asymmetric cases from the Schultz and Lewis dataset and reduced these further to 109
by reducing a crisis which has multiple dyads into a single dyadic case by examining which of the Great
Powers was most involved in the conflict. I also eliminated cases where the Great Power did not challenge
the weak state or had no discernable objectives for the crisis. I also include 5 additional cases which I
identify in chapters 4-6, for the crises between the United States and Iraq, Serbia, the Bosnian Serbs, and
Libya.
1 It is important to note that these asymmetric cases are contingent on a crisis occurring. As such, omitted
are unobserved cases where a Great Power avoided a crisis when it chose to accommodate a weak state.
Conditioning on crises restricts cases to primarily coercion or brute force. There is a single case where a
challenger initiated a brute force strategy to then later change the strategy to accommodate the target: the
French in Vietnam in 1954. These omissions of cases of accommodation are unfortunate, but unavoidable
due to the nature of the dependent variable. Foreign policy outcome measures success or failure based on
the challenger's ex ante objectives given the issue at stake. In cases of accommodation, however, the
challenger has an incentive not to reveal compromises it makes in order to avoid reputation or audience
costs. As with deterrence, with accommodation it is difficult to ascertain whether the crises was avoided
because the challenger accommodated the target, and even if it can be identified it is difficult to determine
whether the challenge achieved its core ex ante objectives.
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Table 3.1: Frequency of Asymmetric Interstate Conflict (1918-2003)
From Table 3.1, two questions which I asked earlier can now be addressed. First,
as to how often Great Powers choose coercion, coercive strategies were chosen twice as
frequently as brute force (87 compared to 43). Coercion was chosen 75% of the time but,
in 12% of the cases, Great Powers adopt coercion initially only to later switch to brute
148 Since deterrence in asymmetric crises is rare, the following summary is provided. In 1922 the United
Kingdom deterred Turkey from invading Thrace after Turkey had defeated Greek forces in Anatolia. In
1927 Japan deployed forces to Manchuria to deter China from threatening Japanese economic interests
there. In 1956 the USSR deployed forces to Poland's border in a failed attempt to deter the Polish
Communist party from electing Wladyslaw Gomulka as party leader. In 1961, after Kuwait was granted
independence, the United Kingdom deployed forces to Kuwait to deter Iraq from taking military action. In
1964, following the alleged attack on the USS Maddox by North Vietnam, the U.S. conducted military
strikes to deter North Vietnam from taking further military action. In 1975, in response to Guatemala
deploying forces to the Belize border, the United Kingdom deployed forces to deter an invasion. Again in
1977, following the granting of independence to Belize, the United Kingdom again deployed forces to deter
Guatemala from taking military action. In 1983 the U.S. deployed troops to Honduras to deter the
Nicaraguans from taking military action. And in 1991 Russia threatened war with Turkey when Turkey
threatened to intervene in fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
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Strategy Great United Other (non
Powers States U.S.) Great
Powers
Total 116 41 75
(% of total) (35%) (66%)
Coercion Total 87 (75%) 33 (80%) 54 (72%)
Compellence 77 (66%) 30(73%) 47 (63%)
Deterrence 10 (9%) 3 (7%) 7 (9%)
(% of top row)
Coercion Only 73(63%) 28 (68%) 45 (60%)
Compellence 63 (55%) 25(61%) 38 (51%)
10 (9%) 3(7%) 7 (9%)
Deterrence148
Coercion Initial/
Brute Force Final 14 (12%) 5 (12%) 9 (12%)
Compellence 14 (12%) 5 (12%) 9 (12%)
Deterrence 0 0 0
Brute Force Only 29 (25%) 6 (15%) 21(28%)
Brute Force Total 43 (37%) 11 (27%) 30 (40%)
(% of top row) , II
force strategies. Second, comparing the United States to other Great Powers, the U.S. is
the country most frequently involved in asymmetric conflict, responsible for initiating a
third of all asymmetric crises.149 In addition, the U.S. chooses to coerce more frequently
than other Great Powers, 80% of the time as compared to 72%, respectively.
Strategy Overall Interwar World War II Cold War Post-Cold
1918-1938 1939-1945 1946-1989 War
1990-2003
Total 116 26 22 46 22
(% of total) (22%) (19%) (40%) (19%)
Coercion Total 87 (75%) 19 (73%) 17 (77%) 34 (74%) 17 (77%)
Compellence 77 (66%) 17 (65%) 17 (77%) 27 (59%) 16 (73%)
Deterrence 10 (9%) 2 (8%) 0 7 (15%) 1 (5%)
(% of top row)
Coercion Only 73(63%) 14 (54%) 14 (64%) 32 (70%) 13 (59%)
Compellence 63 (54%) 12(46%) 14 (64%) 25 (55%) 12 (55%)
Deterrence 10 (9%) 2(8%) 0 7 (15%) 1(5%)
(% of top row)
Coercion Initial/
Brute Force Final 14 (12%) 5 (19%) 3 (13%) 2 (4%) 4 (18%)
Compellence 14 (12%) 5 (19%) 3 (13%) 2 (4%) 4 (18%)
Deterrence 0 0 0 0 0
(% of top row)
Brute Force Only 29 7 5 12 5
(% of top row) (25%) (27%) (23%) (26%) (23%)
Brute Force Total 43 12 8 14 9
(% of top row) (37%) (46%) (36%) (30%) (41%)
Table 3.2: Asymmetric Interstate Conflicts Across Time
Since the international environment has changed over time, it is also useful to
compare the frequency of conflicts in various periods (see Table 3.2, above). I divide the
cases into four periods: Interwar (1918-1938), World War 11 (1939-1945), Cold War
149 The U.S. was involved in 41 cases, followed by the USSR/Russia with 23 cases, and Nazi Germany with
13. The ranking changes if viewed according to the number of crises per year. Per year Nazi Germany
leads, as all 13 of its asymmetric crises transpired between 1925 and 1945 for an average of .65 crises/yr.
The U.S. is second with .48 crises/year and the USSR third (1922-1990) at .33crises/yr.
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(1946-1989), and Post-Cold War (1990-2003). " The frequency of coercive strategies is
consistent across time, with coercion still the preferred strategy, chosen 73% - 77% of the
time.
In sum, across countries and time, asymmetric conflict occurs on a regular basis,
with coercion being the strategy most commonly adopted. The United States initiates the
greatest number of crises and chooses to coerce more frequently than do other Great
Powers. Yet to be addressed, however, is how successful Great Powers are at achieving
their foreign policy objectives. In the next section, I develop coding criteria for the
dependent variable offoreign policy outcome, which allows me to assess how often Great
Powers succeed in obtaining their foreign policy aims. I also identify and code
alternative dependent variables, that of coercion outcome and coercive diplomacy
outcome, which allows for a comparison of my findings with previous research.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Foreign Policy Outcome
The dependent variable for this quantitative study is the challenger'sforeign
policy outcome, a measure of whether the challenger achieves its core ex ante objectives
(see Appendix 3.B for coding rules). Focusing on ex ante core objectives reduces three
potential coding problems. First, it reduces the likelihood of miscoding cases in which
the challenger has actually gone on to lower its demands significantly once the target
resists. Without such a restriction, cases of obvious foreign policy failure would be
coded as a success.
"0 The Post-Cold War period ends in 2001. I include the three cases after September 11, 2001 in the Post-
Cold War period.
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For example, in 1968 North Korea captured the USS Pueblo, an electronics and
signals intelligence gathering ship operating off the coast of North Korea.' 5 1 Initially, the
U.S. demanded North Korea return the Pueblo and its crew and formally apologize.
After 11 months of negotiations, the U.S. reduced its demands to gain the return of the 83
crewmen only and issued an admission of its own guilt in deploying the Pueblo as a spy
ship. This was clearly a failure of U.S. policy, which should not be coded a success on
the basis that North Korea eventually conceded to the United States' drastically reduced
demands. 52
Second, focusing on core objectives prevents too high a bar being set for
measuring success. In negotiations, strategic actors expect to concede on some points in
order to reach an agreement. Such public concessions by the challenger provide the
target state's leader the means of saving face, thus reducing some of the audience costs
incurred by acceding to the remaining demands. As a result, the challenger brings to the
bargaining table higher demands than it knows it will likely achieve, some of which it is
prepared to sacrifice in order to reach an agreement. If the coding for the foreign policy
outcome were based on all the challenger's ex ante objectives, it would lead to too many
outcomes being miscoded as failure.
For example, during the Kosovo crisis in January of 1999, the U.S. demanded
Serbia withdraw its troops from Kosovo and allow in NATO peacekeepers. The U.S.
later adjusted this demand to also allow in Russian troops under a UN Security Council
mandate. This U.S. concession, however, did not change the core demand that Serbia
forfeit control over Kosovo.
"' North Korea claimed it was operating in its territorial waters while the U.S. maintained it was in
international waters.
52 I code this a partial failure since North Korea conceded to only one of the U.S. three demands.
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Third, this coding criterion is based on objectives determined by the challenger.
It is not simply a measurement of what or how much the challenger obtains in the
conflict. If it were, it would not factor in the value the challenger places on the issue,
which is determined by its interests, nor does it consider the challenger's costs for
obtaining them. If the challenger's interests are non-vital, the increased costs of
obtaining a high-level concession, such as homeland territory, may make such an
outcome less desirable than lesser objectives gained at a reduced cost. Coding foreign
policy outcome as the degree to which the challenger achieves its ex ante core objectives,
however, surmounts this problem, as the challenger determines the level of demands
made by first assessing its interests, expected benefits, and expected costs. As a result,
success or failure is not measured by the level of objectives obtained, but by the degree to
which the objectives identified by the challenger are met.
A weakness of a dyadic (success/failure) coding scheme is that it does not allow
for partial outcomes. I therefore expand the coding criteria for the dependent variable by
including outcomes of partial success and partial failure. 53
Two Additional Dependent Variables: Coercion and Coercive Diplomacy Outcomes
In addition to foreign policy outcome, there are two alternative dependent
variables which have been applied in previous research: coercion outcome and coercive
153 This is the same coding method adopted by Hufbauer, Schott and Eliot for their research on U.S.
economic sanctions. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg
(2007) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International
Economics. Such a fine tune adjustment to the dependent variable does not, however, alleviate the problem
with certain ambiguous cases which have elements of both success and failure. For example, in the crisis
between the United States and Libya in 1986 over demands that Libya stop its support of terrorism the
result of the crisis was stalemate. Libya significantly reduced its terrorist activities, but did not stop them
altogether which ultimately led to a second crisis with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland in December of 1988. A partial fix for this problem of coding foreign policy outcome for
ambiguous cases is to conduct robustness checks to determine whether reversing the coding for these cases
changes the overall results, see Table 10 Robust check II.
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diplomacy outcome.154 Coercion outcome evaluates whether theforeign policy outcome
was a success or failure and whether it was the coercive strategy that was responsible for
that outcome. Coercion codes as a failure cases in which a brute force strategy is later
adopted, even if the challenger subsequently achieves its foreign policy objectives. Since
there are 14 such cases in the Asymmetric Interstate Data set (see Appendix 3.A), the
coercion success rate is much lower than that forforeign policy outcome. Coercive
diplomacy similarly codes cases as a failure if brute force is later adopted. It also codes
13 cases of coercion success as coercive diplomacy failures, as the challenger employed
limited force beyond that of exemplary military action (see Table 3.5).
I adopt the foreign policy outcome as the dependent variable for quantitative
analysis over coercion or coercive diplomacy for two reasons. First, my data set includes
both cases of coercive and brute force strategies while coercion and coercive diplomacy
assume that all cases are coercive. It would be inappropriate, however, to code as a
failure those cases in which the challenger never chooses to coerce. Second, as
previously mentioned, coercion and coercive diplomacy code as a failure those cases in
which the challenger abandons coercion for a brute force strategy. Thefinal strategy
chosen by the challenger, however, is an explanatory variable within the asymmetric
coercion model. The fact that both coercion and coercive diplomacy code the success or
failure of the outcome according to whether a brute force strategy is adopted introduces
1 54Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
George, Alexander L. and William E. Simons (1994) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy Boulder:
Westview Press, Sechser, Todd S. (2007) Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent
Threats in International Crises dissertation Stanford University, Art, Robert and Patrick Cronin ed. (2003)
The United States and Coercive Diplomacy Washington: US Institute of Peace Press
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endogeneity into regression analysis, as both dependent variables are correlated withfinal
strategy.
In sum, I employforeign policy outcome as the dependent variable for further
quantitative analysis. I also include codings both for coercion and coercive diplomacy in
order to compare my findings with those of previous research.
Foreign Policy Outcomes in Cases of Asymmetric Conflict
In the previous section I developed coding criteria for the dependent variable of
foreign policy outcome. This enables me to analyze how successful the coercive and
brute force strategies have been at achieving the foreign policy objectives of Great
Powers. Table 3.3, below, presents the foreign policy success rate for the 116
asymmetric interstate crises I have identified (see Appendix 3.A for a list of cases).
Strategy Great Power United States Other (non-U.S.)Great
Foreign Policy Foreign Policy Power Foreign Policy
Success Success Success
Success/Total 84/116 (72%) 29/41 (71%) 55/75 (73%)
Coercion Total 63/87 (72%) 23/33 (70%) 40/54 (74%)
Compellence 55/77 (71%) 21/30 (70%) 34/47 (72%)
Deterrence 8/10 (80%) 2/3 (67%) 6/7 (86%)
Coercion Only 51/73 (70%) 20/28 (71%) 31/45 (69%)
Compellence 43/63 (68%) 18/25 (72%) 25/38 (66%)
Deterrence 8/10 (80%) 2/3 (67%) 6/7 (86%)
Coercion Initial/
Brute Force Final 12/14 (86%) 3/5 (60%) 9/9 (100%)
Compellence 12/14 (86%) 3/5 (60%) 9/9 (100%)
Deterrence 0 0 0
Brute Force Only 21/29 (72%) 6/8 (75%) 15/21 (71%)
Brute Force Total 33/43 (77%) 9/13 (69%) 24/30 (80%)
Table 3.3: Foreign Policy Success Rates
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Three findings are particularly worth noting. First, Great Powers are, more often
than not, successful in obtaining their foreign policy objectives against weak states,
whether coercive or brute force strategies are adopted. From the second column, second
row of Table 3.3, one can see that Great Powers succeed in obtaining their core foreign
policy objectives 72% of the time. Second, brute force strategies are only slightly more
successful than coercive strategies (77% versus 72%, respectively). 5 5 Third, the United
States' foreign policy success rate (71% total, 71% coercion only) is not significantly
different than that of other (non-U.S.) Great Powers (73% total, 69% coercion only).156
It is also informative to review how success rates vary across time (see Table 3.4,
below). During the Cold War, the success rate for coercion and brute force is
significantly lower than other periods. In only 50% of cases do Great Powers achieve
their foreign policy objectives, whether through coercion or brute force. This lower
success rate stems primarily from the asymmetric crises involving the Soviet Union or
China, which combined for roughly half the total number of cases but with successful
outcomes in only 6 of their 22 cases (27%).m5 There are two explanations for these poor
results. First, these asymmetric crises occurred in the midst of the Cold War pitting the
Soviet Union and/or China against the United States. U.S. intervention or the threat of
intervention offset the balance of power enjoyed by the USSR and China against target
states. For example the U.S. intervened in the crisis between the USSR and Turkey in
". From Table 3.3, second column, last row brute force strategies succeed in 33/43 (77%) of cases while
coercion succeeds in 63/87 (72%) of cases (second column third row).
156 From Table 3.3, third column, second row U.S. foreign policy success total 29/41 (72%), U.S. coercion
only from third column, fourth row 20/28 (71%), Other Great Power success total from column 4 second
row 55/75 (73%), and Other Great power coercion only from column 4 fourth row 31/45 (69%).
157 See Appendix A. The Soviet Union were successful in 1956 vs. Israel over Suez Nationalization-War,
1956 vs. Hungary over the Hungarian Uprising, 1968 vs. Czechoslovakia in the Prague Spring, 1973 vs.
Israel in Yom Kippur War, 1979 vs. Afghanistan in the Afghanistan Invasion, and 1980 vs. Poland in
Solidarity. By contrast China was unsuccessful in all 6 crises versus Taiwan, India and Vietnam.
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1946 over control of the Turkish Straits and again in 1954 and 1958 in the crises between
China and Taiwan over the Taiwan Straits.
A second explanation notes that Soviet and Chinese leaders were prone to initiate
crises from which they were then willing to back down if the target resisted. Given the
autocratic nature of the communist parties in the Soviet Union and China, they may well
not have suffered significant audience costs for backing down from crises. 158
Strategy Great Power InterWar World War II Cold War Post-Cold
Foreign Policy 1918-1938 1939-1945 1946-1989 War
1990-2001
Success/Total 84/116 (72%) 25/26 (96%) 19/22 (86%) 23/46 (50%) 17/22 (77%)
Coercion Total 63/87 (72%) 19/19 (100%) 14/17 (82%) 17/34 (50%) 13/17 (76%)
Compellence 55/77 (71%) 17/17 (100%) 14/17 (82%) 12/27 (44%) 12/16 (75%)
Deterrence 8/10 (80%) 2/2 (100%) 0 5/7 (71%) 1/1 (100%)
Coercion Only 51/73 (70%) 14/14 (100%) 11/14(79%) 16/32 (50%) 10/13 (77%)
Compellence 43/63 (68%) 12/12 (100%) 11/14 (79%) 11/25 (44%) 9/12 (75%)
Deterrence 8/10 (80%) 2/2 (100%) 0 5/7 (71%) 1/1 (100%)
Coercion Initial/
Brute Force Final 12/14 (86%) 5/5 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 1/2 (50%) 3/4 (75%)
Compellence 12/14 (86%) 5/5 (100%) 3/3 (100%) 1/2 (50%) 3/4 (75%)
Deterrence 0 0 0 0 0
Brute Force Only 21/29 (72%) 6/7 (86%) 5/5 (100%) 6/12 (50%) 4/5 (80%)
Brute Force Total 33/43 (77%) 11/12 (92%) 8/8 (100%) 7/14 (50%) 7/9 (78%)
Table 3.4: Foreign Policy Success by Time Periods
In sum, coding by the type of strategy employed, the nature of the coercive
demand (compellent or deterrent), and crisis outcome provides important descriptive
statistics to assess both the frequency of crises and coercive strategies, as well as the
overall success rates for Great Powers in asymmetric conflicts. Asymmetric crises occur
often and Great Powers usually succeed at gaining their foreign policy objectives. They
158 Daryl Press analyzes the Soviet Union's willingness to back down from its threats in the Berlin crisis
and Cuban missile crisis. Press, Daryl G. (2005) Calculating Credibility How Leaders Assess Military
Threats Ithica NY: Cornell University Press, 4, 80-141.
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also choose coercion more often than brute force and, in coercive cases, they more often
seek compellent rather than deterrent demands. 5 9 The U.S. is the Great Power most
frequently initiating asymmetric conflicts and, with the exception of the Soviet Union and
China during the Cold War, its success rate does not vary much from that of other Great
Powers.
In light of these findings from Tables 3.1-3.4, I take up in the next section the
question of how my results compare with those of previous researchers.' 60
Compellence in Asymmetric Conflict
In 87 out of the 116 cases in the database, Great Powers choose coercive
strategies. Of these, only 10 are cases with deterrent demands. As discussed in Chapter
1, the difficulty with coding deterrent cases lies in determining whether a target's actions
are caused by the challenger's coercive strategy. To avoid this problem, I exclude
deterrent cases and instead focus on the 77 cases in which the Great Power makes
compellent demands. Table 3.5, below, lists these cases by year, challenger, target, and
crisis name. Success/failure codings are listed for the three dependent variables of
foreign policy, coercion, and coercive diplomacy. I also include predictions from the
survival and the commitment hypotheses. These project the likely outcomes of the crises
according to the level of threat to target survival and the credibility of the Great Power to
159 Table 3.4, from column 2 row 3, one can see that 77 of the 87 coercion cases are compellence while
only 10 are deterrence cases.
160 I compare findings with those on coercive diplomacy from George, Alexander L. and William E.
Simons (1994) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy Boulder: Westview Press, and Art, Robert and Patrick
Cronin ed. (2003) The United States and Coercive Diplomacy Washington: US Institute of Peace Press,
and on compellence from
Sechser, Todd S. (2007) Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in
International Crises dissertation Stanford University
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not make further demands, based on whether it had deployed military forces capable of
backing them up. I examine these predictions in more detail in a later section.
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TABLE 3.5 (1 of 4): 77 CASES OF ASYMMETRIC COMPELLENCE 161
Foreign Policy Coercion Coercive Survival Commitment
YEAR CHALLENGER TARGET CRISIS NAME Outcome Outcome Diplomacy Prediction162 Prediction 13
1918 United States Costa Rica Costa Rican Coup Success Success Success Failure
1919 France Hungary Hungarian War Success Failure Failure Failure Success
1920 France Germany Rhenish Rebellions Partial Success Success Failure Success Failure
1921 United States Panama Costa Rica/Panama Border Success Success Success Success* Failure
1921 France Germany German Reparations Success Success Failure Success Failure
1921 France Austria Austrian Separatists Success Success Success Success Failure
1923 France Germany Ruhr I Partial Success Success Failure Success Failure
1923 Italy Greece Corfu Incident Success Success Failure Success Failure
1924 United Kingdom Turkey Mosul Land Dispute Success Success Failure Success Success
1926 United States Nicaragua Nicaragua Civil War I Success Success Success Success*
1926 Italy Albania Hegemony Over Albania Partial Success Success Success Failure Failure
1929 USSR China Chinese Eastern Railway Success Failure Failure Success Failure
1932 Japan China Shanghai Success Failure Failure Success Failure
1933 Japan China Jehol Campaign Success Failure Failure Failure Failure
1934 Italy Ethiopia Ethiopian War Success Failure Failure Failure Failure
1935 Germany Lithuania Kaunas Trials Success Success Success Success Failure
1938 Germany Austria Anschluss Success Success Success Success*
1938 Germany Czechoslovakia Munich Success Success Success Failure Failure
1939 Germany Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia's Annexation Success Success Success Failure
1939 Germany Lithuania Memel Success Success Success Success Failure
1939 Italy Albania Invasion of Albania Success Failure Failure Failure
1939 Germany Poland Entry Into World War II Success Failure Failure Success Failure
1939 USSR Latvia Soviet Occupation of the Baltic Success Success Success Success* Failure
1939 USSR Estonia Soviet Occupation of the Baltic Success Success Success Success* Failure
161 Asterick indicates
Great Power.
that while the overall demands threaten survival, the prediction is still for success since target did not have the military means to resist the
162 The survival prediction predicts the likely outcome (success/failure) of the crises based on whether concessions threatened target survival.
163 The commitment prediction predicts the likely outcome (success/failure) of the crises according to the credibility of the Great Power commitment not to make
further demands, based on whether it had deployed military forces capable of backing up additional demands.
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TABLE 3.5 (2 of 4): 77 CASES OF ASYMMETRIC COMPELLENCE164
Foreign Policy Coercion Coercive Survival Commitment
YEAR CHALLENGER TARGET CRISIS NAME Outcome Outcome Diplomacy Prediction Prediction
1939 USSR Lithuania Soviet Occupation of the Baltic Success Success Success Success* Failure
1939 USSR Finland Finnish War Success Failure Failure Failure165  Failure
1940 USSR Romania Romanian Territory Success Success Success Success Failure
1941 USSR Iran Occupation of Iran Success Failure Failure Success Failure
1944 Germany Hungary German Occupation of Hungary Success Success Success Success*
1944 USSR Romania Soviet Occupation East Europe Success Success Failure Failure
1944 USSR Iran Iran-Oil Concessions Failure Failure Failure Success Success
1945 USSR Romania Communism in Romania Success Success Success Success*
1945 United States Yugoslavia Trieste I Success Success Success Success Failure
1945 USSR Turkey Kars-Ardahan Failure Failure Failure Failure Success
1945 USSR Iran Azerbaijan Failure Failure Failure Success Failure
1946 USSR Turkey Turkish Straits Failure Failure Failure Failure Failure
1948 United Kingdom Israel Sinai Incursion Success Success Success Success166  Success
1949 USSR Yugoslavia Soviet Bloc/Yugoslavia Partial Failure Failure Failure Success Failure
1950 United States North Korea Korean War II Partial Failure Failure Failure Failure
1951 United Kingdom Egypt Suez Canal Success Success Failure Success Success
1956 USSR Israel Suez Nationalization-War Success Success Success Success Failure
1958 China Taiwan Taiwan Strait I Failure Failure Failure Failure Failure
1961 United States North Vietnam Pathet Lao Offensive Success Success Success Success Failure
1965 United States North Vietnam Pleiku Failure Failure Failure Failure Failure
1965 China India Kashmir II Failure Failure Failure Failure Success
164 Asterick indicates that while the overall demands threaten survival, the prediction is still for success since target did not
Great Power.
have the military means to resist the
165 In 1939 the Soviet Union demanded some Finnish islands and an adjustment to its shared border. Survival hypothesis predicts coercion failure as this
threatened Finnish homeland territory. The Soviet Union had deployed military forces along the border capable of making additional territorial demands. The
commitment hypothesis predicts coercion failure, as the Soviet Union was likely to make additional demands. As a result of the ensuing war, the Soviet Union
did end up with more territory than originally demanded.
166 Great Britain demanded Israel withdraw its troops from Egypt. Demands did not threaten Israel survival so survival hypothesis predicts coercion success.
Deployed British forces were not capable of backing up further demands of Israel so commitment hypothesis also predicts coercion success.
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TABLE 3.5 (3 of 4):,77 CASES OF ASYMMETRIC COMPELLENCE167
Foreign Policy Coercion Coercive Survival Commitment
YEAR CHALLENGER TARGET CRISIS NAME Outcome Outcome Diplomacy Prediction Prediction
1968 United States North Korea Pueblo Partial Failure Failure Failure Success Success
1968 USSR Czechoslovakia Prague Spring Success Failure Failure Success Failure
1972 United States North Vietnam Vietnam Ports Mining Success Success Failure Success Failure
1972 United States North Vietnam Christmas Bombing Partial Success Success Failure Success Failure
1973 USSR Israel October-Yom Kippur War Success Success Success Success Success
1976 United States North Korea Poplar Tree Partial Success Success Success Success Success
1978 China Vietnam Sino/Vietnam War Failure Failure Failure Success Failure
1979 USSR Pakistan Soviet Threat/Pakistan Failure Failure Failure Success Success
1980 USSR Poland Solidarity Success Success Success Success Failure
1981 France Libya Chad/Libya V Success Success Success Success Success
1981 United States Libya Gulf of Syrte I Failure Failure Failure Success Failure
1983 France Libya Chad/Libya VI Partial Failure Failure Failure Success Success
1986 France Libya Chad/Libya VII Partial Failure Failure Failure Success Success
1986 United States Libya El Dorado Canyon Partial Failure Failure Failure Success Failure
1988 United States Libya Libyan Jets Failure Success Failure Success Failure
1990 United States Iraq Gulf War Partial Success Success Failure Success Failure
1991 United States Iraq Bush Ultimatum during Gulf War Success Failure Failure Failure Failure
1993 United States North Korea North Korea Nuclear Crisis Partial Failure Failure Failure Success Success
1994 United States Haiti Haiti Military Regime Success Success Success Success*
1994 United States Iraq Iraq Troop Deployment/Kuwait Success Success Success Success Success
1995 China Taiwan Taiwan Strait IV Partial Failure Failure Failure Failure Success
1995 United States Serbia Bosnian Civil War Success Success Success Success Success
1995 United States Bosnian Serbs Bosnian Civil War168  Partial Success Success Failure Success Failure
1996 United States Iraq Desert Strike Failure Failure Failure Success Success
1997 United States Iraq UNSCOM I Success Success Success Success Success
1998 United States Afghanistan US Embassy Bombings Failure Failure Failure Success Success
167 Asterick indicates that while the overall demands threaten survival, the prediction is still for success since target did not have the military means to resist the
Great Power.
168 See Chapter 5 for full description of Bosnian Civil War.
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TABLE 3.5 (4 of 4): 77 CASES OF ASYMMETRIC COMPELLENCE' 6 9
Foreign Policy Coercion Coercive Survival Commitment
YEAR CHALLENGER TARGET CRISIS NAME Outcome Outcome Diplomacy Prediction Prediction
1998 United States Iraq UNSCOM II (Desert Fox) Failure Failure Failure Success Success
1998 United States Serbia Kosovo Success Success Failure Failure Success
2001 United States Libya Weapons of Mass Destruction Success Success Success Success Failure
2002 United States Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Success Success Success Success Failure
169 Asterick indicates that while the overall demands threaten survival, the prediction is still for success since target did not have the military means to resist the
Great Power.
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Table 3.6, below, presents the success rates for the dependent variables offoreign
policy outcome, coercion, and coercive diplomacy for the 77 compellence cases from
Table 3.5. From the second column the Great Powers success rate for coercion (56%) is
significantly lower than that for foreign policy outcome (7 1%). This is expected, given
that the 12 cases in which the challenger initially chose coercion but later adopted brute
force, are all coded as coercion failures. Coercive diplomacy for Great Powers has an
even lower success rate (43%), as in 10 cases coded as successful coercion, military force
was more than exemplary and crossed the threshold of violence. These cases are all
therefore coded as coercive diplomacy failures.
Great Powers United States Other (non U.S.)
(77 Cases) (30 Cases) Great Powers
(47 Cases)
Foreign Policy 55/77 20/30 35/47
Outcome Success (71%) (67%) (74%)
Coercion 43/77 18/30 25/47
Outcome Success (56%) (60%) (53%)
Coercive
Diplomacy 33/77 13/30 18/47
Outcome Success (43%) (43%) (38%)
Table 3.6: Asymmetric Compellence Success Rates17 0
Comparing Findings with Other Research
To assess how reasonable the results in Table 3.6 are, I compare these to the
findings of other researchers on coercion, coercive diplomacy, and compellence. A direct
comparison is somewhat hampered, however, as researchers have focused on varying
170 Foreign policy outcome is coded a success if the Great Power achieved its ex ante core objectives either
through coercion or brute force. Coercion outcome is a success if the Great Power achieved its objectives
without having to resort to a brute force strategy of engaging in major military operations or invasion.
Coercive Diplomacy is a success if coercion succeeded without taking more than exemplary military
action.
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research questions, which have led to different scope conditions. This, in turn, results in
different cases being selected and alternative dependent variables studied. I examine
three datasets which are most closely related to cases of asymmetric compellence cases.
These include Robert Pape's work on airpower and coercion, George & Simons and Art
& Cronin's combined research on the United States and coercive diplomacy, and Todd
Sechser's most recent research on compellence (see Table 3.7).
Table 3.7: Comparison of Asymmetric Compellence with Previous Research
Robert Pape's Bombing to Win investigates 40 cases of airpower coercion. He
codes 16 cases as successful for an overall success rate of 40%. 171 In Pape's data set 17
of the cases are asymmetric, from which he concludes 9 are successful for a 53%
171 Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press
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Asymmetric Pape George & Simon Sechser
Compellence Air and Art & Cronin Compellence
Power U.S. Coercive
Coercion Diplomacy
Coercion 16/40 65/139
Success (40%) (47%)
Asymmetric 43/77 9/17
Coercion (56%) (53%)
Success
Asymmetric 31/77 26/66
Coercive (40%) (39%)
Diplomacy
Success
U.S. Asymmetric 13/30 6/19
Coercive (43%) (32%)
Diplomacy
Success
asymmetric coercion success rate.172 This is quite close to the 56% asymmetric success
rate I calculate in Table 3.7, though two points need to be clarified. First, Pape codes
coercion a success for some cases which involve major combat operations. In his view,
coercion is still a success if the target concedes while it still retains the means to resist. I,
however, instead code such cases as brute force strategies.173 Ceteris paribus, this should
produce for Pape an overall coercion success rate higher than my own, though a second
consideration explains why this is not actually the case. Pape draws all his cases from
what he calls "important" conflicts which involve higher level foreign policy demands.174
As such, these cases may have a lower overall success rate as compared to the cases in
my data set which incorporate a wider range of demands, including lower demands for
policy change. Even though differences in the coding the dependent variable and in case
selection makes a direct comparison imperfect, it is still useful to know that my coercion
success rate is very close to Pape's.
Alexander George and William Simons, in their seminal work on The Limits of
Coercive Diplomacy, examine 7 U.S. cases of coercive diplomacy. Robert Art and
Patrick Cronin in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, have added 15 crises for a
total of 22 cases, 7 of which they code as successful for an overall coercive diplomacy
172 12 of the 17 asymmetric cases are included in my dataset. Not included is Britain in Somaliland in
1920, which I exclude as a non-state target, Germany's invasion of the Netherlands in 1940 which I code
strictly as brute force, the Korean War in 1950 and 1953 which I combine as a single case, France and
Algeria which I exclude as a non-state target, and the USSR in Afghanistan in 1978-88 which I exclude as
a non-state target.
173 Pape codes Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939, the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939, and the
Korean War all coercion successes, while I code them as brute force strategies. Pape, Robert (1996)
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press 52
m Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press
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success rate of 32%.175 Comparing only U.S. crises from my data, I code 13 of 30 cases
as coercive diplomacy successes for a success rate of 43%. 176 Art and Cronin argue,
however, that their and George and Simons combined data set is both small and not
representative of the universe of coercive diplomacy cases. Since these cases are drawn
from the most well known and difficult cases for coercive diplomacy, they argue that
their success rate of 32% underestimates coercive diplomacy success. 77 Given this, my
result of 43% is not unexpected.
The final research with which I compare my results is recent work on
compellence by Todd Sechser.17 8 He employs the International Crisis Behavior (ICB)
database, as I do, and identifies 139 compellent cases, of which he codes 65 as successful
for an overall coercion success rate of 47%. Sechser's coding of his dependent variable
for compellent outcomes most closely fits the coding criteria I employ for coercive
diplomacy.179 Of these 139 cases, 66 are asymmetric with Great Power challengers, of
which Sechser codes 26 as successes for an overall success rate of 39%.1 80 This is close
to the 40% success rate I calculated for coercive diplomacy (see Table 3.7).
' Three of these cases, however, are not asymmetric, although this does not change their overall success
rate.
176 My dataset includes 15 of the 20 asymmetric cases in the combined George & Simon and Art & Cronin
dataset. Excluded is the Nicaragua case which I code as deterrent, two Somalia cases which I exclude as
the target as non-state actors, and 1991 Safe Haven and 1993 No Fly Zones in Iraq which I code as brute
force.
177 Art, Robert and Patrick Cronin ed. (2003) The United States and Coercive Diplomacy Washington: US
Institute of Peace Press 387
178 Sechser, Todd S. (2007) Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in
International Crises dissertation Stanford University
179 Sechser, Todd S. (2007) Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in
International Crises dissertation Stanford University I11.
180 My dataset of 77 compellent cases and Sechser's 66 asymmetric cases which include only 20 similar
cases. This variation in case selection is in large part due to selection criteria as I do no include many of his
cases as being either brute force, or deterrent. Also Sechser includes multiple dyads from the same crisis in
the database. Of the 20 cases which overlap we agree on the coding of 16 out of 20 outcomes.
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Overall, my findings on coercion and coercive diplomacy outcomes are consistent
with earlier findings from related coercion research. With this confirmation, I now return
to test the survival and commitment hypotheses for coercion outcomes.
SURVIVAL AND COMMITMENT HYPOTHESES
One means to examine the survival and commitment hypotheses is to compare the
predictions they make for the outcomes of the 77 compellent cases (Table 3.5). The
survival hypothesis predicts that the target state will likely resist and coercion will fail
when its survival is threatened, so long as it has the means to resist. The commitment
hypothesis predicts coercion will fail if the challenger cannot make credible promises, ex
ante, not to make additional demands. The commitment problem is more likely to arise if
the challenger has already deployed military forces which can credibly back up more
demands. 8 2 In the last two columns of Table 3.5, I list the predictions for these two
hypotheses. Table 3.8 provides a synopsis for how often each hypothesis correctly
predicts the crises outcomes. Overall, the survival hypothesis (66%) performs much
better than the commitment hypothesis (43%).
For this assessment only target state survival is evaluated. In the regression analysis I include additional
variables for regime and leadership regime survival.
182 Commitment problems are more likely in asymmetric crises since Great Powers have the military
capacity to back up threats against weaker states, the situation Todd Sechser dubs "Goliath's Curse."
Sechser, Todd S. (2007) Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in
International Crises dissertation Stanford University. This insight, however, does not provide ex ante
predictors of coercion success or failure for specific asymmetric cases. To make testable the credible
commitment hypothesis, the remedy I adopt is one suggested by Sir Julian Corbett, who noted "that limited
wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which
they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive point." Corbett, Julian (1988), Some Principles of
Maritime Strategy United States Naval Institute: Annapolis, Md. It is, therefore, those Great Powers that
deploy offensive military forces capable of backing up further demands which are more likely to encounter
commitment problems.
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Survival Commitment
Hypothesis Hypothesis
Correct 51 29
Predictions
Total 77 67
Predictions
Percentage of 66% 43%
Predictions
Correct
Table 3.8: Comparing Predictions of Survival and Commitment Hypotheses
in 77 Asymmetric Compellence Cases
Two points need to be addressed. First, the commitment hypothesis only makes
predictions for 67 of the 77 compellence cases. Concessions made to demands in 10 of
the crises would have led to the target's demise. For such cases, the logic of commitment
problems breaks down. The credibility of a challenger's promise not to make future
demands means nothing to a target that does not expect to be around in the future.
Second, in 9 of the 77 cases the target state does not have the military capability to resist
the Great Power. The survival hypothesis predicts coercion success for these cases since
even though a target may want to resist, it has no choice since it has no means to do so.183
In sum, though the survival hypothesis better predicts coercion outcomes than
does the commitment hypothesis, there are other factors which also affect outcomes. In
the next section, I examine explanatory and control variables which, when incorporated
into regression analysis, allow an evaluation of the survival and commitment hypotheses
while controlling for these factors.
183 If these cases were all coded as failures the survival hypothesis predictions would be reduced to 55%
(51/77), which is only slightly better than predictions made by a coin toss, though still better than the
commitment hypothesis predictions
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EXPLANA TORY VARIABLES
In this section, I operationalize variables for the asymmetric coercion model
developed in Chapter 2. The model includes the challenger's strategy and if it changes
strategies in later stages itsfinal strategy, which I code as compellence, deterrence, brute
force, or accommodation (see Appendix 3.A). For coercion cases I introduce core
demands, threats, and signals (see Appendix 3.B for coding rules). For the survival and
commitment hypotheses discussed in the previous section I develop variables for state
survival, regime survival, leader survival, and commitment. Finally, I identify control
variables also relevant to conflict outcomes; military power, contiguity, allies, intrawar
conflict, sanctions, institutions, polity, superpower involvement, and history. The
remainder of this section discusses in detail each of these variables in further detail.
Strategy and Final Strategy Variables
The strategy variable identifies whether accommodation, coercion (compellence
or deterrence), or brute force strategies were adopted by the challenger. 84  Thefinal
strategy variable identifies the strategy employed by the challenger at the end of the
crisis. These two dummy variables have been included since in 14 cases Great Powers
began with coercive strategies, only to later change to brute force.
Core Demand Variable
The core demand is the ex ante, objective derived by the challenger which if
obtained will likely bring the crisis to a conclusion. I code these as either policy change,
extra-territorial concessions, homeland territorial concessions, or regime change.
184 Since the 77 cases of compellence are all cases of coercion, the strategy variable is dropped in the
regression analysis.
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Threat Variable
The threat variable indicates whether a challenger adopts a punishment or a denial
strategy. A punishment strategy indicates that the threats are aimed at the target's
population or government with the intention of increasing the target's costs for resisting.
A denial strategy attacks the target's military defenses with the aim of reducing the
target's ability to defend the issue at stake.
Signal Variable
Signaling Costs are observable measures the challenger takes and costs it endures
in order to communicate the credibility of its threat to the target. I divide signals into
three categories according to their employment of exemplary military actions, the limited
use of force, and major combat operations.185
State Survival Variable
I code state survival as to whether or not a concession by the target would
threaten the state's control of its population, homeland territory, regime or the viability of
its economy. I also note whether the target has the military means to resist the
challenger. 186
Regime Survival Variable
Regime survival indicates whether or not domestic opposition groups within a
state could threaten revolt and/or overthrow of the regime. The logic of omni-balancing
185 Major combat operations is not a significant variable in any of the regression results and so is excluded
from the models
186 This contingent criteria reverses the coding for 9 cases which are identified by astericks in Table 3.
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suggests that a regime is less likely to make a humiliating concession which could be
interpreted by opposition groups as a sign of weakness.'87
Leader Survival Variable
I also identify leadership survival as a concern for certain types of regimes in
target states. I include three variables adopted from Barbara Geddes' framework for
authoritarian regimes, which I code as military, single party, or personalist regimes.188
These variables are a proxy for the audience costs the leader of a regime expects to pay
for conceding and thereby revealing a failed policy. An alternative proxy for audience
costs is the W score developed in the Logic of Political Survival, where W indicates the
size of the winning domestic political coalition necessary for the regime leader to stay in
power.189
Commitment Variable
The commitment hypothesis predicts the target will resist demands when the
challenger cannot credibly commit not to make further demands. The commitment
variable indicates whether or not the challenger has sufficient military forces deployed to
back up additional demands. I code whether the Great Power deployed military forces
capable of make credible threats to back up additional demands.' 90
187 David, Steven (1991) "Explaining Third World Alignment" World Politics 43:1 233-56
188 My thanks to Barbara Geddes for providing her authoritarian database for Geddes, Barbara (2003)
Paradigms and Sand Castles Lansing MI: Univ of Michigan Press
189 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D Morrow (2003) The
Logic ofPolitical Survival Cambridge MA: MIT Press
190I examine each case for evidence the Great Power deployed offensive military forces in excess of what is
required to credibly back up the current demands and which could be employed to back up further
demands. I do not set coding criteria for the number or type of forces but evaluate each case individually.
If additional forces are deployed then I code the commitment variable 1 and otherwise 0. See Chapter 2
for more detailed discussion on why deployed force is selected as a proxy for commitment problems.
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Control Variables
Other variables impact challenger and target decision making and are likely to
affect crises outcomes (see Appendix 3.B for coding rules). Military power is a measure
of the relative military power of the challenger and the target. I calculate this as a ratio
by dividing the annual military expenditures for the challenger by the combined military
expenditures of the challenger and the target.191 Contiguity specifies the challenger and
target as sharing borders or separated by sea by only a short distance.192 Target Allies are
Great Powers actively involved in the crisis on the behalf of the target. Intrawar conflict
codes those crises initiated while a war is ongoing.193 Sanctions indicate economic
sanctions employed by the challenger.194 Institutions indicates the active involvement of
the League of Nations or United Nations in the conflict. Polity difference measures the
difference between the challenger and target along the polity spectrum from fully
institutionalized autocracies to fully institutionalized democracies.' 95 Given the low
success rate of the Cold War period two control variable for US. and USSR have been
included. Finally, history indicates whether the challenger and target have had a previous
military dispute and if the challenger was victorious in that dispute.196
191 Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (v3.02) www.correlatesofwar.org accessed 14 April
2010.
192 Correlates of War Direct Contiguity (v3. 1) www.correlatesofwar.org accessed 14 April 2010.
193 Correlates of War Militarized Dispute (v3. 1) www.correlatesofwar.org accessed 14 April 2010.
194 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg (2007) Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered, 3'd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics
19 Polity IV Project Polity IV www.systenicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htn accessed 14 April 2010
196 Correlates of War Militarized Dispute Data (3. Iv) www.correlatesofwar.org accessed 14 April 2010 and
International Crisis Behavior Project dataset www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/ accessed 14 April 2010.
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS
With dependent, explanatory, and control variables specified, I now conduct
statistical regressions to further assess the survival and commitment hypotheses. Table
3.9 summarizes the results for 5 regression models. The most appropriate regression,
given the ordinal coding (1-4: failure, partial failure, partial success, success) for the
dependent variable offoreign policy outcome, is the ordered probit utilized in Model 1.197
To verify whether the coding criteria for the dependent variable alter the results, I include
a probit regression (Model II) withforeign policy outcome coded dichotomously as either
success or failure. Model III is another probit regression, but with regime survival,
militarist, single party, and personalist variables replaced by the target's W score as an
alternative proxy for a target regime and leader's audience costs. Model IV is an ordered
probit regression with this W score variable, which also excludes the commitment
variable in order to assess target state survival for all 77 compellent cases. Model V is an
ordered probit which includes W score and commitment variables but omits variables
which were not significant in the other models' regression results.
MUL TICOLLINEARITY
As multivariate regressions, collinearity is always a concern and I provide a
correlation matrix for all the variables, with the exception of the commitment variable, in
Appendix 3.C. Commitment is only highly correlated with one variable, the regime
demand. As discussed earlier, the commitment hypothesis only makes predictions for 67
197 The results do not change with ordered logit or logit models.
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of the 77 compellence cases. Concessions made to demands in 10 of the crises would
have led to the target's demise. For demands such as regime change, the logic of
commitment problems breaks down. The credibility of a challenger's promise not to
make future demands means nothing to a target that does not expect to be around in the
future. As a result commitment is perfectly correlated with regime.
Reviewing Appendix 3.C, there is concern over a high degree of collinearity
(above .40) for two explanatory variables: homeland demand and personalist regime,
Homeland is highly correlated with state survival, exemplary military signal, and limited
force signal, while personalist is correlated with contiguity, sanctions, and polity
differences. To see if this collinearity impacted the regression results, I ran a series of
regressions omitting these variables but did not find that this affected the overall results.
132
Table 3.9: Regression Models for Foreign Policy Outcome as Dependent Variable in Compellence Cases of Asymmetric Conflict
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Ordered Probit Probit Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit
Commitment 1.113 (.553)** 1.930 (1.091)* 1.848 (1.035)* .564 (.423)
State Survival -1.321 (.773)* -2.121 (1.718) -2.367 (1.440)* -1.368 (.700)** -1.744 (.565) *
Regime Survival -.431 (.630) -. 161 (1.134)
Militarist regime -1.210 (1.238) -. 733 (1.711)
Single Party .077 (.593) -.095 (.917)
Personalist regime .384 (.671) -. 768 (1.104)
W score 2.301 (1.634) 2.086 (.883)** 2.066 (.979)**
Final Strategy 1.004 (.692) .704 (1.057) .6548 (.9961) .986 (.589)* 1.23 (.534)**
Extraterritorial -.0373 (.767) .1714 (1.359) .4780 (1.230) .363 (.747)
Homeland .219 (.782) 1.196 (1.773) .7247 (1.424) -. 236 (.718)
Regime 1.47 (.957)
Threat .494 (.488) .381 (.757) .5278 (.6793) .729 (.447)*
Exemplary Signal .809 (.603) .456 (1.049) .5837 (.9609) .749 (.534) .882 (.505)*
Limited Force Signal -1.337 (.609)** -2.595 (1.248)** -1.899 (1.084)* -.520 (.536) -.784 (.550)
Military Power 2.492 (1.994) -.351 (6.725) 2.711 (5.711) 4.157 (2.013)** 3.245 (1.972)*
Contiguity -2.506 (.942)*** -3.087 (1.581)* -2.665 (1.301)** -1.903 (.746)*** -1.784 (.692)***
Target Allies -.453 (.586) -.250 (.852) -.7844 (.7504) -.704 (.478)
Intrawar Conflict 1.768 (.778)** 1.671 (1.155) 2.101 (1.243)* 2.1 (.620)*** 1.578 (.534)***
Sanctions -1.544 (.743)** -1.575 (1.245) -1.878 (1.010)* -1.267 (.571)** -1.413 (.565)**
Institutions -.7004 (.470) -.682 (.680) -.626 (.639) -.627 (.415)
Polity Difference .0456 (.057) -.0039 (.1013) -.009 (.0751) .005 (.043)
United States -2.84 (1.394)** -1.654 (2.413) -1.74 (1.681) -1.919 (.978)** -1.873 (.804)**
USSR -2.740 (.784)*** -3.670 (1.534)** -3.932(1.396)*** -2.323 (.699)*** -2.481 (.688)***
History 2.058 (.684)*** 2.987 (1.49)** 3.086 (1.339)** 1.807 (.539)*** 1.704 (.530)***
Constant 3.724 (7.238) -.409 (5.947)
Chi squared 54.07*** 45.54*** 46.82*** 62.17*** 62.18***
Log likelihood -52.665 -18.89 -18.25 -55.94 -53.61
Pseudo R square .3392 .5466 .5619 .3572 .3273
N 67 67 67 77 67
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance indicated as * p < .10, ** p < .05, and *** for p < .00 1.
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Results
The most significant finding by far is that the state survival estimator is negative,
as expected, while the commitment estimator is positive, which is contrary to the
expectations of the commitment hypothesis. Both were significant above the 90%
confidence level for all but one of the regression models.198
The survival hypothesis expects that when target survival is threatened, the
likelihood of a challenger achieving its foreign policy outcome decreases. This should
result in a negative relationship between the state survival variable and the dependent
variable of foreign policy outcome. This negative relationship is strongly supported by
the quantitative evidence. 199
The commitment hypothesis expects that when a challenger has deployed
sufficient military forces to back up further demands, the likelihood of a target believing
promises that the challenger will not make further demands decreases. This should result
in a negative correlation between commitment and crisis outcome. The evidence,
however, does not support this relationship. It instead strongly supports the opposite,
showing that an increase of deployed military force increases the likelihood that a
challenger achieves its foreign policy outcome in asymmetric cases of compellence.2 0 0
198 Only in the Model III probit regression with 67 observations does state survival fail to reach p>.10. In
this model for state survival p>.21. In Model V commitment is omitted and in Model VI commitment
p>. 18.
199 Including final strategy in the regression controls for whether a powerful challenger changes its strategy
from coercion to brute force, which occurs in 14 cases (see Appendix 3.A).
200 A possible counter argument to the lack of supporting evidence is to claim contiguity not the level of
deployed military forces is a better proxy for commitment problem. While contiguity is negative and
significant it, like commitment, performs poorly in prediction coercion outcomes correctly predicting
39/77 (50%) of the 77 compellent outcomes.
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While the state survival estimator for the survival hypothesis is both negative and
significant, the regime and leadership survival estimators are not consistent. The regime
survival estimator has a negative sign, as expected, though not significant for any of the
regression models. The regime survival variable measures whether the target state has
domestic opposition groups which can threaten the regime in power. There are two
possibilities for the inconclusive results. First, the evidence to code the regime survival
variable is not consistent across all 77 cases. Domestic opposition groups are not
identified in the ICB or the Schultz/Lewis Coercive Diplomacy databases. I code this
variable based on the availability of evidence for each case provided, in large part, by the
ICB and Schultz/Lewis case summaries. The amount of information on the domestic
political situation in the target states varies considerably. I examine in much greater
detail several of these crises which are included in the qualitative case studies in Chapters
4-6. Future research involving a more in-depth examination of domestic opposition
groups in the other cases would improve confidence for the coding of regime survival.
A second possibility is that, in asymmetric conflicts, a domestic opposition group
may well view the crisis itself, a Great Power pitted against the target, as a sign of a weak
regime regardless of regime concession or resistance. If this is the case, the existence of
domestic opposition groups capable of revolt may not bias the target regime towards
resistance. In some cases, this may even provide an incentive for a target regime to
concede, such as when Libya's Qadhafi reversed his policy of support for terrorism, once
radicalized Muslim militant groups had formed within his country. 20 1
In addition to the inconclusive findings for regime survival, the three authoritarian
regime type variables, militarist, single party, and personalist regimes, used as proxies
201 See the second case in Chapter 6.
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for a regime leader's audience costs, are neither consistent nor significant in any of the
models. 202 Research on authoritarian regimes and audience costs shows that the type of
authoritarian regime impacts the likelihood a target will make concessions, i.e. the
personalist regime leader being the most likely to concede, as he suffers the lowest
audience costs.203 I did not find evidence to support this finding.
An alternative to employing militarist, single party, and personalist regimes
variables to code the authoritarian regime type of target states is Bueno de Mesquita's W
score, a variable which codes states from 0 to 1 according to the size of the winning
domestic political coalition required by each regime in order to remain in power 2 04 The
Wscore is significant but, similar to the commitment variable, the sign of the estimator is
positive indicating that, as the size of the winning coalition increases, the likelihood of
achieving the foreign policy outcome also increases.2 05 Thus neither regime type
estimators nor the size of winning coalition produces results which support the logic of
the audience cost argument. 206
202 1 code these as dummy variables with non-authoritarian regime as the basis. A positive estimator
indicates that that type of regime has a positive affect on outcome, compared to all other regime types.
203 Geddes, Barbara (2003) Paradigms and Sand Castles Lansing MI: Univ of Michigan Press. Weeks,
Jessica L. (2008) "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve" International
Organization 62 (Winter) 35-64
204 The W score variable is a rather crude variable coding in .25 increments between 0-1. At the low end of
the spectrum states such as 1979 Pakistan and 1998 Afghanistan are coded 0, Saddam's Iraq and Qadhafi's
Libya are coded .25, Milosevic's Serbia .75, and democracies such as the US and UK 1.0. Bueno de
Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D Morrow (2003) The Logic of
Political Survival Cambridge MA: MIT Press
205 W score is significant for both ordered probits Models V and VI and nearly so in the probit regression in
Model IV. The W score estimator is at p>.16 for Model IV, and it is significant at p>.05 for probit
regressions with 77 observations (model not included in Table 9). Weeks, Jessica L. (2008) "Autocratic
Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve" International Organization 62 (Winter) 35-64
206 The audience cost argument states that as the number of principals capable of punishing leaders
decreases, audience costs for the leader also decrease, thus increasing the likelihood the leader will be
willing to concede to coercive demands.
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There are three possible explanations for these inconsistent or counterintuitive
results. First, previous research on regime leader audience costs analyzed cases in which
the authoritarian regime was the challenger. In those cases, the focus was on different
types of authoritarian regimes and their relative propensity to back down from their initial
demands. The logic for audience costs when the authoritarian regime is the target may be
different. Since the target state is not the one initiating the crisis in asymmetric conflicts,
the leader may not suffer the same level of audience costs as a challenger's leader.
A second possible cause, one which I find more plausible, is a non-rational
explanation based on the type of individuals who become authoritarian leaders. Such
leaders often rise to power through violent means via coups or revolution. Saddam
Hussein and Mu'ammar Qadhafi, whom I examine in detail in Chapters 4 and 6, both
seized power through coups and later became the object of coup attempts themselves.
Such leaders are more likely to perceive a persistent threat to their survival, even when
they are well in control of both their regime and the country, as was the case with
Saddam Hussein. By the late 1990s Saddam had subdued the Shia and Kurds and by all
appearances was well in control of his Baath party. Yet his ingrained "paranoia" led him
to take additional measures, forming his Fedayeen and constructing an internal security
apparatus to deter the formation of opposition within his army and regime. Constantly
focused on his survival, a personalist regime leader may misperceive audience costs to be
much higher than what they are.
A third argument, related to the second, asserts that personalist regimes often are
ruled by a charismatic leader, whose power rests in his followers' continued belief in his
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"supernatural" leadership.207 It may be against the nature of such a leader to concede to
any demands, even when there are few within the regime capable of punishing him.
A fourth argument focuses on the elite of authoritarian regimes, i.e. those who
make up the principal actors capable of punishing the leader and their fear that a
concession by their leader will weaken the entire regime's hold on power.20 8 This fear
for regime survival may undermine the logic of audience costs in such cases.
Selection Effects in Explanatory Variables
A potentially troublesome finding for the asymmetric coercion model is that the
explanatory variables for core demands, threat, and signal costs are not consistent or
significant (see Table 3.9). Upon reflection, however, I find three selection effects
explain these results. First, with regard to the core demand, I expect that, ceteris
parabus, an increase in demands will decrease the likelihood the challenger will achieve
209its foreign policy objectives. When the high level demand of regime change is made,
the target should be particularly resistant. In 9 out of 10 such cases, however, the target
actually conceded and in only 1 of those 9 crises did the challenger revert to a brute force
strategy.210
207 Weber, Max (1947) The Theory ofSocial and Economic Organization London: Collier-Macmillan 358,
360.
208 I credit Barry Posen for this insight.
209 The core demand variables are coded as dummy variables with policy change as the basis. As a result
policy change is not included as a variable included in the regressions. In addition, the colinearity between
commitment and regime change variables requires regime change to be dropped from all but Model V,
where commitment was dropped in order to evaluate regime change.
20 The 9 successes included 1918 U.S.-Costa Rica, 1926 U.S.-Nicaragua ,1939 Germany-Austria, 1939
Germany-Czecholovakia, 1939 Italy-Albania, 1944 Germany-Hungary, 1944 USSR-Romania, 1945 USSR-
Romania, and 1994 U.S.-Haiti. The one failure was the U.S. unconditional surrender demand of North
Korea in the Korean War. The one case of challenger reverting to brute force was the Italian invasion of
Albania in 1939.
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What explains this unexpected high level of success for Great Powers in coercing
weak states into regime change? In 6 of the 10 cases, the target states did not have the
military means to resist and were therefore more likely to concede. Great Powers
therefore chose to coerce regime change in those cases in which they were confident they
would succeed.
If this is true, that target states resist regime change when they have the means to
do so and that challenger's only coerce regime change when they believe the target will
concede, then there is likely to be a higher percentage of brute force cases when regime
change is the objective. This is, in fact, the case as only 13% of the compellent cases
have the core demand of regime change (10 of 77), while this occurs in 33% of brute
force cases (14 of 43). An example of this selection effect of choosing brute force over
coercion is discussed in Chapter 4. In March of 2003, President George W. Bush chose
to conduct a brute force invasion of Iraq. Though Bush made an ultimatum for Saddam
to leave Iraq, he at the same time indicated that the U.S. would invade Iraq regardless of
Saddam's decision. The Bush ultimatum was therefore not coercive, as he did not
believe Saddam could be compelled to concede power.m
A second selection effect may explain why the threat variable is not found to be
significant in the regression models. The threat variable codes punishment or denial as
the strategy adopted by the challenger. The threat estimator is positive, indicating denial
results in better outcomes than punishment, but it is not a significant finding for the
majority of models. This may be explained by the fact that denial strategies, which apply
more coercive pressure than punishment strategies, are also more costly to employ and
are therefore reserved for conflicts in which high value issues are at stake. These are also
21 Woodward, Bob (2004) Plan ofAttack Simon and Schuster: New York 343
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likely to be cases in which it is more difficult for the challenger to obtain its foreign
policy objectives.
A final selection effect may explain signaling costs. The exemplary signal
variable indicates those signals which employ exemplary military action. This is positive
though not significant, which may be explained by the same reasoning just used for why
the threat variable is not significant. Exemplary signals are reserved for more difficult
cases than those where diplomacy alone can convince the target to concede. In addition,
the limitedforce signal is negative and significant, which is opposite to the expectation
for signaling costs, in that, as the challenger increases the costs it is willing to endure, the
credibility of its resolve is also increased. The limitedforce variable also may also be an
indication that diplomacy and exemplary signals have already failed. For such cases, the
likelihood of success is much lower, even when limited force is employed to signal
resolve.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this final analytical section, I examine the quantitative findings and consider
the sensitivity of the regression results for alternative codings of the dependent variable
and for outlier cases which may skew the results. In Table 3.10, I compare the findings
from five robustness checks against the results from the baseline ordered probit
regression of Model I.
Changing the Coding on the Dependent Variable
Of particular concern is how changing the coding of the dependent variable of
foreign policy outcome for individual cases affects the overall findings. In Robust Model
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I (Table 3.10), I consider the impact of coding cases as partially successful. I swap the
coding for the 10 cases of partial success to that of partial failure.2 1 2 This recoding does
not change the overall results.213
A second robustness check is to recode the dependent variable for cases where
other researchers have reached contradictory findings. Todd Sechser codes 4 cases as
compellence failures, which I have coded as either success or partial success foreign
policy outcomes. 2 14 In Robust Model II, I input Secher's codings for the dependent
variable. The result is that while the commitment estimator is no longer significant, it
remains positive and the state survival estimator remains negative and significant.
Hence, a change in the coding of these controversial cases does not change my overall
findings.
Removing Outliers
In Robust Models III and IV, I remove potential outlier cases which could skew
the results. Nazi Germany was a prolific coercer, as Hitler achieved his foreign policy
outcomes in all 7 cases of asymmetric coercion. 21 In Robust Model III I remove these
cases, which does not change the findings, with the exception of the fact that state
survival is just below the 90% significance level (p<.12). This slight reduction in
212 The result of Robust check I had all partial successes coded as 3 changed to 2. In a robustness check
which I do not present in Table 10 I also changed the coding criteria on foreign policy outcome to 1-3 (1
failure, 2 partial failure/success and 3 success). This had no impact on the estimators.
213 An alternative robust check of changing success to partial success has a more significant impact on the
survival. Changing more than 5% of the success codings to partial success is sufficient to make the state
survival variable no longer significant at the p<.10 level.
214 There are no controversial cases between my coding and that of George and Simon, Art and Cronin, or
Pape. Sechser, however, codes the following cases as failures: 1924 Great Britain vs. Turkey "Mosul",
1970 U.S. vs. Syria "Black September", 1990 U.S. vs Iraq "Gulf War", and 1999 U.S. vs. Serbia "Kosovo."
Under my coding criteria these cases are either success or partial success.
215 In only the case of Poland in 1939 was a final strategy of brute force necessary.
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significance, however, has as much to do with the decrease in the number of observations
in the regression as it does with the exclusion of the Nazi Germany cases.
In Robust Model IV, I exclude all the World War II cases in order to examine
whether the nature of global war affects the dynamics of asymmetric conflict. I conclude
that it does not. While the state survival variable remains negative, it is no longer
significant at the 90% level (p<.14) and the commitment variable remains positive but not
significant. This decrease in significance of the survival estimator, however, is primarily
due to the decrease in the number of observations, given the large number of explanatory
and control variables. 2 16
Change in Coding Commitment
A final critique questions the method with which I code the commitment variable
and asserts that it was inappropriate for me to exclude the 10 cases for which I did not
make predictions using the commitment hypothesis. In Robust Model V, I correct for
this omission by coding all 10 of these cases in favor of the commitment variable.
Despite this correction, the results still do not change the overall findings, as the
commitment variable remains positive.
In sum, my quantitative findings are consistent and robust across a variety of
regression models with various combinations of explanatory and control variables, with
alternative codings of the dependent variables, with consideration of potential outlier
2 16Regression results improve by increasing observations and decreasing the number of variables tested.
Running the Robust IV regression without the commitment variable, similar to Model IV (Table 9)
increases the observations to 60 and slightly improves the survival variable (p<.13). Eliminating the
variables which are not significant (see Model V Table 9) results in commitment variable being positive
and significant (p<.05) and improves the survival variable (p<. 11). Combining Model IV and Model V by
removing the commitment variable and other variables which are not significant improves the survival
variable substantially (p<.03).
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cases, and with corrections for a possible shortcoming in the coding criteria for the
commitment variable.
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Table 3.10: Robustness Checks
Variable Model I Robust I Robust II Robust III Robust IV Robust V
Ordered Probit No Partial Success Sechser Coding No Germany No WWII 77 Commit
Commitment 1.113 (.553)** 1.098 (.564)** .809 (.568) 1.020 (.564)* .299 (.607) .672 (.484)
State Survival -1.321 (.773)* -1.405 (.811)* -1.878 (.888)** -1.226 (.779) -1.222 (.826) -1.223 (.750)*
Regime Survival -.431 (.630) -.4869 (.643) -.202 (.617) -.786 (.723) .0257 (.669) -.237 (.588)
Militarist Regime -1.210 (1.238) -1.364 (1.25) -11.14 (.244) -1.460 (1.254) -1.409 (1.378) -.828 (1.114)
Single Party .077 (.593) .1781 (.601) -1.473 (.567)*** .1672 (.612) -.442 (.729) -5.77 (.502)
Personalist Regime .384 (.671) .6300 (.698) -.086 (.677) .413 (.684) -.485 (.738) -.036 (.630)
W Score
Final Strategy 1.004 (.692) 1.119 (.718) 1.082 (.678) 1.132 (.709)* 1.34 (.739) .804 (.644)
Extraterritorial -.0373 (.767) -. 1826 (.793) -1.560 (.830)** .0447 (.772) .892 (.930) .276 (.742)
Homeland .219 (.782) .064 (.794) -.202 (.895) -.01 1 (.816) -.055 (.880) .370 (.785)
Regime
Threat .494 (.488) .5343 (.502) .676 (.482) .529 (.497) .164 (.561) .340 (.456)
Exemplary Signal .809 (.603) .914 (.612) .977 (.668) .772 (.608) 1.42 (.734)** 1.165 (.582)**
Limited Force Signal -1.337 (.609)** -1.215 (.620)** -1.40 (.588)** -1.227 (.612)** -1. 118 (.617)* -.972 (.542)*
Military Power 2.492 (1.994) 2.623 (2.070) .015 (1.838) 2.000 (2.034) 4.272 (2.144)** 2.213 (1.896)
Contiguity -2.506 (.942)*** -2.547 (.962)*** -2.49 (.965)*** -2.449 (.950)*** -1.782 (.938)* -2.057 (.792)***
Target Allies -.453 (.586) -.453 (.593) .380 (.554) -.436 (.606) -.004 (.645) -.276 (.547)
Intrawar Conflict 1.768 (.778)** 1.870 (.802)** 2.503 (.839)*** 1.839 (.794)** 1.747 (.895)* 1.865 (.723)***
Sanctions -1.544 (.743)** -1.569 (.753)** -2.322 (.884)*** -1.834 (.820)** -1.62 (.985)* -1.784 (.773)**
Institutions -.7004 (.470) -.670 (.476) -.768 (.487) -.647 (.47 1) -.737 (.54) -.715 (.433)*
Polity Difference .0456 (.057) .057 (.057) -.009 (.058) .038 (.057) -.013 (.072) -.0003 (.057)
United States -2.84 (1.394)** -3.31 (1.45)** -1.659 (1.285) -2.32 (1.418)* -1.377 (1.75) -1.393 (1.124)
USSR -2.740 (.784)*** -2.740 (.806)*** -2.155 (.790)*** -2.307 (.827)*** -1.74 (.93 1)* -2.347 (.698)***
History 2.058 (.684)*** 1.998 (.694)*** .746 (.519)*** 2.150 (.704)*** 2.977 (.794)*** 1.725 (.576)***
Constant
Chi Squared 54.07*** 53.28*** 65.05*** 51.45*** 46.36*** 60.69***
Log Likelihood -52.665 -40.698 -47.860 -51.386 -45.54 -56.68
Pseudo R Square .3392 .3956 .4046 .3336 .3373 .3487
N 67 67 67 63 55 77
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CONCLUSION
The objective in this chapter was two-fold: first, to examine several of the
assumptions behind my research question of why Great Powers often fail to coerce weak
states and, second, to test the survival and commitment hypotheses. As to this first
objective, I questioned how frequently Great Powers are involved in asymmetric conflicts
with weak states. How often do Great Powers choose coercive strategies and how often
are they successful? How does the United States compare to other Great Powers? Does
the frequency and success of asymmetric conflicts vary over time? To answer these
questions, I identified cases of asymmetric crises since World War I and discovered that
Great Powers achieved their foreign policy objectives in three-quarters of the cases. In
addition, Great Powers chose coercive over brute force strategies at the rate of two to
one. The United States initiated a third of all the crises and 86% of the crises since the
end of the Cold War, which far outnumbered those of any other Great Power. The U.S.
was even more likely to choose coercion and its overall success rates were not
significantly different than those of other Great Powers.
In order to assess the validity of my findings, I then compared these quantitative
results to those from previous research. In order to do this, I first coded for two
alternative dependent variables of coercion and coercive diplomacy. I then found that
Great Powers were successful at coercion 56% of the time and at coercive diplomacy in
43% of the cases. This compared favorably with the findings from Robert Pape, George
& Simon and Art & Cronin, and Todd Sechser.
As to my second objective in this chapter, I tested the survival and commitment
hypotheses by making predictions for each hypothesis for the 77 cases of asymmetric
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compellence. I found that the survival hypothesis performed better than the commitment
hypothesis. Refining this analysis, I operationalized explanatory and control variables in
order to assess the two hypotheses while holding constant for other variables that could
affect the crises outcomes. Again, I found that state survival was a consistently
significant estimator of foreign policy outcome. The commitment variable, however, was
directly correlated with foreign policy outcome, opposite of the relationship expected by
the commitment hypothesis.
Several other estimators were also not as expected. The proxies for regime and
regime leader survival did not perform as well as the state survival estimator. In addition,
several of the explanatory variables derived from the asymmetric coercion model also did
not perform well. Selection effects explain why Great Powers only choose to coerce for
higher level demands when they believe the target will likely concede. As a result, there
were few cases of coercion for regime change in which the target resisted. More often,
however, the Great Power chose to employ a brute force strategy for regime change,
which is consistent with a selection effect explanation and with the predictions of the
survival hypothesis. Targets will likely resist when their survival is at risk. Rational
challengers expect such resistance and choose brute force over coercion for such cases.
In addition, the threat and limitedforce signal variables performed contrary to
what was expected. This is, in part, explained by the fact that threats of force is
expensive for the challenger and therefore reserved for those difficult cases, in which the
target is more likely to resist or where previous efforts where diplomacy backed by
exemplary military signals have already failed.
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In the next three chapters, I further examine the survival and commitment
hypotheses in qualitative cases drawn from conflicts between the United States and Iraq,
Serbia, and Libya. These cases allow for an in depth assessment of the reasons for
coercion success or failure. It also allows for more precise testing and a side-by-side
assessment of the survival and commitment hypotheses. In addition, U.S.-only cases
were intentionally chosen for two reasons. First, the U.S. is the Great Power most often
involved in asymmetric conflicts, being responsible for initiating a third of all crises and
18 out of the 21 cases since the end of the Cold War. Second, holding constant for the
U.S. as a Great Power reduces concern that cross-national variation in the challenger is
responsible for variation in coercion outcomes. Additionally, I include multiple crises
for each target state, which allows me to hold constant for both challenger and target and
to focus, instead, on causes for the variation of the key explanatory variables. 217
217 The primary disadvantage of selecting only U.S. cases, all but one of which occurred after the Cold War,
is that taken alone, it is unclear as to the degree to which these qualitative cases can be generalized for other
Great Powers and during other time periods. Fortunately, this problem is mitigated by the quantitative
findings from this chapter which includes cases of all the Great Powers since WWI.
147
APPENDIX 3.A: 116 CASES OF ASYMMETRIC INTERSTATE CONFLICT2 18
Start
ICB# Year Challenger Target ICB Name Strategy
1 1918 Japan USSR Russian Civil War I Brute Force
2 1918 United States Costa Rica Costa Rican Coup Compel
6 1919 France Hungary Hungarian War Comp/BF
7 1919 Italy Turkey Smyrna Brute Force
11 1919 France Turkey Cilician War Brute Force
12 1920 France Germany Rhenish Rebellions Compel
19 1921 United States Panama Costa Rica/Panama Border Compel
20 1921 France Germany German Reparations Compel
22 1921 France Austria Austrian Separatists Comp el
26 1922 United Kingdom Turkey Chanak Deter
27 1923 France Germany Ruhr I Brute Force
28 1923 Italy Greece Corfu Incident Compel
31 1924 United Kingdom Turkey Mosul Land Dispute Compel
33 1926 United States Nicaragua Nicaragua Civil War I Compel
34 1926 Italy Albania Hegemony Over Albania Compel
35 1927 Japan China Shantung Deter
38 1929 USSR China Chinese Eastern Railway Comp/BF
39 1931 Japan China Mukden Incident Brute Force
40 1932 Japan China Shanghai Comp/BF
43 1933 Japan China Jehol Campaign Comp/BF
47 1934 Italy Ethiopia Ethiopian War Comp/BF
49 1935 Germany Lithuania Kaunas Trials Compel
52 1936 Germany Spain Spanish Civil War I Brute Force
56 1937 Japan China Marco Polo Bridge Brute Force
60 1938 Germany Austria Anschluss Compel
64 1938 Germany Czechoslovakia Munich Compel
68 1939 Germany Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia's Annexation Compel
69 1939 Germany Lithuania Memel Compel
71 1939 Italy Albania Invasion of Albania Comp/BF
74 1939 Germany Poland Entry Into World War 11 Comp/BF
75 1939 USSR Latvia Soviet Occupation of the Baltic Compel
75 1939 USSR Estonia Soviet Occupation of the Baltic Compel
75 1939 USSR Lithuania Soviet Occupation of the Baltic Compel
76 1939 USSR Finland Finnish War Comp/BF
77 1940 Germany Denmark Invasion of Scandinavia Brute Force
77 1940 Germany Norway Invasion of Scandinavia Brute Force
78 1940 Germany Luxemburg Fall of Western Europe Brute Force
78 1940 Germany Belgium Fall of Western Europe Brute Force
78 1940 Germany Netherlands Fall of Western Europe Brute Force
80 1940 USSR Romania Romanian Territory Compel
87 1941 USSR Iran Occupation of Iran Compel
218 ICB# is the crisis number for the International Crisis Behavior Project. Comp/BF indicates an initial
Compellent strategy followed by a Brute Force Strategy. BF/Accomm indicates Brute Force followed by
Accommodation.
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Start
ICB# Year Challenger Target ICB Name Strategy
92 1944 Germany Hungary German Occupation of Hungary Compel
93 1944 USSR Romania Soviet Occupation of East Europe Compel
102 1945 USSR Romania Communism in Romania Compel
104 1945 United States Yugoslavia Trieste I Compel
106 1945 USSR Turkey Kars-Ardahan Compel
108 1945 USSR Iran Azerbaijan Compel
111 1946 USSR Turkey Turkish Straits Compel
128 1948 United Kingdom Israel Sinai Incursion Compel
131 1949 USSR Yugoslavia Soviet Bloc/Yugoslavia Compel
133 1950 United States North Korea Korean War 11 Comp/BF
136 1951 United Kingdom Egypt Suez Canal Compel
145 1954 France Vietnam Dien Bien Phu BF/Accom
146 1954 China Taiwan Taiwan Strait I Brute Force
152 1956 United Kingdom Egypt Suez Nationalization-War Brute Force
152 1956 USSR Israel Suez Nationalization-War Compel
154 1956 USSR Poland Poland Liberalization Deter
155 1956 USSR Hungary Hungarian Uprising Brute Force
166 1958 China Taiwan Taiwan Strait 11 Compel
180 1961 United States North Vietnam Pathet Lao Offensive Compel
181 1961 United States Cuba Bay of Pigs Brute Force
183 1961 United Kingdom Iraq Kuwait Independence Deter
194 1962 China India China/India Border Il Brute Force
210 1964 United States North Vietnam Gulf of Tonkin Deter
213 1965 United States North Vietnam Pleiku Compel
216 1965 China India Kashmir 11 Compel
224 1968 United States North Korea Pueblo Compel
227 1968 USSR Czechoslovakia Prague Spring Comp/BF
238 1970 United States Syria Black September Compel
246 1972 United States North Vietnam Vietnam Ports Mining Compel
249 1972 United States North Vietnam Christmas Bombing Compel
255 1973 USSR Israel October-Yom Kippur War Compel
259 1975 United States Cambodia Mayaguez Brute Force
262 1975 United Kingdom Guatemala Belize I Deter
274 1976 United States North Korea Poplar Tree Compel
279 1977 United Kingdom Guatemala Belize 11 Deter
298 1978 China Vietnam SinoNietnam War Compel
303 1979 USSR Afghanistan Afghanistan Invasion Brute Force
306 1979 USSR Pakistan Soviet Threat/Pakistan Compel
315 1980 USSR Poland Solidarity Compel
321 1981 France Libya Chad/Libya V Compel
323 1981 USSR South Africa Mozambique Raid Compel
330 1981 United States Libya Gulf of Syrte I Compel
336 1982 United Kingdom Argentina Falklands/Malvinas Brute Force
340 1983 United States Libya Libya Threat to Sudan Deter
342 1983 France Libya Chad/Libya VI Compel
343 1983 United States Grenada Invasion of Grenada Brute Force
362 1986 France Libya Chad/Libya VII Compel
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Start
ICB# Year Challenger Target ICB Name Strategy
363 1986 United States Libya Gulf of Syrte 11 Compel
1986 United States Libya Libyan Regime Change Brute Force
383 1988 United States Nicaragua Contras Ill Deter
391 1989 United States Panama Invasion of Panama Brute Force
393 1990 United States Iraq Gulf War Comp/BF
393 1990 United States Iraq Bush Ultimatum during Gulf War Comp/BF
401 1991 Russia Turkey Nagornyy-Karabakh Deter
406 1992 United States Iraq Iraq No-Fly Zone Brute Force
407 1992 Russia Georgia Georgia/Abkhazia Brute Force
408 1993 United States North Korea North Korea Nuclear Crisis Compel
411 1994 United States Haiti Haiti Military Regime Compel
412 1994 United States Iraq Iraq Troop Deployment/Kuwait Compel
415 1995 China Taiwan Taiwan Strait IV Compel
403 1995 United States Serbia Bosnian Civil War Compiel
403 1995 United States Bosnian Serbs Bosnian Civil War Compel
419 1996 United States Iraq Desert Strike Compel
422 1997 United States Iraq UNSCOM I Compel
427 1998 United States Sudan US Embassy Bombings Brute Force
427 1998 United States Afghanistan US Embassy Bombings Compel
429 1998 United States Iraq UNSCOM 11 (Desert Fox) Comp/BF
430 1998 United States Serbia Kosovo Compel
434 2001 United States Afghanistan USA-Afghanistan Comp/BF
2001 United States Libya Weapons of Mass Destruction Compel
440 2002 United States Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Compel
440 2003 United States Iraq Invasion of Iraq Brute Force
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Appendix 3.B: Variables
Variables Values Explanation/SOURCE
Foreign Policy 1 = Failure Failure: Target resisted challenger's demands
Outcome 2 = Partial Failure Partial Failure: Target conceded, but not to
(1-4) 3 = Partial Success core demands
4 = Success Partial Success: Target conceded to a part of
core demands
Success: Target conceded to core demands
Strategy 0 Accommodation Strategy adopted by challenger.
Final Strategy 1 = Coercion Challenger's strategy at end of conflict
(0-2) 2 Brute Force
Core Demand Challenger core demands are for policy
Policy Policy (0/1) change, extraterritorial concessions,
Extra-territory Extraterritory (0/1) homeland territorial concessions, or
Homeland Homeland (0/1) regime change
Regime Regime change (0/1)
Threat 0 Punishment Nature of coercive threat as either
(0-1) 1 Denial punishment or denial
Signal Highest level of signaling
Exemplary EMSig (0/1) Sanctions, naval ops, mobilize/deploy
Limited Force LSig (0/1) Limited force/unopposed occupation
Major Combat MCSig (0/1) Major combat operations
State Survival 0 = Does not threaten Target state control of population,
survival or threatens territory, regime or viability of economy
survival but target state threatened by a concession to core
does not have means to demands
resist
1ag Threatens survival
Regime Survival 0 hno domestic I dicates whether there are domestic
opposition groups opposition groups in target state that can
a domestic threaten regime
opposition
Leader Survival Military (0/1) The type of target regime based on
Single Party (0/1) Barbara Geddes' Authoritarian data set
Personalist (0/1) W score from Bueno de Mesquita, The
______________W score (0-1) Logic of Political Survival
Commitment 2 1 9  0 =Challenger has not Whether challenger has deployed
deployed military forces offensive military power reasonably
with offensive capability thratened byca concession tre
I = Challenger has deployed caal ock upldditioltet
military forces with Wits whes dere com et
offensive capability hypothesis expects foreign policy
outcome likely to fail
219 I examine each case for the presence of deployed forces from the crises summaries provided by the
International Crisis Behavior database and the Coercive Diplomacy database. I do not set specific coding
criteria based on number or type of forces.
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Variables Values Explanation/SOURCE
Military Power Ratio of military Correlates of War (COW) National
expendturesMilitary Capabilities databaseexpendituresII
MilExpA/(MilExpA+MiEx Military Expenditures
pB)
Contiguity 0 = no shared border or Contiguity between states
sea distance greater COW Direct Contiguity Database
than 150 miles
1 = shared border or
sea distance less than
150 miles
Target Ally 0 = None Whether target received support from an
1 = Support from ally
Major
Power
Intrawar Conflict 0 = dispute during Whether conflict occur during ongoing
period of peace war. Coded 0 if conflict responsible for
1 = dispute took place initiation of war
during ongoing war
Sanctions 0 =No sanctions Whether challenger imposed economic
1n Sanctions sanctions
Institutions 0 No League of Nations or United Nations
1 =Yes involvement
Polity Difference (0-20) Polity IV project database
Absolute difference in (-10 to 10)
polity score between Autocratic to democratic
Whtetagtrciesuprfrmchallenger and target
Superpower United States (1/0) Indicates whether a superpower is
Soviet Union (1/0) challenger in conflict
History 0 no previous Militarized Interstate Dispute database
dispute, draw, or target and International Crisis Behavior
won previous dispute database
I challenger won
1=Sanctprevious dispute
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APPENDIX 3.C: Correlation Matrix (N=77)
Variable State Regime Militarist Single Personalist W Score Final Extra- Homeland Regime
Survival Survival Regime Party Regime Strategy Territorial
State Survival 1
Regime Survival -. 13 1
Militarist Regime -. 11 .03 1
Single Party .14 -. 11 .03 1
Personalist Regime -. 17 -. 29 .15 .03 1
W Score .22 -. 01 -.06 .13 -. 20 1
Final Strategy .30 .09 -. 10 -. 14 -.03 -. 06 1
Extraterritorial -.21 .02 -.08 -. 15 -.09 -.09 .02 1
Homeland .59 -. 19 -.11 .10 -.22 .16 .26 -.21 1
Regime .15 .28 .12 -. 15 -. 18 -.01 .02 -.15 -.21 1
Threat .19 .13 .02 -.23 -.27 -.07 .31 .23 .30 .07
Exemplary Signal -.22 .05 .08 -.06 -.09 .16 -. 18 -.06 -.07 .17
Limited Force Signal .11 .04 -. 15 .04 .03 -. 19 .01 .04 .003 -.12
Military Power -.07 -.03 .08 .10 .16 -.27 -.09 .03 .02 .15
Contiguity .18 .20 -.07 -.27 -.51 .10 -.01 -.01 .09 .15
Target Allies .19 -.25 .07 .39 .40 .07 -.20 .08 -.02 -.15
Intrawar Conflict .04 -.30 -. 10 .07 -.19 -. 11 .02 .01 .29 .01
Sanctions -. 12 -.05 -. 14 .20 .55 -.02 -.04 -. 19 -.10 -.02
Institutions -.04 -.06 -.04 .12 .21 -.03 .20 .13 -.02 -.18
Polity Difference .02 -. 16 -. 10 .29 .54 -.06 .12 -.06 -.03 -.18
United States -. 19 -.01 .11 .35 .55 -.10 -.03 -.23 -. 10 .01
USSR -.03 -.01 .04 -.15 -.25 -.12 -.04 .05 .13 -.04
History -.11 .24 -.06 -.37 -.02 -. 14 .02 .07 -.21 .20
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Variable
Threat
Exemplary Signal
Limited Force Signal
Military Power
Contiguity
Target Allies
Intrawar Conflict
Sanctions
Institutions
Polity Difference
United States
USSR
History
APPENDIX 3.C: Correlation
Threat Exemplary Limited Military Conti-
Signal Force Power guity
.08
-.19
.12
.28
-.22
.06
-.30
-.12
.29
-.34
.21
.06
-.71
.19
.12
-.17
.12
.05
-.20
-.07
-.02
.17
Matrix (continued)
Target Intrawar
Allies Conflict
(N=77)
Sanc-
tions
Instit- Polity
utions Difference
U.S. USSR
1
-.30 1
..07 .14
-.04
.09
-.09
-.04
.19
.02
.03
-.29
-.33
.16
.16
.24
.05
.18
.29
.16
-.27
.09
-.65
-.46
-.60
-.76
.32
.04
.31
.09
.40
.28
-.14
.08
-.09
-.05
.01
.25
.30
.48
.75
-.33
.30
.33
-.19
-20 -.07 .08
1
.65
-.35
-.22
1
-.46
-.11
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.15 .12 -.33

Chapter 4: United States vs. Iraq 1990-2003
In this and the following two chapters I conduct qualitative analysis of
asymmetric coercive crises drawn from conflicts between the U.S. and Iraq, the U.S. and_
Serbia, and the U.S. and Libya. For these cases I identify the source of the crises, issues
at stake for both challenger and target, and the demands, threats, signals made and actual
outcomes of the conflicts. I also conduct process tracing, examining probable causes for
the crises outcomes, and assess alternative explanations.
I then assess how well two hypotheses for coercion failure, survival and
commitment predict the coercive outcomes for these conflicts. First, survival predicts that
coercion is likely to fail when all possible negotiated agreements acceptable to the
challenger result in the target's demise. Target states, regimes, and their leaders resist
demands which threaten survival so long as they have the means to resist. Second, the
commitment problem predicts that the likelihood of coercion success decreases when a
challenger cannot credibly commit to refrain from making further demands. Though both
hypotheses correctly predict the outcomes for the majority of these qualitative cases,
survival performs better than commitment problem as to not only the number of cases it
correctly predicts but also the degree to which the logic of the survival explanation is
matched by evidence.
I begin with the conflict between the United States and Iraq from the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 to the U.S. invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003.
This period warrants careful study as it both began and ended with large-scale combat
operations. I select three crises from this conflict for analysis: the Gulf War from
August 2, 1990 to February 28, 1991, the Iraqi deployment of troops to the Kuwaiti
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th
border in October, 1994, and the period leading up to the Iraq War from September 12
2002 to March 2 0 th, 2003. The demands involved in these crises are primarily
compellent in nature and their explanatory and dependent variables of demands, threats,
and outcomes vary considerably.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides context to the
initiation of the conflict, including Saddam's rise to power and the key events which led
to the invasion of Kuwait. In the next three sections I examine each crisis in turn,
summarizing key actions and decisions and then assessing each hypothesis for coercion
failure. In the final section I examine how well the two hypotheses fare and conclude
that survival is a better predictor for these three crises than commitment.
SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RISE TO POWER
Modern Iraq dates back to 1932 with the establishment of the Hashemite
monarchy, which governed until its ouster by a military coup in 1958. The new
Republic of Iraq struggled through internal turmoil and a series of coups. In 1968, the
Arab Socialist Baath Party seized power, placing Ahmed Hasan Bakr at its helm as
president and Saddam Hussein at his side as deputy and enforcer. Convinced that the
greatest threat came from domestic sources, Saddam viciously secured a hold on power
by ridding the party of potential rivals and maintained control of the regime by relying on
family and Tikrit tribal loyalties. 222 They also purged the military and instituted the
220 Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Peter Sluglett (1991) "The Historiography of Modern Iraq" American
Historical Review 96:5, 1408
221 Devlin, John (1991) "The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis" American Historical Review 96:5,
1405
222 Marr, Phebe (2004) The Modern History offraq Westview Publishing: Boulder 139
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Republican Guard, an elite corps commissioned to keep the Baath party in power.m Iraq
nationalized oil production in 1973 and with this revenue Bakr and Hussein were able to
solidify their power through an expansion of the government's bureaucracy and
military.224
The domestic opposition which remained emanated from the Kurds in the north
and the Shia in the south. Saddam was able to weaken the Kurds through a combination
of military action and a 1975 treaty with Iran.22 5 By contrast, Shia opposition grew
steadily, culminating in widespread demonstrations following the 1979 Iranian
Revolution. Saddam responded, arresting thousands of demonstrators and executing their
leaders. Now firmly in control, Saddam Hussein unseated Ahmed Bakr as president.226
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, ITS A FTERMA TH, AND THE KUWAIT INVASION
Tensions soon mounted between Saddam and Iran's new leader, the Ayatollah
Khomeini. By 1980 border skirmishes were frequent and in September Iraq launched an
offensive into Iran. Its objective was to eliminate Iranian influence and to regain full
control of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway, Iraq's primary access to the Persian Gulf, which
had been partially conceded to Iran as part of the 1975 treaty.22 7 This offense quickly
stalled, however, and Iran mounted a counterattack, pushing the Iraqi Army back across
223 Karsh, Efraim and Inari Rautsi (1991) Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography The Free Press: New
York 190
224 Marr, Phebe (2004) The Modern History of Iraq Westview Publishing: Boulder 161-68
225 Associated Press (1975) "Shah Says Ancient Differences With Iraq are Over" New York Times 8 March
1975.
226 Kifner John (1980) "Iraq's President Changes His Image as He Consolidates His Near-Total Power"
New York Times July 5, 1980.
227 Kifner, John (1980) "Teheran Airport Hit" New York Times 23 September, 1980, Sick, Gary (1989)
"Trial By Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War" Middle East Journal 43:2, 231.
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the border by 1982.228 Once fighting on its home soil, the Iraqi Army regained its footing
and the conflict stagnated into a war of attrition until 1987, when the Iranian Army
overextended itself in its failed attempt to take Basra. Iraq retook the offensive into
Iranian territory and with that Iran finally accepted a UN Security Council ceasefire in
1988.229
The war cost Iraq dearly, as oil production fell precipitously while military costs
escalated. In the mid-80s, in order to pay for the war and expand the military Saddam
obtained Saudi and Kuwaiti financing and, in a remarkable Cold War achievement,
procured equipment from the Soviet Union along with military support and aid from the
United States.2 3 0
Except for a larger military, Saddam emerged in 1988 with little to show for eight
years of fighting. Iraq still did not control the Shatt Al-Arab and, with its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) at half of its prewar level, its economy had been devastated. 3
Whereas the Iraqi government relied upon oil exports for 95% of its revenue in 1980,
Iranian attacks had since cut crude production by 60%. Iraq then completed a pipeline to
229 For a detailed analysis of the Iran-Iraq War see Abdulghani, JM (1984) Iraq and Iran: The Years of
Crisis Croom Helm Ltd, Chubin, Sharam and Charles Tripp (1988) Iran and Iraq at War London: I.B.
Tauris & Co Ltd, Ismael, TY (1982) Roots of Conflict Syracuse University Press, Joyner, CC (1990) The
Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law and Diplomacy Greenwood Press, Karsh, Efraim (1989) The
Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications Palgrave Macmillan, Khadduri , Majid (1988) The Gulf War: The
Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict Oxford University Press: New York, Makiya (1998)
Republic of Fear Univ of California: Berkeley, King, Ralph (1987) The Iran-Iraq War: The Political
Implications Int Inst for Strat Studies, Adephi Paper 219, Spring, O'Ballance, E (1988) The Gulf War
Brassey's Defence Publishers
229 United Nations Security Council "Resolution 598 (1987)The Situation Between Iran and Iraq" Official
Records of the Security Council, Forty-second Supplement for April, May, and June 1987 document
S/18852, http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1987/scres87.htm
230 Karsh, Efraim and Inari Rautsi (1991) Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography The Free Press: New
York 161
231 Lohr, Steve (1988) "The Big Dividends of a Gulf Peace" New York Times 13 August 1988, Pear, Robert
(January 8, 1989) "Talks in Paris; Can Words Stem a Flow of Chemical Weapons?" New York Times, Al-
Saadi, Sabri Zire(2005) "Oil Wealth and Poverty in Iraq: Statistical Adjustment of the Government GDP
(1-980-1988)" Middle East Economic Survey 48:16 http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v48n16-
50D01.htm accessed 27 Jan 09
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Saudi Arabia in the nid-1980s and steadily increased oil production until it reached
prewar levels by the end of the conflict in 1988.m Unfortunately for Iraq, the increase
233inIahano
was then more than offset by tumbling world crude prices. By this point, Iraq had not
only depleted its $35 billion in reserves, but also incurred over $50 billion in foreign
debt, half of which was owed to the Saudis and Kuwaitis. By 1989, oil revenue covered
only half of Iraqi's $23 billion in annual expenditures, of which $5 billion alone went
towards debt payments. 234
To solve these economic problems Saddam turned against Kuwait. He claimed,
with some justification, that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirate were responsible for
depressed oil prices, as they were producing well above their OPEC quotas and he
increased diplomatic pressure to curtail their production. 2 35 Saddam also rationalized that
Iraq's war with Iran was fought for the benefit of all Arab states and, therefore, Saudi and
Kuwaiti loans were rightly to be considered as contributions to the effort. 236 Finally,
Saddam attempted to obtain access to the Persian Gulf by forcing the settlement of a
border dispute with Kuwait. Were Kuwait to cede the Warbah and Bubiyan islands, Iraq
would be able to secure the port at Umm Qasr (see Figure 4.1).237 Kuwait chose to
ignore all of these demands and, in late July of 1990, Iraq deployed Republican Guard
232 CIA World Factbook, "Iraq" 1990, EIA (2004) "Iraq's Oil Production and Consumption, 1980-2007"
International Energy Annual
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/raq/images/Iraq%2OCab%2OData%202007 2.xis accessed 26 Jan 09
233 Oil prices adjusted to 2007 dollars, West Texas Research Group, "Oil Price History and Analysis"
http://www.wtrg.con/oil graphs/oilprice 1947. i f accessed 26 Jan 09
2 34Marr, Phebe (2004) The Modern History of Iraq Westview Publishing: Boulder 204, Karsh, Efraim and
Inari Rautsi (1991) Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography The Free Press: New York 202, "Iraq Banking
on Credit" The Economist London, 30 September 1989
235 Baghdad Domestic Service (1990) "Assembly Issues Statement on Kuwait, UAE" FBIS-NES-90-140
20 July 1990
236 Baghdad Domestic Service (1990) "Aziz Assails Kuwait, UAE in Letter to Kblil" JN 1807103390 18 Jul
1990
237 Marr, Phebe (2004) The Modern History ofIraq Westview Publishing: Boulder 219
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armored divisions to the Kuwaiti border. 238 Following a brief meeting with the U.S.
ambassador to Iraq, Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990.239
Figure 4.1: Iraqi Access to the Persian Gulf along the Kuwait Border2 40
THE GULF WAR, 2 AUGUST 1990 -28 FEBRUARY 199241
U.S. INTERESTS IN KUWAIT
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait triggered a crisis for the United States, which
considered three of its interests to be at risk. First, Iraq's actions destabilized global oil
prices which directly impacted the U.S. economy. Saddam now controlled a third of
Middle Eastern oil production and approximately 20% of world proven oil reserves.2 4 2
An already weak U.S. economy suffered increasingly as crude prices doubled in August
238 Ibrahim, Youssef M "OPEC Meets Today: Talks Are Clouded by Iraq's Threat to Kuwait" New York
Times 25 July 1990
239 Confrontation in the Gulf; Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy" New York Times
23 September, 1990, Baker, James (1995) The Politics ofDiplomacy G.P. Putnam's Sons: New York 272
240 Central Intelligence Agency (1991) "Kuwait Political map 1991"
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kuwait.html accessed 28 January 2009
241 The International Crisis Behavior Project, "Gulf War, Case 339"
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer accessed 29 January 2009
242 Energy Information Administration (2008) "Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)" April 2008 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb1 105.html and(2006) "International Energy
Outlook 2006" http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieo06/oil.html accessed 28 January 2009
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of 1990.243 Second, the invasion threatened the ongoing Middle East peace process as
Saddam attempted to link the crisis with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.244 Third, the
United States was concerned with the overall impact to international stability if Iraq's
aggression were to go unchecked.245 A failure on the part of the U.S. to respond forcibly
could have undermined U.S. resolve and threatened the "new world order" in its very
infancy.246
I divide this crisis into three stages and provide a synopsis of the key explanatory
and dependent variables in Table 4.1. In the first stage, from 2 August to 19 October
1990, the United States adopted a strategy of economic sanctions to compel Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait. The U.S. also deployed military forces to defend Saudi Arabia
and deter Iraq from further aggression.
243 Carter, Jimmy (1980) "Jimmy Carter State of the Union Address 1980"
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.or /documents/speeches/su80iec.phtml accessed 29 January 2009, Prices
increased from $16 to $32/barrel, Energy Information Administration (2008) "Annual Oil Market
Chronology" Official Energy Statistics of the US. Government July 2008
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/AOMC/inages/chron 2008.xls accessed 28 January 2009
244 Bush, George (1990) "A Collective Effort to Reverse Iraqi Agression" United States Department of
State Dispatch, 10 September, 1990 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi in I 584/is /ai 9044612 accessed
28 January 2009, Baghdad Domestic Service "Test of Saddam Husayn Initiative on Situation" FBIS-NES
90-156 13 August 1990
245 Bush, George (1990) "Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen Colorado, 2 August 1990"
The Bush Library http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public papers.php?id=2128&vear= 1990&month=8
accessed 28 January 2009
246 Bush, George (11 Sept 1990) "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis
and Budget Deficit"
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public papers.php?id=22 I 7&year= 1990&month=9 accessed 30
January 2009
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Period Core Type of Threat United States United States
Compellent (Denial or Coercion Foreign Policy
Demands Punishment) Outcome Outcome
2 Aug1990 - Extra- Punishment Failure Failure
19 Oct 1990 Territorial Economic Sanctions Iraqi Forces did Iraq Forces
Withdrawal of not withdraw remained in
Iraqi Army Kuwait
from Kuwait
20 Oct 1990 - Extra- Punishment Failure Failure
15 Jan 1991 territorial - Economic Sanctions Iraqi Forces did Iraq Forces
Withdrawal of - Threat of air strikes not withdraw remained in
Iraqi Army on Iraqi infrastructure Kuwait
from Kuwait and leadership
Denial
- Threat of invasion
and air strikes against
Iraqi military
16 Jan 1991 - Extra- Punishment Success Success
24 Feb 1991 territorial - Economic Sanctions Iraq agrees to Iraq Forces
Withdrawal of - Air strikes on Iraqi withdraw from withdraw from
Iraqi Army infrastructure and Kuwait within Kuwait
from Kuwait leadership 21 days following U.S.
ground invasion
Policy Denial
Iraqi Army - Air strikes on Iraqi Failure Partial Success
abandon its military Saddam rejects U.S. coalition
heavy -preparation for ground U.S. 48-hour ejects Iraqi
equipment in a invasion withdrawal Army from
humiliating 48- Deadline Kuwait but U.S.
hour withdraw unable to close
from Kuwait off retreat and
Iraqi Army
retains half its
heavy weapons
Table 4.1: Coercion Typology of Gulf War, 2 Aug 1990 -28 Feb 1991
In the second stage, from 20 October 1990 to 15 January 1991, the U.S. continued
sanctions but the Bush administration began distancing itself from a coercion strategy,
instead deploying ground forces to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and destroy the
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armored divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard. In the third stage, from 16 January - 28
February 1991 the U.S. conducted a five-week-long air campaign followed by a ground
invasion with the objective of liberating Kuwait and severely weakening Iraq's military
power.
THE FIRST STA GE: 2 AUG - 19 OCT 1990, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND
DETERRENCE
The United States responded to the invasion by quickly pushing through United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660 which condemned the invasion and
made the compellent, extra-territorial demand "...that Iraq withdraw immediately and
unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August
1990."247 The U.S. adopted a non-military punishment strategy of economic sanctions.
These sanctions against Iraq were further adopted by all UN states according to UNSCR
661, which froze Iraqi financial assets and imposed a trade and arms embargo.248 The
U.S. ruled out a strategy of accommodation with these actions and with these words from
President Bush: "...if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it
will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930's,
we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors." The United
States also issued a deterrent demand that Iraq not invade Saudi Arabia and with the
deployment of military forces to Saudi Arabia, signaled that it would back this demand.
247 United Nations Security Council "Resolution 660 (1990), 2 August 1990"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/575/1 O/IMG/NR0575 I 0.pdf?OpenElernent
accessed 26 February 2009
248 Farnsworth, Clyde H. (1990) "The Iraqi Invasion; Bush, in Freezing Assets, Bars $30 Billion to
Hussein" New York Times 3 August 1990 and United Nations Security Council "Resolution 661 (1990), 6
August 1990"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement
accessed 28 January, 2009
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Bush claimed that U.S. forces would "... not initiate hostilities, but they [would] defend
themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf."249
At this early stage, the United States had insufficient forces in the region to
credibly adopt either a coercive military or a brute force strategy to force Iraq out of
Kuwait. Also, the more general concern over stability in the emerging post-Cold War
world led the United States to work through the UN Security Council.250 As a result,
even if the U.S. had desired to adopt a brute force strategy, which it initially did not, it
did not have the support of the Soviet Union, France and China to garner a resolution
authorizing force.
IRAQ'S RESPONSE AND THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Saddam rejected an unconditional withdrawal, and, in reply announced the
annexation of Kuwait. On the 12th of August, he further insisted that any settlement of
the crisis be linked to the Israeli - Palestinian conflict.2  In order to reduce the number
of fronts and free up additional troops to defend Kuwait, Saddam settled the Iran-Iraq
stalemate by agreeing to return to the terms of the 1975 treaty.
The impact of the UN trade embargo was immediately felt as imports were cut by
90% and exports by 97%. As a result Iraq began rationing in early September.2 Iraq
indeed seemed the perfect target for sanctions as it imported nearly 70 percent of its food
249 Bush, George (8 August 1990) "Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States
Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia" The Bush Library
http://bushlibrarv. tamu. edu/research/public papers.php?id=2 147&year= /990&month=8 accessed 28
January 2009
250 Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft (1998) A World Transformed Alfred A. Knopf: New York 322,
Baker, James (1995) The Politics of Diplomacy G.P. Putnam's Sons: New York 277-278
25 Baghdad Domestic Service (1990) "Text of Saddam Husayn Initiative on Situation" FBIS-NES-90-156
13 August 1990
252 Baghdad Domestic Service (1990) "Foreigners To Receive Food Under Ration System" FBIS-NES-90-
191 2 October 1990
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and U.S. estimates had Iraq at a two- to three-month supply of wheat, rice and corn.m In
addition, Iraqi oil was particularly vulnerable to embargo as its crude flowed primarily
through pipelines into Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
However, economic distress on the part of the Iraqi population did not translate
into sufficient pressure to convince Saddam to withdraw his army from Kuwait. Having
ordered chemical weapon attacks on Kurdish villages in the past, Saddam was not moved
by civilian suffering and would not change his policies at the first sign of misery. In
addition the sanctions had minimal impact on the Iraqi Army. Having already achieved
the objective of seizing Kuwait, it was now positioned in a static defense which required
minimal logistical support. Therefore, while Saddam acknowledged the plight of the
Iraqi people, he remained defiant.2 5 4
On the 5th of October, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sent envoy Yevgeny
Primakov to Baghdad to convey that only a withdrawal would avoid military
confrontation. 25 5 Saddam confided to Primakov, "... now that I have given up all the
results of the eight-year war with Iran and returned everything to prewar conditions, the
Iraqi people will not forgive me for unconditional withdrawal of our troops from
Kuwait."256 Primakov then traveled to Washington on the 1 9 th of October and presented
253 Lardner, George (December 6, 1990) "CIA DIRECTOR SANCTIONS NEED 9 MORE MONTHS
WEBSTER SAYS EMBARGO OFFERS NO GUARANTEE" Washington Post, Passell, Peter (1990)
"CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; How Vulnerable is Iraq?" New York Times 20 August 1990
254 Baghdad Domestic Service (1990) "RCC, Ba'th Party Issue Statement on 'Battle"' FBIS-NES-90-184
21 September 1990
255 Primakov, Yevgeny (2004) Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium New Haven: Yale
University Press 48-49
256 Primakov, Yevgeny (2004) Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium New Haven: Yale
University Press 49
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a gloomy assessment, casting doubts that sanctions alone would convince Saddam to alter
his course.257
ANALYSIS OF STA GE I: 2 AUGUST -19 OCTOBER 1990
The invasion of Kuwait triggered a crisis for the United States. While it had just
emerged victorious from the Cold War with an abundance of military power available to
compel an Iraqi withdrawal, it would take time and resources to deploy sufficient military
force to the region to demonstrate a credible offensive capability. In the interim, the only
viable foreign policies were those of accommodation or a non-military coercive strategy
of economic sanctions. Accommodation was dismissed as only encouraging further Iraqi
aggression and weakening U.S. credibility to deter other states from taking similar
actions in the future.
The unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait was the core
demand on which the U.S. refused to compromise, but economic sanctions were not a
sufficient threat to compel Iraq. Sanctions, however, were not implemented out of
miscalculation on the part of the United States. While the U.S. would have preferred the
sanctions to work, it could not rely solely on this non-military solution. Sanctions did,
however, punish Iraq and serve as a stop-gap measure while hundreds of thousands of
U.S. and coalition forces poured into the Persian Gulf to "defend" Saudi Arabia and U.S.
military planners busily planned an offensive campaign. This first stage ended as soon as
the U.S. was in a position to elevate the threat and adopt a credible military strategy to
force Iraq out of Kuwait.
257 Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft (1998) A World Transformed Alfred A. Knopf: New York 377
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THE SECOND STAGE: 20 OCTOBER 1990 -15 JAN 1991
On 11 October the Pentagon briefed President Bush on an offensive option to
invade Kuwait.258 The military estimated it would require an additional 200,000 U.S.
troops beyond the 230,000 U.S. and 200,000 international forces already deploying to the
Gulf. A deployment order was required by the end of October to have these additional .
forces in position by mid-January. 25 9 This forced a decision point for the United States:
either it continued with economic sanctions and maintained defensive-only forces in
Saudi Arabia or it could ratchet up an offensive military threat. In late October, President
Bush chose the latter. 260 Though this new course contained elements of both punishment
and denial strategies, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell,
declared it a primarily brute force strategy as the force build-up was designed to achieve
a decisive military victory. 26 1
Bush announced the troop buildup following the November mid-term elections. 262
The doubling of force was intended to signal the credibility of an offensive military
threat. However, the strength of U.S. resolve was diluted by an outcry from Congress.
Unlike sanctions and the defense of Saudi Arabia, both of which had received broad
258 Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor (1995) The Generals' War New York: Little, Brown and
Company 135
259 Two technical concerns made the end of October decision necessary. First the Defense Department had
activated the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to deploy the troops. If the military released control of these aircraft
back to the airlines once the deployment of troops was complete at the end of October, it would then be
difficult to deploy an additional 200,000 troops later. Second military estimates were that a ground war
needed to commence no later than March in order to avoid the searing summer heat of the Kuwait desert.
"Table 14: Threater CENTCOM personnel at weekly intervals" Gulf War A irpower Survey, volume V
(1993) Government Printing Office: Washington 51, "Table 15: CENTTAF Strike aircraft Strength by
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260 Woodward, Bob (1991) The Commanders Simon and Schuster: New York 322
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support, many in Congress disagreed with any offensive military option and instead
counseled the White House to have more patience to allow sanctions to work.263 Polling
also indicated that the American public preferred a diplomatic to a military solution. 264
To counter this dissent, the President met with bipartisan leadership and top Bush
administration officials testified on the necessity of military action before congressional
committees. 265
International support to expel Iraq from Kuwait proved easier to obtain. On 29
November, the Security Counsel passed Resolution 678, setting a deadline of 15 January
1991 for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal and authorizing the coalition to take whatever
means necessary to enforce Iraq's compliance. 266 President Bush, realizing that further
diplomatic effort would be needed to gain congressional support, offered to conduct
direct talks with Iraq. 267 These negotiations only fizzled into a brief, unproductive
meeting, however, between Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Secretary Baker on the
9 th of January. 268 Though the effort did not produce a peaceful settlement, it did solidify
sufficient domestic support for Bush as both the House and the Senate authorized the use
of force only three days later. 269
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IRAQ'S RESPONSE TO THE THREA T OF MILITARY FORCE
Iraq responded to this new threat in three ways. First, Iraq fortified its defenses in
Kuwait and mobilized an additional quarter of a million reserve troops.270 Second, in an-
ill-fated attempt to garner international support, Iraq incrementally released hostages in a
series of high-profile visits by dignitaries and international celebrities. Third, Saddam
attempted to drive a wedge between the coalition's Arab and Western states by
repeatedly calling for a linkage between Kuwait and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This
effort gained some footing within the Arab community following the 8 October
confrontation between Palestinians and Israeli defense forces at Haram al-Sharif which
left 21 Palestinians dead. 271
A November interview provided useful insight into Saddam's perception of the
crisis. First, he noted that the decision to go to war was not his to make. He understood
the asymmetric dynamics of the conflict and realized that it was the powerful U.S. which
would make this decision. Iraq's only choice was to resist or to concede to U.S.
demands. Second, Saddam correctly observed that the U.S. had added the objective of
weakening Iraq's military power. Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, had
expressed this intention to Primakov in October.272 Bush, however, in order to gain and
retain domestic and international support, did not make explicit the U.S. desire to destroy
27Q Baghdad Domestic Service (19 November 1990) "Saddam Husayn Calls up 250,000 More Troops"
FBIS-NES-90-223. U.S. intelligence estimated 540,000 Iraqi troops in the Kuwait Area of Operation
although post war analysis estimates the number at 336,000. Cohen, Eliot A and Thomas A Keaney (1993)
Gulf War A irpower Survey Volume One
Washington: US Government Printing Office 233
271 Lemoyne, James (October 10, 1990) "Mideast Tensions: "Saudis Say Jerusalem Killings Could Weaken
Alliance Against Iraq" New York Times Lewis, Paul (October 25, 1990) "Mideast Tensions; U.S. Joins in
2d Vote at UN to Criticize Israel Over 21 Slain" New York Times, Apple, R.W. (October 14,1990) "Two-
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272 Primakov, Yevgeny (2004) Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium New Haven: Yale
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the Republican Guard, though it was a primary objective of the offensive campaign he
had approved.273 Regardless of whether Saddam was completely candid or not, these
comments do reveal that he understood the asymmetric nature of the conflict and that,
facing the growing offensive capability of the coalition, Iraqi military power was now at
stake.
As December wore on, Saddam spoke increasingly pessimistically of the chances
for a peaceful settlement, blaming U.S. intransigence, yet vowing that Iraq would never
withdraw its troops unconditionally. 274 As Iraq prepared for combat, Saddam provided
indications of a two-part strategy he had formulated. First, on the 24th of December,
Saddam announced that in response to any U.S. strikes, Iraq would target Israel.275 An
attack on Israel was intended to elicit an Israeli counterattack which would, in turn, rob
the coalition of its Arab support. Second, Saddam predicted that, just as it had lost its
resolve in Vietnam, the U.S. would give up fighting once casualties mounted.276
Saddam's rhetoric grew ever more bellicose as the 15 January deadline approached. He
called upon the Arab world for jihad and predicted that Iraq's high moral character would
overcome the U.S. technological advantage.277 For Saddam, the key to success lay not in
273 Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft (1998) A World Transformed Alfred A. Knopf: New York 383.
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54, 2.
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January 1991
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his army's ability to defeat the U.S. on the battlefield, but in its ability to outlast the U.S.
and to inflict more casualties than the U.S. was willing to endure.278
ANALYSIS OF STAGE H: 20 OCTOBER 1990 -15 JANUARY 1991
The United States' efforts at coercive diplomacy failed to compel Saddam
Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait even after his country had endured 5 months of painful
sanctions and now faced a war against a vastly superior coalition force. In the first stage
of the crisis, the U.S. had not yet deployed sufficient force to threaten to eject the Iraqi
Army from Kuwait. By January of 1991, however, the credibility of an impending attack
had risen dramatically. Yet Saddam still resisted. What explains his continual refusal to
concede at the risk of not only losing Kuwait, but also much of his military power? And
why did the U.S. not compromise to provide Saddam a face-saving opportunity to bring
about a peaceful settlement?
First, misperception and miscalculation over the balance of power and the
willingness of the United States to use force figured heavily into Saddam's decision to
resist. Iraq's combat experience with Iran, extensive though it was, had not prepared
Saddam to face the United States. He, to a greater degree than the U.S., underestimated
the vulnerability of his army to modern airpower and ground forces. Saddam also
deceived himself by habitually punishing those within his regime who brought him "bad"
Readiness" FBIS-NES-91-005 8 January 91, Baghdad Domestic Service (7 January 1991) "Saddam
Addresses Reception" FBIS-NES-91-007 10 January 91
278 He graphically detailed how U.S. troops would swim in their blood and become food for the desert birds
Baghdad Domestic Service (10 January 1991) "Saddam: U.S. To Swim 'in Blood' if War Starts" FBIS-
NES-91-007
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news. As a result, he misperceived how hollow his forces had become and the degree of
technological advantage enjoyed by the U.S.. 279
Second, Saddam's dominant and perpetual concern was his political and personal
survival. 2 80 He had constructed a cult of personality and exhibited the characteristics of
Max Weber's charismatic leader. As such, his power rested in his followers' continued
belief in his "supernatural" leadership. 2 8' During the Iran-Iraq war Saddam attempted to
divert economic hardship away from the Iraqi population by means of foreign loans. The
resulting debt was substantial and a driving force behind his decision to invade Kuwait.
The subsequent five months of the international trade embargo only exacerbated Iraqi's
dismal economic plight. Unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait would not solve any of
these problems and could only further undermine Saddam's authority. Standing up to the
mighty United States, on the other hand, enhanced his standing within Iraq and the Arab
world and might present him a political victory, even if it led to military defeat.
A combination of misperception, miscalculation, and political posturing may
explain Saddam's refusal to concede in the face of overwhelming force, but it does not
explain the unwillingness of the United States to make compromises of its own. There
were three other factors, rather, which contributed to its reluctance to reduce demands to
settle the crisis once the U.S. had deployed its forces. First and foremost, a compromise
which left the Iraqi military intact would require the long-term deployment of U.S.
forces, lest Kuwait and Saudi Arabia be left exposed to future Iraqi aggression. From
279 Woods, Kevin and James Lacey and Williamson Murray (2006) "Saddam's Delusions" Foreign Affairs
85: 3, 2
280 Gen Powell makes a similar assessment of Saddam's priorities, Powell, Colin (1995) My American
Journey New York: Random House 490
281 Weber, Max (1947) The Theory ofSocial and Economic Organization London: Collier-Macmillan 358,
360.
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both a foreign policy and domestic political perspective this would also be the Bush
administration's nightmare scenario, i.e. to have paid the diplomatic and political costs to
obtain both UN and congressional approval for an invasion, to have paid the actual
deployment costs of half a million personnel, many of whom had already been in place
for six months, only to have Saddam accept the UN demands in the eleventh hour. On
the eve of war, the U.S. not only did not want compromise, but was relieved when
Saddam proved such a "cooperative" enemy by refusing to concede.
A second reason for not compromising was that of U.S. primacy in the nascent
post-Cold War world. Not only had the United States recently emerged as the sole
superpower, but it also possessed an abundance of military force in Europe no longer
required to deter a crumbling Soviet Union. This was now available to be used in the
Persian Gulf. Equally important was the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor any other
major state had chosen to balance against the U.S. by aligning with Iraq. As a result, the
U.S. enjoyed an asymmetric advantage in power by January, which translated into a high
probability of victory in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait at a relatively low cost.
Third, the U.S. perceived any compromise with Iraq as a threat to broader U.S.
interests. Compromise could destabilize the post-Cold War world order by reducing U.S
credibility to deter other states from taking similar aggressive actions. 2 82 Consequently,
the U.S. was unwilling to make any concessions which would appear to reward Iraq's
actions. In addition, Saddam's insistence upon linking any settlement to the broader
Middle East peace process only increased the expected costs for the U.S. in procuring an
agreement and lessened the likelihood of a diplomatic solution ever convincing Iraq to
leave Kuwait.
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All told, these three factors created an expected outcome of war which exceeded
that of any peaceful settlement to which Saddam might have agreed.
THE THIRD STA GE: 17 JANUARY - 28 FEBRUARY 1991
Once coercive diplomacy had failed to convince Saddam to withdraw from
Kuwait, the United States commenced air strikes in the early hours of 17 January 1991.
The initial focus of the U.S. was on gaining air superiority and directly targeting Saddam
and other strategic targets in and near Baghdad. Within three days, however, the majority
of strikes shifted toward the Republican Guard and the regular Iraqi units deployed to the
Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Iraqi Force Deployment in Kuwait2
283 The map shows the deployment of Iraqi divisions. XX above a rectangle indicates a division. A large X
within the rectangle indicates an infantry unit, a racetrack symbol to represent the tread of a tank indicates
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By mid-February the air campaign and the impending ground invasion had finally
convinced Saddam to concede to the unconditional withdrawal in an effort to preserve his
army. In order to avoid a Soviet-brokered peace deal which would leave Iraq with much
of its military power in tact, however, the U.S. was no longer interested in this concession
alone. Instead it issued an ultimatum which, if accepted, would have forced the Iraqi
Army to abandon much of its heavy equipment in Kuwait. Indeed a prime objective of
the U.S. military strategy was to weaken Saddam's power by destroying his Republican
Guard. Though the USAF had designed a strategic air campaign to target Saddam and
his Baath party in Baghdad, the overwhelming majority of air missions were allocated to
fix, attrit, and sever avenues of retreat from the KTO until the U.S. Army's mighty left
hook could engage and annihilate the Republican Guard.2 84
In this section I examine the events leading to Saddam's decision to withdraw and
I consider punishment and denial as the competing coercive levers which caused this
reversal. By comparing the timing and the level of the U.S. military effort, I conclude
that the U.S. denied Saddam both the hope that both his strategy would succeed and the
means of defending Kuwait. It was fear of the destruction of his army which caused him
to accept the Soviet proposal to concede Kuwait in order to save his army. I do not
suggest, however, that the U.S. actually adopted a coercive denial strategy. The U.S.
was, rather, applying a brute force strategy to eject the Iraqi Army from the KTO and to
armor and an X overlaying a tread a mechanized division, with fewer tanks than an armored unit, and a
diagonal line with a tread indicated mechanized infantry. Mroczkowski, Dennis (1993) "U.S. Marines in
the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2nd Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm" U.S. Marine
Corps, History and Museums Division: Washington http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kuwait.html accessed
9 February 2009
284 Homer, Chuck and Tom Clancy (1999) Every Man a Tiger: The Gulf War Air Campaign New York:
Berkley, 265
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destroy the armored divisions of the Republican Guard. The consequence of executing
this brute force strategy, however, placed coercive military pressure on Iraq to concede to
UN demands, despite the fact that the U.S. no longer intended to accept such concessions.
My purpose here is not to provide a detailed analysis of military operations but to
examine how and when the U.S. employed its military power and to compare these
actions to those of Iraq. 285 The war can be divided into six week-long periods,
commencing with air strikes on the 17th of January and ending with a unilateral U.S.
ceasefire on the 28th of February.
WEEK ONE, 17 -23 JANUARY: AIR SUPERIORITYAND STRA TEGIC A TTACK
The initial phase of the air campaign prioritized two U.S. military objectives:
gaining and maintaining air superiority and attacking Iraqi political/military leadership
and command and control.286 The U.S. quickly achieved air superiority and by the end of
the week, the Iraqi Air Force ceased to offer any resistance. 2 87 In addition, air strikes
degraded Iraq's integrated air defense system. 2 88 The cost to the coalition for achieving
285
2 For a detailed analysis see the six volume Gulf War Airpower Survey , Cohen, Eliot A and Thomas A
Keaney (1993) Gulf War Airpower Survey Washington: US Government Printing Office
htt ://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/gwaps.htm accessed 13 Feb 2009
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Flight Activity versus Coalition Kills" Gulf War Airpower Survey Summary Washington: US Government
Printing Office 59
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air superiority was initially significant, with a loss of 17 aircraft in the first three days of
strikes. By mid-week, however, once the U.S. had restricted aircraft operations to
medium altitude and shifted its attacks from Baghdad to the KTO, coalition losses
decreased dramatically, averaging one aircraft loss per day for the remainder of the
289
war.
For strategic attacks, the U.S. conducted precision strikes with F- 117 stealth
aircraft and conventionally-armed cruise missiles. By the third night of strikes, the U.S.
had already exhausted virtually all Iraqi leadership targets. 290 Rather than punish Saddam
until he conceded, however, the purpose of this decapitation strategy was to degrade his
ability to command and control the Iraqi military. 29 1
Iraq responded to the strikes in three ways. First, it launched ballistic Scud
missiles at Israel in an attempt to split the coalition by drawing the Israelis into the
conflict. 292 This provocation placed enormous pressure on Israel's leadership to respond
in kind and required a good deal of diplomatic effort on the part of the United States to
dissuade Israel from retaliating.293 Second, Iraq reacted to strikes on its Air Force by
hiding its aircraft in hardened aircraft shelters and even flying some to Iran. Third, once
Thomas A Keaney (1993) Gulf War A irpower Survey Volume Two Washington: US Government Printing
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the war was under way, Iraq did not bow to the pressure to seek a ceasefire and on 21
January publicly rebuffed such an overture made by the Soviets.294
WEEK TWO, 24 -31 JANUARY: THE KTO AND AL KHAFJI
By week two, the focus of the air campaign had shifted to the south, the most
important change being the increased emphasis on attacking Iraq's ground forces. The
Iraqi Army deployed to the KTO 42 divisions, 8 of which were elite Republican Guard
units. They totaled 336,000 troops, 3,200 tanks and 2,400 artillery pieces. 295 In the first
week the coalition conducted 938 strikes, primarily with U.S. A-Os, B-52s, F-16s and F-
18s. These strikes tripled to 2,798 by week two and attacks on the Republican Guard
rose 16-fold from 53 to 805.296
Saddam's strategy to draw Israel into the conflict and to inflict a large number of
U.S. casualties in a bloody ground war was not working. Israel had yet to retaliate to
over a dozen Scud launches and the U.S. appeared content with an extended air campaign
to severely attrit Iraqi forces prior to any ground operation.297
Saddam was ready for the ground campaign to begin and for U.S. casualty rates to
rise. He met with his commanders in Basra on the 2 7th of January and ordered an Iraqi
294 Baghdad Domestic Service (21 Jan 91) "Gorbachev Letter Proposes Withdrawal from Kuwait" FBIS-
NES-91-014 22 Jan 91, Baghdad INA (21 Jan 91) "Text of Saddam's Reply" FBIS-NES-91-014 22 Jan 91
295 At the commencement of the war the U.S. estimated Iraq strength at 540,000 troops, 4000 tanks and
3000 artillery pieces. However a combination of undermanning, Iraqi troops disserting or on leave
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offensive. 298 Soon thereafter, three Iraqi divisions massed along the Kuwait-Saudi
border, sending lead units to cross and occupy the Saudi coastal town of Al Khafji on the
evening of 29 January. Saddam considered this invasion of Saudi Arabia a major
success. The Iraqi forces, however, held Al Khafji for only a day and a half until Saudi
and U.S. Marine ground units dislodged them on the morning of the 3 1st. The larger
story was the inability of the Iraqis to maneuver and maintain the offensive as coalition
aircraft mounted nearly 300 sorties against the exposed Iraqi armor as its columns
moving to the south. Its columns stalled and the offensive collapsed.299
WEEKS THREE AND FOUR (1 FEB -14 FEB): KTO AND AL FIRDOS
In weeks three and four, the coalition continued to prioritize the Iraqi Army. The
number of strikes rose to 3,512 in week three and 3,972 in week four.300 In addition the
effectiveness of strikes increased as the coalition made two adjustments to its tactics,
relaxing altitude restrictions on strike aircraft such as A-I Os to improve their lethality and
employing infrared targeting pods and laser-guided bombs against Iraqi tanks.30 '
Though attacks against leadership targets fell sharply following the first three
nights of strikes, in week four air planners returned to attack lower priority bunkers in
302 th
Baghdad not yet targeted. On the 13 of February the coalition hit the Al Firdos
298 Baghdad INA (24 January 1991) "INA Reports Saddam Visit to Southern Front" FBIS-NES-91-016,
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district bunker in downtown Baghdad.303 The attack killed several hundred civilians,
capturing international attention and forcing the U.S. to cancel strikes on Baghdad for
two weeks.
While Iraq stood defiant for the first three weeks, by week four Saddam began to
show signs of weakening his position. On the 1 1th of February Iraq announced its
willingness to consider a ceasefire. 304 That same day, the Soviet envoy Primakov arrived
in Baghdad to discuss conditions for such a ceasefire. 30 5 Primakov was initially
encouraged as Saddam sent a message to Gorbachev which for the first time dispensed
with linking a withdrawal to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His hopes were soon
frustrated, however, as Saddam only agreed to send his Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to
Moscow for further talks. The peace terms Saddam then issued on the 15th of February
were more demanding than his 12 August proposal. 06
The U.S. dismissed Saddam's proposal but worried that the Soviet efforts might
yet succeed in bringing Iraq to agree to withdraw from Kuwait, a development the U.S.
would find difficult to refuse. 307
WEEKS FIVE AND SIX (15 FEB - 28 FEB): PREPARA TION OF THE
BA TTLEFIELD AND THE GROUND INVASION
In week five, coalition air strikes in the KTO reached their apex at over 4,000
sorties flown, accounting for 85% of all missions. In preparation for the ground
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offensive, strikes were increasingly aimed at Iraq's front line units.308 U.S. Central
Command Commander General Norman Schwarzkopf set a goal for coalition airpower to
attrit 50% of Iraqi armor by the 2 4th of February, the date set for the invasion.309
SOVIET FINAL A TTEMPTA T BROKERING A PEACE A GREEMENT
On 18 February Tariq Aziz arrived in Moscow to speak with President
Gorbachev. Gorbachev informed him that the Soviet Union would immediately call for a
Security Council session to seek a cease-fire if Iraq declared its readiness to set a timeline
for a troop withdrawal.3 10 Aziz took this information to Baghdad and returned to
Moscow on the 2 1st prepared to finalize a peace proposal.
By the morning of the 2 2nd, Gorbachev and Aziz had reached an agreement on a
six-point proposal. In it, "...Iraq agree[d] to implement Resolution 660, that is to
withdraw all of its troops immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait to the positions
they occupied on 1 August 1990."31 The timetable would have all Iraqi forces out of
Kuwait City within 4 days and out of all of Kuwait within 21 days. However, Aziz
also insisted on the following caveat: "...immediately upon completion of troop
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withdrawal from Kuwait, the reasons for the passage of the other Security Council
resolutions will no longer exist, so said resolutions shall cease to be effective."313 The _
proposal was transmitted to Baghdad and, in the early hours of 23 February, Saddam
accepted the terms.3 14
As these events transpired, Gorbachev kept Bush informed of the progress being
made and let him know that the peace proposal was being formalized and sent to
Baghdad.315 The Bush administration, however, rejected two conditions of the proposal:
the removal of the 12 UN resolutions and the extended timetable for withdrawal, which
would allow the Iraqi Army to depart from Kuwait with all its heavy weapons which had
survived the airstrikes. 316 On 22 February, the day before Saddam approved the proposal,
Bush pre-empted the Soviet negotiations by issuing a new ultimatum: a coalition
ceasefire would be contingent on Iraq's commencement of a withdrawal by noon the next
day, 23 February, to be out of all of Kuwait in 48 hours. In addition, Saddam would have
to make a public statement agreeing to these terms.317 This new deadline was intended to
humiliate Saddam and to force the Iraqi Army to abandon a significant portion of its
equipment in Kuwait.
313 Gorbachev, Mikhail (1995) Memoirs New York: Doubleday 562
m Primakov, Yevgeny (2004) Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium New Haven:Yale
University Press 70, Gorbachev, Mikhail (1995) Memoirs New York: Doubleday 562, Schmemann, Serge
(22 Feb 1991) "War in the Gulf: Diplomacy; Soviets Say Iraq Accepts Kuwait Pullout Linked to Truce and
an End to Sanctions; Bush Rejects Conditions: War is to go on" New York Times, "War in the Gulf: Soviet
Statement; Moscow's Statement on the Iraqis' Response" New York Times 22 Feb 1991
315 "War in the Gulf: U.S. Statement; Transcript of White House Statement and News Conference on
Soviet Plan" New York Times 22 Feb 1991
316 Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft (1998) A World Transformed Alfred A. Knopf: New York 474-476,
Dowd, Maureen (22 Feb 1991) "War in the Gulf: White House; Pressing Demands" New York Times
317 Bush, George (22 Feb1991) "Remarks on the Persian Gulf Conflict 1991-02-22" The Bush Library
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public papers.php?id=2729&year= 1991 &month=2 accessed 23 Feb
2009
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Saddam rejected the ultimatum, while re-affirming his support for the Soviet
initiative.318 The U.S., in turn, announced that the Soviet proposal "...was unacceptable
because it did not constitute an unequivocal commitment to an immediate and
unconditional withdrawal. Thus, the Iraqi approval of the Soviet proposal is without
effect."31 9
THE U.S. GROUND INVASION
In the early hours of 24 February, or G-day, the coalition commenced its ground
invasion. U.S. Marines broached the Iraqi forward defenses along the Kuwaiti southeast
border and met with little resistance as they raced through a second line of defense by
nightfall (see Figure 4.3).320 On the morning of the 25th the Iraqis mounted a
counterattack but were driven back within hours.32 ' By that evening Kuwaiti resistance
was reporting the departure of Iraqi troops from Kuwait City and, in the early hours of 26
February, Baghdad Radio announced a general withdrawal of all forces from Kuwait. 322
The coalition's ground plan had been for the Marine advance to be followed by a
U.S. Army 7th Corps attack on the Republican Guard's exposed western flank while the
1 8th Corps drove deep into Iraq toward Tallil to cut lines of communication with
318 Baghdad Domestic Service (22 Feb 91) "RCC Statement on Bush's 'Disgraceful' Ultimatum" FBIS-
NES-91-037 25 Feb 91, Associated Press (23 Feb 1991) "War in the Gulf: Iraq; U.S. Peace Terms
Denounced by Iraq" New York Times, "War in the Gulf; Statement by Iraqi Revolutionary Council" New
York Times 23 Feb 1991
319 Fitzwater, Marlin (23 Feb 1991) "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Persian Gulf Conflict"
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public papers.plp?id=2732&year=1991 &month=2 accessed 23 Feb
2009
320 Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor (1995) The Generals' War New York: Little, Brown and
Company 355-58
321 Associated Press (25 Feb 1991) "War in the Gulf: The Marines; 2 Divisions Said to Near Kuwait City"
New York Times, Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor (1995) The Generals' War New York: Little,
Brown and Company 369,
322 Baghdad Domestic Service (25 Feb 91) "Official Spokesman Says 'Withdrawal Order' Given" FBIS-
NES-91-038 26 Feb 91, Tyler, Patrick (26 Feb 1991) "War in the Gulf: The Overview; Iraq Orders Troops
to leave Kuwait but U.S. Pursues Battlefield Gains" New York Times
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Baghdad. All of this, however, was contingent on the Iraqi Army standing and fighting.
Its retreat instead became a race to see how much of his army Saddam could salvage
before escape routes could be sealed off. At 8:00 a.m. on 28 February, the U.S. formally
declared a ceasefire and, though the coalition never completed its encirclement, it did
destroy or capture 75% of the tanks, 54% of the Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and
89% of the artillery pieces of the Iraqi Army in the KTO. 323
Figure 4.3: Timing of Coalition Ground Invasion, 24 Feb 19912
323 Cohen, Eliot A and Thomas A Keaney (1993) "Part 2 Effectiveness: Table 21 Estimates of Iraqi
Equipment Status in Kuwait Theater" Gulf War A irpower Survey Volume 2 Washington: US Government
Printing Office 261. The Republican Guard divisions which were deployed in reserve along the Iraq-
Kuwait border did not suffer as high of attrition losing approximately half of their tanks, APCs, and
artillery. Cordesman, Anthony H. (1999) Iraq and the War of Sanctions. Conventional Threats and
Weapons of Mass Destruction Westport, CT: Praeger 68
324 XXX above a rectangle indicate a Corps, XXXX indicate an Army. The symbol of a gulls wing
represents airborne. Mroczkowski, Dennis (1993) "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the
2"d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm" U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums
Division: Washington http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/timing of attack.jpg accessed 25 Feb
2009
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The reduction of Iraq's overall military power, though not total, was significant
and greatly degraded Iraq's ability to project power across its borders. Iraq's army had
been reduced from 955,000 to 350,000 troops, from 5,500 to 2,300 tanks, from 159 to
120 armed helicopters, and from 3,000 to 1,000 artillery pieces. In addition, the
Republican Guard had contracted by nearly half, from 12 to 7 divisions and the Iraqi Air
Force had gone from 689 to 439 combat aircraft. 325
IRA QI DIPLOMA CY
The rapid succession of events in the ground campaign was accompanied by a
flurry of diplomatic activity in an attempt to bring about a ceasefire. After issuing its
withdrawal order on the 2 6th of February, Iraq informed the Soviets, who then, as
promised called an emergency UN Security Council meeting to discuss a ceasefire. 326In
response, the U.S. announced its conditions for a ceasefire. They called for Iraq to agree
to abide by all 12 of the Security Council Resolutions and for Saddam to publicly
renounce the annexation of Kuwait and to accept responsibility for reparations. 327
The following day, Aziz wrote a letter to the Security Council, in which Iraq
agreed to renounce the annexation of Kuwait and to pay war reparations, but only if it
were absolved from the remaining resolutions. When the U.S. and Security Council
325 On the lead up to the war and during the war the number of troops and equipment was higher than these
figures which were adjusted downward following after action assessments of Iraqi military capabilities.
Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor (1995) The Generals' War New York: Little, Brown and
Company 459, International Institute for Strategic Studies (1991-1992) The Military Balance London:
Brassey's, International Institute for Strategic Studies (1990-1992) The Military Balance London:
Brassey's
326 Gorbachev, Mikhail (1995) Memoirs New York: Doubleday 564
327 Fitzwater, Marlin (25 Feb 1991) "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Persian Gulf Conflict"
The Bush Library http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public papers.php?id=2737&year= 1991 &month=2
accessed 25 Feb 91,
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rejected the offer, Aziz produced a second letter to relay that Iraq would abide by all
resolutions.328
All of these efforts, however, were quickly overcome by events. The Bush
administration believed, incorrectly, that an Iraqi retreat had been cut off by U.S. forces.
Prompted further by the negative press generated from images of the carnage along the
"highway of death" leading from Kuwait City to Basra, the U.S. moved unilaterally to
declare a ceasefire on the 2 8 th of February. General Schwarzkopf and Iraqi military
leaders then met on 3 March 1991 to finalize the peace agreement and brought the war to
an end. 329
ANALYSIS OF STAGE III: 17 JANUARY - 28 FEBRUARY 1991
It was a combination of factors which finally convinced Saddam to soften his
position. A month of intense air strikes left the Iraqi Army demoralized and ineffective,
the Iraqi offensive at Al Khafji failed to draw the coalition into an early ground
campaign, and Scud attacks on Israel failed to split the coalition. Finally realizing the
United States' high probability of victory and low costs in terms of casualties, Saddam
was pressed to concede to its core demand: the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
An alternative interpretation of events maintains Saddam was never coerced into
withdrawing forces prior to the ground invasion. This argument is made on the basis of
four claims: there is no evidence that Saddam would have abided by the terms of the
Soviet six-point peace plan to which he agreed on the 2 3 'd of February; even in the Soviet
328 "War in the Gulf: Diplomacy; Texts of Iraqi Letters" New York Times 28 February 1991
329 Apple, R.W. (4 March 1991) "After the War: The Overview; U.S. says Iraqi Generals agree to
Demands 'on all matters'; Early P.O.W. Release Expected" New York Times, Gordon, Michael R. and
Bernard E. Trainor (1995) The Generals' War New York: Little, Brown and Company 444-447,
Schwarzkopf, Norman and Peter Petre (1992) It Doesn't Take a Hero New York: Bantom
557-568
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peace plan Saddam never agreed to an unconditional withdrawal; Saddam rejected the
United States' 48-hour ultimatum to withdraw; and finally, the United States had long
abandoned a coercive strategy, did not desire Iraqi concession to the UN resolution for
unconditional withdrawal, and took measures to frustrate the Soviet efforts.
To address this argument I address each claim in turn. First, as to whether
Saddam would have abided by the Soviet peace plan to begin withdrawing his forces
within 24 hours of a ceasefire, to be out of Kuwait City in 4 days and out of Kuwait in 21
days the only evidence we have is Saddam's word. It would have benefited him little,
however, to later renege on his promise and would have proven politically costly. At the
most, Iraq could have gained a day or two of relief from air strikes during the ceasefire
before the U.S. recommenced strikes. The cost for such a temporary ceasefire would
have been the further alienation of the Soviet Union, the lone major power and only
permanent member of the Security Council somewhat sympathetic to Iraq's plight.
Second is the claim that Iraq never agreed to an unconditional withdrawal as
evidenced by a clause in the Soviet plan, insisted on by Tariq Aziz which stipulated that,
upon the Iraqi troop withdrawal, the remaining UN resolutions would no longer be in
effect. This, the U.S. insisted, was clearly Iraq imposing conditions, a move which Bush
firmly rejected.
While it is true that Aziz did attach these conditions for a voluntary Iraqi
withdrawal, the core U.S. demand that Iraq remove all its forces from Kuwait was
conceded. Further, any suspension of the UN resolutions would take place only
following the withdrawal. And finally, Aziz's conditions did not address any of the
issues which Iraq had used to justify the invasion in the first place: Kuwaiti
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unwillingness to forgive Iraq's war debts, Kuwaiti unwillingness to concede to Iraq the
Warbah and Bubiyan islands to secure the port at Umm Qasr, and Kuwaiti oil production
over OPEC quotas. In fact, the conditions announced by Saddam on 12 August 1990
were even more extensive than these, but the Soviet peace proposal made no reference to
any of these issues nor did it link a withdrawal to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I
therefore conclude that though Iraq did not concede unconditionally to a withdrawal, the
Soviet peace plan was a concession to the core U.S. demand of the withdrawal of all Iraqi
troops from Kuwait.
Third, as to Saddam's dismissing the U.S. ultimatum, it was clear at the time to
both Saddam and the U.S. that the 48-hour timeline was more than the extra-territorial
demand to vacate Kuwait, but was in effect a demand that the Iraqi Army withdraw from
Kuwait in defeat, in a hasty retreat which would force it to abandon a large portion of its
heavy weaponry.
The final point claims that Saddam was not coerced because the United States had
abandoned its coercive strategy at the commencement of hostilities and no longer desired
that Saddam agree to the UN resolutions. This was the position the United States held on
the eve of war in mid-January and clearly in late February the U.S. accelerated its ground
invasion in part to avoid any agreement taking place. Still, from the Iraqi perspective it
was impossible to differentiate a coercive denial strategy from a brute force strategy ex
ante and the increase in U.S. demands did not preclude Iraq from conceding to the
original UN resolution. While the U.S. could not prevent Saddam from agreeing to the
Soviet peace plan, it was, in turn, not prevented from refusing to accept the plan and
adding the demand that the Iraqi Army vacate Kuwait in 48 hours.
189
The weakening of Iraq's military power became an objective as soon as the
United States was in a position to pursue it. Once President Bush approved military plans
and ordered the deployment of forces in October 1990, his administration's efforts were
aimed at securing international and domestic support for a military offensive. By mid-
January, having undertaken the arduous and costly task of deploying over four hundred
thousand troops and having expended an enormous amount of diplomatic and political
capital to obtain the UN resolution and the congressional vote, the U.S. had no interest in
any compromise which left Iraq's military intact.
The U.S. position hardened further as the air campaign progressed. Aircraft
losses remained low and the Iraqi Army proved quite vulnerable to airpower. By the 24th
of February the United States' expected outcome for the ground invasion exceeded that
of the Soviet peace proposal. It would almost certainly liberate Kuwait and severely
weaken Saddam's military power.
In sum, the United States achieved the majority of its foreign policy objectives in
the Gulf War. The core demand was for the removal of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. In
addition, Iraqi military power was significantly degraded, rendering Iraq less threatening
to the region. However, the destruction of the Iraqi Army, in particular the Republican
Guard, was not fully realized. This left Saddam with a sufficient number of loyal forces
to remain in power and they proved instrumental in subduing a significant uprising by the
Shia in the south and in pursuing the Kurds in the north.
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ANAL YSIS OF EXPLANA TIONS FOR COERCION OUTCOME
In this section I assess the predictions from two hypotheses for coercion failure,
survival and commitment, presented in Table 4.2.
Core Survival Commitment Actual
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Coercion
Demands Outcome
Gulf War Withdrawal Predicts Predicts Coercion
Aug 90-Feb of Iraqi Success Failure Success
91 Army from Kuwait not Deployed forces and Saddam agrees to
Kuwait required for Iraqi demonstrated U.S. Soviet proposal to
state survival military power and withdraw Iraqi
and Saddam can resolve makes Army from Kuwait
withdraw and credible military in 21 days
claim victory for threat if U.S. makes
standing up to further demands
U. S. (which it does) _________
Iraqi Army Predicts Predicts Coercion
abandon Failure Failure Failure
heavy Humiliating Deployed forces and Saddam refuses to
weapons in a withdrawal if demonstrated U.S. accept U.S. 48 hour
48-hour Iraqi Army power and resolve ultimatumforced into a makes credible
withdraw hasty retreat. military threat if
from Kuwait Sign of U.S. makes further
Saddam's demands for Iraqi
weakness which homeland territory or
threatens his regime change
_____________________________regime____________
Table 4.2: Predictions of Coercion Outcome
TESTING H YPO THESIS ON SUR VIVA L
The survival hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when a powerful
challenger's demand directly threatens the survival of a weaker target, an issue which the
target is not likely to peacefully cede while it maintains the means to resist. This
hypothesis suggests that, for rational actors, if a challenger makes an optimal demand and
signals a credible threat then the target will likely acquiesce so long as concessions do not
threaten the survival of the target. I will test the survival hypothesis at three levels: the
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state, the regime, and the regime leader. If demands threaten neither state, nor regime,
nor leader survival then the hypothesis predicts coercion will likely be successful. If,
however, concessions will likely result in either target state death or the removal of the
regime or regime's leader from power, then the target will resist so long as it has the
means to do so.330 In this Gulf War case this requires making predictions for the two
compellent demands: the Soviet withdrawal proposal and the Bush 48-hour withdrawal
ultimatum. The survival hypothesis performs well, correctly predicting Saddam Hussein
would accede to the Soviets' proposed withdrawal from Kuwait. It also predicts that
Saddam could not accept the humiliation of conceding to Bush's ultimatum, to appear
weak not only to the U.S. but, more importantly, to domestic opposition groups.
The Impact to Iraq of the Soviet's Proposed Withdrawal
The extra-territorial demand for Iraq's Army to withdraw from Kuwait did not
threaten Iraqi state survival. The demand was neither for Iraq to relinquish control of its
homeland territory nor to cede control of its population. A concession would, however,
adversely affect Iraq's economic fortunes though not to the point of risking state death.
Iraq's economic woes had been the primary motivation for the August 1990
invasion. The Iran-Iraq war had reduced Iraq's oil production and raised its debt. By the
end of the war, though Iraq had been able to return its output to prewar levels, the low
price of global crude prevented Iraq from generating sufficient revenue to service its war
debt and sustain government spending while preserving an acceptable standard of living
for the Iraqi population.
330 While a demand which threatens state survival is also assumed to threaten the regime, the reverse is not
necessarily true, though I do regard a compellent demand for regime change as threatening the survival of
both the state and the regime. Death of the regime entails removing it from power over the state, not
necessarily the actual death of the regime's leader.
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The crisis was thus brought on by this fiscal shortfall which, if left unchecked,
would have held long-term implications for Iraq's economic and military strength. But
this did not mean that Iraq's survival was at risk. Indeed, while the Iran-Iraq war had
seriously drained the resources of both states, the regional balance of power had actually
tilted in Iraq's favor. Though the war exhausted Iran's military strength, Iraq emerged as
the most powerful state in the Gulf. And while the decision to invade Kuwait actually
worsened Iraq's economic situation at the introduction of the trade embargo, the
sanctions did not lead to the collapse of Iraq's economy or weaken Saddam's grasp on
power. In fact, sanctions had the perverse effect of actually increasing the population's
dependence on the government after it implemented a rationing system.
Conceding to a withdrawal from Kuwait would have benefited Iraq economically
once the sanctions were lifted. Such a decision, however, would have also forfeited the
economic potential of the Kuwaiti oil fields and of a secure access to the Gulf, leaving
Iraq dependent on the good will of its not-so-friendly neighbors in Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
and Iran for its oil to reach the world market. Essentially, Iraq would have given up all
the objectives for which it had invaded with little to show for it. In the end, though a
withdrawal clearly would have been a major concession, it would not have led to Iraq's
demise.
Impact of the Soviet proposed withdrawal to Saddam Hussein and his regime
Prior to the commencement of the war on 17 January 1991, a withdrawal of Iraq's
mighty army from Kuwait without so much as a fight would have been humiliating both
to Saddam and to his regime. While Saddam had a firm control of his Baath party and
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the military, he feared the domestic repercussions of such a move, particularly from
Shiite and Kurdish groups, and confided as much to Primakov in October. This fear,
coupled with Saddam's misperception and miscalculation of the probability of victory
and the costs of resisting, explain why coercive diplomacy failed in the second stage of
the crisis leading up to the 15 January deadline. After five weeks of air strikes, however,
Saddam's calculus had evolved. Now during the third stage, on the eve of the coalition
ground invasion, he understood that further resistance would not likely result in Iraq
keeping Kuwait and also risked the loss of his army. Yet concession no longer entailed
the same level of humiliation as before, as Saddam could now claim that Iraq had
defiantly and valiantly withstood America's airpower. He could withdraw and declare a
victory of sorts, having stood up to the might of the West, much as Nasser had done
following the Suez crisis.
In sum, since neither Iraq, nor Saddam, nor his regime's survival was threatened
by the Soviet proposal, the survival hypothesis correctly predicts that Saddam would
concede to demands to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
Impact of Bush's 48-hour Withdrawal on Iraqi Survival
While the Soviets' proposed withdrawal did not threaten Iraq's survival Bush's
48-hour ultimatum was a different matter altogether. The nationalization of oil
production and investment in industrialization and manufacturing in the 1970s had, at
least by regional standards, created a strong economy for Iraq. During the 1980s Iraq
sacrificed investment in its economy to create a garrison state with a million man army
drawn from a population of only 20 million. Iraq's power now firmly resided in its
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military might, specifically its army, which was now threatened with the loss of its heavy
weaponry.
Iraq's military forces were vital to Iraq's national security, given the regional
threat from Iran, along with the global threat now posed by the U.S. coalition. To assess
these threats, I evaluate how much military power Iraq stood to lose if it had conceded to
Bush's 48-hour ultimatum as compared to resisting, and whether those expected losses
would likely have risked Iraq's survival. The following analysis provides insight through
a counterfactual exercise to estimate the quantity of tanks, APCs, and artillery the Iraqi
army would likely have abandoned in a hasty retreat from Kuwait. This estimate is then
compared to the actual weapons remaining in Iraqi hands after the war.
On 24 February, after weeks of airstrikes and on the eve of the ground campaign,
Iraq had approximately 2,087 tanks, 2,151 APCs and 1,322 artillery pieces operational in
the KTO (see Table 4.3).33 By 1 March the totals had been slashed to 842 tanks, 1,412
APCs, and 279 artillery pieces still in Iraqi control. Iraq deployed 43 divisions to the
Kuwaiti theater of operations, just over half of which (23 divisions) were inside Kuwait,
while the remainder (including the Republican Guard divisions) were deployed just
inside the border of Iraq (see Figure 4.2).
In a worse case scenario for Iraq conceding to the 48-hour ultimatum, assume the
Iraqi Army would abandon all of its weapons in Kuwait, which equates to roughly half
the equipment within the entire KTO on 24 February, i.e. approximately 1,040 tanks,
331 Cordesman, Anthony H. (1999) Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of
Mass Destruction Westport, CT: Praeger 68
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1,075 APCs, and 660 artillery pieces. Assuming the Iraqi Army had been able to get
out of Kuwait with even half of its equipment, this would have left Iraq with 1,570 tanks,
1610 APCs, and 1,000 artillery pieces.3 33 Combining these two estimates (third row of
Table 4.3) provides an estimated range for the number of weapons the Iraqi Army would
likely to have retained under the Bush ultimatum. Comparing this to the actual weapons
remaining in Iraqi control after the war (comparing Row 3 and Row 4 in Table 4.3), Iraq
would have recovered more military equipment by conceding to the Bush ultimatum.
Iraq clearly would have recovered more tanks and artillery pieces and the number of
APCs actually recovered falls within the estimated range of APCs recovered by
conceding. 334
Date Location Tanks APCs Artillery
(remaining) (remaining) (remaining)
16 Jan 1991 KTO 3,475 3,080 2,474
24 Feb 1991 KTO 2,087 2,151 1,322
In Kuwait 1,040 - 1,570 1,075 - 1,610 660-1,000
(if 100% - 50%
abandoned)
1 March 1991 In Iraqi Control 842 1,412 279
Table 4.3: Iraqi Army heavy equipment estimates in Kuwaiti Theater of
Operations3 35
332 This is a conservative estimate since the hardest hit units were those within Kuwait, particularly those
units along the eastern Saudi border, and the most heavily armored divisions were those of the Republican
Guard which took the lightest damage from U.S. air strikes.
333 The estimate of 1,000 artillery pieces is high since the vast majority of these were towed. It is no
surprise that the actual number of Iraqi artillery pieces which survived the war was so low given the Iraqi
hasty retreat.
m The high number of Iraq's APCs, relative to tanks and artillery, which actually made it out of Kuwait
during the war makes sense given the APCs greater mobility and the number of troops each vehicle could
carry. Even had Saddam conceded to Bush, the number of APCs which would have gotten out of Kuwait
would have been at least as many as those that actually got out while under fire.
m The 16 January and 1 March numbers were produced through imagery assessment. The 24 February
numbers for battle damage assessment were estimated by USCENTCOM. Various battle damage
assessments of the damage inflicted by airpower prior to the ground invasion range from 20 to 48%. Using
the more conservative 20% estimate increases the number of weapons Iraq could recover, but does not
affect the outcome of this analysis. Cordesman, Anthony H. (1999) Iraq and the War of Sanctions:
Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction Westport, CT: Praeger 68
196
Given this assessment, I conclude that Iraq would have retained more of its
military capability had it chosen to concede to the Bush 48-hour ultimatum. This does
not suggest that this was the type of assessment which Saddam should have been able to
make while under fire. Rather, this is simply a comparison of the likely results of
concession versus what actually transpired on the ground.
The second question of whether the expected military losses would likely have
threatened Iraq's survival requires additional analysis. In August 1990 the Iraqi Army
totaled roughly a million men, 5,500 tanks, 6,000 APCs, and 3,000 artillery pieces. 33 6 By
the time the Iraqi Army regrouped at the end of the Gulf War it was roughly one third its
former size in terms of both personnel and equipment (see Table 4.4 below). 337 If
Saddam had conceded to the ultimatum and recovered 100% of the weapons remaining in
Kuwait, the Iraqi Army would have retained an additional 100,000 men under arms, just
under half the size of its former army.338
Date Soldiers Tanks APCs Artillery
1990 - Prior to Iraqi 955,000 5,500 6,000 3,000
Invasion (53 divisions)
24 Feb 1991 - Prior to 4,100 5,100 1,850
U.S. Invasion
1991 - After Gulf War 350,000 2,300 2,000 1,000
(28 divisions)
If Saddam Conceded 450,000 3,000 2,200 1,700
and 100% of weapons (37 divisions)
recovered from Kuwait
Table 4.4: Iraqi Army Before and After Gulf War 339
336 International Institute for Strategic Studies (1990-1991) The Military Balance London: Brassey's 105
337 International Institute for Strategic Studies (1991-1992) The Military Balance London: Brassey's 107
338 The 100,000 additional troops were estimated by assessing the additional equipment which likely would
have been retained by conceding to the 48-hour ultimatum with the 100% estimate of Table 3 row 3 and
then extrapolating the number of additional divisions this equipment would arm.
339 Numbers for and after Gulf War Iraqi force size taken from International Institute for Strategic Studies
(1990-1991, 1991-1992) The Military Balance London: Brassey's
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By the end of the Gulf War, Iraq's army had shrunk to a third its former size. Had
Saddam conceded to Bush's ultimatum and avoided the ground war, Iraq might have
retained up to half its forces. But the relevant question is whether either a third or a half
of its army was sufficient for Iraq to defend itself against either Iran or the U.S.. Table
4.5, below, compares the size of the Iraqi and Iranian Armies in 1980, prior to the force
build-up of the Iran-Iraq war, with their size after the Gulf War in 1991. The Iraqi Army
maintained a numerical advantage over Iran throughout this entire period and it is
reasonable to assume, based on these force ratios, that the Iraqi Army possessed
sufficient military force to defend itself against an Iranian invasion after the Gulf War.
Iraqi Army Iranian Army
1980 200,000 troops 2,850 tanks 150,000 troops 2,000 tanks
1983 475,000 2,400 150,000 1,050
1986 800,000 6,150 305,000 1,000
1990 955,000 5,500 305,000 500
1991 350,000 2,300 305,000 700
Table 4.5: Comparison Iranian and Iraqi Army 1980-1991340
Turning to the United States, at the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. had in theater
over 500,000 ground troops, 2000 modern battle tanks, and 900 strike aircraft, not
counting other coalition forces.34 1 The U.S. had thus both a numeric and qualitative
advantage over the Iraqi Army giving it the capacity to invade Iraq, even if Saddam
conceded to Bush's ultimatum. Note that this assessment evaluates the capability, not the
will, of the U.S. to overthrow the Iraqi government in March of 1991. Since the U.S.
threatened Iraq's state survival should Saddam acquiesce to the 48-hour ultimatum, the
340 International Institute for Strategic Studies (1980-199 1) The Military Balance London: Brassey's
34' Cohen, Eliot A and Thomas A Keaney (1993) Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume Five Washington: US
Government Printing Office 27-32
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survival hypothesis predicts Saddam would resist this demand. This even though the
probability of the Iraqi Army stopping the U.S. ground invasion on 24 February 1991 was
small.
Impact to Saddam and his regime for conceding to Bush's Ultimatum
In the previous section I concluded that Iraq was likely to resist Bush's 48-hour
ultimatum since a concession would have left the Iraqi state vulnerable to invasion. I
now evaluate how such a concession would have impacted Saddam and his regime.
According to the logic of target survival, a threat to the state likewise threatens both its
leader and his regime. But it is also worthwhile to examine the domestic impact of such a
concession on both the leader and regime. First, as to Saddam's survival as leader of his
regime, the question is whether a humiliating concession to Bush's ultimatum would
have generated sufficient audience costs from within the Baath party and Iraqi
Republican Guard to cause Saddam to be removed by members of his own regime.
Audience cost is the result of a principal-agent problem, whereby those within the regime
evaluate the performance of the leader for evidence of success or failure of his policies
and punish the leader for failure by removing him from power. Given Saddam's
personalist regime and the ironfisted control he had over the government, military, and
the Baath party, this is not likely. Personalist regimes such as Saddam's are less likely to
generate large audience costs since there are few principals within the regime with the
means to punish the leader.34 2 In this case, concession to the U.S. would not likely have
generated sufficient audience costs to threaten his survival.
342 Weeks, Jessica L. (2008) "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve"
International Organization 62 (Winter) 35-64
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The second level of domestic assessment is whether the survival of Saddam's
regime was at risk from domestic opposition groups. The logic of omni-balancing
suggests that concessions by Saddam could reveal him to be weak and opposition groups
could use this information to assess the regime's vulnerability and attempt a revolt.34 3
The Shiite and Kurdish opposition groups of March 1991 had both the ability to observe
whether or not Saddam ordered a hasty retreat and the power to threaten his regime. The
severity of this threat is evidenced in the uprisings which followed the Gulf War and very
nearly toppled the regime.
Though a concession likely did not pose a threat to Saddam from those within his
regime, the Bush ultimatum would render the state more vulnerable to foreign invasion
and a direct threat from domestic opposition groups to the survival of Saddam's regime.
Since the survival hypothesis requires that only the state's, or the regime's, or the leader's
survival be threatened this hypothesis correctly predicts coercion failure.
TESTING HYPOTHESIS ON CREDIBLE COMMITMENT
The commitment problem places the blame on coercion failure to be the
challenger's inability to credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands on the
target once it concedes. Potential settlements which either increase the challenger's
power or harm the reputation of the target by exposing its weak resolve introduce an
incentive for the challenger to make still further demands. This is particularly
problematic in an anarchical system where there is no one to enforce the promises a
challenger makes. The unenforceability of international agreements precludes some
which, ex ante, are in the interests of both the challenger and the target.
m David, Steven (1991) "Explaining Third World Alignment" World Politics 43:1 233-56
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For a given crisis two conditions must be met before a credible commitment
problem is deemed to exist. First, the challenger must have sufficient military force
deployed to the area in order to back up demands beyond those already made. The lack
of force mitigates the commitment problem since a rational challenger will not make
additional demands if it does not have the force available to make good its threats.
Second, the challenger must be able to make additional demands in the future. If the
original demand threatens the survival of the target, such as one for regime change or
unconditional surrender, then the logic of the credible commitment argument no longer
holds. A target cannot fear future demands if it believes it has no future. In such a
scenario target resistance is driven by survival rather than a commitment problem.
Soviet Proposal
In the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein was considering the Soviet proposal for
an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the U.S.-led coalition had a sufficient military
advantage not only to dislodge the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but also to threaten the
entire Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). The credible
commitment hypothesis therefore expects that Saddam would reject the Soviet proposal,
since he would believe a concession to be followed by additional U.S. demands. But
Saddam, in fact, agreed to the Soviet proposal. What is most interesting here is that the
logic of the commitment problem, that the challenger would escalate demands once the
target conceded, proved true for this case. When informed that Saddam would accept the
Soviet plan President Bush then increased demands to a 48-hour withdrawal which would
have forced the Iraqi Army to abandon much of its heavy weaponry in Kuwait. In sum,
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the U.S. not only had the deployed forces to back up additional demands, but then they in
fact did make more demands once Saddam conceded.
Bush's 48-hour Ultimatum
Examining further whether a credible commitment problem then existed with the
Bush 48-hour ultimatum, one must ask if there were additional demands the U.S. could
have made of Iraq given the forces available to the U.S. at the time. The answer is yes.
Had Saddam conceded to Bush's ultimatum, the Iraqi Army would have ended up in a
better position than the one in which it found itself at the end of the ground invasion, but
not by much (see previous section). On 28 February, when the U.S. declared a unilateral
ceasefire the Iraqi Army was in disarray and in no position to defend Iraq. The U.S.
therefore had the military capability to take and hold Iraqi territory, even to threaten
Baghdad, as no significant Iraqi forces stood between the capitol and the U.S. Army's 7th
Corps and 18th Airborne units. Given the military advantage the U.S. had gained by 28
February, the commitment hypothesis would logically expect that the U.S. would make
still further demands of Iraq, such as territorial concessions of its oil fields in southern
Iraq or for regime change. The U.S., however, made no further demands and instead
instituted a unilateral ceasefire. In this second case, the credible commitment hypothesis
correctly predicts Saddam would not concede to the 48-hour ultimatum.
In sum, the credible commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicted that Saddam
would resist the Soviet proposal, and when he conceded the U.S. did in fact make
additional demands with its 48-hour ultimatum. The commitment hypothesis then
correctly predicted Saddam would not concede to the 48-hour ultimatum. But then on 28
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February, when the Iraqi Army was defeated the U.S. did not increase its demands as
expected by the commitment hypothesis. What explains these apparent discrepancies? If
Saddam was concerned with the U.S. ratcheting up demands, neither he nor any Iraqi
spokesmen ever publicly voiced the commitment argument as a reason for Iraqi
intransigence. If the credibility of the U.S. to commit was at issue, it would have been in
Iraq's interest to make this concern public, as this might have garnered assurances from
the U.S., such as those given by the U.S. not to invade Cuba following the Cuban missile
crisis. And finally why didn't the U.S. go on to make additional demands of Iraq once it
had defeated the Iraqi Army?
Avoiding Commitment Problems: Bush Administration Tying its Hands
The Bush administration largely avoided credible commitment problems by
effectively tying its hands by four measures which made it more difficult and costly for
the U.S. to adopt military objectives beyond that of attacking the Iraqi Army in the KTO.
First, the U.S. engaged the United Nations from the outset of the crisis. The U.S.
succeeded in passing key resolutions through the Security Council for the limited demand
of Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. These resolutions also blessed the U.S.-led coalition
military actions to force Iraq out of Kuwait. The United States in effect made a public
promise through the UN which, if subsequently reneged, would have had diplomatic
costs to the U.S. and been detrimental to Bush's plans for a New World Order. Second,
the coalition, which included forces from Syria, Egypt, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia,
had a dampening affect on any additional ambitions the U.S. might have had with regards
to Iraq. Theses regional Muslim states were willing to join the U.S. and fight to eject
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Iraqi troops from Kuwait and even to weaken the Iraqi Army so that Saddam could not
threaten his neighbors again. They would not, however, be party to an invasion of Iraq,
an action which would likely have split the coalition.
Third, the Soviet Union played a role in limiting U.S. designs. While a weakened
Gorbachev could not convince Bush to accept the Soviet proposal for an Iraqi
withdrawal, the Soviet Union still remained a major global and nuclear super power. The
U.S. had vital security interests in the continued peaceful decline of the Soviet Union,
one of which was that of securing the Soviets' vast nuclear arsenal. Such interests would
likely have suffered at a U.S invasion of Iraq and the subsequent strain on U.S. - Soviet
relations.
Finally, the Bush administration was constrained domestically by the
congressional joint resolution of 12 January which "...authorize[d] the President to use
the U.S. armed forces against Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Resolution
678."344 Reflecting the mood of the American people, Congress was split in its support
of military action and as a result the resolution passed by the slimmest margin since the
War of 1812.345
For the Gulf War the survival hypothesis performs better at predicting the actual
outcome of the crisis than does the credible commitment hypothesis. Saddam conceded
when his survival was not threatened but balked at humiliating concessions which would
threaten Iraq and his regime from domestic opposition groups. By contrast the Bush
344 Michel, Robert H. Rep (12 January 1991) "To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant
to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678" House Joint Resolution 77 Washington D.C.: The
Library of Congress http://thomas.loc/gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:HJ00077:@D@L&summ2=m&
accessed 25 Feb 2010
345 Mueller, John (1993) "A Review: American Public Opinion and the Gulf War: Some Polling Issues"
The Public Opinion Quarterly 57:1 (Spring) 80-91, Mueller, John (1994) Policy and Opinion in the Gulf
War University of Chicago Press: Chicago 108
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administration avoided credible commitment problems through its ties to the UN, its
military coalition, its interests in further cooperation with the Soviet Union, and domestic
U.S. constraints.
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IRAQI TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO KUWAITI BORDER,
6 OCTOBER 1994 - 17 OCTOBER 1994346
In this section I consider a second crisis between the United States and Iraq in
October of 1994. The confrontation took place during the interwar period of 1991 to
2003, in which the United States maintained economic sanctions to compel Saddam to
abide by UN resolutions following the Gulf War. The most notable of these resolutions
demanded that Iraq abandon its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and
allow international monitoring to ensure that it did not recommence production.
Numerous crises arose during this period as Iraq attempted to free itself from sanctions
and from the watchful eyes of UN inspectors. By the fall of 1994, Saddam was frustrated
that these efforts had failed to have the sanctions lifted and decided to mobilize his
Republican Guard to again threaten Kuwait.
On the 6th of October U.S. intelligence sources discovered armored elements of
two Republican Guard divisions massing near the Kuwaiti border much as the Iraqi Army
had done just prior to the August, 1990 invasion. This time the United States responded
much more quickly and forcefully. It immediately repositioned forces in the region and
signaled its resolve by announcing the deployment of thousands of troops and hundreds
of additional war planes. Adopting a coercive strategy, the U.S. issued the deterrent,
extra-territorial demand that Iraq not invade Kuwait and, within days, added the
compellent policy demand that the Republican Guard units redeploy to their permanent
posts north of the southern no-fly zone (see Table 4.6 for typology of coercive demands,
threats, and outcomes). It further backed these demands with the punishment threat of air
346 The International Crisis Behavior Project, "Gulf War, Case 412"
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer accessed 5 March 2009
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strikes and cruise missile attacks on Baghdad. Iraq blinked first and, on the 10 th of
October, announced the repositioning of its troops with the claim that they had only been
conducting exercises. By the 17th of October, eleven days later, U.S. intelligence
confirmed the units had returned north of the no-fly zone, where they remained until
2003.
Period Level of Nature of Type of Coercion Foreign
Demands Demands Threat Outcome Policy
Outcome
6 Oct Extra- Deterrent Punishment Did not Fail Success
1994 - Territorial - Do not - Economic - Iraq did Iraq did not
17 Oct Iraq not to invade Sanctions not invade invade
1994 invade Kuwait Kuwait - Air and
Policy cruise
Withdrawal of Compellent missile
deployed Withdraw strikes Success Success
Republican Republican Republican Republican
Guard Units Guard Units Guard Guard
from Kuwaiti to garrison redeploys to redeploys to
Border back to garrison garrison
garrison
Table 4.6: Coercion Typology of Iraqi Troop Deployment to Kuwaiti Border,
6 Oct - 17 Oct 1994
This crisis has been largely ignored by coercion scholars, in part because it was
overshadowed by the concurrent, highly publicized asymmetric crisis between the United
States and Haiti. Yet the Iraqi troop deployment is a useful test of asymmetric coercion
for three reasons. First, coercion succeeded quickly and armed conflict was avoided. In
the study of armed conflict, this is a case of war that did not take place, of the dog that
did not bark. Second, the United States' compellent demand was for a relatively modest
policy change for Iraq to restrict the positioning of troops within its own borders. This
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demand was not inconsequential, however, as it forced Saddam Hussein to cede at least
partial sovereignty over southern Iraq. In this case, an airpower punishment strategy
succeeded in compelling policy change. This tests the claim of airpower theorist Robert
Pape that "...coercion by punishment rarely works. When coercion does work, it is by
denial." 34 7 Finally, this crisis provides another test for the survival and credible
commitment hypotheses. In this particular case, both explanations correctly predict
coercion success.
The following section is divided into three parts. First, I provide context for the
crisis, reviewing the significant and relevant events following the Gulf War and leading
up to October of 1994. Second, I summarize the key actions and the timing of decisions
from 6 October to 17 October and assess alternative explanations for Iraq's actions.
Third, I assess how well the predictions for the two hypotheses for coercion failure fare
when compared to the actual outcome of the crisis.
POST GULF WAR IRAQ, 1991-1994
At the conclusion of the Gulf War the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
687 to continue sanctions against Iraq until it agreed to acknowledge the Kuwaiti border
demarcated by the UN Secretary General. It was also to abandon its WMD program,
cooperate with UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) monitors, agree to honor its prewar debt obligations, and pay war
reparations to Kuwait. 34 8 Saddam, however, was preoccupied with the domestic unrest
sparked by his defeat and sent surviving units of the Republican Guard to suppress Shiite
347 Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press
15
348 UN Security Council Resolution 687, 3 Apr 1991, www.un.org/Docs/scres/I1991 /scres9 .htm, accessed
5 March 2009.
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and Kurdish uprisings. To constrain Saddam's ability to use force against these groups,
the U.S. established a southern no-fly zone and a northern safe area. While the U.S.
restricted Iraqi troops in the north, no such restrictions were placed on troop deployments
in the south.
In January of 1993 Iraq began to test the determination of the United States in
enforcing these restrictions and weapons inspections. Iraqi aircraft repeatedly violated
the no-fly zone and Iraqi officials impeded the work of inspectors. To induce
cooperation President Bush, in his final days in office, ordered air strikes on Iraqi air
defenses in the north and south and cruise missile strikes on the Zaafaraniya nuclear
facility.34 9 This did not, however, deter Iraq's efforts at undermining the U.S. and, in
April, Iraqi intelligence made an assassination attempt on the former U.S. president
during his visit to Kuwait. This prompted a June 1993 retaliatory cruise missile strike on
Iraq's intelligence headquarters by the new Clinton administration.
UNITED STA TES INTERESTS IN IR AQ
Following the Gulf War, Iraq continued to threaten the Persian Gulf and with it
the vital economic and security interests the U.S. had in maintaining unrestricted access
to the region. 350 The U.S. economy was dependent on foreign oil and, although the U.S.
received little of its oil supplies from the Gulf by the mid-90's, any interruption in the
flow of oil from the region would have an immediate impact on the global price of crude
and, in turn, on the U.S. economy as a whole.
349 Gordon, Michael R. (19 January, 1993) "Raid on Iraq; U.S. Leads Further Attacks on Iraqi Antiaicraft
Sites; Admits its Missile hit Hotel; Raids in 2 Regions" New York Times
350 The White House (1995) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
http.//www. au. af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf accessed 18 March 2009, 14
209
The U.S. therefore adopted a strategy of containment of Iraq. It continued to
maintain a military presence in the region, primarily through the forward presence of air
and sea power, but also with a small number of ground troops and pre-positioned
equipment meant to reduce the deployment time for follow-on forces, if needed.m3 5
Economic sanctions were also kept in place in an effort to compel Iraq to abide by
existing UN resolutions concerning weapons of mass destruction, as well as to prevent
Iraq from rebuilding its conventional military forces.
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS - REPUBLICAN GUARD DEPLOYMENT
Years of sanctions eventually placed such a burden on the Iraqi people that even a
tyrant like Saddam could no longer ignore them. Inflation spiraled out of control, leaving
most Iraqis unable to afford food and dependent on meager government rations. 352 As a
result, in November of 1993 Iraq changed its policies and began to cooperate with United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors in the hope that this would convince
the Security Council to lift sanctions. By the summer of 1994, UNSCOM had made
significant progress, destroying all known chemical and nuclear weapons and production
equipment and installing video surveillance equipment at key production facilities.35 3
The Security Council reviewed the sanctions bi-monthly and, in September,
Saddam was counting on a positive recommendation from UNSCOM to help lift the
sanctions. By this point, Iraq had exhausted its foreign currency reserves for purchasing
351 The White House (1995) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
http://www.au. afmil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf accessed 18 March 2009, 30
352 Ibrahim, Youssef (25 October 1994) "Baghdad's Burden-A special report; Iraq is Near Economic Ruin
but Hussein Appears Secure" New York Times
353 Lewis, Paul (26 July 1994) "U.N.'s Team in Iraq Sees Arms Gains" New York Times
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foodstuffs and begun to halve rations to well below subsistence levels.1 4 The UNSCOM
chief recommended more time, however, to ensure further Iraqi compliance and to make
certain the new monitoring equipment was functioning properly.355
Convinced that the Security Council would not lift sanctions as long as he
remained in power, regardless of the level of cooperation, Saddam again reversed course.
First, Iraqi officials issued threats to deny inspectors further access unless sanctions were
immediately lifted.356 Second, Iraq mobilized 14,000 troops in armored elements of two
of its Republican Guard divisions and began deploying them near the Kuwaiti border.
This brought force levels in southern Iraq up to 64,000 troops.3 57 These events coincided
with an address made by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, to the UN General
Assembly on the 6th of October. He concluded his remarks by stating that "Iraq [had] the
right to demand with all possible strength, a change of this unjust and illegitimate
situation as soon as possible and to demand complete clarity in the UN position on its
[Iraq's] just demand." 358
15 Baghdad INA (25 September 1994) " 'Temporary' Changes Made to Ration Card Quotas" FBIS-NES-
94-187 on 27 September 1994, Ibrahim, Youssef (25 October 1994) "Baghdad's Burden-A special
report; Iraq is Near Economic Ruin but Hussein Appears Secure" New York Times
355 UNSCOM (7 October 1994) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE STATUS OF
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION'S PLAN FOR THE ONGOING
MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT PARTS OF
SECTION C OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991) S/1994/1138 Security Council
Distribution General: United Nations, Crossette, Barbara (1 October 2009) "Threats in the Gulf: The U.N.;
Iraq's Attempt to have Sanctions lifted Quickly may have Backfired" New York Times
356 London THE TIMES (4 October 1994) "West Urged to Maintain Sanctions Against Iraq" FBIS-NES-
94-192
357 Clinton, William (27 October 1994) "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Iraq" The American
Presidency Project http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49379&st=&st = accessed 9 March
2009
358 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network (7 October 1994) "Tariq 'Aziz Addresses U.N. General
Assembly" FBIS-NES-94-196 on 11 October 1994
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UNITED STA TES' QUICK RESPONSE TO THE IRA QI TROOP DEPLOYMENT
Intelligence sources discovered the movement of the Republican Guard units,
prompting an immediate U.S. response. On the 7th of October, a Navy carrier group was
dispatched from the Adriatic to the Red Sea, which included two destroyers carrying
cruise missiles. Also, 2,000 Marines conducting exercises nearby in the United Arab
Emirate boarded the USS Tripoli, which then repositioned off the Kuwaiti coast (see
Table 4.7 for the chronology of crisis).359 These forces joined the coalition's 77 combat
aircraft and 18,000 Kuwaiti troops already in place.360
On 8 October, the Pentagon took the unusual step of announcing deployment
orders by disclosing the repositioning of its forces, the airlift of 4,000 soldiers to joint,
pre-positioned equipment in Kuwait, and the deployment of ships from Diego Garcia
bearing equipment for another 15,000 troops.361 The Pentagon further announced that it
had placed on alert USAF air combat wings in the U.S. and Europe, along with the
Army's 24th mechanized division at Ft. Stewart, Georgia.
Concurrent with its deployment announcement, the Pentagon also issued a
deterrent demand that "...Iraq respect the territorial integrity of Kuwait." Though the
military spokesmen denied that the forces currently in the region were sufficient to repel
an invasion, they emphasized that they were capable of punishing Iraq with hundreds of
359 Gordon, Michael E. (9 October 1994) "Threat to Kuwait; Iraq Moves Its Troops Toward the Brink
Again; Clinton Responds Quickly" New York Times
360 Bacon, Kenneth (28 October 1994) "DoD News Briefing: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ATSD PA"
defenselink http://www.defenselink.mi1/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid65 accessed 9 March 2009
361 Such deployment orders are typically kept secret. Sheehan, John LTG and MG Pat Hughes "DoD
News Briefing: Lieutenant General John Sheehan" defenselink
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=60 accessed 7 March 2009, Herr, Eric
W (1996) "Chapter 3 Operation Vigilant Warrior" Operation Vigilant Warrior: Conventional Deterrence
Theory, Doctrine, and Practice Masters Thesis, Montgomery, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies
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cruise missiles and air strikes capable of reaching downtown Baghdad.362 Later that day,
President Clinton reiterated the U.S.'s position by warning Saddam that "...it would be a
grave error for Iraq to repeat the mistakes of the past or to misjudge either American will
or American power." 363
Date Action/Statement
6 October 1994 - Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz addresses the UN
General Assembly and demands lifting of sanctions
- U.S. intelligence observes two Republican Guard armor
divisions begin to deploy towards Kuwait Border
7 October - U.S. deploys USS George Washington Carrier Group from
Adriatic to Red Sea
8 October - Pentagon announces deployment of Carrier Group, 2,000
Marines, 4,000 soldiers and Pre-Positioned Equipment Ships
from Diego Garcia
- Pentagon warns of capability of forces to conduct punishment
strikes on downtown Baghdad
10 October - Iraq announces troop withdrawal
- President Clinton announces deployment of 36,000 troops and
350 combat aircraft
11 October - U.S. intelligence observes commencement of Iraqi troop
withdrawal
12 October - U.S. acknowledges Iraqi troop movement but continues
deployment
13 October - Several Republican Guard units delay south of 32d Parallel
- Russia announces commencement of negotiations with Iraq to
recognize Kuwaiti border
14 October - U.S. submits Resolution 949 to Security Council demanding
Iraq continue pulling back its forces to home bases
15 October - UN Security Council adopts Resolution 949
16 October - Iraq accepts Resolution 949
17 October - U.S. intelligence determines remaining Republican Guard
units moving north
Table 4.7: Chronology of Iraqi Troop Movement to Kuwait Border
362 Sheehan, John LTG and MG Pat Hughes "DoD News Briefing: Lieutenant General John Sheehan"
defenselink http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=60 accessed 7 March 2009
363 Clinton, William (8 October 1994) "Remarks on Iraq" American Presidency Project
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4926 1 &st=lraq&st 1= accessed 7 March 2009
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IRAQ BACKS DOWN
It did not take long for Iraq to respond to the initial deployment of U.S. forces.
After consultation and urging by Russia, Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Said Sahhaf
announced on 10 October that Iraq would remove the forward Republican Guard units
from the border. He claimed their deployment had merely been part of scheduled
military exercises, though there was some evidence the Iraqis had also been establishing
logistics sites, just as they had in late July 1990.364 That evening, President Clinton stated
that there was not yet evidence of a withdrawal and that the United States policy would
"... not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors or intimidate the United Nations as it
ensure[d] that Iraq [would] never again possess... weapons of mass destruction." With
that, he announced the additional deployment of 350 aircraft and 36,000 troops.365
On the 1 1 h of October, forward Iraqi units began pulling back from the border
and, on the 12th, Iraq announced that most of its troops had been withdrawn.366 Uncertain
as to whether the Iraqi troops were indeed returning to their garrisons, the U.S. indicated
that it would continue with troop deployments and keep 155,000 on alert.367
On 13 October, U.S. intelligence noted 2 brigades from one Republican Guard
division stopping near the town of Nasiriya, south of the no-fly line at the 32"d parallel. It
364 Baghdad INA (10 October 1994) "Al-Sahhaf Announces Troop Withdrawal" FBIS-NES-94-196 on 11
October 1994, Sciolino, Elaine (13 October 1994) "Threats in the Gulf: The Overview; U.S. Offers Plan to
Avoid Threat from Iraq Again" New York Times, Clinton, William (27 October 1994) "Letter to
Congressional Leaders on Iraq" The American Presidency Project
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49379&st=&st 1- accessed 9 March 2009
3 6 5Clinton, William (2004) My Life New York: Alfred A. Knopf 624, Michael Gordon (10 October, 1994)
"Threats in the Gulf: The Military Buildup; at least 36,000 U.S. Troops going to Gulf in Response to
continued Iraqi Buildup" New York Times, Clinton, William (10 October 1994) "Address to The Nation on
Iraq" American Presidency Project
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49264&st=lraq&stl= accessed 7 March 2009
366 Greenberger, Robert S. (12 October 1994) "U.S. Plan to Block Future Iraqi Moves on Kuwait Amid
Signs of Withdrawal" The Wall Street Journal A3
367 Gordon, Michael R (12 October 1994) "Threats in the Gulf: The Tactics; U.S. Sees Signs of Iraqi
Retreat but Continues Buildup" New York Times
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=6 I accessed 9 March 2009
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also observed Iraqi forces just north of Basra at Qalat Salih delaying their retreat. 368 On
the 14th, the U.S. submitted Resolution 949 to the Security Council, which was then
adopted on the following day. It demanded "...that Iraq immediately complete the
withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original
positions." It further demanded Iraq not threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq,
that it not redeploy units to the south, and that it cooperate fully with UNSCOM.369 On
the 16th of October, Iraq accepted the Security Council resolution and, by the 17th, the
crisis came to an end with U.S. reports of Iraqi troops again on the move north.370
RUSSIAN DIPLOMA CYAND RECOGNITION OF KUWAITI BORDER
Just as the old Soviet Union had played an active diplomatic role during the Gulf
War, so too did the new Russian Federation involve itself in this crisis. In the wake of
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in the midst of an economic crisis of
its own. It therefore had an interest in lifting sanctions in hopes of collecting the $7
billion it was owed and gaining lucrative contracts promised it by Iraq.371 When the
troop withdrawal was announced on the 1 0 th of October, Iraq confirmed the decision had
been made in consultation with Russia.372 Three days later, the Russian foreign minister,
368 Gordon, Michael R (14 October 1994) "Threats in the Gulf: The Strategy; U.S. Plans to keep Planes and
Tanks in the Gulf Area" New York Times
369 UN RESOLUTION 949 (15 October 1994) http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1 994/scres94.htm accessed 9
March 2009
370 Greenhouse, Steven (17 October 1994) "U.S. Says Iraq Appears to Resume Pullback from Kuwait
Border" New York Times
371 Kozyrev, Andrei (18 October 1994) "Kozyrev Urges a New Partnership" Columbia University Record
20:8 http://www.colunbia.edu/cu/record/archives/vol20/vol2O iss8/record2008.15.html accessed 9 March
2009
372 Baghdad INA (10 October 1994) "Al-Sahhaf Announces Troop Withdrawal" FBIS-NES-94-196 on 11
October 1994, Paris Radio Monte Carlo (11 October 1994) "AI-Sahhaf Defends Position, Criticizes U.S."
FBIS-NES-94-197 on 12 October 1994
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Andrey Kozyrev, met with Saddam and issued a joint statement:
Russia has called for adopting decisive steps to prevent the escalation of the
situation and to return the situation to the course of political and diplomatic
efforts. These efforts will eventually lead to achieving solid security and
stability in the region, to the cancellation of the sanctions imposed on Iraq,
and to setting up good neighborly relations between Iraq and Kuwait.373
The meeting also produced a proposal that Iraq acknowledge the Kuwaiti border, in
response to which the UN would lift sanctions. Kozyrev conveyed this proposal first to
the Kuwaiti government and then traveled to New York to present it to the Security
Council.374
President Clinton, however, was irritated by Kozyrev's efforts which did not
address the central issue of Iraqi forces still being in the position to threaten Kuwait in the
future. Before Kozyrev could address the UN, the U.S. pushed through a vote on
Security Council Resolution 949 demanding that Iraq complete its troop withdrawal. 375
The Russians' diplomacy proved only partially successful. On the 10 th of
November, Saddam Hussein did indeed formally recognize "...the sovereignty of the
State of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political independence." 376 Russian efforts to
have the Security Council subsequently lift sanctions, however, proved fruitless.
ANAL YSIS OF IRAQI TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO KUWAITI BORDER
The identification of lead elements of Republican Guard armored units deploying
near the Kuwaiti border on the 6th of October sparked a crisis for the United States. Just
3 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Network (13 October 1994) "Joint Statement Issued" FBIS-NES-94-199 on
14 October 1994
374 Crossette, Barbara (14 October 1994) "Threats in the Gulf: The Diplomacy; Russia and Iraq Work out
plan to ease Gulf Tension" New York Times, Crossette, Barbara (15 October 1994) "U.S. is Demanding a
Quick U.N. Vote on Iraqi Pullback" New York Times
37 Crossette, Barbara (15 October 1994) "U.S. is Demanding a Quick U.N. Vote on Iraqi Pullback" New
York Times, Security Council Resolution 949 http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/I994/scres94.htm accessed
27 March 2009
376 Crossette, Barbara (11 November 1994) "Iraqis to Accept Kuwait's Borders" New York Times
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as in August of 1990, the U.S. did not have a sufficient military presence in the region to
initially adopt either a brute force defensive strategy or a credible deterrent denial
strategy. The U.S. again ruled out accommodation and, since economic sanctions were
already in place, its only feasible option was a punishment strategy. The Gulf War taught
policy makers that general deterrence did not always work with Saddam. To prevent a
similar miscalculation of its resolve and intentions, the United States quickly extended a
strong, immediate deterrent demand that Iraq not invade Kuwait. It signaled the
credibility of its punishment threat when the Pentagon gave notice that its combat aircraft
and cruise missiles for the carrier group were within range of Baghdad.377
Though the explicit demand made by the Pentagon on the 8th of October for Iraq
not to invade Kuwait was deterrent, there was also an implicit compellent element that
the Republican Guard units also withdraw from the border. This was clearly understood
by Iraq as evidenced by its announcement on the 10th that it would be repositioning those
forces. President Clinton then reiterated this demand in his address that evening to
encourage compliance.
The U.S. could initially threaten a punishment strategy of limited air and cruise
missile strikes on Baghdad but until additional attack aircraft were deployed, it could not
credibly threaten a denial strategy of directly attacking these heavy elements of the
Republican Guard.378 Iraq conceded to a withdrawal prior to the announcement of an
additional 350 aircraft and 36,000 troops to be deployed to the region (only 30,000
377 Sheehan, John LTG and MG Pat Hughes "DoD News Briefing: Lieutenant General John Sheehan"
defenselink http://www. defenselink mil/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=60 accessed 7 March 2009
377 Clinton, William (8 October 1994) "Remarks on Iraq" American Presidency Project
378 The tactical aircraft already in place were there to enforce the no fly zone. They did not have anti-armor
capability. The U.S. follow on forces included A-10s which did have anti-armor weapons. Herr, Eric W
(1996) Operation Vigilant Warrior: Conventional Deterrence Theory, Doctrine, and Practice Masters
Thesis, Montgomery, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies 14
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actually deployed). This increased capability could defend against another Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait and it could eventually destroy the forward deployed Republican Guard units.
These forces were not, however, sufficient to credibly threaten a U.S. invasion of
southern Iraq.
The U.S. succeeded in its punishment strategy to compel Iraq to a policy change
of returning the Republican Guard troops north of the southern no-fly zone (3 2nd
parallel). While this was a relatively modest change to Iraqi policy, it still had a negative
impact on Iraq's sovereignty in the southern region, albeit in a more limited way than the
northern safe area constrained Saddam's freedom of action against the Kurds in the north.
CRITIQUE OF THE IRAQI WITHDRA WAL
A critique of this analysis points out that, given the small number of troops
deployed Saddam never intended to invade Kuwait. The redeployment of those troops,
therefore, should not be viewed as a concession resulting from the airpower punishment
strategy adopted by the United States.
Indeed, I concur that Iraq did not deploy enough troops to invade Kuwait. The
most these forces could have hoped to accomplish was a cross-border incursion similar to
Al Khafi during the Gulf War. I also agree that Saddam likely had no intention of
actually crossing into Kuwait. He instead had deployed his ground forces as part of a
signal to coincide with Aziz's speech at the UN. Still, the concessions Iraq eventually
made, though modest in comparison to territorial concessions or regime change, were
nevertheless real. Not only did the Republican Guard units withdraw, but Saddam also
chose to abide by the U.S. demands not to deploy additional troops to southern Iraq
again. Also as a result of this crisis Saddam agreed to recognize Kuwait.
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In sum, this crisis was a clear defeat for Saddam. In the face of the U.S.
compellent demand that Iraq redeploy its forces and not deploy them again, Iraq forfeited
partial sovereignty over southern Iraq. 379 Saddam made this concession while the U.S.
had only a credible threat to punish Baghdad with air strikes and cruise missiles and prior
to the U.S. deployment of additional attack aircraft and ground troops to threaten his
Republican Guard armored units.
ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION OUTCOME
In this section I assess the predictions from the two hypotheses for coercion
failure against the actual coercion outcome for the Iraqi Troop Deployment crisis of
October 1994 (see Table 4.8 below).
Table 4.8: Predictions of Coercion Outcome
379 Saddam had already lost sovereignty in the airspace overhead southern Iraq with the U.S. establishment
of the southern no fly zone.
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Core Survival Commitment Actual
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Coercion
Demand Outcome
Iraq Troop Iraqi Predicts Predicts Coercion
Movement Republican Coercion Coercion Success
to Border Guard troops Success Success Iraq
Oct 94 withdraw Deployment of U.S.can threaten only withdraws
from border troops to south limited air and cruise its troops
and return to not required for missile strikes. U.S. fom the
anretun to Iraqi security. deployed military Kuwaiti
garrison Saddam not capability not border and
north of 3 2 "d humiliated as credible for either returns them
parallel Iraq given direct attack on to garrison
opportunity to Republican Guard or
announce invasion of southern
redeployment Iraq.
prior to any U.S.
__________________________ultimatum
TESTING THE SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis for target survival predicts that compellence is likely to fail if the
challenger's demand directly threatens the survival of either the state, or the regime, or
the regime's leader, so long as the target has the means to resist. If, however, the
demands threaten none of these three, the hypothesis predicts coercion likely to succeed.
In this crisis there is a single compellent demand, that Iraq redeploy its Republican Guard
units away from the Kuwaiti border and back to garrison north of the 3 2 "d parallel. The
survival hypothesis correctly predicts that coercion will succeed as this concession
threatens the survival of neither Iraq, nor Saddam Hussein, nor his regime.
Impact on Iraqi State Survival
The U.S. demand to withdraw the two Republic Guard divisions did not threaten
Iraq's survival. The units were not deployed to defend southern Iraq from attack, but
rather to threaten Kuwait. The Iraqi Army still maintained 50,000 troops south of the
32nd parallel. Further, neither Iran nor the U.S. had forces deployed that could threaten
an invasion of Iraq, even with the additional 36,000 troops the U.S. intended to deploy.
This crisis was triggered by the dire state of Iraq's economy as a result of
economic sanctions and by Saddam's reaction to the realization that sanctions would
remain in place so long as he remained in power. Conceding to redeploy Republican
Guard troops did not further exacerbate Iraq's economic straits. It was, in fact an initial
step, along with Iraqi recognition of Kuwait and Saddam's later acceptance of the "Oil-
for-Food" program which eventually stabilized Iraq's weakened economy.
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Though conceding did not threaten Iraq's survival and aided in eventually
stabilizing its economy, it did impinge on Iraqi sovereignty as to where it could deploy its
forces within its own borders. As such, it was an unwelcome concession which limited
the government's control of its territory and population in southern Iraq.
Impact of Redeployment on Saddam and his Regime
Since the U.S. demand for the redeployment of troops did not threaten the
survival of the Iraqi state, the next step is to determine whether the demand threatened
that of either Saddam or his regime.
The United States' initial reaction on the 8th of October was to publicly announce
the deterrent demand that Iraq not invade Kuwait. But delaying the compellent demand
to redeploy those troops back to garrison effectively lowered the audience costs suffered
by Saddam. This delay afforded Iraq the opportunity to then announce the redeployment
of those troops on the 1 0 th of October, deny any intention of invading Kuwait, and
characterize the troop movements as part of a preplanned exercise. The U.S. did not
make explicit its compellent demand until the 14th of October when it appeared the Iraqi
troops were delaying their redeployment. There is no evidence that the sequence of
public statements between the Pentagon and the White House was intentionally
coordinated to provide an opportunity for Saddam to save face. Regardless, the delay had
that affect.
Even if one believes that the sequencing of U.S. actions and statements had no
impact on the level of humiliation Saddam suffered by making a concession, his audience
costs were not likely to be large as he continued to maintain an iron fist control over his
regime. He relied on familial and tribal ties and placed only those loyal to him into key
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positions of the government, the Republican Guard, and the Baath party. This effectively
prevented and co-opted potential opposition from within his regime. Therefore any
audience costs Saddam might have suffered would not likely have resulted in his removal
from power by those within his regime.
With regards to domestic threats from outside Saddam's regime, these had already
been effectively dealt with in the recent past. Although the Iraqi government had barely
survived the insurrection of March 1991, the regime had ruthlessly attacked the Shiites in
the south and the Kurds in the north. These groups were weakened to the extent that they
no longer posed the same level of threat they had directly following the Gulf War.
In sum, the demand to redeploy the Republican Guard divisions to garrison north
of the 3 2nd parallel did not threaten the survival of the Iraqi state, Saddam, or his regime.
The survival hypothesis correctly predicts that Iraq would likely concede and that
coercion would succeed.
TESTING COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS
The commitment hypothesis expects coercion to fail if a powerful challenger
cannot credibly commit ex ante to not make further demands should the target concede.
For the October 1994 crisis, the commitment problem hypothesis correctly predicts
coercion success since the U.S. did not have sufficient military force deployed to credibly
back up additional demands the U.S. might have made.
In theater, the U.S. had only a few thousand ground troops with deployment
orders for an additional 36,000 (of these 30,000 eventually deployed). These forces were
insufficient to mount an offensive into southern Iraq where permanently stationed troops
numbered 50,000. The only offensive option available to the U.S. was that of limited air
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and cruise missile strikes. As a result, the U.S. was not in a position to make credible
threats to make additional demands of Iraq, such as demands for homeland territorial or
regime change. The credible commitment hypothesis therefore predicts Iraq would
concede. Even though this prediction proved correct, as in the Gulf War, commitment
issues were never publicly brought up by Iraq and did not appear to factor significantly
into Saddam's decision making.
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LEAD-UP TO IRAQ WAR: 12 SEPTEMBER 2002 - 20 MAR 2003380
In this section I examine the crisis which led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March
of 2003. The September 1 1th, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon fundamentally altered the United States' perception of the threat from terrorists,
and the weapons of mass destruction they could employ. Though the task of identifying
international terrorist networks was complicated, the targeting of those states which
supported terrorist organizations proved less so and the U.S. quickly responded to 9/11
by attacking both Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Before the
Afghanistan War had concluded, however, President Bush was already contemplating his
next move. Adopting a preventive war strategy, the U.S. would no longer wait to be
attacked, going instead on the offensive, targeting not only terrorists and the states that
actively supported them, but also those "rogue" states most likely to provide them with
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. At the top of this list was Iraq.
While the U.S. had been able to contain Iraq's conventional military since the
1991 Gulf War, it had not been able to verify the extent of Iraq's WMD programs.
Convinced that such weapons would remain a threat as long as Saddam Hussein was in
power, President George W. Bush employed coercive diplomacy in September of 2002,
renewing the compellent demand that Iraq disarm. The UN Security Council passed
Resolution 1441 in November, demanding that Iraq declare the extent of its WMD
programs and cooperate fully with UN inspectors. Should Iraq not comply, the U.S.
threatened to remove Saddam from power (see Table 4.9 for typology of coercive
380 The International Crisis Behavior Project, "Iraq Regime Change, Case 440"
httn://www.cidcm.und.edu/icb/dataviewer accessed 27 March 2009
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demands, threats, and outcomes). Its coercive threat was intended to be one of denial
with a rapid troop buildup to be followed by an invasion. Saddam, however, did not
believe the U.S. had the resolve to push all the way to Baghdad, expecting instead that
the U.S. would again rely on airpower as it had done in Afghanistan in 2001. Preparing
therefore for air strikes only, Saddam dispersed his military forces and did not take the
steps necessary to defend against a U.S. invasion. Worried also about a domestic or
military uprising, which had occurred following Desert Storm in 1991, Saddam attempted
to insulate himself by placing his most loyal troops nearest him in a concentric circle
defense of Baghdad. Saddam prioritized the placement of troops according to loyalty
rather than on operational considerations for how best to defend the country against an
American invasion.
Period Level of Type of Threat Coercion Foreign Policy
Demands Outcome Outcome
12 Sep 02 Policy Denial Success Success
- Iraq declare all - Air Strikes Iraq declared Bush
20 Mar 03 WMD programs against Iraqi WMD Administration
and cooperate Army programs and used Iraqi
fully with UN - Ground cooperated WMD as
inspectors Invasion with UN justification for
inspectors invasion
Table 4.9: Coercion Typology of Lead-up to Iraq War,
12 September 2002 - 20 Mar 2003
By 2002, a combination of economic sanctions, UN inspections and U.S. air
strikes employed throughout the 1990s had, in fact, already led Iraq to dismantle its
WMD programs. This information had been kept secret, however, not only from the
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international community but even from Saddam's own military in an effort to deter
domestic and regional threats. Therefore, his concession to U.S. demands in the fall of
2002 was but a policy change to publicly acknowledge that Iraq no longer possessed
WMD. Unfortunately for Saddam, he now found himself in the untenable position of
having to prove a negative. A dozen years of deceiving and harassing UN inspectors had
left both the UN and U.S. ill-disposed to lending credence to any statement coming out of
Iraq. Even actions to remove all remaining traces of chemical or biological agents at
known WMD sites were taken by the U.S. as evidence of Iraqi subterfuge. Iraq did
indeed comply with the UNSCR 1441 demands per a declaration in December 2002 that
its WMD programs no longer existed and by cooperating with UN inspectors.
The issue of Iraqi WMD was, in fact, used as a pretense for removing Saddam
from power, a strategy neoconservatives now within the Bush administration had been
pushing since the early 1990s.381 An invasion of Iraq was even suggested by Paul
Wolfowitz as an initial response to the I1 September 2001 attacks despite the lack of
evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda.3 82 It was this underlying objective of removing
Saddam from power which was primarily responsible for the Bush administration judging
Iraq to be in material breach of the UN resolution, even though Iraq was now clearly
cooperating with inspectors. Thwarted by France and Russia in its attempts to garner
international support for an invasion through a second Security Council resolution, the
U.S. finally abandoned its fagade of diplomatic negotiations and commenced an invasion
38 1Paul Wolfowitz included this in the secret 1992 Defense Planning Guidance which was rewritten once
leaked to the New York Times and Washington Post. Gellman, Barton (11 March 1992) "Keeping the U.S.
First; Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower" Washington Post A1, Wolfowitz, Paul, Rumsfeld,
Donald, Armitage, Richard et al (26 January 1998) "Open Letter to President William J Clinton" Project
for the New American Century www.newamericancentury.org/iragcIintonletter.htm accessed 2 March 2010
382 Woodward, Bob (2002) Bush at War Simon and Schuster: New York 60
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on 20 March 2003. By early April Saddam's regime had been toppled and on May 1s',
President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. In the end, no WMD were
ever discovered.
The Iraq War itself is not a case of coercion as the Bush administration never
expected Saddam Hussein to concede to regime change. George W. Bush's 48-hour
ultimatum for Saddam and his sons to leave Iraq was not accompanied by either a
promise that he and his family would be safe or that Saddam leaving the country would
prevent the U.S. invasion. 383 The ultimatum therefore should not be considered coercive.
Instead the U.S. adopted a brute force strategy in order to eject Saddam from power.
Still, the lead-up to the Iraq War, with President Bush's decision to go to the
United Nations and make Iraqi WMD justification for an invasion provides an intriguing
case for analyzing asymmetric coercion. Even though the U.S. did not intend to accept
Iraqi concessions, Saddam Hussein was still successfully coerced into revealing that Iraq
no longer possessed any WMD, thereby losing whatever prestige and deterrent value he
believed he had previously enjoyed through a policy of ambiguity.
The case of the lead-up to the Iraq War is an interesting case of asymmetric
coercion for five reasons. First, coercive diplomacy succeeded in achieving Iraqi policy
change. Granted, this was not a major policy concession as Saddam was not being asked
to abandon WMD, but rather to reveal that Iraqi WMD programs no longer existed. Still
this deception had value to Saddam for he guarded this fact even allowing Iraq to endure
a decade of costly sanctions levied in large part over the issue of WMD. It was therefore
a painful concession for Saddam to make. Second, it is another case in which the U.S.
383 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice favored an alternative draft of Bush's ultimatum speech in
which the pending military action was simply announced. Woodward, Bob (2004) Plan ofAttack Simon
and Schuster: New York 343
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was unwilling to take "yes" for an answer, just as Saddam's acceptance of the Soviet
proposal for withdrawal from Kuwait in February 1991 was rejected by the elder Bush.
Third, the U.S. calculated that Saddam could not be coerced into regime change.
President Bush therefore did not even make a compellent demand for regime change,
opting instead for brute force invasion. This self-selection of the U.S. in not choosing a
coercive strategy it believed would fail illustrates the limits of coercion as an effective
foreign policy tool for such high-level demands as regime change.
Fourth, the extended length of the conflict between the United States and Iraq
which began in August of 1990, demonstrates that, over time, a challenger may come to
view the existence of the leader and/or regime as the problem, rather than the foreign
policies of the state. By the mid-90s neoconservatives who would later come into
positions of power within the Bush administration were convinced that only regime
change could curtail the seemingly endless series of crises arising between the two states.
Yet it was unlikely that any coercive strategy could force Saddam Hussein from power,
an objective that only a brute force strategy was likely to achieve.
Finally, this crisis provides another test for the survival and commitment
hypotheses of coercion outcomes. As abandoning WMD did not threaten either Iraq,
Saddam, or his regime's survival the survival hypothesis correctly predicts Saddam
would likely concede to the U.S. demands. The deployment of over 700 tactical aircraft
and over a 100,000 U.S. troops during the winter of 2002-2003 increased the credibility
of an invasion. It was now Saddam's resistance, not concessions, which would threaten
Iraqi survival. By contrast, the commitment hypothesis initially predicts coercion success
in the fall of 2002, until the U.S. deploys sufficient military force to credibility threaten
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an attack. At this point the commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicts Iraq likely to
reverse its decision and stop cooperating with UN inspectors. The commitment argument
suggests that further Iraqi cooperation would only lead to additional demands by the
United States. In fact the U.S. did increase its demand, although no longer coercive, for
Iraqi regime change. Still, Iraq cooperated fully with the UN, hoping French and Russian
efforts in the Security Council would succeed in preventing the U.S. attack.
The following section is divided into three parts. First, I provide context for the
crisis, briefly reviewing the relevant events from October 1994 until September l th,
2001. Second, I examine the key actions and the timing of decisions during the crisis,
from President Bush's United Nations address on 12 September 2002 until the U.S.
invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003. I analyze the decisions made by the U.S. and Iraq, as
well as address alternative interpretations of the crisis. Third, I assess how well the
predictions of the two hypotheses for coercion failure fare as compared to the actual
outcome of the crisis.
UNITED STA TES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ: 1994-2002
Following the Gulf War the U.S. strategy for containing Iraq took a three-pronged
approach: continuing economic sanctions, deploying United Nations inspectors to verify
Iraq's abandonment of its WMD program, and restricting Iraqi military operations in the
north and the south. By the mid-90s all three of these efforts were beginning to unravel.
The impact of sanctions was significantly reduced once Saddam agreed to the UN's Oil-
for-Food program. Iraq was soon exporting billions of dollars worth of oil each year and
Saddam controlled to a large extent which countries received the lucrative contracts to
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provide goods, as well as how those goods were distributed within Iraq.384 December of
1998 proved a turning point for U.S. foreign policy towards Iraq, as the decision to
withdraw UN inspectors in preparation for the four days of coalition air strikes, named
Operation Desert Fox, subsequently left Iraq's WMD programs unmonitored for over
four years. 385 In addition, Iraq grew increasingly defiant in the northern and southern no-
384 In August of 1991, in response to growing international humanitarian concerns over the condition of the
Iraqi population the Security Council adopted an "Oil-for-Food" program which would allow Iraq to export
oil and generate up to $1.3 billion every 6 months in revenue which would flow into a UN controlled
escrow account to purchase humanitarian foodstuffs, medicine and health supplies, UN Security Council
Resolution 706, 15 Aug 1991, www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm, accessed 29 March 2009 . Citing
issues of sovereignty and restrictions on the use of revenues, Saddam refused for nearly five years to
cooperate with the UN, Malone, David (2006), The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN.
Security Council 1980-2005 Oxford Press, 117. In April of 1995 the U.S., under pressure from Russia and
France, agreed to an updated the Oil-for-Food offer, and though Iraq initially rebuffed this offer as well, it
finally agrees to the terms of the program in May 1996 and Iraqi began to pump oil in December, UN
Security Council Resolution 986, (14 April 1995)
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/109/88/PDF/N9510988.pdf?OpenElement accessed 27
March 2009, U.N. Security Council (26 May 1996) "Letter dated 20 May 1996 from the Secretary-General
Addressed to the President of the Security Council",
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/127/71/PDF/N9612771.pdf?OpenElement accessed 27
May 2009. For a chronology of the Oil-for-Food program see "Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for
Food" http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/chron.html accessed 27 March 2009. The ceiling on the
quantity oil exported was effectively lifted in 1998 when the Security Council agreed to increase exports to
$5.2 billion, well above Iraq's oil production capacity. In addition limits on the type of goods that could be
imported were relaxed in December of 1999 when the logic for the sanctions was fundamentally reversed,
UN Security Council Resolution 1153, (20 February 1998)
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/039/34/PDF/N9803934.pd?OpenElement accessed 27
March 2009, UN Security Council Resolution 1284, (17 Dec 1999)
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/396/09/PDF/N9939609.pdf?OpenElement accessed 27
March 2009. The broad economic sanctions which precluded any imported goods except those specifically
designated was replaced by the system of "smart" sanctions where all goods were allowed except those
specifically prohibited. A combination of removing restrictions on oil exports and imports coupled with
Saddam ever increasing control over how those oil revenues were used greatly weakened the effectiveness
of sanctions. Not until after the events of 11 September, 2001 would the U.S. again be able to pressure Iraq
with sanctions when the Security Council adopted resolutions restricting the import of dual-use goods
which could be used for the production of chemical and biological weapons, U.S. Department of State (14
January, 2003) "Fact Sheet: Iraq-Goods Review List" http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
engl ish/2003/January/20030 114160026pkuratagpd.state.gov0.3441126.html accessed 27 March 2009.
As economic sanctions eroded over time, so to did the effectiveness of UN weapons inspections.
Following the October 1994 Kuwaiti border crisis, Iraq recommenced cooperation with UNSCOM
inspectors. The August 1995 defection of Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamel, responsible for WMD
programs, resulted in UNSCOM obtaining a wealth of additional documentation on Iraq's biological and
nuclear weapons programs,United Nations Special Commission "Chronology of Main Events"
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscon/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm accessed 27 March 2009. By 1996,
however, Iraq again was restricting access to facilities and harassing UN inspectors. For the next three
years Iraq adopted "cheat and retreat" tactics concerning UNSCOM inspections where Iraq would hinder
inspectors only to relent when faced with a new Security Council resolution. The Security Council adopted
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fly zones, engaging the coalition aircraft entering its air space. 386 Convinced Saddam
would never fulfill the obligations of the UN resolutions to which he had agreed in 1991,
the Republican-led Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, making Iraqi regime
change a U.S. mandate. 387 Though now its official policy, the U.S. did not adjust its
containment and punishment strategy to eject Saddam from power until the events of
September 11h , 2001 elevated the threat of Iraqi WMD falling into the hands of
international terrorists. Following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. again
turned to Iraq, this time with a renewed resolve to bring about regime change and, in so
doing, remove any threat from Iraqi WMD.
UNITED STATES' INCREASED INTERESTS IN WMD FOLLOWING
SEPTEMBER 11 TH,2001
The September 1 1th attacks demonstrated Al Qaeda's capacity to hit targets within
the United States and raised the concern over WMD falling into the hands of international
terrorist groups. The Bush administration quickly added Iraq, along with Iran and North
Korea, just after Afghanistan on its short list of state sponsors of terrorism. Though there
were no credible evidence linking Iraq to Al Qaeda, President Bush justified this action
by pointing to the potential threat of WMD being procured from Iraq and used in a
seven such resolutions during this period, June 1996 (UNSCR1060), June 1997 (1115), October 1997
(1134), and November 1997 (1137) 1997, March 1998 (1154), September 1998 (1194), and November
1998 (1205) until it finally withdrew inspectors from Iraq on 16 December 1998 in anticipation of the
Desert Fox air strikes. In the end Saddam outlasted UNSCOM which was replaced by the UN Monitoring
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in December 1999, though inspectors would not
enter Iraq for four years until their return in 2002. For specifics on Operation Desert Fox see Knights,
Michael (2005) Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern US. Military Annapolis MD: Naval
Institute Press 200-210
386 For an overview of military operations during this period see Michael Knight's (2005) Cradle of
Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern US. Military Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 150-250
3 8 7H.R. 4655 (1998) Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
http://www.iragwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm accessed 28 March 2009
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terrorist attack against the United States.388 Saddam's rhetoric did not help matters when
he called the 911 attacks a direct result of the "evil policy" of the U.S.. 389 No longer
would the U.S. regard Iraq's WMD program as a mere a regional threat which could be
contained by UN inspections and economic sanctions.
UNITED STA TES' COMPELLENT DEMANDS AND THREA TS: 12 SEPTEMBER -
8 NOVEMBER 2002
President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address put Iraq on notice, labeling it a
rogue state along with Iran and North Korea in an "...axis of evil, arming to threaten the
peace of the world." Bush would no longer accommodate these states, allowing them to
continue to stockpile weapons which could then be misappropriated by those intent on
harming the United States. He noted that, "by seeking weapons of mass destruction,
these regimes pose[d] a grave and growing danger... [and]... could provide these arms to
terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred." 390 In his 1 June 2002 address at
West Point he further articulated his preventive war strategy, assuring his audience that
"....the war on terror [would] not be won on the defensive..." and that the U.S. would
have to "...take the battle to the enemy, disrupt its plans, and confront the worst threats
before they emerge[d]." 391
388 Bush, George W. (29 January 2002) "State of the Union Address"
http://archives.cnn.con/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/ accessed 29 March 2009, Bush,
George W. (1 June 2002) "West Point Graduation Speech"
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/06/mil-02060 1 -usia0 I b.htm accessed 29 March
2009, The White House (September 2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica
http://www.globalsecuritv. org/militarv/librarv/policv/national/nss-020920.pdf accessed 29 March 2009
389 (13 September 200 1) "After the Attack: Reaction From Around the World" New York Times
90 Bush, George W. (29 January 2002) "Bush State of the Union the United Address"
http://transcripts.cnn.com/2002/A LLPOLITICS/0 1 /29/bush.speech.txt/ accessed 1 April 2009
391 Bush, George W. (1 June 2002) "President Bush Delivers Remarks at West Point"
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0206/01/se.0l.html accessed 1 April 2009
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Though both Iran and North Korea had active WMD programs at the time,
President Bush chose to target Iraq alone and, on 12 September 2002, he announced his
preemptive strategy when speaking before the United Nations General Assembly:
If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally
forswear, disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of mass
destruction... [and] end support of terrorism. 392
He went on to underscore:
The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security
Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and
security will be met or action will be unavoidable and a regime that has
lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.393
Just as in the lead-up to the Gulf War, in order to shore up domestic and
international support the President sought authorization for the use of force from both the,
United States Congress and the UN Security Council. Unlike his father, however,
President George W. Bush found it more convenient to first secure approval from
Congress, where both the House and Senate voted by a large bipartisan margin to
authorize the use of military force (See Table 4.10 for chronology of crisis).394
By contrast, garnering a Security Council resolution proved more challenging, as
both France and Russia would not condone military action against Iraq. After weeks of
diplomatic maneuvering, Secretary of State Colin Powell was finally able to push through
UNSCR 1441 on 8 November 2002 by a vote of 15-0. The resolution held Iraq in
"material breach" of previous resolutions and afforded Iraq a final opportunity to comply
392 While there was some evidence of Iraqi WMD, there was no evidence of an Iraq - Al Qaeda connection
3 Bush, George W. (12 September 2002) "Address to the United Nations"
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/09/12/bush.transcript/ accessed 29 March 2009
394 The authorization became law on 16 October 2002. The House voted 296-133 and the Senate 77-23
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll455.xml accessed 1 April 2009
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/rolI call lists/roll call vote cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vo
te=00237 acccessed 1 April 2009, H.J.Res 114 (2002) "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002" http://www.c-span.org/resources/pdf/hiresI 14.pdf accessed 30 March 2009
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by disclosing its WMD programs and allow enhanced inspections. It also warned of
serious consequences for non-compliance. 395 To obtain the resolution, Powell was forced
to concede to weaker terms, whereby Iraq would be considered in material breach of
UNSCR 1441 only if found to be both falsifying its weapons declarations and (rather
than or, which the U.S. preferred) not cooperating fully with UN inspectors. Iraq was to
provide unrestricted access for inspectors and declare all aspects of its WMD programs
within 30 days. 396
IRA Q'S RESPONSE
Since President Bush had labeled it a founding member of the axis of evil in
January 2002, Iraq had been in discussions with the UN Secretary General over the
potential return of UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission) and IAEA inspectors. 397 Though Iraq had consistently refuted U.S.
accusations concerning its WMD, the gravity of President Bush's 12 September 2002
United Nations address was not lost on the Iraqis. Within days, Saddam agreed to the
return of inspectors "... to remove any doubts that Iraq still possesse[d] weapons of mass
destruction."398 Though Iraq denied having WMD and adamantly opposed UN resolution
1441, once it had passed, Iraq reluctantly agreed to abide by it, allowing UN inspectors
395 UN Press Release SC/7564 (8 November 2002) "Security Council Holds Iraq in 'Material Breach' of
Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final Chance to Comply, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1441
(2002)" http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm accessed 2 April 2009
396 UN Security Council Resolution 1441, (8 November 2002)
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into the country and providing a 12,000-page WMD declaration to the UN on 7
December 2002.399
Date Action/Statement
11 September 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks
November 2001 U.S. defeats Taliban in Afghanistan
Late November 2001 Bush orders Rumsfeld to begin military planning for Iraq
28 January 2002 "Axis of Evil" State of the Union Address
1 June 2002 Bush Preventive War Strategy speech at West Point Graduation,
12 September 2002 Bush UN General Assembly speech demanding Iraq declare
WMD and admit UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors
October 2002 Congress authorizes use of force in Iraq
8 November 2002 UN Resolution 1441: 30 days for Iraq to declare WMD and
cooperate with inspectors
7 December 2002 Iraq submits 12,000 page declaration
December 2002 Iraq increases cooperation with UN inspectors
19 December 2002 U.S. declares Iraq in Material Breech of UNSCR 1441
December 2002 U.S. announces large deployment of troops
5 February 2003 Secretary Powell provides "proof' of Iraq WMD at UN Security
Council
March 2003 - France successfully leads campaign within Security Council to
defeat resolution with a 17 March deadline for Iraq to disarm
- Iraq continues cooperation with inspectors, destroys missiles,
prepares for defense of Baghdad
17 March 2003 Bush withdraws second resolution before vote and issues 48-
hour ultimatum for Saddam and sons to leave Iraq
20 March 2003 U.S. invades Iraq
9 April 2003 Saddam regime toppled
1 May 2003 Bush declares end to major military operations
Table 4.10: Chronology of Lead-up to Iraq War
Much of Iraq's WMD capabilities had eroded during the 1990's through a
combination of sanctions, previous periods of cooperation with UN weapons inspections,
and the Desert Fox air strikes. Saddam either could not or chose not to reconstitute the
399 Baghdad Babil (14 November 2002) Editorial by Abd-al-Razzaq al-Dulaymi reacting to Iraq's decision
to comply with UN Resolution 1441 FBIS-NES-2002-1114
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WMD programs.400 Instead, he adopted a deterrent strategy of ambiguity over the status
of Iraqi WMD. 401 The impetus behind this strategy could in part be traced to the
destruction of much of Iraq's conventional military power during the Gulf War. Its
current undertrained and underequipped 350,000 soldiers were a mere shadow of the
million men it had fielded in the Gulf War, though the Iraq Army was still larger than that
of Iran and outnumbered the U.S. forces deployed in the region. 402
With Iraq now anticipating the return of UN inspectors, Saddam ordered all
WMD sites to be scrubbed for any remaining documents or traces of chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons.403 Ironically, it would be the actions of the Iraqi military
in sanitizing these locations which Secretary of State Colin Powell would later offer as
"proof' of Iraqi deception.
UNITED STA TES DIPLOMACY
Though the U.S. had gone to the Security Council to demand Iraq abandon its
WMD program, this did not mean that the Bush administration intended to accept a
concession by Saddam. President Bush quickly began making the case against the
credibility of any claims or actions by Saddam: "He deceives. He delays. He denies.
400 Iraqi Survey Group (October 2004) "Realizing Saddam's Veiled WMD Intent" Final Report
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And the United States and, I'm convinced, the world community, aren't going to fall for
that kind of rhetoric by him again." 404
In response to Iraq's WMD declaration in December, the U.S. quickly countered
that the report had significant omissions and contained little substantive information on
Iraq's program since the departure of UN inspectors in 1998.405 UNMOVIC chairman
Hans Blix and IAEA chairman Mohamed ElBaradei provided a similar assessment in
their report to the Security Council on 19 December 2002. While they did indicate that
Iraq was cooperating in the process by allowing inspections, they felt more cooperation
was required in terms of "...uncovering of evidence to exonerate themselves that they
[were] clean from weapons of mass destruction." 406 Secretary of State Colin Powell
subsequently declared Iraq in material breach of Resolution 1441, citing not only the
large omissions and gaps in the report, but also the disturbing, though as it turned out
truthful claim that "...the Iraqi declaration denies the existence of any prohibited
weapons programs at all." 407
On 27 January 2003 Hans Blix provided his 60-day assessment of UN
inspections, indicating that little had changed since December, i.e. Iraq was cooperating
with the inspection process, but was still not revealing its WMD.408 The following
404 Bush, George W. (18 September 2002) "Remarks Following a Meeting with Congressional Leaders and.
an Exchange with Reporters" The American Presidency Project
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406 Blix, Hans and Mohamed ElBaradei (19 December 2002) "News Update on Iraq Inspections" IAEA,
U.N. Chiefs Brief Press http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2002/ma iraq 1912.shtml
accessed 1 April 2009
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evening President Bush asserted the United States' position in his second State of the
Union Address:
The United States will ask the UN Security Council to convene on
February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the
world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and
intelligence about... Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide
those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups. We will
consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does
not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the
world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.409
On the 5th of February, Secretary Powell presented additional evidence from U.S.
intelligence sources on Iraq's WMD programs and ties to terrorist organizations. 410 The
following day, President Bush ordered 15,000 more troops to join the 100,000 American
personnel already in place in the Persian Gulf.41
Powell's presentation was not sufficient, however, to change the position of
France and Russia, who along with Germany, issued a joint statement on the 10th of
February:
Russia, Germany and France favour the continuation of the inspections
and a substantial reinforcement of their human and technical capacities
through all possible means and in liaison with the inspectors, in the
framework of the UN resolution 1441.
There is still an alternative to war. The use of force can only be considered
as a last resort. Russia, Germany and France are determined to ensure that
everything possible is done to disarm Iraq peacefully. 412
409 Bush, George W (28 January 2003) "State of the Union Address"
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Though the U.S. was predisposed to going forward with military action on the
basis of UNSCR 1441, without further authorization from the Security Council, the
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who faced a vote of no confidence in Parliament,
desired a second resolution to quell domestic concerns over the legality of an invasion.
Not wishing for the U.S. to go it entirely alone and as a personal favor to Blair, Bush
pressed forward for the second resolution. 413 Standing firm, France in particular actively
campaigned against the U.S. and British proposal.
On 6 March President Bush, doubting France would veto, announced that the
U.S., Britain, and Spain would jointly submit a resolution to the Security Council,
"...stating that Iraq ha[d] failed to meet the requirements of Resolution 1441."114 Britain
introduced the draft resolution the very next day, setting a 17 March deadline for Iraq to
disarm.415
The U.S. and Britain failed to garner the requisite votes to pass the resolution,
however, and France, Russia, and China stated their intentions to veto, if necessary. On
16 March, Prime Minister Blair, President Bush, and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria
Aznar met briefly in the Azores, issuing the following joint statement: "If Saddam refuses
even now to cooperate fully with the United Nations, he brings on himself the serious
consequences foreseen in UNSCR 1441 and previous resolutions."416 The next morning,
the U.S. withdrew the draft resolution from consideration and that very evening,
President Bush addressed the nation and delivered an ultimatum: "... Saddam Hussein
413 Purdham, Todd S. (2003) A Time of Our Choosing Time Books: New York 74
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and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military
conflict commenced at a time of our choosing." 417
IRAQI COOPERA TION WITH UNAND STRA TEGY OF DENYING U.S. CASUS
BELLUM
By the time Saddam agreed to allow UN inspectors back into country, Iraq had
long since destroyed all of its WMD and the Republican Guard had removed any
remaining traces of their existence. Saddam's new strategy was to now fully cooperate
with inspectors in order to remove justification for a U.S. invasion. This new strategy
was initially difficult for Saddam to employ as a dozen years of deceiving UN inspectors
had inculcated within the Iraqi government a culture of obfuscation. Following Hans
Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei's initial reports of anecdotal examples of non-cooperation,
however, Saddam redressed this problem by making it clear to subordinates under the
threat of severe punishment that Iraq would fully cooperate with inspectors.418 A second
problem Saddam could never overcome, however, was the thoroughness of Iraq's
cleanup, which left him no proof that the tons of VX nerve agents and Anthrax
unaccounted for, were not hidden away as the U.S. claimed.419
Still Iraq cooperated with inspectors by providing them heretofore unprecedented
access to the Iraq military and Saddam's presidential palaces. Iraq even destroyed the 76
417 Bush, George W (17 March 2003) "Bush: 'Leave Iraq within 48 hours' CNN World
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Al Samud II medium-range missiles it had only recently produced when the U.S. argued
the missile's operational range breached existing UN resolutions.42
By the spring of 2003 Saddam was convinced that the U.S. would invade. Still,
Iraq continued to cooperate with inspectors to provide additional support for France,
Germany and Russia in the hopes that their opposition could halt the U.S.. 42I In addition,
Saddam became increasingly defiant, rebuffing any suggestion that he go into exile, and
firmly rejecting Bush's ultimatum on the eve of war.422
UNITED STA TES' MILITARY PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT
Planning by the Bush administration for a military operation against Iraq began in
the midst of the Afghanistan War. On the 2 1s" of November 2001 President Bush
informed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that he wanted to "...know what the
options [were]." 423 The existing contingency Operation Plan 1003-98 was similar to
planning for the Gulf War in that it included a six-month buildup of 400,000 troops prior
to invasion. 424 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, however, pushed for a lighter and quicker
response. By February 2002, Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command,
General Tommy Franks had taken lessons from Afghanistan and pared down the forces
required to commence the attack to 160,000. Deployments would then continue until a
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total of 250,000 troops could be available for occupation at the end of combat
operations.42
Saddam and the world were well aware of the U.S. military plans as senior
defense officials leaked the war plan just days after the Security Council's vote on
UNSCR 1441. In late November, General Franks submitted a request for deployment
orders, the number of initial forces for which had now been further ratcheted down to
128,000 to be in the region by mid-February 2003. A total of 200,000 were to be in place
by the commencement of ground operations (G-day).426 By 20 March the U.S. had
115,000 American ground troops in place alongside another 26,000 British soldiers and
marines. 42 7 Coalition forces in the entire region totaled 250,000, including 735 fixed-
wing combat aircraft.428
Unlike the Gulf War, for which a lengthy air campaign preceded ground
operations, the U.S. planned a near simultaneous attack dubbed "Shock and Awe". The
ground invasion was to be a two-pronged push to Baghdad with the Marines approaching
from east of the Euphrates and the Army maneuvering from the west. The plan for a
northern attack was abandoned in March when the Turkish parliament voted to deny the
U.S. permission to deploy its 4 th Infantry Division from Turkish territory.429 Punishment
air strikes against leadership targets and the Republican Guard had not been planned in
advance of the ground invasion. Denial air strikes, however, had begun as early as July
425 Franks, Tommy and Malcolm McConnell (2004) American Soldier HarperCollins: New York 371
426 Sander, David E., Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker (10 November 2002) "Threats and Responses: The
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2002 as the U.S. degraded Iraq's air defenses and command and control network in the
southern no-fly zone in preparation for air support for the ground invasion.43
President Bush ordered the first attacks to commence in the early hours of 20
March, just hours after the deadline had expired.43 Initial air and missile strikes on
Baghdad failed to topple Saddam's regime. By 9 April, however, U.S. ground troops had
entered central Baghdad.432 On 1 May 2003, aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, President
Bush announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq. 43 3
IR AQ'S MILITARY PREPARA TIONS
On the eve of war Iraq had an estimated 389,000 active duty personnel, of which
350,000 were Iraqi Army, a force with an inventory of 2,600 tanks and 2,400 artillery
pieces. 4 34 A subset of the Iraqi Army, the Republican Guard, was comprised of 70,000
personnel divided into three elite groups: the Special Guard in Baghdad provided for
Saddam's own personal protection, while the Northern, or 1St Corps, further defended
Baghdad and Saddam's hometown of Tikrit from the Kurds and from Turkey and Iran.
The Southern, or 2"d Corps, employed its armored divisions to suppress the Shias and to
defend against an Iranian or U.S. attack.43  Saddam could also count on the Saddam
Fedayeen, an organization founded in 1995 to gain additional domestic control. Some
40,000 strong, though not professional soldiers, these men were loyal to Saddam and
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tasked with keeping Iraqi towns under Baath party control.436 The Fedayeen had training
in small arms and were capable of conducting irregular warfare, as the U.S. would later
discover. They reported outside of the army command structure directly to Saddam's
SOS437
In preparation for the U.S. attack, the Republican Guard withdrew towards
Baghdad. Rather than have them prepare entrenched defensive positions, however,
Saddam dispersed them for the extended U.S. air campaign he felt was sure to come, as
the one he had witnessed in Afghanistan. He did not anticipate a U.S. ground invasion all
the way to Baghdad and did not take certain defensive measures expected by U.S.
military experts, such as flooding the Euphrates, setting oil fields on fire, or defending
key strategic points along the road to Baghdad. Ignoring all military advice, Saddam
instead deployed the army in a series of concentric circles around Baghdad, with his most
438
loyal forces in the innermost rings.
ANALYSIS OF LEAD-UP TO IRAQ WAR
The September 1 1th, 2001 attacks fundamentally altered the U.S. perception of the
threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction. No longer would the U.S. accommodate
states that threatened to supply terrorists with these weapons. President Bush initiated a
crisis for Iraq in his 12 September 2002 address at the United Nations when he made the
compellent demand that Iraq abandon its WMD. He backed up this demand with the
threat of removing Saddam from power if he failed to disarm. The U.S. signaled the
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credibility of its threat politically with the quick and bipartisan authorization from
Congress to use force, diplomatically with the passing of UNSCR 1441 which entailed
"serious consequences" for Iraqi noncompliance, and militarily with a public release of
its plans for a rapid buildup of ground forces.
Though the U.S. threatened a ground invasion, Saddam did not find such a denial
strategy credible. He was convinced, rather, that the U.S. would rely extensively on
airpower and he dispersed his government and military to defend themselves against air
strikes. His conclusions were founded in part on the propensity of the U.S. to employ
airpower over ground forces.
Saddam miscalculated by not anticipating a U.S. invasion of Baghdad. He instead
dispersed and hid his forces in anticipation of airstrikes. He also prepared against
domestic threats to his personal survival and that of his regime and designed the defense
of Baghdad with this in mind. He had witnessed the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan to
the ragtag Northern Alliance Army supported by U.S. airpower. He had also experienced
the near toppling of his regime by Shia and Kurdish opposition in the March uprisings of
1991. From this point of view, Saddam's decisions not to take such defensive measures
as flooding the Euphrates, setting fire to oil fields or reinforcing key strategic positions to
the south make more sense. Why endure these costs or expend his army defending
positions which U.S. ground forces would never threaten? From Saddam's perspective it
was preferable to instead employ all his forces to insulate his regime. He could then ride
out U.S. airstrikes, as he had done for Desert Fox, while defending against any domestic
opposition.
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Saddam also mistakenly hoped that Bush would order an attack only if the U.S.
received a clear mandate from the Security Council as it had for the Gulf War. Saddam
realized that conceding to UNSCR 1441 was a necessary step in attempting to forestall a
U.S. attack. His strategy of removing all traces of WMD and cooperating with inspectors
was an effort to eliminate any justification the U.S. might have for military action and to
bolster French and Russian efforts to prevent Security Council authorization.
Unfortunately, the Bush administration was unwilling to accept that, after twelve years of
defiance, Saddam would finally relent and could now be trusted to abide by UN
resolutions. President Bush was convinced Iraq had WMD and there was nothing
Saddam could do to satisfy him. 439 The U.S. interpretation of the resolution intentionally
placed Saddam in a "Catch-22": if he continued to deny Iraq had any WMD, the U.S.
would label him a liar and, if he produced WMD, the U.S. would call him a cheat.44 0
Either way, the U.S. would have its justification for an attack.
Vice President Dick Cheney elaborated on this skepticism regarding WMD
inspections in a 27 August 2002 speech. In his view, Iraqi cooperation with UN
inspectors provided no assurances of Iraqi compliance. "On the contrary, there is a great
danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in his box.
439 Evidence of the United States belief that Iraq had WMD is its secret prewar planning, which assumed
both that Iraq had WMD and that removal of WMD was one of the two primarily objectives of a ground
campaign. In addition the U.S. military planning included preparing troops for combat in a contaminated
war zone. Franks, Tommy and Malcolm McConnell (2004) American Soldier HarperCollins: New York
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Meanwhile, he would continue to plot." 44' Saddam's decision to destroy all evidence of
WMD would later make it impossible for Iraq to account for the whereabouts of known
WMD stockpiles. As a result, Iraqi officials were unable to dispute U.S. claims that these
supplies were in fact hidden.442
When Secretary Powell declared Iraq in material breach of UNSCR 1441, the
U.S. abandoned its pretense of a coercive strategy, favoring instead a brute force strategy
to depose Saddam.443 The U.S. did not adopt a coercive strategy for regime change as
President Bush did not believe Saddam would ever voluntarily abdicate power.4 44 In fact,
it was the threat of forcing regime change which the U.S. had levied against its demand
for Iraq to disarm. This confirms that the U.S. did not consider regime change to be
within the range of possible coercive outcomes, but an objective that could only be
achieved through force.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
In this section, I assess two alternative interpretations of events: that Iraq was not
coerced into abandoning WMD, and that Bush's 48-hour ultimatum amounted to a
coercive demand for regime change which failed.
The first argument claims that, although he had allowed his nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons programs to decay, Saddam had the intention of reconstituting
these weapons programs once sanctions were removed. This is the finding of the Iraqi
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Survey Group (ISG), sent in by the Bush administration to discover hidden stockpiles and
to assess the extent of Iraq's WMD programs.4 4 5 Though ISG found no physical
evidence, after interviews with Saddam and his surviving deputies, it surmised that
Saddam continued to value WMD and that he believed they had helped win the Iran-Iraq
war, had deterred a U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1991, and that ambiguity over WMD had
deterred the Israelis and Iranians in the 1990s. ISG concluded that Saddam had retained
the scientists to reconstitute his WMD programs in the event economic sanctions were
lifted.
The argument for Saddam's plans to reconstitute his WMD, however, is not
backed by the facts. The only evidence presented by the ISG for Iraq's intention to
reconstitute was the retention of the Iraqi scientists and technicians who had constructed
and operated the WMD facilities. But what was Saddam supposed to have done with
these highly educated Iraqi citizens? Short of exile or execution, neither of which had
been previously demanded by the U.S. or UN, there was little Saddam could have done to
disavail himself of their expertise. In sum, there is no evidence Saddam ever intended to
reconstitute Iraqi WMD. Instead, all of his actions after September 1 1th, 2001 indicate he
was ridding Iraq of all traces of WMD.
Even if the ISG findings were accepted, however, they do not refute the argument
that U.S. compellent demands caused Iraq to change its behavior in 2002. In fact, Iraq
began allowing UN inspectors back into country after an absence of 4 years and
cooperated more fully with inspections than it had ever done in the past. Saddam further
44' Duelfer, Charles (30 September 2004) "Transmittal Message" Comprehensive Report of the Special
Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction)
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports- I/iraq wmd 2004/transmittal.html accessed 7 April
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made a policy change by abandoning his strategy of ambiguity over the existence of Iraqi
WMD. Iraq took additional conciliatory actions by destroying all of its new Al Samud II
medium-range ballistic missiles. U.S. coercive diplomacy therefore succeeded in
obtaining the core demands of UNSCR 1441, even though the U.S. would accept neither
Saddam's concessions nor the evidence that Iraq no longer possessed WMD.
A final argument has been made that President Bush did in fact make the
446
compellent demand for Iraqi regime change, for which coercion failed. His ultimatum
was for Saddam and his sons to depart Iraq within 48-hours or face a U.S. invasion. Only
after this deadline had expired and Saddam had summarily rejected this demand did the
war commence.
There are two reasons, however, to reject the assertion that Bush's ultimatum was,
in fact, a coercive demand. First, the U.S. was unwilling to negotiate with Iraq and,
unlike in 1991 when the Soviet Union played a critical role in convincing Saddam to
concede to withdraw his troops from Kuwait, there was no such intermediary in 2003.
Saddam had, in fact, alienated Russia in December of 2002 by canceling a major oil
contract with the country to punish it for voting in favor of UNSCR 1441. 447 Second, the
Bush administration did not intend to nor believed the ultimatum would coerce Saddam
out of power. In fact, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice favored an alternative
draft of Bush's ultimatum speech in which the pending military action was to be simply
announced.448 It did not make sense to her to declare an ultimatum if the U.S. intended
to invade Iraq regardless of Saddam's response. Prior to the end of the 48-hour deadline,
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in fact, the White House went on to make public its intention to enter Iraq even if Saddam
did abdicate power and accept exile.44 9 Finally, while Bush officials hinted that the U.S.
might accept an offer of exile for Saddam, President Bush would make no guarantees for
the safety of Saddam or his family should they follow through with the offer.45 0
In sum, the Iraq War was not a case of coercion and the Bush ultimatum, which
was in effect, an unconditional demand for Iraqi surrender, should not be considered a
case of coercion failure. Rather, it should be seen as a successful case of a brute force
strategy of invasion followed by an extremely long and costly occupation.
ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION OUTCOME
In this final section, I assess predictions of the two hypotheses for coercion failure
presented below in Table 4.11.
Core Survival Commitment Actual
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Coercion
Demand Outcome
Lead-up to Iraq declare Predicts Predicts initial Coercion
Iraq War WMD Success Success then Success
12 Sep 02 - programs and WMD not Failure Iraq reveals
20 Mar 03 fully required for U.S. military all evidence
cooperate Iraqi, Saddam or presence initially that it nocpte his regime limited until longer has
with UN survival December when U.S. WMD and
inspectors in position to make cooperates
credible threat of with
attack inspectors
Table 4.11: Predictions of Coercion Outcome
449~Gordon, Michael R. (18 March 2003) "Threats and Responses: Military Plans; Allies Will Move in,
Even if Saddam Hussein Moves Out" New York Times
410 Woodward, Bob (2004) Plan of Attack Simon and Schuster: New York 314, Bums, John F. (12
February 2003) "Threats and Responses: Amman; Jordan Pressing U.S. to Offer Exile to Hussein and his
Aides if They Yield Power in Iraq" New York Times
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TESTING SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS
The survival hypothesis predicts coercion is likely to succeed when concessions -
do not threaten the target state, regime, or regime leader's survival, so long as the target
has the means to resist. And in the lead-up to the Iraqi War the U.S. demand, which
effectively called for Saddam Hussein to abandon his policy of ambiguity over the
existence WMD, threatened the survival of neither Iraq, nor the Baath party, nor Saddam.-
I do not suggest, however, that Saddam was not concerned over the safety of all three. In
fact, he continually adopted measures to decrease the likelihood of invasion, revolt, and
coup. His WMD policy was an effort to deter Iran, the founding of the Fedayeen and
reorganization of homeland defense by region was to prevent revolution, and his
elaborate internal security network was to protect against coups. Still, the Iraqi Army
was strong enough to stand up against Iran and Saddam's internal security measures
protected him and his regime from internal threats. Therefore conceding to no longer
having WMD did not risk the survival of Iraq, Saddam, or his regime and the survival
hypothesis therefore correctly predicts coercion would likely succeed.
Impact on Iraq State Survival
The most credible regional threat to the Iraqi state was that posed by Iran.
However, although Iran now had an airpower advantage as a result of the Gulf War,
Iraq's Army of 350,000 troops and 2,300 tanks was still larger than Iran's 305,000 troops
and 700 tanks. And, as evidenced twice in the Iran-Iraq war, an Iranian invasion would
451 Woods, Kevin, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey (2006) Iraqi
Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership Naval
Institute Press: Annapolis 25
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likely bog down in the southern region of Al-Basrah and thereby not threaten Iraq at
large.
Since Iraq had previously employed chemical weapons against Iran, the threat of
Iraqi WMD likely had an impact on Iranian calculations for future military action against
Iraq. Still given the relative weakness of Iranian forces, the Iraqi Army was well
equipped to defend itself against any attempt by Iran to invade and overthrow Saddam.
The other external threat to Iraqi survival was that posed by the United States.
Saddam's ambiguity over WMD, however, would not likely have deterred U.S. military
action. Indeed the weapons had not deterred the U.S. in 1991 when Iraq actually
possessed them. Further, since the terrorist attacks of September 1 1th, 2001, Iraqi WMD
served more as a catalyst than a deterrent as it now provided the Bush administration the
excuse they were looking for to invade.
In sum, Saddam's policy of ambiguity over WMD likely had some deterrent value
against a limited Iranian attack, but it was not required for Iraqi state survival, and after
9/11, presented the Bush administration with a casus bellum.
Impact on Saddam's Regime for Conceding
Besides its impact on Iran, ambiguity over WMD also had a potential deterrent
effect on domestic opposition groups such as the Shia and the Kurds. Conceding would
not only remove the threat of WMD to these groups, but also would provide a signal that
Saddam's regime was weak. Saddam, however, had suppressed domestic opposition
following the March uprising after the Gulf War, and in the ensuing years had taken
measures to prevent another revolt.
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In 1995, Saddam founded the Fedayeen, his loyal paramilitary organization,
which gave local Baath parties additional force to keep towns and villages in line. 45 2 In
the wake of the Desert Fox airstrikes of 1998, Saddam also split the administration of
Iraq into four regions, delegating control of the military forces in each district to a trusted
Baath politician.453 Though this would later hinder the Iraqi military from defending
against the U.S. invasion, Saddam ordered this reorganization to retain better domestic
control over Iraq and to prevent the rise of rivals from within the army.
In sum, conceding ambiguity over WMD did reveal a weakness in Saddam's
regime which consequently would have made it more vulnerable to revolution, if strong
domestic opposition groups had existed. His founding of the Fedayeen along with the
administrative reorganization of homeland defense, however, had prevented the
formation of armed dissident groups. In addition, had Saddam continued to resist the UN
resolutions, he would have increased the likelihood of a U.S. attack, which he, in turn,
feared could have triggered an uprising.
Impact on Saddam for Conceding
As the leader of an authoritarian personalist regime, Saddam should not have
expected the same level of audience costs for making concessions as faced by either
democratic leaders or leaders of military or single party regimes. 454 Saddam had in
recent years expended enormous resources on an elaborate internal security network to
452 Collins, Dan (24 March 2003) "Saddam's Secret Weapon? Fedayeen A Tough Militia Force Personally
Loyal to Iraqi Leader" CBS News www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/24/iraq/main5 4 580 2 .shtml accessed
2 March 2010
453 Woods, Kevin, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey (2006) Iraqi
Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership Naval
Institute Press: Annapolis 26
454 Geddes, Barbara (1999) Paper on authoritarianism presented at 1999 American Political Science
Association Conference www.uvm.edu/-cbeer/,eddes/APSA99.htm accessed 16 Feb 2010
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monitor not only the Iraqi population, but also watch those within his own military and
security apparatus.455 To further protect against a military coup, he forbade his army,
save the loyal Special Guard, from entering Baghdad. Saddam had, in fact, once again
successfully insulated himself from the threat of coup to the extent that concession to
U.S. demands did not threaten Saddam's ouster from within.
In sum, Saddam conceding to U.S. demands and removing the ambiguity over
Iraqi WMD did not threaten Iraqi, Saddam, or his regime's survival. While such a
concession did remove whatever deterrent value WMD had against an Iranian attack, it
decreased, though obviously did not eliminate, the likelihood of a U.S. invasion. The
concession also revealed the Baath regime as weak, but Saddam had effectively taken
measures to reduce the risk of revolt by forming his Fedayeen and by reorganizing
homeland defense. Finally, Saddam's personal survival was ensured by his placing a
premium on loyalty within his regime and employing an elaborate internal security
network to deter coups. Since survival was not at stake, the survival hypothesis
therefore correctly predicts Saddam would concede to U.S. demands and coercion would
succeed.
TESTING THE COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS
The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion as likely to fail when a powerful
challenger cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands once the target
concedes. In the lead-up to the Iraq War, the commitment problem was minimal, as the
4 Woods, Kevin, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey (2006) Iraqi
Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership Naval
Institute Press: Annapolis 92
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U.S. had insufficient military force in the region to make credible threats of invasion.
The commitment hypothesis therefore initially correctly predicts Saddam's concessions in
the fall of 2002. The situation changed, however, in early 2003 with the U.S. deployment
of more troops and tactical aircraft in preparation for a brute force invasion. This force
buildup tipped the regional balance of power further in the United State's favor. This
increased the ability for the U.S. to back up increased demands with credible force. Still,
Saddam continued to cooperate with UN inspectors even as the U.S. prepared for
invasion and as the U.S. maneuvered diplomatically, though unsuccessfully, for a second
UN resolution authorizing force. The commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicts
Saddam would discontinue cooperation and coercion would fail as the likelihood that the
U.S. could demand regime change increased.
Explaining Iraq's continued Cooperation with the United Nations
What explains Saddam's continued cooperation with UN inspectors as the U.S.
prepared for invading? By early 2003 it was apparent that the U.S. had deployed
sufficient military capability to attack. Not yet evident was the United States' will to
invade Iraq without a Security Council resolution authorizing it to do so. Saddam hoped
that Iraqi cooperation would be sufficient to negate the Bush administration's argument
for war. Even in February, when the U.S. was pressing hard in the Security Council for a
resolution to authorize force, Iraq's best option was to continue to cooperate with
inspectors in hopes that the French and the Russians would prevent authorization and that
the U.S. would not attack without such justification.
France and Russia no longer felt obliged to rubber stamp U.S.-sponsored
resolutions as they had in 1990 in the lead-up to the Gulf War and in 1994 in response to
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the Iraqi troop movement to the Kuwaiti border. The diplomatic battle within the
Security Council over economic sanctions on Iraq in the late 1990s had driven a wedge
between them and the U.S., as France and Russia stood to reap the largest economic
rewards from the lifting of sanctions. As long as U.S. demands were vetted through the
Security Council and Iraq conceded to those demands, Saddam could correctly calculate
that French and Russian diplomacy would prevent the U.S. from garnering a resolution to
authorize force.
Saddam's mistake was not in its continued cooperation, but in underestimating
U.S. intentions for a full-fledge ground invasion to Baghdad to depose him from power,
even without a UN resolution.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I assessed interstate asymmetric conflict between the United States
and Iraq from the 2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait until the 20 March 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq. I analyzed three crises from this conflict: the Gulf War from 2 August
1990 to 28 February 1991, the Iraqi troop movement to the Kuwaiti border in October of
1994, and the lead-up to the Iraq War from 12 September 2002 to 20 March 2003. In
these crises, the U.S. made four compellent demands, for three of which coercion
succeeded in gaining Iraqi concessions (see Table 4.12). I assessed the survival and
commitment explanations for coercion failure and conclude that the survival hypothesis is
a better predictor for the coercive outcomes of the three crises.
The hypothesis on survival correctly predicted all four coercive outcomes.
Saddam conceded to U.S. demands as long as the Iraqi state, Saddam's regime, and his
leadership survival were not at stake. The single case of coercion failure involved
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President Bush's ultimatum in 1991 that the Iraq Army retreat from Kuwait within 48
hours, a concession which would have cost the Iraqi Army a great number of heavy
weapons and been a humiliation for Saddam so damaging as to threaten his regime's
domestic control of Iraq. In fact, the subsequent March uprising illustrates just how
precarious Saddam's control of Iraq was at the end of the Gulf War, regardless of his
decision to concede or fight. In addition, the issue of target survival explains why in
2003, rather than adopting a coercive strategy, the U.S. chose a brute force invasion to
achieve Iraqi regime change. This demonstrates the limits of coercive strategies for
higher order demands such as homeland territory or regime change.
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Core Survival Commitment Actual
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Coercion
Demand Outcome
Gulf War Withdrawal Predicts Predicts Coercion
Aug 90- of Iraqi Success Failure Success
Feb 91 Army from Kuwait not Deployed forces and Saddam agrees
Kuwait required for Iraqi demonstrated U.S. to Soviet
state survival and military power and proposal to
Saddam can resolve makes credible withdraw Iraqi
withdraw and military threat if U.S. Army from
claim victory for makes further demands Kuwait in 21
standing up to (which it does) days
__________ U.S. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Iraqi Army Predicts Predicts Coercion
abandon Failure Failure Failure
heavy Humiliating Deployed forces and Saddam
weapons in a withdrawal if demonstrated U.S. refuses to
48-hour Iraqi Army power and resolve accept U.S. 48forced into a makes credible military hour
withdraw hasty retreat. threat if U.S. makes ultimatum
from Kuwait Sign of further demands for
Saddam's Iraqi homeland territory
weakness which or regime change
threatens his
____________________________regime _____________ ________
Iraq Troop Iraqi Predicts Predicts Coercion
Movement Republican Coercion Coercion Success
to Border Guard troops Success Success Iraq withdraws
Oct 94 withdraw Deployment of U.S.can threaten only its troops from
from border troops to south limited air and cruise the Kuwaiti
and return to not required for missile strikes. U.S. border andIraqi security, deployed military returns them to
garrison nd Saddam not capability not credible garrison
north of 3 2nd humiliated as for either direct attack
parallel Iraq given on Republican Guard or
opportunity to invasion of southern
announce Iraq.
redeployment
prior to any U.S.
____________ ____________ultimatum___________________
Lead-up to Iraq declare Predicts Predicts initial Coercion
Iraq War WMD Success Success then Success
12 Sep 02 - programs and WMD not Failure Iraq reveals all
20 Mar 03 fully required for U.S. military presence evidence that
cooperate Iraqi, Saddam or initially limited until it no longerth his regime December when U.S. in has WMD and
with Nsurvival position to make cooperates
inspectors credible threat of attack with inspectors
Table 4.12: Predictions of Coercion Outcomes
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The commitment hypothesis correctly predicted just two of the four coercion
outcomes. Yet notably, for all three crises there was little evidence that a U.S.
commitment problem had a significant impact on Saddam's decision making. This is a
particularly troubling finding for the commitment argument as there is an incentive for a
target to communicate its commitment concerns in order to gain additional assurances
from the challenger that it will not make further demands.
Finally, I will take this opportunity to make four comments before turning to the
next case of U.S. foreign policy with Serbia in Bosnia and Kosovo. First, the typology
for coercion I employed assisted in the coding of each case in terms of the nature
(compellent or deterrent) and level (policy, extra-territory, homeland, or regime change)
of demands and type (punishment or denial) of threats. Identifying the core ex ante
demands also provided a means for coding U.S. coercion and foreign policy outcomes.
This method enabled me to identify the key dependent and independent variables in each
case and provided a means of cross-case comparison. The asymmetric coercion model
was also a useful framework for examining the strategic interaction which transpired
between the U.S. and Iraq. This included examining the range of strategic options
available to the U.S. as the challenger, from accommodation, to sanctions, to coercion, to
brute force invasion. It was a systematic means of evaluating Iraq's decision to resist or
concede as a function of the demands and threats issued by the United States.
Still, as a parsimonious rational model, the asymmetric coercion model has limits.
Notably, it does not incorporate psychological biases, misperceptions, or miscalculations,
which are particularly relevant to the decision-making of Saddam Hussein and of George
W. Bush. Nor does a two-actor model adequately explain the role of third parties, such
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as that of the Soviet Union during the Gulf War or of post-Soviet Russia in 1994 during
the Kuwaiti border crisis. Finally, the unitary actor assumption omits important domestic
considerations for both the U.S. and Iraq. I have attempted to overcome this
shortcoming, at least in part, through a combination of process tracing and analysis aimed
at assessing causality in each case. I also considered the actions of third parties and
relaxed the unitary actor assumption in testing the survival and commitment hypotheses
for coercion outcomes.
Second, successful coercion does not necessarily avoid war. Coercion in the air
campaign of the 1991 Gulf War employed limited force, but was still extremely violent
and risked blood and treasure on both sides. In addition, both in 1991 and in 2003, Iraq
was coerced successfully, but the U.S. refused to accept its concessions. For the Gulf
War the high military, political, and diplomatic costs to the elder Bush's administration to
deploy offensive forces to the region led to a fear on its part that Saddam would escape
with his military intact by agreeing to the initial demand of unconditional withdrawal
from Kuwait; for all its efforts, Saddam could simply invade again once U.S. forces
departed from theater. This, factored in with the success of the coalition air campaign in
increasing the probability of a brute force victory, led the U.S. to increase its demands in
late February. To satisfy U.S. officials Iraq would now have to abandon its heavy
weapons in a humiliating hasty retreat from Kuwait, a demand to which Saddam could
not concede. Again in 2003 the U.S. refused to accept that Iraq was willing to abide by
UN resolutions to abandon its WMD. Again refusing to take "yes" for an answer, the
Bush administration used the pretense of Iraqi WMD as justification for its brute force
strategy.
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Third, the October 1994 deployment of Republican Guard forces to the Kuwaiti
border is a case in which a punishment strategy of threatening conventional air and cruise
missile strikes successfully coerced Saddam into making a policy change. This
concession restricted Iraq's sovereignty over the number of troops it could deploy within
its own territory south of the 3 2nd parallel. The aftermath of this crisis also highlights
how the punishment from economic sanctions eventually led Saddam to recognize
Kuwait in the hopes of getting the sanctions lifted. Granted, these were relatively minor
concessions compared to territory or regime change, but the costs to the U.S. of the threat
of limited air strikes and of economic sanctions were likewise minimal compared to the
later costs of the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
This case of the success of a punishment strategy runs counter to Robert Pape's
assertion that only coercion by denial works. Pape's research, however, is limited to only
those "important" airpower cases involving territorial demands. This was indeed the case
in the Gulf War crisis, where a denial strategy did cause Saddam to concede Kuwait. The
1994 case demonstrates, however, that when demands are low, punishment strategies can,
in fact, achieve more limited U.S. objectives.
Finally, as this case illustrates, there are limits to the effectiveness of coercion.
Coercion is less likely to achieve high level demands which threaten target survival. For
such objectives, a challenger may instead choose a brute force strategy, as was the case
with Iraqi regime change in 2003.
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Chapter 5: United States vs. Serbia 1992-1999
In Chapter 4, I conducted qualitative analysis of three asymmetric crises drawn
from the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and found that the
survival hypothesis was a better predictor of coercive outcomes than the commitment
hypothesis. In this chapter, I continue this analysis, looking to a conflict between the
U.S. and Serbia within the same time period. It is a conflict that warrants careful study,
as the Clinton Administration chose on two occasions to go to war over non-vital U.S.
security interests. Reluctant to expose its troops to the risks of ground combat, the U.S.
conducted air-only operations. I focus analysis on two crises during this period: the
Bosnian Civil War from the spring of 1992 until its conclusion with the Dayton Peace
Accords in November 1995, and ethnic violence between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo which escalated in the summer of 1998 until the ceasefire of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes against Serbia on 9 June 1999.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides context to the rise of
Slobodan Milosevic, to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and to the political and ethnic
divisions which led to the Bosnian Civil War. I summarize key events, actions,
decisions, and final outcomes and conclude with an assessment of the two hypotheses for
coercion failure. In the second section, I repeat this process for Kosovo. In the final
section I conclude by examining how well the survival and commitment hypotheses fare.
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DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
The origins of modem Yugoslavia can be traced back to the end of World War I
with the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, renamed the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia in 1929. In World War II, the Axis powers occupied Yugoslavia until
partisans liberated the country in 1945 and elected Marshal Tito as president. Three
decades later, in 1974, in response to increasing ethnic violence, Tito amended the
constitution to create two autonomous regions within Serbia: the primarily ethnic-
Albanian Kosovo and multi-ethnic Vojvodina (see Map 5.1). Tito died in 1980 without
having established a successor, an omission which led to tensions throughout the 1980s.
Slovenians and Croats demanded a reduction in the influence of the federal government
while the Serbs sought greater control over Yugoslavia. Additionally, Kosovo demanded
that its status be elevated to that of a Republic.456
456 Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic Boulder, CO:
Westview 31
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Map 5.1: Yugoslavia 457
Rise of Slobodan Milosevic
By the time of Tito's death, Slobodan Milosevic was a well entrenched and rising.
member of the Serbian Communist party. Born to Montenegrin parents, Milosevic grew
up in the Serbian town of Pozarevac, where in high school he joined the Communist party
4" Central Intelligence Agency (1993) "Former Yugoslavia (Political)" map no. 728410 (R00472) 4-93
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/former yugoslavia.jIpg accessed 1 June 2009
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and met his future wife, Mirjana Markovic, who also became his closest political
confidante. 458 Whereas Markovic was a communist ideologue, Milosevic's membership
in the party was primarily a means of career advancement. With his graduation from law
school in 1964 he garnered the favor of an ambitious Serbian politician, Ivan Stambolic.
Over the next two decades, Milosevic rose on Stambolic's coattails through a series of
increasingly influential economic and governmental postings. These culminated in
Stambolic's ascension to the Serbian Presidency in 1986, at which point Milosevic
assumed Stambolic's former position as Serbian communist party chief.459
Their political partnership began to unravel shortly thereafter, however, in
September of 1986 when a Belgrade newspaper leaked sections of a pro-Serbian
nationalist memorandum published by the Serbian Academy of the Sciences and Arts.
While Stambolic publicly condemned the memorandum, Milosevic remained ambiguous
over the question of Serbian nationalism. 460 Ethnic tensions between Serbs and
Albanians in Kosovo later mounted in April of 1987 and Milosevic appeared before a
crowd of 15,000 denouncing the Kosovar Albanian demand for independence,
"Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo."461 Milosevic returned to Belgrade a
national hero and, within five months, leveraged his populist support to drive Stambolic
from power. 462 Milosevic then moved to consolidate his powerbase in Serbia, Vojvodina
and Kosovo. In October of 1988 he replaced the leaders of Vojvodina with men loyal to
458 Sell, Louis (2002) Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia Durham NC Duke University
Press 16
459 LeBor, Adam (2004) Milosevic A Biography New Haven CT: Yale University Press 71
460 Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic Boulder, CO:
Westview 59
461 Reuters (26 April 1987) "Protest Staged by Serbs in an Albanian Region" New York Times
462 Stambolic did not officially resign until December 1987
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him and, in March of 1989, he forced Kosovo to accept a new constitution which
significantly decreased its autonomy. 463
By the time Milosevic finally assumed the presidency of Serbia in May of 1989,
he was in a position to control Yugoslavia through an alliance with Montenegro and his
support from Vojvodina and Kosovo. Consequently, the relationship between Slovenia
and Serbia grew increasingly tenuous and in September of 1989, the Slovenian
Parliament declared itself a sovereign state.464 In December, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
formed the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK) with Ibrahim Rugova as their leader
and adopted a strategy of passive resistance in their quest for independence.465
Milosevic's Consolidation of Power
Milosevic rode a wave of Serbian nationalism into the presidency. Once in office,
however, he faced the dilemma of how to consolidate his powerbase from the support he
had drawn from disparate factions of the Serbian populace. Old guard communists
wished to maintain the communist party, non-communist nationalists wanted an end to
the communist system, and reformers sought economic reform.466
In the fall of 1989, communism collapsed throughout Eastern Europe, taking the
League of Communists in Yugoslavia down with it, an institution that was formally
dissolved in late January of 1990.467 Milosevic responded to these events in two ways.
First, he crafted a new Serbian constitution that was overwhelmingly approved in a
463 Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic Boulder, CO:
Westview 77
464 Even with this declaration it would be nearly two years before the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Silber,
Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death ofA Nation New York: Penguin 77
465 Doder, Dusko and Louise Branson (1999) Milosevic Portrait of a Tyrant New York: Free Press 61
466 Cohen, Lenard J. (200 1) Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic Boulder, CO:
Westview 160
467 Simons, Marlise (23 Jan 1990) "Upheaval in the East: Yugoslavia; Yugoslav Communists Vote To End
Party's Monopoly" New York Times
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national referendum in June of 1990. This gave the office of the presidency broad
powers, uncontestable by either parliament or constitutional courts.468 Second, Milosevic
dismantled the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) in July 1990, repackaging it as
the new Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). The SPS inherited all the SKS assets and much
of its membership, making it the most powerful party in Serbia.4 69 Three contending,
albeit far less popular, political parties also formed during this period: the Serbian
Renewal Movement (SPO), founded by nationalists, Vuk Draskovic and Vojislav Seselj,
the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) formed by Seselj after he split away from the SPO, and,
finally, the Democratic Party headed by Belgrade intellectuals.470
Slovenia Secession and Croatia's Civil War
On 23 December 1990, a Slovenian referendum for independence passed by an
overwhelmingly margin. The Serbian-dominated federal government in Belgrade
responded to the mounting threat of a Slovenian succession by taking control of the
Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA). The Slovenian
government, however, resisted and seized control of the heavy military equipment in
Slovenia.
The following March, Milosevic met secretly with Croatian President Franco
Tudjman at Tito's favorite hunting villa in Karadjordjevo, in northwest Serbia.
468 Hayden, Robert M (1992) "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics" Slavic
Review 51:4 (Winter) 660
469 Hall, Gregory 0. (1999) "The Politics of Autocracy: Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic" East European
Quarterly 33:2 (Summer) 240
470 Hall, Gregory 0. (1999) "The Politics of Autocracy: Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic" East European
Quarterly 33:2 (Summer) 242
267
According to Tudjman, he and Milosevic agreed to the demarcation of borders between
Croatia and Serbia and to the partitioning of Bosnia.471
On June 25 h, 1991 the republics of Slovenia and Croatia both declared
independence in response to rising nationalism, to dismal economic conditions in
Yugoslavia, and to the growing assertiveness of Milosevic.472 Slovenia's secession was
relatively bloodless, following only ten days of fighting against an inept, Serbian-
dominated JNA.473
Croatia was much less fortunate. The Karadjordjevo talks did not prevent
violence from escalating between Croatian forces and the JNA, which fought alongside
ethnic Serbs from the eastern Croatian regions of Krajina and Slavonia. The UN Security
Council responded to the violence by adopting an arms embargo for all of Yugoslavia, a
measure which would later hamper overt efforts by the U.S. to arm the Bosnian
Muslims.4 74 Though the Serbs made early gains in Croatia, by autumn large-scale
desertions had weakened the JNA offensive. In November, both the Serbs and the Croats
agreed to a UN-brokered truce and the deployment of nearly fifteen thousand United
Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers. 475 While the ceasefire provided
a much needed respite for Croatia to reorganize and rearm, it locked in territorial gains
for the Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia. It also freed the Serbian-controlled JNA, now
471 Judah, Tim and Anne McElvoy (16 July 1991) "Belgrade ready for border sacrifices to preserve unity"
The Times, London. For more on the Milosevic-Tudjman talks see Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996)
Yugoslavia: Death ofA Nation New York: Penguin 131-32
472 Sudetic, Chuck (26 June 1991) "2 Yugoslav States Vote Independence to Press Demands" New York
Times. Macedonia declared its independence on 8 September 1991. Woodward, Susan L. (1995) Balkan
Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War Washington DC: Brookings 119
473 Fewer than 70 were killed in the fighting, over half of which were JNA.
474 United Nations Security Council "Resolution 713 (1991), 25 September 1991" http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/3758833.html accessed 26 May 2009
47 Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death ofA Nation New York: Penguin 177
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renamed the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ), to join Serbs in neighboring Bosnia in preparation
476for civil war.
Ethnic Political Division in Bosnia
While Croatia's war was fought between the Croats and Serbs, in Bosnia three
ethnic factions vied for power. Parliamentary elections in November of 1990 had split
Bosnia along clear ethnic lines. Muslims constituted 44% of the population and were
represented by the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA) led
by its founder and later Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic. At 31%, Serbs were the
next largest ethnic group, electing Serb nationalist Radovan Karadzic as the head of the
Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS). The SDS was the most
powerful party within Bosnia and enjoyed the support of both Serbia and the JNA. Its
headquarters was established at Pale, a town just east of Sarajevo. Croats made up only
17% of the Bosnian population and were represented by the Croatian Democratic Union
(Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ). Though the Bosnian Croats suffered under
weak leadership, they did receive political and military support from Croatia and its
president, Franco Tudjman.4 77
After Slovenia and Croatia's secession, a tear had appeared in the political fabric
of Bosnia. Muslims and Croats favored independence over membership in a Serbian-
dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Bosnian Serbs, however, preferred
Bosnia remain a republic within the FRY and refused to be a minority ethnic group in an
476 Cowell, Alan (25 November 1991) "Fighting Slows Under Yugoslav Truce; Hopes for a Peace Force"
New York Times, Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic
Boulder, CO: Westview 204-5
477 Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 26, 45-48
269
independent Bosnia. On 15 October 1991 the Bosnian parliament, minus its Serbian
contingent, voted for sovereignty but refrained from declaring independence.478 In
response, the Serbs declared their own Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, later renamed
the Republika Srpska and on 9 January 1992, they declared their independence from
Bosnia.479 Fearing civil war, the European Community (EC) initiated negotiations with
the three Bosnian factions. The talks, however, were overcome by events as Bosnian
Muslims and Croats voted for independence in a 1 March 1992 referendum boycotted by
the Serbs.480 From there, violence quickly thereafter spiraled into full-scale civil war.481
BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR 1992 - 1995
The dissolution of Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War triggered violence
rarely witnessed in Europe since World War II. Particularly brutal, the three-year war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to simply as Bosnia) left tens of thousands dead,
displaced two million more, and introduced the term ethnic cleansing to the humanitarian
intervention lexicon. Throughout the conflict, the objectives of the international
community were to ensure the survival of the Bosnian state and to put a stop to the
killing. This was achieved only through a U.S. strategy that combined economic
478 Binder, David (16 October 1991) "Serbia and Croatia Agree to Another Cease-Fire; 4 th Independence
Move" New York Times
479 Sudetic, Chuck (10 January 1992) "Serbs Proclaim Autonomy in Another Yugoslav Region" New York
Times
480 The Croat's were divided over the issue of Bosnian independence. Zagreb's eventual support for the
referendum was more out of a desire to wrest control of Bosnia from Belgrade as a potential stepping stone
toward the incorporation of Bosnia rather than a desire for Bosnian independence. Burg, Steven L. and
Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention
New York: M.E. Sharpe 106-7
481 The referendum was a requirement of the European Community's Badinter Arbitration Commission for
examining applications for recognition by the Yugoslavian republics. Sudetic, Chuck (2 March 1992)
"Turnout in Bosnia Signals Independence" New York Times The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not
formally establish itself or declare a constitution until 27 April 1992
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sanctions, military force, the defacto partitioning of Bosnia, and the long-term
commitment of U.S. ground troops.
By any measure, Bosnia is a complex and difficult case of asymmetric coercion.
The conflict included numerous actors from the Yugoslav republics and their ethnic-
based political parties, all seeking independence. It also involved intervention from
international institutions and the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia. Within
Bosnia, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats struggled for territory and sovereignty while the
bordering states of Croatia and Serbia intervened both politically and militarily.
International institutions stepped in early on in the conflict. The European Community
and the United Nations formed the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
(ICFY) in an ill-fated attempt to bring about a peace agreement. As the conflict wore on,
NATO became involved, conducting limited air operations to deter the Bosnian Serbs.
When ICFY efforts failed, the United States and Russia joined Great Britain, Germany,
and France to form the Contact Group and began placing greater diplomatic and military
pressure on the warring parties. Ultimately, the United States brought about a permanent
settlement through a coercive strategy of sanctions, air strikes, and rearming and
supporting the Croat-Muslim offensive.
Though these efforts eventually achieved the United States' core ex ante objective
of maintaining a Bosnian state and ending the violence, Bosnia is hardly a shining
success story for U.S. foreign policy. It took three violent years of civil war to bring the
actors to the table and, in order to reach a settlement, the Clinton administration had to
concede to the partitioning of Bosnia and allow the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims
to keep territory secured through ethnic cleansing. The U.S. was also complicit in
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circumventing a UN Security Council arms embargo in its own efforts to arm the Bosnian
Muslims. By the conclusion of the war, the United States had placed its reputation and
prestige, along with that of NATO, at risk over its non-vital interests in ending the
Bosnian Civil War. The U.S. then continued to the pay for its "success" by deploying
peacekeeping troops to the region for nearly a decade.
I divide the Bosnian Civil War into three coercive stages and provide a synopsis
of the key explanatory and dependent variables in Table 5.1. In the first stage, from April
1992 to February 1994, the United States supported the EC-UN peace effort.482 This
diplomatic initiative implemented economic sanctions and an arms embargo, and
deployed thousands of peacekeepers to the region, but did not directly threaten military
force. In the second stage, from February 1994 to April 1995, the United States took
over negotiations by forming the Contact Group. During this period the U.S. brokered a
Muslim-Croat peace agreement, resulting in the Bosnian Federation. The military
balance of power in the region shifted in favor of the Croats and the Bosnian Federation
with the support of the U.S. for their military build up which accompanied the limited
NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The period then culminated in a temporary
four-month ceasefire over the winter and spring of 1995.
In the third and final stage, May - November 1995, violence again erupted as
Croatian forces assumed the offensive against the Serbs, gaining momentum in Croatia
and then joining with Muslim Federation forces in Bosnia throughout the summer of
1995. Alongside this offensive, the United States adopted a sticks-and-carrots strategy,
threatening air strikes while offering a peace deal which would partition Bosnia by
recognizing the Republika Srpska and lift UN sanctions on Serbia. A ceasefire was
482 The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) in 1993.
272
eventually declared in mid-October and a political settlement reached at the Dayton
Peace Accords in November of 1995
Period Level of Type of Threat United States United States
Compellent (Denial or Coercion Foreign
Demands Punishment) Outcome Policy
Outcome
SERBIA Punishment SERBIA Failure
Coercive Policy Change - Economic Partial Failure Civil War
Stage I - Pressure Bosnian Sanctions accepts Vance- continues and
April Serbs to accept the Owen but Serbs control"
1992- Vance-Owen peace continues support 70% ofplan of Bosnian Serbs
February BOSNIAN SERBS BOSNIAN Bosnia
1994 Homeland SERBS
Regime change Failure
- Accept Vance-Owen Refuses to accept
resulting in break up of Vance-Owen
Bosnian Serb
government & non-
contiguous territorial
concessions
SERBIA Punishment SERBIA Failure
Policy Change - Economic Partial Success Though Civil
Coercive - Pressure Bosnian Sanctions accepts Contact War abates with
Stage II Serbs to accept - Limited NATO air Group Proposal but temporary
Feb 1994 Contact Groupceasefire,Feb199 Cotac Grup triesprovide military negotiations for
- April proposal suport permanent
1995 BOSNIAN SERBS BOSNIAN ceasefire fail and
Homeand ERBSSerbs continue toHomelandcontrol 70% of
- Accept Contact Group Failure Bosnia
proposal resulting in Refuses Contact
territorial concessions Group Proposal
SERBIA Punishment Success Success
Policy Change - Economic Milosevic wrests Dayton
Coercive - Pressure Bosnian Sanctions power to negotiate Accords end
Stage III Serbs to accept Denial a r o 5e1/4 Civil War in
May 1995 Contact Group - Air strikes on spi of Bonia4a Bosnia
- Nov Proposal Bosnian Serb Dayton
1995 BOSNIAN SERBS Command and BOSNIAN
Policy Change Control and SERBS
- Accept Contact weapon storage Success
Group Proposal areas Karadzic and
resulting in territorial - Croat-Muslim Mladic concede
concessions ground campaign negotiating power
otoMilosevic
Table 5.1: Coercion Typology of Bosnian Civil War, Feb 1992 - Nov 1995
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COERCIVE STAGE I: BOSNIA, APRIL 1992 - FEBRUARY 1994: ETHNIC
CLEANSING AND THE VANCE-OWEN PEACE PLAN
In April of 1992, the civil war within Bosnia expanded into a regional conflict as
both Croatia and Serbia moved forces into Bosnia. Following the Serb shelling of
Sarajevo, the U.S. and EC formally recognized Bosnia's independence in an ill-fated
attempt to constrain the fighting.483 However, the late May arrival of General Ratko
Mladic, appointed by Milosevic as commander of the newly-formed Bosnian Serb Army,
only marked an escalation in the violence. The shelling of Sarajevo intensified and, in
response, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which by then included Serbia and Montenegro and the
autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo. 4 84 The sanctions did little to stop the
fighting and the superior-armed Serbs soon gained 70% of Bosnian territory through a
campaign of ethnic cleansing, i.e. purging eastern and northern Bosnia of most Muslims
and Croats. 4 85 This, in turn, generated a crisis for Europe as over two million refugees,
roughly half the Bosnian population, either fled the country or were internally
displaced.486
Under pressure to take action to alleviate the situation, the United Nations
deployed 1,700 UNPROFOR troops over the course of the summer and, in the fall,
483 The U.S. also recognized Slovenia and Croatia. Bush, George (7 April 1992) "Statement on United
States Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republics" The Bush Library
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public papers.php?id=4152&year=I992&month=4 accessed 1 June
2009
484 United Nations Security Council "Resolution 757 (1992), 30 May 1992"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/0I1/I6/IMG/NR00 I 16.pdf'?OpenElement
accessed 1 June 2009
485 Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1997) Yugoslavia: Death ofA Nation New York: Penguin 251, Sudetic,
Chuck (15 April 1992) "Breaking Cease-Fire, Serbs Launch Attacks into Bosnia" New York Times
486 United Nations High Commission on Refugees (2006) "Chapter 7 Internally Displaced Persons, Lessons
from Bosnia and Herzegovina" The State of the World's Refugees 2006
httn://www.unhcr.oru/Dubl/PUBL/4444d3cd34.html accessed 2 June 2009
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authorized another 6,000 to secure the Sarajevo airport and assist in the delivery of
humanitarian assistance. 487 As the EC's diplomatic efforts failed to produce a viable
ceasefire, the UN and EC joined forces to form the International Conference on Former
Yugoslavia (ICFY) in late August 1992. Co-chairs to the ICFY were the UN
representative, former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and the EC envoy, former
British Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen.4 88 The comprehensive Vance-Owen peace
plan revealed in January 1993 proposed a decentralized Bosnian government divided into
ten provinces. Muslims, Croats and Serbs were each to retain majorities in three of the
provinces, while Sarajevo would become a separate open and demilitarized province (see
Map 5.2).489
487 By the end of 1994 UNPROFOR grew to 23,000 drawn largely from non-U.S. NATO troops. Burg,
Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and International
Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 199, United Nations Security Council "Resolution 764 (1992), 13
July 1992"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/011/23/IMG/NR00 1123.pdfOpenElem ent
accessed 2 June 2009, United Nations Security Council "Resolution 770 (1992), 13 August 1992"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/379/72/IMG/N9237972.pdf'?OpenElement accessed 2
June 2009, United Nations Security Council "Resolution 776 (1992), 14 September 1992"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/438/40/IMG/N9243840.pdfOpenElement accessed 2
June 2009
488 Ramcharan, B.G. editor (1997) The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official
Papers Volume ] Rjinland in Leiden, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 29-57
489 Watson, F. (1993), "Peace Proposals for Bosnia-Herzegovina" Research Paper No. 93/35, 23 March
1993 House of Commons Library London
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Map 5.2: Vance-Owen Map January 1993490
The Croats were the most amenable to the Vance-Owen plan as their territorial
ambitions were largely met in the placement of all three provinces along the Croatian
490United Nations Secretary General (15 Nov 1999) "Vance-Owen Peace Plan as Presented January 1993"
The Fall ofSrebrenica United Nations Map No. 4129, 15
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/348/76/IMG/N9934876.pdfOpenElement accessed 3
June 2009
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border. By contrast, the Bosnian (Muslim) government had serious issues, both with the
proposed constitution and with the division of territory. President Izetbegovic, however,
hoped for a military intervention by the U.S. with the new Clinton Administration.
Albeit reluctantly, he did agree to Vance-Owen in order to garner international support.
He also rightly calculated the Serbs would never agree to such a plan.49'
The plan, in fact, produced a split between Serbs in Belgrade and Pale. Milosevic
was increasingly concerned over the deteriorating health of Serbia's economy and the
negative impact of the UN-imposed sanctions. He prioritized Serbia's economy over the
interests of Serbian nationalists, who supported the Bosnian Serbs. This move was
condemned by Serb nationalists, leading to the dissolution of the political alliance
between Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS).
In subsequent elections, Milosevic's Socialist Party was, however, able to form a more
moderate government without the SRS.492
Still Milosevic was reluctant to press Karadzic for an agreement until territorial
gains in eastern Bosnia were resolved.493 Not until April of 1993, when the Security
Council voted to implement tougher sanctions against the FRY, did Milosevic finally
begin to urge the Bosnian Serbs to sign.494 Vance-Owen, however, called for the Serbs to
491 Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 224, 242
492 Hall, Gregory 0. (1999) "The Politics of Autocracy: Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic" East European
Quarterly 33:2 (Summer) 240-3
493 From 1991 to 1993 per capita GDP in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) plummeted by nearly 50%
from $1766 to $908. In addition hyperinflation ensued when Yugoslavia printed money to fund a large
fiscal deficit generated by a significant decrease in tax revenue combined with the high costs of military
operations in Bosnia. Heenan, Patrick (1999) Central and Eastern Europe Handbook New York:
Routledge 96, Delevic, Milica (1998) "Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of
Yugoslavia" International Journal of Peace Studies http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol3 I/Delvic.htm
accessed 3 June 2009, Burns, John F. (5 March 1993) "Serbs Reported Willing to Allow Muslims to Leave
Overrun Area" New York Times
494 United Nations Security Council "Resolution 820 (1993), 17 April 1993"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/222/97/IMG/N9322297.pdfrOpenEement accessed 3
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relinquish territory they had just gained in the previous year's fighting and the provinces
designated for the Serbs were intentionally drawn non-contiguous to deny the viability of
an independent Bosnian Serb state (Map 5.2). Believing that the provisions of Vance-
Owen threatened the very survival of their newly-formed republic, Bosnian Serbs ignored
Milosevic's demands and overwhelmingly rejected the plan in a mid-May referendum. 495
In addition to territorial issues, the plan also called for the Serbs to hand over
their heavy weapons to their adversaries. Equally important, the plan was not backed by
a threat credible enough to compel them to comply. The Croats and Muslims were too
weak and were at the time fighting each other over the remaining 30% of Bosnia. No
major power was willing to commit to employ its military in order to implement the plan.
And Bosnian Serbs could afford to resist Milosevic as he was not yet in a position to
leverage effective political and economic pressure against them.496 It would not be until
the tides of war had turned in the summer of 1995 and the Bosnian Serbs were on the
defensive that Milosevic could finally exert power over them.
United States Interests in Bosnia
Though the United States desired a peaceful political transition in the former
Yugoslavia, it viewed the situation as a primarily European issue without vital U.S.
security interests at stake. As such, the U.S. supported the EC's diplomatic efforts but,
even as the humanitarian crisis unfolded over the summer of 1992, it was unwilling to
June 2009, Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict
and International Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 244
495 Burns, John F. (20 May 1993) "Bosnian Serbs' Leaders Meet to Ratify Vote Rejecting Peace Plan" New
York Times
496 Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 246
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commit military aid in the absence of a peace agreement. 497 The Bush administration
maintained this policy even as presidential candidate Bill Clinton called for the U.S. to
consider military force and a lifting of the arms embargo to help stop the ethnic
cleansing.498 In the fall of 1992 and throughout 1993, however, as thousands of
European troops deployed to Bosnia as peacekeepers, U.S. security interests were now
indirectly connected through the military commitments of its NATO allies.
ANAL YSIS OF COERCIVE STAGE I: APRIL 1992 - FEBRUARY 1994
The large out-flow of Bosnian refugees triggered a crisis for the United States.
Without vital interests at stake, the U.S. readily deferred to the Europeans to broker a
peace agreement to stop the fighting. The Vance-Owen plan, however, proved to be
flawed as it mismatched the demands and threats it made of the Bosnian Serbs. It called
for large homeland territorial concessions and regime change. A forfeiture of 30% of
Bosnian Serb-held territory would leave them with only scattered, non-contiguous
provinces. They were also expected to surrender their arms and accept a Bosnian
constitution which would end the newly-formed Bosnian Serb Republic. To back up
these demands Vance-Owen threatened and implemented economic sanctions but made
no significant threat of military force. The international troops deployed to Bosnia were
not well-armed and operated under a UN peacekeeping mandate. More importantly, the
balance of power in Bosnia lay in favor of the Serbs as they gained and held ground
while the Croats and the Muslims expended their efforts fighting each other. In sum,
coercive diplomacy failed because the significant demands for territorial concessions and'
497 Baker, James (1995) The Politics of Diplomacy G.P. Putnam's Sons: New York 636, 648-9
498 Ifill, Gwen (10 August 1992) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; Clinton Takes Aggressive Stances On
Role of U.S. in Bosnia Conflict" New York Times
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the demise of the independent Bosnian Serb government were not backed by a
sufficiently large threat (see Table 5.2).
Period Core Type of Threat United States United States
Compellent (Denial or Coercion Foreign Policy
Demands Punishment Outcome Outcome
SERBIA Punishment SERBIA Failure
Policy Change Partial Failure Civil War
Apr 92 - - Pressure Bosnian Economic accepts Vance-Owen continues and
Feb 94 Serbs to accept Sanctions but continues Serbs control
Vance-Owen support of Bosnian 70% of Bosnia
Serbs
BOSNIAN SERBS BOSNIAN
Homeland SERBS
Regime change Failure
- Accept Vance- Refuses to accept
Owen resulting in Vance-Owen
break up of Bosnian
Serb government &
non-contiguous
_________ territorial concessions ___ ________________
Table 5.2: Typology of Coercive Stage I, April 1992 - February 1994
While economic sanctions may have been insufficient to convince the Bosnian
Serbs, they did motivate Milosevic. Bosnia was not part of Milosevic's vision for a
Greater Serbia. Rather than a demand for homeland territory or regime change, the
Vance-Owen plan was merely a policy change for Serbia to stop its support of the
Bosnian Serbs and to pressure them to concede. The Serbian economy, on the other
hand, as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ongoing war, was now suffering
from hyperinflation and a 50% loss of GDP, leaving it particularly vulnerable to UN
sanctions. While Milosevic initially supported the Bosnian Serbs in its early victories, by
April 1993 he viewed them as a major impediment to the removal of sanctions and the
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stabilization of the Serbian economy. Milosevic's powerbase lay in his popularity and
the support of the political elite in government and business. Both groups were
threatened by the severe economic conditions.
By 1993, Milosevic was no longer politically aligned with the more radical
Serbian nationalists in the SPO and SRS, who were now operating as opposition parties.
Though he had initially supported the Bosnian Serbs, as the civil war continued and
economic conditions worsened, he slowly shifted his policies against them. Despite the
unlikelihood that the Bosnian Serbs would concede to demands to disband their newly-
formed independent government and concede territory while they were winning,
Milosevic began, at least publicly, to pressure them to accept Vance-Owen.499
In Athens, on 2 May 1993, Bosnian Serb President Karadzic caved into
international pressure and signed on to the Vance-Owen peace agreement, though final
approval rested with the Bosnian Serb National Assembly. Two weeks later, General
Mladic appeared before the Assembly, offering up an impassioned speech against Vance-
Owen and prompting the Assembly to reject the plan in the end.500 It would take
additional time for the situation in Bosnia to shift to the point where Milosevic could
leverage his political and media machine to exert sufficient influence over the Bosnian
Serbs to change their minds.
COERCIVE STAGE II: FEB 1994 - APRIL 1995, THE CONTACT GROUP
By September of 1993 the Vance-Owen plan was dead. The ICFY changed
tactics in the subsequent Owen-Stoltenberg and European Action plans and attempted to
induce the Bosnian Serbs by redrawing the maps and conceding to the defacto
499 United Nations (1993) "Tragedy continues with 'no sign of abatement' UN Chronicle 30:3 10-20
500 Binder, David (4 September 1994) "Pariah as Patriot; Ratko Mladic" New York Times Magazine
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partitioning of Bosnia. 501 Like Vance-Owen, however, these efforts demanded the more
powerful Serbs relinquish territory without a credible threat compelling them to do so.
The dynamics of the conflict changed on 6 February 1994, when a single mortar
round landed in Sarajevo's Markala marketplace killing sixty-eight civilians.50 2 The
attack and subsequent media coverage led to two changes in U.S. foreign policy. First,
the U.S. was now willing to threaten NATO air strikes should the Serbs not cease the
shelling and remove their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. 503 The U.S. also
demonstrated a willingness to enforce the UN's previously mandated no-fly ban. 504
Second, the U.S. commenced negotiations to end the fighting between the Croats and
Muslims, first reaching a cease-fire on February 2 2nd and then forming the Bosnian
Federation at the end of March 1994.505 This proved a major diplomatic achievement
which would eventually shift the balance of power in the Federation's favor as Croats and
Muslims rearmed and refocused their attention against the Serbs.
In late March and April of 1994, Serbs attacked the Bosnian Muslim enclave of
Gorazde, one of six designated safe areas. In an effort to deter further attack, the UN
50' For a detailed discussion of Owen-Stoltenberg and the European Action plan see Burg, Steven L. and
Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention
New York: M.E. Sharpe 269-286
502 Cohen, Roger (7 Feb 1994) "TERROR IN SARAJEVO; NATO to hold Emergency Talks on Sarajevo
Attack" New York Times. It is disputed who fired the artillery round.
50 3North Atlantic Council (9 Feb 1994) "DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC COUNCIL" Press Release (94)15 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1994/p94-015.htm accessed 4
June 2009. Though the ultimatum was also addressed to Muslim forces, it was clearly aimed at the Serbs
which had the preponderance of heavy weapons around Sarajevo.
504 To prove the point the U.S. downed four Serb fighters. Gordon, Michael R. (1 Mar 1994) "CONFLICT
IN THE BALKANS; NATO CRAFT DOWN 4 SERB WARPLANES ATTACKING BOSNIA" New York
Times
505 Schmidt, William E. (24 Feb 1994) "Croats and Muslims Reach Truce To End the Other Bosnia
Conflict" New York Times
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approved three limited NATO air strikes.5 0 6 The Serbs retaliated by shelling the town,
downing a NATO fighter, and taking 120 UN personnel hostage. 507
The Gorazde crisis brought an end to ICFY efforts and, on 24 April 1994, the
ICFY was replaced as lead international negotiators by the newly-formed Contact Group,
led by the United States and, to a lesser extent, Russia, joined with representatives from
France, Germany and Great Britain.508 The Contact Group differed from previous efforts.,
in that negotiations were bilateral in nature, the U.S. now charged with bringing the
Croats and Muslims to the table, while Russia was responsible for the Serbs. The
Contact Group announced its peace plan in mid-May, proposing a federated Bosnia,
partitioning it with 51% of the territory going to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49% to
the Bosnian Serbs.509
The United States advocated a "lift and strike" strategy, threatening to lift the
arms embargo on the Bosnian (Muslim) Army and strike the Bosnian Serb Army with
NATO air power to compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the terms of the Contact Group
plan. The U.S. also wished to increase economic sanctions on Serbia to further motivate
Milosevic to pressure Pale. The Russians, on their part, approved of the partitioning plan
506 UNSCR 824 (1993) on 6 May 1993 declared Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica as
safe areas
507 Sudetic, Chuck (12 April 1994) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; THE OVERVIEW; U.S. PLANES
BOMB SERBIAN POSITION FOR A SECOND DAY" New York Times, Sudetic, Chuck (17 April 1994)
"CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; THE OFFENSIVE; Serbs Down a British Jet Over Gorazde" New York
Times, Sudetic, Chuck (20 April 1994) "Serbian Soldiers Seize Guns Held by UN, Then Return Most"
New York Times
508 Greenhouse, Steven (26 April 1994) "U.S., Britain and Russia Form Group to Press Bosnia Accord"
New York Times,
509 Greenhouse, Steven (15 May 1994) "Peace Outline Has Its Flaws, Bosnians Say" New York Times
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but resisted the other measures. In the end, the Contact Group plan, like previous efforts,
lacked sufficient coercive leverage.5 10
Predictably, the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the Contact Group plan in July
of 1994. 511 Though Bosnian (Muslim) and Croatian forces were beginning to take the
initiative, they had yet to make serious gains against the more powerful Serbs, who still
held 70% of Bosnia and had little reason to give up nearly one third of the territory they
held. Even under pressure from their allies, Russia and Serbia, they continued to resist.
On 4 August 1994, after the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the Contact Group's
proposal for a third time, Milosevic implemented economic and diplomatic sanctions
against the Bosnian Serbs.m
Unable to form an appropriate response in the face of the obstinate Bosnian Serbs,
the Contact Group did little. The U.S. considered unilaterally lifting the arms embargo
for the Bosnian Federation Army, but faced the opposition of Great Britain and France,
who feared such action would increase the risk to their peace-keeping forces. The
Clinton administration instead adopted an opaque policy. While the U.S. did not openly
arm the Croats or Muslims, the U.S. provided training and encouraged clandestine arms
shipments from Muslim countries.5 13
510 Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention
New York: M.E. Sharpe 300
511 Riding, Alan (21 July 1994) "Bosnian Serbs Said to Reject Mediators' Partition Plan" New York Times
512 Lyons, Richard (5 August 1994) "UN Security Council Weighs Rewarding or Punishing Serbs" New
York Times, Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1997) Yugoslavia: Death ofA Nation New York: Penguin 341-
3, Engelberg, Stephen and Eric Schmitt (11 June 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE
SERBIAN ROLE; WESTERN OFFICIALS SAY SERBIA HELPS BOSNIAN COMRADES" New York
Times
513 Gordon, Michael (11 November 1994) "PRESIDENT ORDERS END TO ENFORCING BOSNIAN
EMBARGO" New York Times, Wiebes, Cees (2003) Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995 Berlin:
Lit Verlag
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The air power portion of the U.S. strategy did not materialize until November of
1994. During the previous summer, the Bosnian army had advanced into northwest
Bosnia, forcing Serbs out of the UN-designated safe area of Bihac.5 14 The Serbs mounted
a counter attack which included air strikes and, by mid-November, was in position to
overrun the town. In response, the UN Security Council authorized NATO air strikes
against the Serb surface-to-air missile sites and the Serb airbase at Udbina in neighboring
Krajina. 5  The results of the strikes were dismal. The Serbs retaliated by detaining over
two hundred UN personnel near Sarajevo. Fearing the Serbs would keep their personnel
hostage, NATO backed down.51 6
The Serbs, however, continued to detain and harass UN troops and, by December
of 1994, France, the largest contributor of UN peacekeepers, called for NATO to begin
planning for a UNPROFOR withdrawal.517 This led to the NATO Council endorsement
of OPLAN 40-104. This plan called for the deployment of up to 20,000 U.S. ground
troops to assist in a withdrawal from Bosnia if such action became necessary. President
Clinton promised to send these troops to the region, should such action become
necessary. 518 At the same time, Bosnian Serb President Karadzic, under increasing
pressure to seek a peace agreement, initiated a ceasefire proposal through former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter. Karadzic agreed to reopen the Sarajevo airport, to allow the
movement of humanitarian aid and to stop the harassment of UN personnel in return for a
514 Gordon, Michael (18 November 1994) "U.S. Proposes Exclusion Zone in Bosnia Town" New York
Times
515 United Nations Security Council "Resolution 959 (1994), 19 November 1994"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/458/34/PDF/N9445834.pdf?OpenElement accessed 7
June 2009, Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and International
Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 300
516 Cohen, Roger (25 November 1994) "Fighting Rages as NATO Debates How to Protect Bosnian
Enclave" New York Times
517 Cohen, Roger (8 December 1994) "France Seeking Plan for Ending Bosnia Mission" New York Times
518 Bass, Warren (1998) "The Triage of Dayton" Foreign Affairs 77:5 99-100
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four-month ceasefire and the recommencement of serious negotiations.519 Though it
largely held until May 1995, this Serbian-initiated ceasefire did not produce a permanent
peace, providing rather an opportunity for the Croatian and Bosnian Federation Armies to
prepare for a summer offensive.
ANALYSIS OF COERCIVE STAGE H: FEBRUARY 1994 - APRIL 1995
Once again images of humanitarian suffering caused by the shelling of Sarajevo
and the attack on Gorazde sparked a change in the Clinton Administration's foreign
policy. The U.S. took over international negotiations by forming the Contact Group at
the end of April, 1994 and proposed a partitioned, federated Bosnia with 51% of the
territory going to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49% to the Bosnian Serbs.5 20 Unlike
Vance-Owen, this new proposal significantly reduced the level of demands by allowing
the Bosnian Serbs to keep their government, their heavy weapons and allowing them to
form independent diplomatic relations with Serbia.
This proposal, like the Vance-Owen plan before it, had no mechanism to make
credible threats to back up its demands. The "lift and strike" strategy advocated by the
U.S. was vetoed by Europe, who feared for their troops in Bosnia vulnerable to Serb
retaliation following NATO air strikes. While the Contact Group did reduce its demands
from those of the Vance-Owen plan, it still was unable to sufficiently increase the threat
level.
519 Karadzic felt political pressure from General Mladic, who along with twenty members of the Bosnian
Serb parliament met with Milosevic in Belgrade. Cohen, Roger (17 December 1994) "Seeking Carter
Visit, Bosnia Serbs Ease Up" New York Times, Barber, Tony (22 December 1994) "Bosnian Serbs
'succeeded in outwitting Jimmy Carter' Pale may have more cause for celebration than the Sarajevo
government following the peace initiative of the former US president" The Independent, The Carter Center
(1.994) "President Carter Helps Restart Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina"
http://www.i immycarter.com/news/documents/doc2 14.html accessed 8 June 2009
520 Greenhouse, Steven (15 May 1994) "Peace Outline Has Its Flaws, Bosnians Say" New York Times
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Milosevic continued to publicly pressure Karadzic and Mladic, even going so far
as to order the blockade of roads, to cut economic ties, and to freeze the pay of Bosnian
Serb military officers. 5 2 These actions had a decided effect on both men. In July of
1994, Mladic traveled to Belgrade in an effort to make amends with Milosevic. Karadzic
initiated contact with Jimmy Carter, a move which resulted in a ceasefire over the winter
of 1994-95. 522
The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, failed to fully appreciate what effect a
withdrawal of Serbian support would have on the balance of power in the region,
particularly for the Serbs in Croatia. The fate of Krajina and Slavonia, however, had long
been decided by Milosevic and Tudjman back at Karadjordjevo in March of 1991.523 The
Krajina Serbs, who relied on Serbia's backing to deter Croatian forces, were in no
position to defend against a Croat offensive. The Bosnian Serbs had not considered nor
prepared for the collapse of Krajina, which had created a second front, now threatening
western Bosnia. So long as they misperceived that the balance of power in Bosnia
remained in their favor, the Bosnian Serbs had insufficient incentive to concede to a
51/49 partition while they held 70% of the territory (see Table 5.3).
Though U.S. efforts at coercion failed, at this juncture, the seeds for ultimate
success were sown with the formation of the Croat-Muslim Bosnian Federation. This
alliance would eventually change the balance of military power on the ground in Bosnia,
proving a viable threat to Bosnian Serbs and finally bringing both Karadzic and Mladic
under Milosevic's control.
521 Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in
Banja Luka.
522 Svarm, Filip (22 Aug 1994) "The Silence of the General" Vreme News digest Agency 152
www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian digest/ accessed 23 June 2010.
121 Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death ofA Nation New York: Penguin 131
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The second critical event of 1994 was the NATO Council's endorsement of
OPLAN 40-104. This commitment of up to 20,000 U.S. ground forces elevated U.S.
interests to include its prestige and sincerity of its commitments to NATO. NATO's
credibility would have been seriously undermined had the UN called for a withdrawal of
UNPROFOR, only to have President Clinton refuse to deploy U.S. troops.524
Period Core Type of Threat United States United States
Compellent (Denial or Coercion Foreign Policy
Demands Punishment) Outcome Outcome
SERBIA Punishment SERBIA Failure
Policy Change - Economic Partial Success Though Civil War
Feb94 - - Pressure Bosnian Sanctions Accepts Contact abates with
Apr 95 Serbs to accept - Limited NATO Group Proposal, temporary
Contact Group Air Strikesceasefire,ConactGrop ir triesprovide military negotiations for
Proposal support permanent
ceasefire fail and
BOSNIAN SERBS BOSNIAN Serbs continue to
control 70% ofHomeland SERBS Bosnia
(No longer Regime Failure
Change) Refuses Contact
- Accept Contact Group Proposal
Group Proposal
resulting in
territorial
concessions
Table 5.3: Typology of Coercive Stage 11, Feb 1994 - April 1995
COERCIVE STAGE III: MAY - NOVEMBER 1995: END OF CEASEFIRE TO
DAYTON ACCORDS
On the Is' of May, 1995, after three years of relative calm, war returned to Croatia
with the expiration of the four-month Bosnian ceasefire. The Croatian Army pushed into
western Slavonia, meeting light resistance, and within a week, had retaken the region,
524 Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modem 65-67.
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though Serbs still controlled eastern Slavonia and Krajina (see Map 5.1).52s The strong
showing by the Croatian Army was attributable to two factors. First, the Croatian Army
proved a much better fighting force over what it had been in 1991. The U.S. had
supported Croatia's military buildup by encouraging arms embargo violations and by
retired senior U.S. officers advising the Croatian Army. 526 Second, and more important,
Milosevic had withdrawn Serbian military support from the Krajina Serbs. 527
The ceasefire likewise collapsed within Bosnia as fighting broke out around
several cities, including Sarajevo. Following several weeks of hard fighting,
UNPROFOR issued an ultimatum on 25 May 1995, calling for both the Bosnian Serb and
Bosnian (Muslim) Armies to refrain from employing their heavy weapons near Sarajevo
or face NATO air strikes. 528 When the Serbs refused to comply, NATO struck an
ammunition depot near Pale. This elicited a now predictable response from the Bosnian
Serbs, who shelled five of the six safe areas and seized 400 UN personnel, this time
displaying them handcuffed as human shields in front of potential NATO targets. 529 By
the 10th of June, the Bosnian Serbs had clearly won the standoff. To secure the release of
525 Cohen, Roger (2 May 1995) "CROATIA HITS AREA REBEL SERBS HOLD, CROSSING UN
LINES" New York Times, Cohen, Roger (5 May 1995) "Croats Attack, Serbs Flee and Another Town is
Uprooted" New York Times, Cohen, Roger (7 May 1995) "April 3 - May 6: A New Phase; The Balkan
Wars Heat Up As Croatia Takes the Field To Roll Back Serbs" New York Times
5 26Cohen, Roger (28 October 1995) "U.S. Cooling Ties To Croatia After Winking at Its Buildup" New York
Times, Clinton, William (2004) My Life New York: Alfred A. Knopf 667. Wiebes, Cees (2003)
Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995 Berlin: Lit Verlag
527 Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 328
528 Cohen, Roger (25 May 1995) "NATO May Be Called On to Silence Guns in Sarajevo" New York Times
529Cohen, Roger (26 May 1995) "NATO Jets Bomb Arms Depot At Bosnian Serb Headquarters" New York
Times, Mitchell, Alison (27 May 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE DIPLOMACY; Clinton
Defends NATO Air Strikes in Bosnia and Calls on Serbs to Free UN Hostages" New York Times
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the remaining hostages, the UN announced it would "return to the status quo" and "abide
strictly by peacekeeping principles until further notice."530
In June 1995, France and Britain began sending mixed signals as to their resolve
over Bosnia. While French and British diplomats publicly questioned how long they
would continue to support UNPROFOR, their militaries deployed heavily-armed units to
the region as a new rapid-response force. It was unclear how this additional ground
power would be used, however, whether it was to provide additional military might to
back up UN ultimatums or to facilitate a withdrawal.5 3 ' At the same time, bilateral talks
between the United States and Serbia were scuttled over the hostage crisis and a
disagreement over terms for suspending the UN sanctions. Milosevic, bolstered by the
recent Bosnian Serb victory, demanded the sanctions be permanently lifted and balked at
the U.S. insistence that the Security Council retain the right to reimpose them.53 2
In July 1995, in response to raids by Muslim forces staging out of the UN safe
area of Srebrenica, General Mladic ordered the shelling of the city. With the UN
unwilling to authorize NATO airstrikes, the lightly-armed and outnumbered UNPROFOR
troops could do no more than withdraw as the Bosnian Serb forces overran the city and
conducted the mass killing of over seven thousand Muslim men.5 33 This gruesome
530 Cohen, Roger (11 June 1995) "CONFLCIT IN THE BALKANS: THE UN MANDATE; Peacekeeping
vs. an Intractable War" New York Times
531 By early June 1995 the British had 4,700 and the French 3,800 troops of the 22,500 UNPROFOR in
Bosnia, Darnton, John (2 June 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE ALLIES; Clinton's Offer of
Troops Pleases Europe" New York Times, Scmitt, Eirc (9 June 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS:
IN BRUSSELS; Briton Suggests UN May Leave Bosnia" New York Times, Christopher, Warren (1998) In
the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 348
532 Milosevic demanded that the UN General Secretary make the determination as to whether Serbia was in
compliance. Kinzer, Stephen (8 June 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN BOSNIA; U.S.-Serb
Talks Suspended" New York Times
1 Hedges, Chris (12 July 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW; Bosnian Serbs
Overrun Town Protected by UN" New York Times, Hedges, Chris (20 July 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE
BALKANS: IN BOSNIA; SECOND 'SAFE AREA' IN EASTERN BOSNIA OVERRUN BY SERBS"
New York Times, Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation New York: Penguin
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attack, along with the fall of Zepa two weeks later, shocked the U.S. and Western Europe
into action.
President Clinton acknowledged to his national security team that the current U.S.
foreign policy was untenable and that the situation in Bosnia was making the U.S. look
weak and "...doing enormous damage to the United States'... standing in the world."5 3 4
This newfound resolve was, in part, due to his belated recognition that, regardless of the
outcome in Bosnia, he had already committed 20,000 ground troops to deploy to the
region, whether to enforce a peace agreement or to assist in a potentially violent
UNPROFOR withdrawal.53 5 Clinton therefore pressed for the peace agreement as he
could ill afford to deploy U.S. troops to enforce a failed foreign policy in the midst of his
1996 reelection bid.536
A 21 July 1995 conference hastily convened in London and attended by NATO
leaders, a Russian representative, and the UN General Secretary's envoy, produced two
fundamental changes to NATO policy. First, a line was drawn in the sand declaring that
an attack on Gorazde, the last UN safe area in eastern Bosnia, would "...be met by
347, International Committee of the Red Cross (2005) "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ten years after fall of
Srebrenica, families of missing persons continue to suffer"
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/6e4lay?opendocument accessed 9 June 2009
5 Woodward, Bob (1996) The Choice New York: Simon & Schuster 258, 263
535 Purdam, Todd (4 June 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: U.S. POLICY; CLINTON, FACING
OBJECTIONS, REFINES NARROW CONDITIONS FOR USING TROOPS IN BOSNIA" New York
Times, Woodward, Bob (1996) The Choice New York: Simon & Schuster 258
536 U.S. policy in the Balkans began to have additional domestic political implications for Clinton as future
Republican Presidential nominee, Senator Robert Dole and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich pushed
through legislation to unilaterally lift the arms embargo. Though Clinton vetoed the legislation it placed
additional pressure for results. Woodward, Bob (1996) The Choice New York: Simon & Schuster 269,
Sciolino, Elaine (2 August 1995) "House, Like Senate, Votes to Halt Bosnia Embargo" New York Times,
Englelberg, Stephen (19 August 1995) "HOW EVENTS DREW U.S. INTO BALKANS" New York Times,
Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modern 68
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substantial and decisive air power."5 3 7 This protection was later expanded to include the
other remaining safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla.538 Second, NATO airstrikes had
been hampered by a "dual key" approval process, which required authorization by UN
military officials and NATO civilian officials. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali now'
agreed to delegate UN strike authority out of civilian hands and into those of the overall
military commander for UNPROFOR, French Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier. This
significantly streamlined the NATO-UN air strike approval process. 539
The Clinton administration then announced a new "End Game" strategy in early
August 1995.540 The plan called for a U.S. diplomatic initiative to reinvigorate the
Contact Group's proposal, this time adding the threat of a large-scale air campaign
against the Bosnian Serbs if they rejected the plan. 54 1 Unlike a similar U.S. proposal in
1993, the Europeans now agreed to the expanded role of NATO air power over the tepid
objections raised by Russia.s42
This stiffening of U.S. resolve was accompanied by a shift in the balance of
military power within the Balkans in favor of Croatia, the Muslim-Croat Bosnian
5 Darnton, John (22 July 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: POLICY - ALLIES WARN
BOSNIAN SERBS OF 'SUBSTANTIAL' AIR STRIKES IF UN ENCLAVE IS ATTACKED: ACCORD
IN LONDON" New York Times
538 Whitney, Craig (2 August 1995) "ALLIES EXTENDING SHIELD TO PROTECT ALL BOSNIA
HAVENS" New York Times
539 Crossette, Barbara (27 July 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: AT THE UN; UN Military Aides
Given Right to Approve Attacks" New York Times
540 The U.S. plan was a seven point initiative calling for 1) a comprehensive peace settlement 2) three-way
recognition of Bosnia, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 3) lifting
of economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 4) Peaceful return of eastern Slavonia to
Croatia 5) cease-fire and end of all offensive operations 6) Reaffirmation of Contact Group plan for 51/49
split of territory to Bosnian Federation (Muslim and Croats) and Bosnian Serbs respectively 7)
Comprehensive economic program for regional reconstruction , Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War
New York: Modem 74
541 It also included the withdrawal of U.S. support for the Muslim-Croat Bosnian Federation if they also
refused the plan Woodward, Bob (1996) The Choice New York: Simon & Schuster 268-9
542 Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 344-5
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Federation, and NATO, all aligned against the Serbs. On 4 August 1995, the Croatian
Army commenced a new offensive, "ethnically cleansing" over 200,000 Serbs from
Krajina. This left eastern Slavonia the sole Croatian territory still under Serbian
control. 543 The stunned Bosnian Serbs witnessed not only the collapse of Krajina, which
opened a new front to their west, but also saw the influx of thousands of Serb refugees.
As with western Slavonia, Milosevic withheld military support and instead blamed
Krajina Serb leadership for failing to reach a settlement with Croatia's President
Tudjman.544 The Croat offensive had a rippling effect in northwest Bosnia, relaxing the
Serb stranglehold on the Bihac pocket and allowing Bosnian-Muslim units to break out of
the city. Meanwhile in central Bosnia, both Croatian and Muslim Federation troops
began attacking Serb positions.545
As the tides of war quickly turned against the Bosnian Serbs, their leadership
began to show signs of strain and their solidarity publicly unraveled. President Karadzic
blamed the recent losses in western Bosnia on General Mladic and he moved to relieve
Mladic of command of the army. 546 Having originally been appointed to his position by
Milosevic, however, Mladic now traveled to Belgrade to confer with him. In the end, he
refused to step down and declared Karadzic's order illegal. Backed by the entire Bosnian
543 Greenhouse, Steven (5 August 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE ALLIES; U.S. Criticizes
Croatia, but Only Halfheartedly, for Attack on Serbs" New York Times, Bonner, Raymond (7 August 1995)
"CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW; Croatia Declares Victory in Rebel Area" New York
Times
544 Perez, Jane (6 August 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN BELGRADE; Serb Chief's
Response To Events Is Restrained" New York Times, Perez, Jane (11 August 1995) "Croatian Serbs Blame
Belgrade For Their Rout" New York Times Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death ofA
Nation New York: Penguin 357
545 O'Connor, Mike (14 August 1995) "Bosnian Army Presses Offensive Against Rebel Serbs in Central
Region" New York Times, Mueller, Karl (2000) "Chapter 1: The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction
of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses" Owen, Robert (ed) DELIBERATE FORCE: A Case
Study in Effective Air Campaigning Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press 27
546 Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in
Banja Luka and Perlez, Jane (6 August 1995) "Bosnian Serb Leader Demotes Commander" New York
Times
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Serb General Officer Corps, Mladic won the day and forced Karadzic to reverse his
decision.547
The United States' newly appointed chief negotiator in the Balkans, Richard
Holbrooke, sought to bypass both Bosnian Serb leaders altogether. He met with
Milosevic in Belgrade on 17 August 1995 and announced that the U.S. would no longer
negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs, dealing instead with Milosevic alone. 548 Two Serbian
artillery shells killed thirty-seven in another attack on Sarajevo's Markala marketplace on
28 August, providing the pretext the U.S. had been waiting for to commence preplanned
NATO air strikes. 549 Karadzic and Mladic were still stunned over the collapse of Krajina
and, with air strikes imminent, they were particularly vulnerable. Summoning the
bickering pair to Belgrade on 30 August, Milosevic finally wrested from them the
authority to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs' by threatening to cut them off
completely from any aid.550 With morale low and losing territory in the west, they were
now desperately in need of Serbian support and were no longer in a position to refuse
Milosevic.
547 Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in
Banja Luka. Perlez, Jane (7 August 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE BOSNIAN SERBS;
Power Struggle of 2 Top Leaders Grows" New York Times, Perlez, Jane (14 August 1995) "Bosnian Serbs,
Angry at Setback And Tired of War, Blame Leaders" New York Times
548 Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modem 4
549 Whereas in the February 1994 attack it was never clearly determined who fired the artillery round, in
this instance NATO analysis confirmed the artillery rounds were fired by the Serbs. Even so the origin of
the attack remained contentious. Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation
New York: Penguin 365, Dittmer, David and Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NA TO'S First
Extended Air Operation Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 19, Greenhouse, Steven (28 August 1995)
"U.S. Officials Say Bosnian Serbs Face NATO Attack if Talks Stall" New York Times, Cohen, Roger (29
August 1995) "Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo; U.S. Urges NATO to Strike Serbs" New York Times, The
NATO air campaign was approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 25 July 1995, Mueller, Karl
(2000) "Chapter 1: The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects,
and Responses" Owen, Robert (ed) DELIBERATE FORCE: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning
Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press 27
*5 Chollet, Derek (2005) The Road to the Dayton Accords New York: Palgrave 63, MacMillan Silber,
Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death ofA Nation New York: Penguin 365
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Operation Deliberate Force, 30 August -14 September 1995
Following the 28 August 1995 shelling of the Markala marketplace, the U.S.
immediately called for the UN to approve and for NATO to implement a large-scale air
operation. 55' Following a one-day delay to secure the withdrawal of the remaining
UNPROFOR troops from Gorazde, Operation Deliberate Force commenced on the 30th
of August. Over the next two days, NATO launched 372 strike sorties against the
Bosnian Serb Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), artillery positions, ammunition
depots, and command and control centers located near Sarajevo and Pale in southeast
Bosnia (see Table 5.4 for daily strike summaries).55 2 In addition, the UN's Rapid
Reaction Force fired over 1,000 artillery rounds against Bosnian Serb positions near
Sarajevo and in western Bosnia.5 53
" Cohen, Robert (29 August 1995) "Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo; U.S. Urges NATO to Strike Serbs"
New York Times, The NATO air campaign which has become known as Deliberate Force actually consisted
of three parts, DEADEYE targeted the Bosnian Serbs Integrated Air Defenses (IADS), Vulcan was a
military target set specific to protecting the enclaves of Sarajevo and Goradze, and DELIBERATE FORCE
was a broader target set consisting of option one (fielded forces) and option two (command and control,
munitions depots, and IADS munitions sites, and radar and SAM sites) targets. Option three targets which
included Serb troop concentrations and civilian infrastructure were never approved to strike. The
operational objective was to "...adversely alter the BSA's [Bosnian Serb Army] advantage in conducting
successful military operations against the BiH [Bosnian (Muslim) Army]" with the aim of compelling the
Serbs to "...sue for cessation of military operations, comply with UN mandates, and negotiate." Sargent,
Richard (2000) "Chapter 10: Deliberate Force Targeting" Owen, Robert ed. DELIBERA TE FORCE: A
Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press 285, Dittmer, David and
Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NA TO'S First Extended Air Operation Washington: Center for
Naval Analyses 10-11. AFSOUTH Fact Sheets (16 Dec 2002) Operation Deliberate Force
www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm accessed 22 June 2010
552 Sargent, Richard (2000) "Chapter 12: Deliberate Force Combat Air Assessments" Owen, Robert ed.
DELIBERATE FORCE: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning Maxwell AFB AL: Air University
Press 337 Dittmer, David and Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NATO'S First Extended Air
Operation Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 28, Cohen, Roger (30 August 1995) "CONFLICT IN
THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW; NATO JETS ATTACK SERBIAN POSITIONS AROUND
SARAJEVO" New York Times
553 Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in
Banja Luka. Dittmer, David and Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NA TO'S First Extended Air
Operation Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 22, Nichols, David (1996) "Bosnia: UN and NATO"
Royal United Services Institute Journal 141:1 3 5-6
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Date Event Weather554  Strike Change in Targets Change in
Sorties number of remaining number of
Sorties from by targets
previous day DMP remaining
29 -30 Aug 85 - - -
30 -31 Aug Strikes Good 170 +85 338 -
Commence
31 Aug -1 Good 202 +32 295 -43
Sep
1 - 2 Sep Strike Pause 118 -84 295 0
2 - 3 Sep 103 -15 295 0
3 - 4 Sep 122 +19 295 0
4 - 5 Sep 122 0 295 0
5 - 6 Sep Strikes Fair 176 +54 258 -37
Resume
6 - 7 Sep Poor 213 +37 235 -23
7 - 8 Sep Fair 232 +19 214 -21
8 - 9 Sep Poor 171 -61 198 -16
9 - 10 Sep Croat Poor 145 -26 165 -33
Offensive
10 - I ISep TLAM Fair 152 +7 161 -4
Strikes
11 - 12 Sep Fair 180 +28 156 -5
12 - 13 Sep Poor 151 -29 60 -86
13 - 14 Sep Serbs Agree Poor 81 -70 56 -4
to terms
14 - 15 Sep Strikes 0 -81 43 -13
Suspended
Total 2,423
Sorties I I I I _k
Table 5.4: Deliberate Force Strike Rates and Battle Damage Assessment556
"4 Wx reported in AFSOUTH Headquarters daily Press Briefings for September 1995
http://www.hri.org/news/nisc/nisc-news/1995/95-09-index.misc.html accessed 16 June 2009
"5 Approved target consisted of 56 targets with 338 Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI). A DMPI is the
exact location on a target identified for a weapon to strike. For example a munitions storage area may be a
target, while each weapons storage bunker may be a DMPI.
556 Sorties indicate combat aircraft that penetrated into Bosnia. These include strike aircraft, Suppression
of Enemy Air Defense aircraft, and Combat Air Patrols, but not command and control aircraft, Combat
Search and Rescue or air refueling assets. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is NATO's assessment of
DMPI's effectively serviced. Attacks were primarily against fixed targets such as air defense sites and
command and control, ammo and depot facilities, and bridges and lines of communication. Relatively few
attacks were against fielded forces. BDA assessment in some cases were delayed several days due to
inclement weather impairing reconnaissance. Sargent, Richard (2000) "Chapter 12: Deliberate Force
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At the onset of air strikes Lieutenant General Janvier dispatched messages to
General Mladic on 30 August with three conditions for halting the bombing: cease
threatening attacks on the four safe areas, withdraw all heavy weapons from Sarajevo,
and cease hostilities throughout Bosnia. 557 On 31 August, Janvier requested a 24-hour
bombing pause from NATO in order to meet with Mladic, but then rejected Mladic's
conditional acceptance. Mladic demanded a guarantee that the Bosnian (Muslim) Army
would not take over the territory vacated by a Serb withdrawal.558 The bombing pause
was further extended until the 5th of September when confusion arose over who had the
authority to speak for the Serbs. Milosevic, who had yet to fully exert control over the
Bosnian Serbs, made an attempt to accept the UN terms by contacting the Secretary
General's senior civilian envoy, Yasushi Akashi, while Karadzic sent a conciliatory
message through Jimmy Carter. 559
Regardless of diplomatic efforts made, by 5 September there was no evidence on
the ground that Bosnian Serb heavy weapons were being removed from Sarajevo. 560
NATO air strikes recommenced, this time accompanied by a revised ultimatum for the
Bosnian Serbs to cease their attacks on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, to immediately
withdraw their heavy weapons from the 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo,
Combat Air Assessments" Owen, Robert ed. DELIBERATE FORCE: A Case Study in Effective Air
Campaigning Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press 337, 338, 344
m Dittmer, David and Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NA TO'S First Extended Air Operation
Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 23
558 Cohen, Roger (3 September 1995) "Serbs Balk But NATO Delays Raids" New York Times
559 Yugoslav Daily Survey (5 September 1995) "Mladic Calls For Urgent Meeting of Bosnia Factions" and
"Former U.S. President Announces Serb Compliance with NATO Demands" in 4 September 1995 Tanjug,
Belgrade http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/yds/1995/95-09-05.yds.txt accessed 16 June 2009, Cohen,
Roger (5 September 1995) "A NATO DEADLINE IN BOSNIA PASSES WITHOUT ATTACK" New
York Times
560 Smith, Leighton W. Admiral (6 September 1995) "Transcript of Press Conference Admiral Leighton W.
Smith Commander In Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe: NATO Recommences Air Strikes Against
Bosnian Serbs" http://www.hri.org/news/misc/misc-news/ 1 995/95-09-06.misc.txt accessed 16 June 2009
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and to allow the free movement of UN and non-government organization personnel in
and out of Sarajevo.
In addition to military activity, U.S. diplomacy was also beginning to make
inroads. In Geneva on 8 September Croatian, Bosnian, and Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) foreign ministers agreed to basic principles for a
Bosnian settlement, which recognized the international borders of Bosnia and formed two
political entities within Bosnia: the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and the Serbian
Republica Srpska with territory divided 51% to 49%, respectively. 561
On 9 September, the Croatian and Bosnian Federation Armies launched a
coordinated ground offensive into western Bosnia.562 The same day, General Mladic
informed Janvier that the Bosnian Serb Army was now ready to meet the UN ultimatum.
The two met, along with Milosevic, in Belgrade the following day.563 Meanwhile,
NATO expanded its air operations into western Bosnia supporting the Croat-Muslim
ground offensive which was gaining momentum and threatening Banja Luka, the largest
Serbian city in western Bosnia.564
On 13 September Holbrooke met with Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic in
Belgrade, where the Serbs agreed to the basic principles signed in Geneva the previous
561 9 September 1995 "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; Details of Accord: Division Within Unity" New
York Times
562 Cohen, Roger (16 September 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE CROATS; Croatia
Expands Its Power in Bosnia" New York Times
563 Dittmer, David and Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NA TO'S First Extended Air Operation
Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 37
564 These strikes included the use of 13 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Murray, Trevor (11 September 1995)
"Transcript Deliberate Force Press Brief 11 September 1995" http://www.hri.org/news/misc/misc-
news/1995/95-09-1 I.misc.html accessed 16 June 2009. O'Connor, Mike (14 September 1995)
"CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE FIGHTING; Bosnian Serb Civilians Flee Joint Muslim-Croat
Attack" New York Times
298
565
week. In addition, Mladic agreed to end the siege on Sarajevo and to remove all heavy
weapons upon receiving assurances that Russian UNPROFOR troops would occupy the
positions the Serbs were to vacate.s66 In return, NATO suspended air strikes the very
next day, on 14 September, initially for 72 hours and then permanently, once the Bosnian"
Serbs were deemed in compliance. 567
Permanent Ceasefire
Although NATO suspended air strikes, the Croat-Muslim ground offensive
continued, forcing the Serbs to concede large portions of western Bosnia.568 Holbrooke,
who preferred to enter formal peace negotiations with the ground reality closely matching
the Contact Group's 51/49 partitioning, encouraged Croatia's President Tudjman to
continue seizing territory, but cautioned against taking Banja Luka.5 69 By 19 September,
the offensive had begun to lose steam and Croat forces approaching Banja Luka from the
south were hampered by Bosnian Serb forces in the easily defendable mountainous
terrain while Croat forces from the north took significant losses as they attempted to cross
into Bosnia over the Una river at Dubica. 570
565 Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modem 152, Sciolino, Elaine (15 September
1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE IMPLICATIONS; Sarajevo Pact: Diplomacy on a Roll"
New York Times
566 Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovinia: Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention New York: M.E. Sharpe 354
567 Dittmer, David and Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NA TO'S First Extended A ir Operation
Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 41-5
568 Hedges, Chris (19 September 1995) "Extent of Croat-Bosnia Advance Threatens U.S.-Brokered Peace"
New York Times
569 Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modem 160,
570 NATO implicitly condoned the Bosnian Serb air strikes by not imposing the no fly zone ban. Kinzer,
Stephen (22 September 1995) "Bosnian Serbs Fend Off Croatian and Muslim Attacks, Holbrooke, Richard
(1998) To End A War New York: Modem 164. Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General
Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in Banja Luka.
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By October the Croat-Muslim offensive had stalled and the Bosnian Serbs were
showing signs of mounting a counteroffensive. 571 On 5 October, with the Federation and
Bosnian Serbs each controlling roughly half of Bosnia, Holbrooke finally secured a
ceasefire agreement between Croatia's President Tudjman, Bosnia's President
Izetbegovic and Serbia's President Milosevic. President Clinton announced the cease-
fire would officially commence on the 10 th of October, with peace talks taking place later
in the United States.572
Dayton Accords 573
Negotiations began on 1 November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in
Dayton, Ohio and concluded three weeks later. The Dayton Accords were then formally
signed in Paris on 15 December. 574 As with the October ceasefire agreement, the talks
were held primarily with Croatia's Tudjman, Bosnia's Itzetbegovic and Serbia's
Milosevic. Neither Karadzic nor Mladic, now internationally indicted war criminals,
were present.
An early agreement between Milosevic and Tudj man resolved the remaining issue
of the Croatian war, i.e. the return of eastern Slavonia to Croatia. Milosevic agreed to
571 Hedges, Chris (4 October 1995) "Negotiator Says Cease-Fire in Bosnia Is Unlikely Soon" New York
Times
572 Clinton, William (50ctober 1995) "Remarks Announcing Agreement on a Cease-Fire in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and an Exchange With Reporters" The American Presidency Project
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50605&st=&stl= accessed 22 June 2009
573 For an extensive treatment of the Dayton Negotiations see Chollet, Derek (2005) The Road to the
Dayton Accords New York: and Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modem
5 Cohen, Roger (1 November 1995) "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW; Balkan
Leaders Face an Hour for Painful Choices" New York Times, Sciolino, Elaine (22 November 1995)
"BALKAN ACCORD: THE OVERVIEW; ACCORD REACHED TO END THE WAR IN BOSNIA;
CLINTON PLEDGES U.S. TROOPS TO KEEP PEACE" New York Times, "The General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina" http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content id=380
accessed 21 June 2009, Whitney, Craig (15 December 1995) "BALKAN ACCORD: THE OVERVIEW;
Balkan Foes Sign Peace Pact, Dividing An Unpacified Bosnia" New York Times
300
turn over the region, and in return, Tudjman supported the Bosnian peace process.57 5 The
more difficult and time-consuming aspect of the talks lay in defining the inter-entity
border to separate the Federation from the Republika Srpska (see Map 5.3).
MAP 5.3: Dayton Agreement Inter-entity Boundary Line 576
To gain an agreement Milosevic conceded on two key territorial issues: first he
agreed to give up Serb-held sections of Sarajevo and territory in eastern Bosnia in order
to provide the Federation with a secure access route to Gorazde. Second, he agreed to
5 Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modem 238
576 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (August 2009) "Bosnia and Herzegovina" US. Department of
State Diplomacy in Action www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm accessed 4 Nov 2009
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delay for a year a decision over the Brcko corridor and to ultimately submit the issue to
international arbitration.5 7 7 In return, the Republika Srpska retained 49% of Bosnian
territory and received recognition as a separate political entity within Bosnia with the
right to directly interact with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The Bosnian
Serbs retained their military, though their heavy weapons were assigned to UN-monitored
cantonment areas. As promised, Milosevic delivered the cooperation of the Bosnian
Serbs when he traveled to Bosnia the following week and secured the signatures of both
Karadzic and Mladic. 578 For his efforts, he finally succeeded in having UN sanctions
against the FRY lifted.
ANAL YSIS OF COERCIVE STA GE III: WHY KARADZIC AND MLADIC
CONCEDED NEGOTIA TING POWER TO MILOSEVIC
After three years of bloody civil war in Bosnia, the United States finally
succeeded in coercing the Bosnian Serbs into accepting a permanent peace agreement
(see Table 5.5 for coercion typology). A critical juncture in the process took place in
Belgrade on 30 August 1995 when Karadzic and Mladic ceded negotiating power to
Milosevic.579 Two related factors explain their reversal, the build up of Croat and
Muslim military forces which combined with Milosevic's withdrawal of Serbian military
support shifted the balance of power in Bosnia.
"7 At issue was control of the Brcko corridor, the narrow neck connecting the eastern and western sections
of the Republika Srpska. Brcko was largely populated by Muslims prior to the war, but by wars end had
only Serbs. Also at issue was the width of the corridor. Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To EndA War New
York: Modern 308. In March 1999 a final ruling on Brcko established the district would be jointly run by
the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska. ( 9 March 1999) "Bosnian Serbs Moderate Confrontation"
New York TImes
578 Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modern 310
579 Milosevic included the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church Patriach Pavle at his Belgrade meeting
with Karadzic, Mladic, and Montenegrian President Momir Bulatovic
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Core
Compellent
Demands
May 95
- Nov 95
Type of Threat
(Denial or
Punishment)
Punishment
- Economic
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Denial
- Air strikes on
Bosnian Serb
Command and
Control and
weapon storage
areas
- Croat-Muslim
ground campaign
United States
Coercion
Outcome
__________________ 
I
United States
Foreign Policy
Outcome
Success
Dayton Accords
end Civil War
in Bosnia
Table 5.5: Typology of Coercive Stage III, May 1995 - Nov 1995
The balance of military power between the Bosnian Serbs and the Federation
began to shift with the collapse of Krajina, which left the Bosnian Serbs' western flank
exposed to the Croat-Muslim offensive. General Mladic, however, was prevented from
reinforcing Banja Luka, as his heavy weapons were dedicated to the siege of Sarajevo.
He feared Muslim troops would occupy the positions vacated by a withdrawal from
Sarajevo and NATO air power threatened the transport of the weapons.580
Though the Bosnian Serbs' situation in the west was serious, it was not yet dire.
Mladic was unwilling to concede to NATO's demands to remove his weapons from
Sarajevo until he received assurances that Russian peacekeeping troops would replace his
580 Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in
Banja Luka.
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forces. 581 Such a deployment would prevent the Muslim forces in Sarajevo from further
territorial gains and provide a buffer between the Bosnian Serb and Federation forces in
central Bosnia. This was the same tactic employed by the Serbs in Croatia in 1991, when
UNPROFOR troops deployed to eastern Croatia, thus freeing the Serbs to reinforce
Bosnia. 582
To secure the deployment of Russian troops Mladic was willing to endure 12 days,
of NATO air strikes in the interim. Under this umbrella of air power, however, the
Croat-Muslim offensive gained momentum, leaving Mladic little option but to accede to
NATO's demands, though not before he received the assurances for the Russian
peacekeepers.
The second factor in Karadzic and Mladic's concession of negotiating power was
Milosevic's threat to pull the plug on all Serbian support. Serbia had already secured its
border with Bosnia and reduced the flow of goods. More importantly, the fighting during
the summer of 1995 had nearly exhausted the Bosnian Serb Army, leaving them
dependent on Serbia to continue their military operations. In sum, Karadzic and Mladic
had finally concluded that they were losing and needed Milosevic's support to avoid a
defeat that could threaten the very survival of the Republika Srpska.
ANALYSIS OF EXPLANA TIONS FOR COERCION FAILURE
In this section I assess the predictions for the two hypotheses for coercion failure,
that of target survival and challenger commitment problems. The Bosnian crisis was
initiated when the United States adopted its core objectives of maintaining a single
581 Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death ofA Nation New York: Penguin 366
582 Cowell, Alan (25 November 1991) "Fighting Slows Under Yugoslav Truce; Hopes for a Peace Force"
New York Times
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Bosnian state and procuring a permanent ceasefire. This case differs from that of Iraq or
Libya in that the U.S. targeted two countries, Serbia and the Republica Srpska. The U.S.
employed sanctions on Serbia to convince Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to
pressure Bosnian Serb President Karadzic and General Mladic first to concede to a
ceasefire and then to the Contact Group's peace proposal. The U.S. also employed
military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, through NATO airstrikes and through its support
of the Croat and Muslim ground offensive. In the following analysis, I evaluate Serbia
and the Republica Srpska as separate target states and test the two hypotheses against
each case in turn.
TESTING THE SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS
In the asymmetric coercion model the powerful challenger optimizes its outcome
by matching demands and threats such that the target is just willing to concede. The
expectation of the survival hypothesis is that coercion will succeed so long as the target's
state, regime, and regime leadership's survival is not threatened by acquiescing to a
challenger's demands as long as the target has the means to resist. For the case of
Bosnia, the survival hypothesis correctly predicts U.S. coercion success for both Serbia
and the Republica Srpska.
IMPACT ON SERBIA, MILOSEVIC, AND HIS REGIME'S SURVIVAL FOR
CONCEDING
Impact on Serbia for Conceding
Conceding to a ceasefire and signing the Dayton Peace Accords did not threaten
the survival of Serbia. Bosnia had never been part of Serbia and had maintained an
autonomous status as a republic for over a century prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia
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in 1991. The Contact Group's proposal therefore did not infringe on Serbia's control of
its territory or its population. In addition, an agreement which removed the draconian
UN sanctions stood to improve Serbia's economic plight and, indeed, proved the key
motivating factor behind Milosevic's support of the Dayton Accords.
Impact on Milosevic's Regime for Conceding
Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) controlled the Serbian government
and, within Serbia, there were no armed opposition groups capable of violently
overthrowing the regime. In November of 1990 Milosevic sealed an alliance between the
SPS and the Yugoslavian Army (JNA). This successful subjugation of the military to
civilian control not only reduced the chances of a military coup, but also by its mere
presence deterred the formation of armed opposition groups that could threaten revolt. 583
As a result, Milosevic's government was not threatened by civil war.
The SPS was vulnerable, however, at the ballot box. Since Milosevic's rise to
power, the SPS had won elections easily. But a year after Dayton, in the November 1996
national election, its margin of victory was significantly narrowed. This required the SPS
to share power by expanding its governing coalition. Still, it is not likely that the
decrease in the SPS vote share was a direct result of Milosevic signing the Dayton Peace
Accord, but of a general displeasure on the part of the Serbian population with
Milosevic's leadership and, in particular, with his mishandling of the economy.
Conceding to U.S. demands actually assisted Milosevic and his SPS by bringing the
costly Bosnian Civil War to a close and by lifting the debilitating UN sanctions.
583 Bennett, Christopher (1995) Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse New York: NYU Press, 133
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In sum, Milosevic's regime was not threatened by conceding to U.S. demands as
there were no domestic opposition groups capable of threatening revolution and
concessions which put an end to the war and sanctions may have improved SPS election
prospects. Indeed, resistance would only have led to still greater dissatisfaction with the
regime.
Impact on Milosevic's Leadership for Conceding
As the leader of a single party regime, Milosevic was more likely than Saddam
Hussein, a leader of a personalist regime, to suffer audience costs for making
concessions. Milosevic, however, undertook two actions to undercut the backlash
generated by his pressuring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a peace agreement. First, in
February of 1994 Milosevic began employing his propaganda machine to place the blame
for Serbia's growing economic crisis on the unwillingness of the Bosnian Serbs to accept
the Contact Group's peace plan. Second, he changed his policy incrementally, first by
implementing weak economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs, then enforcing those
sanctions more strictly and, finally, threatening to withdraw all Serbian military support
for their war effort. This placement of blame for policy failure on the Bosnian Serbs and
the incremental implementation of this policy reversal succeeded at least partially in
deflecting audience costs away from Milosevic.
IMPACT OF CONCESSION ON REPUBLICA SRPSKA, KARADZIC AND
MLADIC, AND THEIR REGIME'S SURVIVAL
Impact on Republica Srpska for Conceding
By the October 1995 ceasefire, conceding to the Contact Group plan no longer
threatened state survival for the Bosnian Serbs. By contrast, the earlier Vance-Owen,
307
Owen-Stoltenberg, and European Action plans had all threatened to take away territory
and the Bosnian Serb government's control over its population. The Vance-Owen plan
was particularly onerous as it, in effect, demanded regime change by not even
recognizing the Bosnian Serb government. It also reduced the overall size of Serb-held
territory, broke it up into provinces which were non-contiguous, and disarmed the
Bosnian Serb Army. The subsequent Owen-Stoltenberg and European Action plans were'
less threatening for the Republica Srpska. Yet while these proposals did allow for the de
facto partitioning of Bosnia, they still required major territorial concessions.
When introduced in May of 1994, the Contact Group's proposed 51/49 territorial
split, likewise, required the Bosnian Serbs to concede land which they had fought for and
held for three years. By the fall of 1995, however, the situation on the ground had
changed and the Croat and Muslim offensive had reduced Bosnian Serb-held territory to
roughly half of Bosnia, now reflective of the plan's partitioning. 584 In sum, conceding to
the Contact Group's plan for a 51/49 territorial split did not threaten the survival of the
Republica Srpska as this peace agreement provided international recognition of the
republic, allowed the Bosnian Serb Army to maintain its heavy weapons at cantonment
sites, and enabled special economic and diplomatic ties established with Serbia.
Impact on Bosnian Serb Regime for Conceding
While the Contact Group plan did not externally threaten regime survival, one
must consider whether there were armed domestic opposition groups within the
Republica Srpska capable of overthrowing President Radovan Karadzic and his Serbian
584 There were however three controversial territorial swaps where Milosevic's conceding parts of Sarajevo,
the Gorazde corridor, and deferred talks on the Brcko corridor issue in exchange for worthless land in
western Bosnia.
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Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS). This logic of omni-balancing
applies to regimes threatened by opposition groups from within the country but outside of
the regime. Such groups look for signs of weakness in a regime as a trigger for revolt. In
this case, while the Bosnian Serb government was threatened on many sides, by NATO,
the Bosnian Federation, Serbia and, at times, by internal dissension, there is no evidence
that it was threatened by revolt from an armed domestic opposition group.
Impact of Concession on Bosnian Serb Leadership
The final analysis on survival assesses whether President Karadzic would suffer
significant audience costs for conceding to a permanent ceasefire and peace agreement.
By the fall of 1994, Karadzic was beginning to feel pressure to bring the war to an end.
Turning to a third party, Karadzic solicited Jimmy Carter to negotiate a four-month
ceasefire in an effort to buy time. Unfortunately for the Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic was
unable to garner a permanent peace agreement which would allow the Republica Srpska
to retain the territory they held. The ceasefire, instead, proved more beneficial for
Croatian and Muslim forces, granting the two armies time to make preparations for a
summer offensive.
Indeed, the Croatian offensive against Krajina in July of 1995 along with the
withdrawal of Milosevic's support led to the collapse of the Serbs in Croatia, creating a
rippling effect across northwest Bosnia. In central Bosnia, both Croatian and Muslim
Federation troops also began attacks on Serb positions.585 Karadzic blamed the losses on
585 O'Connor, Mike (14 August 1995) "Bosnian Army Presses Offensive Against Rebel Serbs in Central
Region" New York Times, Mueller, Karl (2000) "Chapter 1: The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction
of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses" Owen, Robert (ed) DELIBERATE FORCE. A Case
Study in Effective Air Campaigning Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press 27
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Mladic and unsuccessfully attempted to take control of the Bosnian Serb Army.s86
Further advances of Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces in August then forced both
leaders to cede their negotiating power over to Milosevic at the patriarch's meeting in
Belgrade on 30 August. 587 The encroaching enemy forces, impending NATO airstrikes,
and Milosevic's threat to withdraw all Serbian military support had all worked together to
588place the very survival of the Republica Srpska on the line.
Concession at this point no longer generated as high an audience cost as before,
when the Bosnian Serbs had had the military advantage. Even so, Karadzic attempted to
deflect audience costs by first blaming Mladic in early August for the military defeats in
western Bosnia and then blaming Milosevic for withholding Serbian support.
A counterargument asserts that Karadzic's survival was indeed at stake for
conceding and points to July of 1995 when Karadzic and Mladic were both indicted by
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Karadzic
subsequently lost the presidency in 1996 and eventually went into hiding where he
remained until his arrest in 2008. Still, even though the indictment eventually led to
Karadzic's arrest, its impact on Karadzic in August of 1995 does not appear to have
affected his decision making. As long as Republica Srpska remained a state and
Karadzic in power the indictment had little impact, particularly since the ICTY had no
authority to make arrests. Since conceding to the Contact Group's proposal ensured the
recognition of the Bosnian Serb state and left Karadzic in control it is not likely he
considered the indictment a risk to his survival.
586 Perlez, Jane (6 August 1995) "Bosnian Serb Leader Demotes Commander" New York Times
587 The patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox church was also in attendance at the meeting along with the
President of Montenegro.
588 Milosevic's threat to withdrawal Serbian support for Bosnia was made more credible by his actions in
Krajina.
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In conclusion, the survival of the Republica Srpska, Karadzic and the Bosnian
Serb government was not at risk by conceding to a permanent ceasefire and peace
agreement. The reverse was actually the case, as the survival of the Republica Srpska
would have been seriously threatened had they not conceded. The survival hypothesis
therefore correctly predicts coercion success for the U.S. core demands.
LIMITS OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS
The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when the challenger
cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands. A commitment problem is
more likely to arise when the challenger has sufficient military force deployed to back up
additional demands. In late August and September of 1995, a combination of the Croat-
Muslim ground forces and NATO airstrikes now threatened the Bosnian Serbs. These
deployed forces were also available to back higher demands, such as for additional
territorial concessions in western Bosnia.
With the collapse of Krajina, the Bosnian Serb western flank was exposed and the
city of Banja Luka lay vulnerable to the Croat western offensive. It was, in part, this dire
situation which prompted Mladic to concede to a withdrawal of heavy weapons from
Sarajevo in early September.589
The commitment hypothesis therefore incorrectly predicted coercion would fail as
the hypothesis expected the Bosnian Serbs to view a concession as only leading to further
territorial demands.
Serbia, by contrast, was never threatened, either by NATO airstrikes or by a
ground invasion. Serbia had a modern integrated air defense system (IADS) and its army
589 Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in
Banja Luka.
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could easy defend against Croat and Muslim forces. The real threat to Serbia had always
come from sanctions. Yet the sanctions in place were already severe and had been in
effect for three years. In effect, there was little room for the U.S. to increase sanctions
further in order to back additional demands. As a result the commitment hypothesis
correctly predicts Milosevic's willingness to concede to U.S. demands.
Avoiding Commitment Problems
How then did the U.S. overcome its commitment problems with the Bosnian
Serbs? Four factors influenced the Bosnian Serb calculation that the U.S. would make no
further demands. First, the U.S. intentionally included Russia in the Contact Group and
charged it with bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table. The Bosnian Serbs placed
more trust in the Russians, as witnessed by Mladic's refusal to remove his heavy
weapons from Sarajevo until assured that it would be Russian troops that occupied their
vacated positions.
Participation by Russia also increased the diplomatic costs for the U.S., had it
decided to renege on the agreement. The U.S. would have suffered strained relations
with Russia, particularly now that Russia had placed its reputation on the line.
Second, Milosevic's involvement helped reduce commitment concerns for the
Bosnian Serbs. While he held negotiating power for the republic, it was contingent on
his holding fast to the 51/49 split of Bosnian territory. At Dayton, Milosevic made it
clear that he could not take the agreement back to the Bosnian Serbs with less. This point
was non-negotiable and resulted in last-minute trades of worthless mountainous terrain in
western Bosnia, dubbed "the egg" by U.S. negotiators because of its shape, in exchange
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for broadening the Gorazde corridor in the east (see Map 5.3).590 While Milosevic made
concessions with regard to Sarajevo and the Goradze corridor and deferred the Brcko
corridor to international arbitration, he came away with the promised 49% of Bosnian
land.
Third, NATO suspended air strikes, once Mladic agreed to remove the heavy
weapons from Sarajevo. 591 So long as the Bosnian Serb Army fulfilled the terms of the
ceasefire, it would be diplomatically difficult for the U.S. to recommence the strikes.
This loss of air support weakened the Croat-Muslim offensive, thereby limiting the
availability of military force to back up additional demands the U.S. might have
contemplated.
Finally, the commitment hypothesis presumes that a target reveals itself to be
weakly resolved when it makes a concession. A target state may, however, be able to
mitigate this appearance of weakness by first enduring some punishment before
conceding. Having withstood 12 days of air strikes, the Bosnian Serbs indeed looked
tougher and more resolved than they would have, had they had conceded prior to any
NATO airstrikes.
590 Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modern 299
591 Dittmer, David and Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NA TO'S First Extended A ir Operation
Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 41-5
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WAR IN KOSOVO JUNE 1998 - JUNE 1999
Though the Dayton Accord brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia, Milosevic
refused to include in the negotiations the issue of the political instability and ethnic unrest
in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Kosovo is a small, diamond-shaped valley,
approximately 80 miles north to south and east to west, wedged between southern Serbia,
Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia (see Maps 5.3 and 5.4). In 1998 Kosovo had a
population of 2 million, 90% of which were ethnic Albanians and the remainder
predominantly ethnic Serbs.5 92
Map 5.3 of Kosovo 593
592 Online NewsHour (1 October 1998) "Terror in Kosovo" A News Hour with Jim Lehrer Transcript
www.pbs.org/newhour/bb/europe/july-dec98/kosovo 10-1.html accessed 5 Nov 2009
593 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (August 2009) "Kosovo" US. Department ofState Diplomacy
in Action www.state.zov/p/eur/ci/kv/ accessed 5 Nov 2009,
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The lesson Albanian Kosovars learned from Bosnia was that only violence could
prompt an international response to assist in their struggle for independence from Serbia.
Following Dayton, a small group of militants known as the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) began to grow, both in membership and in popular support. By the summer of
1998, fighting between the KLA and the Serbian military and police had spread
594 CIA (1993) "Former Yugoslavia Political Map 728410 (R00472) 4-93" U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/former yugoslavia.ipg accessed 5 Nov 2009
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throughout the region, forcing hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians from their
homes.
The lesson the Clinton Administration took away from Bosnia was not to sit back
and wait for a Balkan crisis to solve itself. The United States quickly engaged
diplomatically in an attempt to curtail the violence. A peace agreement brokered in
October 1998 between U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and now Federal Republic of
Yugoslavian (Serbia and Montenegro) President Slobodan Milosevic called for a
reduction in Serbian forces in Kosovo and the introduction of Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors.
The United States and the Serbs had, however, excluded the KLA from the peace
talks and the KLA unraveled this flawed agreement over the winter. Meanwhile, the
Clinton administration was diverted internationally by Operation Desert Fox, a four-day
bombing campaign in Iraq in December, and domestically by the Lewinsky affair.
Attention was drawn back to Kosovo in January 1999, however, when the chief OSCE
monitor accused the Serbs of a massacre in the Kosovar Albanian village of Ra'ak. In
response, the United States hardened its policy and, at talks in Rambouillet, France in
February, it demanded the Serbs remove the majority of its forces from Kosovo, allow in
NATO troops as peacekeepers and, in three years' time, hold an international conference
over the future of Kosovo.595
In late March, at Milosevic's rejection and the Kosovar Albanians' albeit delayed
acceptance of these demands, NATO commenced an air campaign, Operation Allied
Force (OAF), aimed at changing Milosevic's position. The Serbs responded to the initial
59s U.S. State Department Rambouillet Agreement: Interim Agreement for Peace and Se/f-Government in
Kosovo www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo rambouillet text.html accessed 5 October 2009
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air strikes with a large-scale counter-insurgency operation which would eventually evict
close to a million Kosovar Albanians from their homes.596 Only after 78 days of NATO
bombing, heavy diplomatic pressure from Russia, and a growing unpopularity of the war
among the Serbian population and elite did Milosevic finally concede to demands
negotiated between the U.S. and Russia.597 Watered down from Rambouillet, these
demands designated Russian and NATO troops as peacekeepers and placed them under
the auspices of the UN Security Council. It further removed any reference to a future
international conference on the status of Kosovo, leaving the fate of the province
ambiguous.
Kosovo is an intriguing case for the study of asymmetric coercion. Where
coercive diplomacy failed, military coercion through air power succeeded in convincing
Serbia to concede a portion of their historic homeland. The level of success of U.S.
foreign policy in Kosovo, however, is contestable. The United States failed in its initial
deterrent objective of preventing widespread ethnic violence in Kosovo and the coercive
air campaign, initially designed for only 3 nights, lasted 78 days. Some analysts have
deemed the conflict a U.S. foreign policy failure or, at best, a hollow victory.598 Still, the
United States clearly gained a territorial concession from Milosevic and the Kosovar
Albanians did return to take control of Kosovo at war's end.599 As with Bosnia, however,
the United States placed its reputation and prestige, as well as its security interests in
596 Many of the Kosovars remained within Kosovo so were not technically refugees but instead internally
displaced persons (IDPs).
597 The G8 included U.S., Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, and Italy.
598 Sechler, Todd S. (2007) Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in
International Crises dissertation Stanford University, 118
59 It should also be noted that upon the Kosovars return most of the over 100,000 Serbs living in Kosovo
were ethnically cleansed.
317
NATO, at risk over non-vital interests and continues to the pay for its "success" with the
long-term commitment of peacekeeping troops.
I divide the Kosovo War into three coercive stages and provide a synopsis of the
key explanatory and dependent variables in Table 5.6. In the first stage, from May 1998
to January 1999, the United States demands Serbia to change its policy in Kosovo and
obtains an agreement from Milosevic in October. The omission of the KLA from the
talks, however, left them free to occupy the territory vacated by the Serbian Army. When
Serbia realized their withdrawal was handing control of Kosovo over to the KLA the
agreement unraveled as the Serb forces quickly reversed course and violence returned to
Kosovo.
The second stage, from mid-January to late April 1999 commenced with the
Clinton Administration's policy change following the Radak massacre. The U.S. now
ratcheted up its demands for Milosevic to remove all Serbian forces from Kosovo and
deploy NATO troops in their stead. Such a costly demand, absent a commensurate
escalation in threat, was the primary reason coercive diplomacy failed at Rambouillet.
This, in turn, led to the NATO air strikes of late March and April while the Serbs
systematically ejected roughly a million Kosovar Albanians from their homes.
The third coercive stage commenced with NATO's 50 th Anniversary Washington
Summit in late April, from which NATO leaders emerged unified in their resolve to
succeed in Kosovo. Russia also agreed to do its part to pressure Milosevic into a peace
agreement. Militarily, NATO stepped up attacks on Serbia's fielded forces and expanded
the targeting of Serbia's leadership and infrastructure. Meanwhile, Russia and the United
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States negotiated a mutually acceptable peace proposal, which Russia delivered and
Milosevic accepted in early June.
Period Core Type of Threat United States
Compellent (Denial or Foreign Policy
Demands Punishment Outcome
May 1998 - Homeland Territory Punishment Partial Success
January 1999 - Serbia reduce - Threat of air - Kosovar Albanians
military presence, strikes returned to their
allow in monitors, homes by winter
negotiate with - Serbian forces
Kosovar Albanians initially withdraw, but
then return
- Violence returns
January 1999 Homeland Territory Punishment Failure
- April 1999 - Serbia remove forces - NATO air - Serbian forces
- allow in NATO strikes remained in Kosovo
peacekeeping troops - Hundreds of
- decide future of thousands of Kosovar
Kosovo within 3 years Albanian refugees
April 1999 - Homeland Territory Punishment Success
June 1999 - Serbia remove forces - Economic - Serbian forces leave
- allow in UN Sanctions Kosovo
peacekeeping troops - Escalating - Kosovar Albanians
- Kosovo future left NATO air strikes return
ambiguous - NATO and Russian
peacekeeping troops
deploy
Table 5.6: Coercion Typology of the Kosovo War, May 1998 - June 1999
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The first section covers
the post-Dayton Accord period and Milosevic's machinations to remain in power, as well
as the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The second through fourth sections
cover the three coercive stages just described (see Table 5.6). In section five, I test the
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two hypotheses for coercion failure: survival and commitment and, in the final section,
draw conclusions from both the Bosnia and Kosovo cases.
POST-DAYTON SERBIA - MILOSEVIC'S HOLD ON POWER, RISE OF
KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY AND VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO
Milosevic emerged from Dayton with two significant gains: the lifting of UN
economic sanctions against Serbia and an international reputation as a peacemaker.soo
Back home, however, years of bloodshed over Croatia and Bosnia and economic decline
had taken a toll on his popularity and, after the November 1996 elections, his power had
been substantially weakened. Prior to the election, his political coalition had consisted of
his Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and his wife Mirjana Markovic's smaller Yugoslavia
Left (JUL) party. In order to retain a majority of seats in the Yugoslav Federal
Assembly, in 1996, he was forced to include in his government the former opposition
party, the liberal New Democracy (ND). Even so, the remaining opposition, loosely
banded under the Together (Zajedno) coalition, a group which had in the past been
unable to pose a credible challenge, had now gained ground in local elections and taken
control of Belgrade and several other municipalities. 601 A stunned Milosevic attempted
to falsify the election results but finally relented in the face of large-scale public protest.
Milosevic remained in power but, over time, felt increasing pressure from
nationalists. In 1998 he moved to co-opt them by bringing into his coalition two of their
600 The UN and EU sanctions were known as the inner wall. The U.S. maintained bilateral sanctions
known as the outer wall.
601 The Coalition consisted of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) his wife Markovic's Yugoslav
Left (JUL) and the New Democracy (ND) won 108 of 138 Yugoslav Federal Assembly seats. In local
elections the Zajedno opposition won 21% of the 188 municipalities. Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) Serpent in
the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic Boulder, CO: Westview 204-5
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leading voices: Vuk Draskovic, founder of the nationalist Serbian Renewal Movement
9SPO), and Vojislav Seselj, founder of the extremist Serbian Radical Party (SRS).602
Rise of Kosovo Liberation Army and mounting violence in Kosovo
Though Dayton ended the Bosnian Civil War, the peace conference had avoided
discussing the ethnic tensions which had long plagued Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians, led
by Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK), had for many years
opposed Serbia through a strategy of peaceful resistance. Bosnia had proven, however,
that only violence could goad the international community into action. Following
Dayton, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA also known as the UCK, Ushtria Clirimtare
e Kosoves), a small guerilla movement formed in the early 1990s, began to gain support,
particularly outside of the capital of Pristina.603 In late 1996, the military potential for the
KLA was also greatly enhanced by a bonanza of small arms made available by the
collapse of the government in Albania. Cheap weapons flowed from Albanian armories
into the eager hands of KLA fighters.604
By early 1998, a better armed KLA emerged from the shadows, waging attacks on
Serbian civilians, police and Kosovar Albanians cooperating with the Serbs.605 Serbian
police responded with a series of heavy-handed raids on the homes of KLA leaders,
including the highly-publicized 5 March attack on the Jashari clan in Prekaz twenty miles
602 Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic Boulder, CO:
Westview 255
60 3Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova. Rexhep was among 20 founding members
of KLA. He was the first KLA member along with two others to come forward publicly on 28 November
1997. He served as the operations officer (G-3) at KLA headquarters in 1998 and as Inspector General for
the KLA during combat operations during the NATO air campaign. Cohen, Lenard J. (200 1) Serpent in the
Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic Boulder, CO: Westview 234
604 Judah, Tim (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge Yale: New Haven CT 128-9
605 International Crisis Group (March 1998) Kosovo Spring: Europe Report www.crisisgroup.org accessed
10 Sep 2009
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west of Pristina, which according to conflicting reports, left 40 to 60 dead, among them
women and children. 606
Following the attack the size of the KLA expanded rapidly. From an organization
of approximately 200, with an informal horizontal organization, the KLA's membership
rose to approximately 1,000 in the course of two weeks. The KLA also reorganized,
adopting a more conventional military structure, forming a Headquarters and
establishment of 7 zone commanders responsible for the brigades and operations assigned
to them.607 Most of the new volunteers had neither weapons, nor training and recruits
traveled to Albania for weapons and received a minimum of training. In addition to
recruits, funds from the Kosovar diaspara began to flow quickly into the region with
close to $200,000 raised by the KLA in just days following the Prekaz attack.608
Coercive Stage I: United States Involvement in Kosovo, May 1998 - January 1999
Following the attack on the Jashari clan, the United States attempted to stop the
violence through diplomatic channels. In March, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, blaming Milosevic for the surge in violence, urged the Contact Group to impose
606 This retaliatory operation was in response to a 28 February 1998 gunfight which left 4 Serbian police
dead. Abrahams, Fred and Elizabeth Anderson (1998) Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo Human
Rights Watch: New York 28
60 7Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
608 Nebi Qena (17 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosovo. He is a Kosovar Albanian and Associated
Press reporter who covered the Kosovo campaign in Pristina until 3 April 1999 when he and his family
were forced to leave the city. He continued reporting from Macedonia until the end of the war in June
1999.
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sanctions."' The U.S. then dispatched Richard Holbrooke in May to deliver a stern
warning to Milosevic to end the fighting in Kosovo. 610
Neither the threat of sanctions nor diplomacy, however, had much impact on the
ground, as the fighting continued throughout the summer between the Serbs and the
KLA. In late May, the Serbs launched an offensive to regain the nearly 40% of Kosovo
611then under KLA control. In the process, they drove tens of thousands of Kosovar
Albanians from their villages.612 By early June NATO was considering military options
while, on the diplomatic front, the U.S. worked through the Contact Group to demand a
ceasefire, a Serbian troop withdrawal, and a Kosovar Albanian guarantee to abandon the
use of terrorism. 61 By late June, the Serbian offensive had stalled and the KLA began to
step up attacks. Defeats in mid-July, however, forced the KLA back into hiding and a
return to guerilla tactics. 614 The Serbs then countered with a second, broader offensive
which again displaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians. is
609 The Contact Group consisted of the United States., Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.
Erlanger, Steven (8 March 1998) "Albright Tours Europe to Whip Up Resolve to Punish Serbia" New York
Times, The minor sanctions included a halt to supplying equipment for internal repression or terrorism,
deny visas to those responsible in Kosovo, and stop financing of export credits and money for privatization
of state-owned companies Erlanger, Steven (10 March 1998) "Sanctions on Yugoslavia" New York Times
610 Shenon, Philip (9 May 1998) "U.S. Dispatches Its Balkans Mediator With a Warning" New York Times
611 Jim Lehrer, The News Hour Transcript, 5 June 1998, 19 April 2006
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-jun98/kosovo 6-5.html , Hedges, Chris (1 June 1998) "NEW
SERB ASSAULT ON ALBANIA REBELS: Slim Hope for U.S. Peace Effort as Milosevic Flouts Accord"
New York Times
612 Hedges, Chris (5 June 1998) "Refugees From Kosovo Cite A Bitter Choice: Flee or Die" New York
Times
613 Whitney, Craig (11 June 1998) "Offensive by Serbia Puts Allies in War Room" New York Times,
Weller, Marc (1999) The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999; From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet
and the Outbreak of Hostilities vol 1, Book Systems Plus: Cambridge 236
614 Desertions within the KLA were particularly high during this period as many of the March recruits were
either killed or returned to protect their families. Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina,
Kosova.
615 O'Connor, Mike (24 August 1998) "Kosovo Refugees: Pawns in a NATO-Serb Clash?" New York
Times
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The Holbrooke Agreement, October 1998
In September, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and American President Bill
Clinton reacted to the humanitarian crisis with a joint statement calling for an immediate
ceasefire in Kosovo and the commencement of negotiations. By the end of the month,
the UN Security Council had incorporated these demands into a resolution condemning
the violence in Kosovo but stopped short of authorizing the use of force by NATO.616
Russia, however, soon made it clear to the U.S. that, while Russia would veto another
resolution to authorize force, it would not interfere if NATO were to elect to conduct air
strikes without a UN mandate. 617 Confident that air strikes would not widen the conflict,
NATO approved Operation Allied Force (OAF), a limited, phased air operation against
Serbian military assets and command and control facilities. With the now credible threat
of NATO air strikes in hand, Richard Holbrooke returned to Belgrade and brokered a
deal with Milosevic on 12 October 1998. Milosevic agreed to reduce Serbian military
and police presence in Kosovo to pre-conflict levels, to allow up to 2,000 Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors to enter Kosovo, and to begin
serious negotiations with the Kosovar Albanians.
Short-Lived Peace, Winter 1998
Holbrooke's diplomatic victory in October was short-lived, however, as a fatal
flaw in the agreement soon surfaced. The KLA had been omitted from the negotiations
and, as Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, the KLA reemerged from the shadows to
616 United Nations Security Council "Resolution 1199 (1998), 23 September 1998"
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm accessed 15 September 2009
617Talbott, Strobe (2002) The Russia Hand New York: Random House 302
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occupy the checkpoints and villages they had previously held in May. 618 The militants'
actions prompted the Serbs to reverse course and redeploy their forces.
In December and January, violence returned to Kosovo in a series of tit-for-tat
reprisal attacks between the KLA and Serbs. On 14 January 1999, in response to a KLA
attack which left three policemen dead, Serb forces entered the village of Racak, killing
forty-five men. William Walker, chief of the OSCE monitors, arrived the next day and
placed responsibility for the killings on the Serbs.619
ANALYSIS OF STA GE I, MA Y 1998 - JANUARY 1999
The killing of Kosovar Albanian women and children of the Jashari clan in
western Kosovo on 5 March of 1998 triggered a crisis for the United States. The Clinton
administration's experience in Bosnia told them that ethnic violence in the Balkans could
easily spiral out of control and only tough, decisive U.S. diplomacy could stop it. In
addition such key administration officials as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and
envoy Richard Holbrooke mistakenly deemed Milosevic a bully who would only back
down when threatened by military power. The U.S. therefore rejected a strategy of
accommodation and instead adopted a coercive strategy threatening limited air strikes.
The U.S. demanded a reduction in Serbian troops to pre-summer 1998 levels, the
deployment of OCSE monitors, and the commencement of negotiations between the
618 Holbrooke did attempt to contact the KLA in a visit to Kosovo in May 1998. The KLA leadership,
however, would not meet with him. General Lieutenant Agim Ceku (17 May 2010) Interview. Agim Ceku
is-former Kosove Prime Minister and chief of the KLA. He was a career officer in the JNA until deserting
to fight for the Croatia in 1991 through 1998. In 1998 he retired from the Croatian Army and joined the
KLA where he was named their chief. He served as Prime Minister of Kosovo from 10 March 2006 to 9
January 2008. Smith, Jeffrey (18 November 1998) "Turnaround in Kosovo: Rebels Bounce Back As
NATO Threats Drive Army Out" Washington Post and Judah, Tim (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge
Yale University Press: New Haven CT 189
619 Dinmore, Guy (17 January 1999) "Villagers Slaughtered in Kosovo 'Atrocity'; Scores Dead in
Bloodiest Spree of Conflict" The Washington Post
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Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. The credible threat of NATO air strikes in October proved
sufficient to convince Milosevic to initially concede to these demands and enter into an
agreement with the United States.
The U.S. Relationship with the LDK and the KLA
The Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK) was an established political party
with an organized shadow government, founded in 1989 by the intelligentsia in Pristina
and led by Ibrahim Rugova, a poet, professor, and pacifist. 62 The U.S. had no difficulty
engaging diplomatically with the LDK in May of 1998 when Rugova met with Richard
Holbrooke and agreed to talks in Belgrade. 62 1 For his cooperation, Rugova was rewarded
with a trip to the White House on 29 May. 62 2 In contrast, the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) had only recently formed as a secretive insurgent group and its founders were
young men lacking in political experience, drawn primarily from the rural villages of
western and southeastern Kosovo.623 For his part, Rugova refused to acknowledge the
KLA. By the summer, however, the KLA's numbers had swelled to over a 1,000 and
620 OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (1999) Kosovo As Seen As Told: An analysis of the human rights
findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998 to June 1999 Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights: Warsaw, chapter 1, page 4
www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part I /ch 1.htm accessed 24 June 2010
BBC News (5 May 1999) "Ibrahim Rugova: Pacifist at the Crossroads" BBC Online Network
http://news.bbc.co.uk.2.hi.special report/I 998/kosovo/ 110821.stm accessed 24 June 2010
621 Judah, Tim (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge Yale: New Haven CT 154
622 Rugova, Ibrahim (29 May 1998) "Dr. Ibrahim Rugova Kosovo Albanian Leader makes remarks outside
White House after meeting with President Clinton" Washington Transcript Service
623 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova. Rexhep was among 20 founding members
of KLA. He was the first KLA member along with two others to come forward publicly on 28 November
1997. He served as the operations officer (G-3) at KLA headquarters in 1998 and as Inspector General for
the KLA during combat operations during the NATO air campaign. Judah, Tim (2000) Kosovo: War and
Revenge Yale: New Haven CT 66-7
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they could no longer be ignored. Holbrooke made at least one attempt to contact KLA
leadership during a visit to Kosovo in early summer, but was rebuffed.624
By late July, however, the Serbian offensive had driven the KLA underground.
High desertion rates had reduced their numbers to well under 300, rendering them
seemingly inconsequential on the political front.625 Holbrooke, therefore, entered the
October talks with Serbia and the LDK, having made no contact with the KLA. This
structural error of precluding a key actor from negotiations led directly to the agreement's
collapse. Despite its exclusion from the talks, the KLA benefited the most from the
negotiated Serbian withdrawal, seizing the opportunity to reorganize, train, and rearm,
and quickly reemerged from the shadows. 626 This, in turn, prompted Serbia to reverse its
policy and redeploy its forces.
Milosevic learned from this experience that U.S. demands without the compliance
of the KLA were tantamount to a territorial demand for Kosovo, an issue he refused to
concede, even in the face of air strikes. Furthermore, late December's Operation Desert
Fox in Iraq demonstrated to Milosevic that Saddam Hussein's regime could survive the
same limited U.S. air strikes Serbia now faced. In sum, coercive diplomacy failed at this
stage, as the diminished expected costs to Serbia from limited air strikes was insufficient
to outweigh the losses from the de facto homeland territorial demands for Kosovo.
624 In an interview with the author, General Lieutenant Agim Ceku, the commanding officer of the KLA,
claimed that the KLA made a mistake by not meeting with Holbrooke in the summer of 1998. Rexhep
Selimi, a founding member of the KLA, agreed with Ceku, but pointed out that in the summer of 1998,
while the KLA had reorganized militarily, it did not have a political wing capable of engaging the U.S.
diplomatically. General Lieutenant Agim Ceku (17 May 2010) Interview. Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010)
Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
625 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
626 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
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The October agreement, proved only partially successful. It allowed Kosovar
Albanian refugees to return to their homes over the winter627 It was not, however, a
sustainable solution to quell the violence in Kosovo. This first stage ended with the
massacre at Radak, signaling to the Clinton administration that its foreign policy in
Kosovo was no longer tenable. 628
Coercive Stage II: A Change in U.S. policy over Kosovo, January to late April 1999
Escalating violence in Kosovo and the international attention created by Walker's
condemnation of the Serbs led to a change in White House policy. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright now convinced National Security Advisor Sandy Berger to support a
more aggressive position.629 On 19 January, the National Security Council Principals
Committee (NSC/PC) agreed to an ultimatum for the removal of Serbian forces from
Kosovo and the insertion of NATO troops as peacekeepers. 63 0 Still, Secretary of Defense
William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton stood
fast in refusing to consider U.S. ground troops for combat operations.
At Rambouillet, France in February, a final attempt at coercive diplomacy by the
U.S. produced the "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo."631
This called for an aggressive timetable for the withdrawal of all Serbian forces (except
for border guards), the deployment of a NATO implementation force, the establishment
627 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
628 OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (1999) Kosovo As Seen As Told: An analysis of the human rights
findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998 to June 1999 Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights: Warsaw, chapter 1, page 7
www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part I /ch L.htm accessed 24 June 2010
629 Barton Gellman (21 February 1999) "U.S. Has 'Vital Interests' in Containing Conflict" Washington
Post
630 Albright, Madeleine (2003) Madam Secretary New York: Miramax Books 502
631 Alternatively it could be argued that Rambuoillet was not an attempt to coerce Serbia at all, but rather to
coerce the Kosovar Albanians to sign on to the agreement in order to provide justification for NATO
bombing. Either way U.S. coercive diplomacy against Serbia had failed or had already failed.
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of a democratic Kosovo government, and an international meeting to be held in three
years' time for a final settlement. 632
Why Milosevic did not concede to the Rambouillet Agreement
Unlike negotiations the previous fall, Milosevic was no longer interested in
conceding to U.S. demands. Four changes help explain this reticence. First, the Serbian
population was clearly against the Rambouillet concessions. In a nationwide referendum
in April 1998 and in opinion polling conducted during Rambouillet negotiations in
February and March of 1999 the Serbian population overwhelmingly opposed foreign
intervention in Kosovo. 633 Second, Milosevic's political coalition had moved to the right
with the inclusion of the Serbian Radical Party and the purge of moderates further
removed those from his government and military who might argue for compromise.634
Third, in December 1998, Milosevic witnessed Saddam Hussein's regime survive four
days of bombardment and Serbian defense specialists visited Baghdad to glean lessons on
how to withstand U.S. air strikes. 635 Finally, the demands made by the U.S. at
Rambouillet were significantly greater than what Milosevic thought he was agreeing to
back in October. Milosevic had miscalculated Holbrooke's demands as merely requiring
a Serbian policy change in how it dealt with Kosovo. Only with the Serbian troop
632 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 10 Dec 2006
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo rambouillet text.html The agreement also included in
Appendix B section 8 the following clause: "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles,
vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY
including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of
bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and
operations."
633 Judah, Tim (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge Yale: New Haven CT 152 and Hosmer, Stephen (200 1)
The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When he Did Monterey CA: RAND 11
634 Djukic, Slavoljub (2001) Milosevic and Markovic McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal 127,
Perlez, Jane (29 November 1998) "Purges Hint at Beginning of the End for Milosevic" New York Times
and Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic Boulder, CO:
Westview 250-257
635 Diamond, John (30 March 1999) "Yugoslavia, Iraq Talked Air Defense Strategy," Philadelphia Inquirer
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withdrawal did it become clear that the KLA was still viable. Rambouillet, on the other
hand, was demanding historic homeland territorial concessions, seeking to replace
Serbian forces with NATO troops and setting a timeline for international talks which
would doubtlessly lead to an independent Kosovo. Equally important, while the demands
had escalated to homeland territory, the threat of limited air strikes had remained
unchanged.
Interestingly, not only did Serbia refuse to sign the Rambouillet agreement but so,
too, did the KLA-led Kosovar Albanian delegation. They sought a referendum for
Kosovo independence, a measure opposed by both the Serbs and the Russians. Instead of
a referendum, the U.S. inserted an amendment, designating in "three years after the entry
into force of the Agreement, an international meeting [would] be convened to determine a
mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo." 636 Even then, KLA representatives would
not sign on without first returning to Kosovo to explain the agreement to its
commanders. 637 Once satisfied that the KLA leadership concurred, the delegates returned
and signed the Agreement on 18 March 1999. With signatures in hand, Holbrooke
returned to Belgrade, where he met for the last time with an intransigent Milosevic. On
24 March 1999, NATO commenced Operation Allied Force (OAF).
United States Interests, Political and Military Objectives in Kosovo
The United States had only non-vital security interests at stake at the
commencement of the OAF air strikes, i.e. the prevention of a large-scale humanitarian
crisis in Kosovo similar to that of the Bosnian Civil War. President Clinton made clear
636 U.S. State Department Rambouillet Agreement Chapter 8 Article 1. 3.
www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo rambouillet text.html accessed 24 June 2010
637 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
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the limitations of U.S. interests when, on the eve of OAF, he announced that he did not
intend to use U.S. troops to fight a ground war.638
Operation Allied Force: The 3-Day Air Campaign
The initial phase of OAF took aim at fifty NATO-approved targets: integrated air
defense sites (IADS), command and control facilities, airfields, military and police
barracks, electric power facilities near Pristina, and two "dual-use" weapons factories.639
Given the combat aircraft and cruise missiles available to NATO, this target set required
only three nights of air operations. 640
United States and NA TO air assets
NATO commenced operations with 214 deployed combat aircraft, roughly half of
which were U.S. strike aircraft. 641 In addition the U.S. employed conventional cruise
missiles launched from B-52s, USN surface ships, and USN and British HMS
submarines. 642 Though other NATO countries also provided a large number of aircraft,
the highest priority targets were assigned to the modern U.S. strikers and strike packages
were led by U.S. mission commanders.
638 Clinton, William (1999) "Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" The American Presidency Project
www.presidency.ucsb.edu accessed 17 Sep 2009
639 Dual use factories could be used for both commercial and military purposes. Headquarters United
States Air Force (2000) The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force: Initial
Report United States Air Forces in Europe Studies and Analysis Directorate: Ramstein GE 9, Strickland,
Paul (2000) "USAF Aerospace-Power Doctrine: Decisive or Coercive?" Aerospace Power Journal 14:3
(fall) 16, 21 and Lambeth, Benjamin (200 1) NATO's Air Warfor Kosovo RAND: Santa Monica, CA 21
640 Not simply the weather but also the level of moon illumination is important for night operations
641 U.S. aircraft included USAF A-10s, B-1s, B-2s, B-52s, F-16s, F-15Es, and USN F-14Bs and F/A-18s
642 Headquarters United States Air Force (2000) The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation
Allied Force: Initial Report United States Air Forces in Europe Studies and Analysis Directorate:
Ramstein GE 17 and Hewson, Robert (1999) "Operation Allied Force: The First 30 Days" World Air
Power Journal 38 (Autumn) 16
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Serbian Air Defenses
The Serbian air defenses were professionally trained with a robust LADS
(Integrated Air Defense System) armed with forty-four SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 radar-
guided SAMs (surface-to-air missile systems), over a hundred vehicle-mounted SA-9 and
SA- 13 infrared-guided SAMs, nearly two thousand AAA (anti-aircraft artillery) pieces,
and thousands of infrared-guided MANPADS (man portable air defense systems).643
Serbian Air Force fighter interceptors included 16 modem MiG-29 Fulcrums and 88
older MiG-21 Fishbeds. 644
NATO aircraft neutralized these defenses by jamming and attacking Serbian
radars, flying at medium altitude well above MANPADs and AAA effective ranges, and
by employing Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) to protect strike packages from Serbian
fighters. This suppression was largely effective as NATO lost only two aircraft to enemy
645
ground fire, a U.S. F- 117 and F-16, of which both pilots were rescued.
Phase One of OAF: 24 - 27 March 1999646
The first phase of OAF focused on suppressing Serbia's air defenses and targeting
Serbian military facilities. On the first night, fifty-five cruise missiles were launched
643 Lambeth, Benjamin (200 ) NA TO's Air Warfor Kosovo RAND: Santa Monica, CA 17
644 Headquarters United States Air Force (2000) The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation
Allied Force: Initial Report United States Air Forces in Europe Studies and Analysis Directorate:
Ramstein GE 11
645 Neutralizing defenses did come at a cost. NATO could conduct fewer strikes if strike packages required
both CAP and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) on station. More importantly medium altitude
operations greatly affected the number of strikes due to weather. Not until May was the weather good
enough in the Balkans to conduct medium altitude operations on a consistent basis.
646 I segment the Kosovo conflict into three coercive stages (prior to Racak, Rambouillet to Washington
Summit, and Washinton Summit to Milosevic conceding). This should not be confused with OAF's three
phases of targeting where NATO identified its targets as phase I, 11, and III (Phase I: IADS, military
barracks, Kosovo electrical grid and two military factories, Phase II: Serbian Fielded Forces in Kosovo,
Phase III: Broader leadership and civilian targets in Serbia).
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against the IADS, airfields and Kosovo's electrical power plant in Pristina.647 In
addition, NATO conducted 120 air strikes targeting radar and SAM sites, military
airfields, command and control nodes, military barracks and munitions storage areas.
NATO fighters also downed three Serbian Mig-29s (Table 5.7 provides a summary for
the first four nights).648 While NATO flew even more strike missions the second night,
poor weather on night three extended the Phase I strikes into a fourth night. 649
These four nights of air strikes on the Serbian military did not convince Milosevic
to change his mind nor did they deter Serbian forces from commencing large-scale
operations against the Kosovar Albanians.
647 The targeting of Pristina's electrical power was to degrade the Serbian IADS by forcing them to resort to
backup power sources.
648 Lambeth, Benjamin (2001) NA TO's Air Warfor Kosovo RAND: Santa Monica, CA 22
649 The last night of phase I strikes was punctuated by the Serbs downing an F- 117 stealth fighter, the first
time this aircraft had been lost in combat. This was followed by a dramatic 7-hour combat search and
rescue mission which plucked the downed pilot from the suburbs of Belgrade. Haun, Phil (2003) "The First
Night CSAR" in Haave, Christopher and Phil Haun eds A-10s over Kosovo Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press 214
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Day Strike Wx Number of Number of Target
Date Missions Weapons targets Description
expended (DMPIs)
(precision)650 attacked
65 1
1 175 Clear 190 (170) 180 IADS,
24 Mar Airfields,
Electrical
grid, barracks,
munitions
storage
2 300 Clear 110 (100) 80 Airfields,
25 Mar military HQs,
barracks and
facilities
3 280 Partly 50(40) 40 Attacks in
26 Mar Cloudy Belgrade and
Kosovo
4 250 Partly 40(40) 40 Attacks in
27 Mar Cloudy Belgrade
Table 5.7: Strike Summaries for first phase of OAF 65 2
Serbian Response: Rock Concerts and Ethnic Cleansing
Serbia responded to NATO air strikes in two ways. First, the air strikes
galvanized the population to "rally round the flag" in support of Milosevic. Political
protestors found they could not voice dissent against Milosevic while their nation was
under attack.653 At night in Belgrade and other cities, as air raid sirens blared, thousands
of Serbs defiantly congregated in the streets and on bridges. 654 On the 2 8th of March, a
650 First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one
unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPI. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)
651 Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is
the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.
652 Headquarters United States Air Force (2000) The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation
Allied Force: Initial Report United States Air Forces in Europe Studies and Analysis Directorate:
Ramstein GE 16-22 and Hewson, Robert (1999) "Operation Allied Force: The First 30 Days" World Air
Power Journal 38 (Autumn) 16 - 17
653 Harden, Blaine (March 25 1999) "Honor Compels Opposition to Rally Around Belgrade" New York
Times, Djukic, Slavoljub (2001) Milosevic and Markovic McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal 133
654 "Kosovo Update" (9 April 1999) New York Times
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rock concert commemorated the ten-year anniversary of the constitutional changes which
had stripped Kosovo of its autonomy. Many of the bands which played and the Serbian
students who now protested NATO were the same ones who had earlier protested
Milosevic's falsification of the 1996 election results.655
Second, within Kosovo, Serbian ground forces now launched attacks against the
KLA by targeting the Kosovar Albanian population. 656 Within days, tens of thousands
poured across the border, into refugee camps in Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro.
After the initial phase of NATO bombings, the numbers of refugees swelled to hundreds
of thousands as the Serbs moved to empty Pristina and other large towns throughout
Kosovo.657 By mid-April, Serbian forces were again fully in control of Kosovo while the
KLA fled along with the refugees.
Phase Two of OAF, 28 March - 24 April 1999
The U.S. responded to this large-scale humanitarian crisis by expanding its target
list to include Phase II targets, the Serbian fielded forces in Kosovo. These air strikes,
however, were ineffective due to limited U.S. contingency planning for such operations,
restrictions in the rules of engagement, the lack of NATO ground troops to facilitate
strikes, poor weather, and the tactical adaptation of Serb troops.658 After a month of
655 Erlanger, Steven (29 March 1999) "UNITY IN BELGRADE: Support For Homeland Up as Sirens Wail
and News Is Censored" New York Times
6 5 6Smith, Jeffrey and William Drozdiak (11 April 1999) "Serbs' Offensive Was Meticulously Planned"
Washington Post
657 Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets
dissertation New York: Columbia University 487, "Kosovo Update" (7 April 1999) New York Times,
Judah, Tim (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge Yale University Press: New Haven CT 240 and Office of
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance "Kosovo Crisis Fact Sheet #66" 11 June 1999
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/kosovo-aid47.html accessed 11 Dec 2006. By war's end in June an
estimated 1.3 million Kosovars had fled their homes.
658 NATO air planners had done little to prepare for striking fielded forces in terms of intelligence or
developing command and control for combat operations. The lack of friendly ground forces precluded
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bombing, the U.S. had neither stopped the violence nor seriously weakened the military
capability of the Serbs in Kosovo (see Table 5.8 for weekly summary of air
operations).659
Date Avg Strike Wx Average Average Significant
Missions/day Weapons Number of Events
expended targets
(precision)660 (DMPIs)
attacked661
28 Mar - 287 Cloudy 105 (21) 47 NATO expands
3 Atarget set, first
April attacks in
downtown
Belgrade
4 -10 366 Cloudy 199 (90) 86 NATO begins
April targeting Serbianfielded forces
11-17 456 Partly 214(94) 97 U.S. collateral
April Cloudy damage attack ontrain and refugee
column662
18-24 424 Partly 171(83) 87 Milosevic private
April Cloudy residencetargeted:
NATO Summit
held in
Washington
Table 5.8: Phase II, OAF Air Operations Summary; 28 Mar-24 Apr 1999663
employing close air support procedures where ground forces are responsible for targeting the enemy. The
rules of engagement allowed only attacks on Serbian military equipment and Serb forces quickly switched
to driving civilian vehicles. The weather for most of April was cloudy to partly cloudy precluding
sustained mid-altitude operations. For a tactical overview of the challenges of attacking fielded forces see
Haave, Christopher and Phil Haun eds (2003) A-10s over Kosovo Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press.
659 Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O'Hanlon (2000) Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo
Brookings Institute: Washington: Brookings Institute 136
660 First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one
unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPI. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)
661 Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is
the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.
662 During the second phase the most significant collateral damage incident was the 14 April daylight attack
by U.S. F-16's on a Kosovar refugee column which killed 73 Kosovar. Arkin, William (2001) "Operation
Allied Force: 'The Most Precise Application of Air Power in History,"' Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen,
ed. War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age New York: Columbia University Press 16
663 Headquarters United States Air Force (2000) The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation
Allied Force: Initial Report United States Air Forces in Europe Studies and Analysis Directorate:
Ramstein GE 16-22
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In addition to targeting Serb fielded forces, on 3 April NATO conducted a small
number of strikes on leadership targets in Serbia (referred to as Phase IIA targets by
NATO spokesmen).664 Two security headquarters housed in office buildings were struck
in downtown Belgrade, followed over the next two weeks by strikes on police and
military headquarter buildings, telephone exchanges, TV and radio stations and towers,
and dual-use factories and oil refineries. 665 NATO also struck transportation and other
infrastructure targets. By the 2 1st of April, the last bridge over the Danube had been
dropped and Belgrade's main water supply was destroyed. NATO also began targeting
Milosevic and his political supporters directly by bombing the office building housing the
headquarters of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and his wife Mirjana
Markovic's Yugoslavia Left (JUL) party. The master bedroom of Milosevic's official
residence was struck the very next day.666
Even with these attacks directed at Milosevic personally and the increasing
number of successful strikes on Serbian fielded forces, it was clear by late April that
these air strikes were not having the desired effect of convincing Milosevic to acquiesce.
ANALYSIS OF STA GE H; FEBRUARY 1999 - 24 APRIL 1999
The Rambouillet Accord articulated what Milosevic had already realized: the
United States was demanding the territorial concession of Kosovo. 667 Yet Milosevic had,
already signaled that he would not give up Kosovo when he redeployed Serbian forces in
664 Arkin, William (2001) "Operation Allied Force: 'The Most Precise Application of Air Power in
History,"' Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, ed. War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global
Age New York: Columbia University Press 12
665 Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets
dissertation New York: Columbia University 495
666 Graham, Bradley (23 April 1999) "Missiles Hit State TV, Residence of Milosevic" Washington Post
667 The inclusion by the U.S. of the Rambouillet amendment for an international meeting in three years time
indicates that by March 18, 1999 the U.S. clearly understood that it was demanding a territorial concession
of Serbia
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November in response to the KLA retaking territory. For the United States to gain such
territorial concessions through coercive means would require a significant increase in the
level of force used in order to increase Milosevic's expected costs of resistance. Instead,
the Clinton administration maintained its previous threat of limited air strikes. Three
factors explain the inability/unwillingness of the U.S. to make threats commensurate with
demands.
First, U.S. security interests were non-vital. The Clinton administration was
primarily concerned with preventing another humanitarian crisis similar to that of Bosnia.
This effectively capped the level of force the U.S. was willing to threaten and Secretary
of Defense Cohen and General Shelton adamantly opposed the deployment of ground
troops for any role other than peacekeeping. President Clinton likewise had little appetite
for a ground war in Kosovo and publicly ruled out such an option. This was a strategic
mistake, as it reduced the ambiguity over whether the U.S. might invade. Absent this
tipping of the hand, however, Milosevic still had reason to be confident, given the
transparency of NATO's operational planning, that a ground invasion of Kosovo was
unlikely.
Second, a rift within Clinton's NSC Principals Committee between the State and
Defense departments resulted in the U.S. using separate criteria for evaluating the level of
demands it would make and the threat of force it would use to back up those demands.
The Ra'ak massacre proved a turning point for Clinton's foreign policy in Kosovo.
Secretary of State Albright pinpointed Milosevic as the problem and argued for getting
all Serb police and military out, NATO troops in, and a return to Kosovo autonomy.668
668 Albright titled the chapter in her memoirs concerning Kosovo as "Milosevic is the Problem" Albright,
Madeleine (2003) Madam Secretary New York: Miramax Books
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Her viewpoint, however, had previously been checked by Cohen and Shelton, who
argued against threatening force over non-vital interests. After Ra'ak, however, Cohen
and Shelton were effectively silenced as National Security Advisor Sandy Berger swung
his support to Albright. Even so, Cohen and Shelton held firm on no ground troops. In
sum, Clinton agreed to a foreign policy strategy which now fundamentally mismatched
demands and threats. Why is it he agreed to such a flawed plan?
A primary reason for Clinton's miscalculated foreign policy was a misperception
of Milosevic's willingness to resist. Clinton, Albright, and Holbrooke had all faced
Milosevic before in Bosnia and again in October 1998 when he backed down once the
U.S. threatened force. They had come to believe that the threat of air power, or at most
three days of limited strikes, would convince him yet again. They failed, however, to
properly consider Milosevic's interests in Kosovo. Kosovo was not Bosnia. Kosovo was
the historic birthplace of Serbia, the retention of which had served as the platform for
Milosevic's ascension to power. Furthermore, the territorial demands now being made
by the U.S. were far greater than the policy changes to which Milosevic had mistakenly
believed he was agreeing in October. Finally, two additional events had taken place since
October: Milosevic's political coalition had moved further to the right with the purging
of moderates and Desert Fox had demonstrated that the costs of limited air strikes were
bearable.
U.S. efforts at coercive diplomacy failed with the commencement of Operation
Allied Force as the threat of force was then replaced by actual strikes. While limited air
strikes did not change Milosevic's calculus, it did trigger an escalation in Serbian military
operations which generated hundreds of thousands of refugees, fundamentally altering
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the dynamics of the conflict. It proved to be a tactical success but a strategic blunder.
Rather than enduring only a limited number of days of attacks, as Saddam Hussein had in
Desert Fox, Milosevic now confronted unrelenting NATO air strikes. Over time,
however, as air power failed to compel Milosevic to accept the terms of Rambouillet, the
reputation of NATO itself was coming under attack.
By the time of the NATO Summit in Washington, U.S. interests had expanded
beyond humanitarian concerns to include security interests in a viable NATO and the
prestige of the U.S. and of Clinton's presidency. As this second coercive stage came to
an end the U.S. found itself frustrated with its inability to increase the level of its threat to
Serbia, though this was about to change.
Coercive Stage III and OAF Phase III; 24 April - 9 June: Washington Summit to
Peace Agreement
The air campaign, originally planned for 3 days but extended well into April,
slowly expanded to include attacks on Serbian fielded forces and a limited number of
strikes on Serbian leadership and infrastructure.669 On 24 April, however, as European
leaders met in Washington to celebrate NATO's 50-year anniversary, two critical events
transpired. First, Boris Yeltsin phoned Bill Clinton and offered to pressure Milosevic
into a peace agreement. 670 The U.S. agreed to meet with Yeltsin's new personal envoy to
the Balkans, Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, to negotiate a mutually acceptable proposal for
Chernomyrdin to present to Milosevic.671 Second, the Clinton administration and NATO
leaders arrived at the consensus that the reputation and credibility of NATO was now at
669 "Kosovo Update" (31 March 1999 and 19 April 1999) New York Times
670 "Kosovo Update" (26 April 1999) New York Times Clark, Wesley (2001) Waging Modern War Public
Affairs: New York 287
671 Talbott, Strobe (2002) The Russia Hand New York: Random House 310, Albright, Madeleine (2003)
Madam Secretary New York: Miramax Books 530
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stake over Kosovo. With U.S. security interests now at play, the U.S. and NATO
emerged from the Washington summit with a newfound resolve for victory in Kosovo. 672
The European Union and United States imposed additional sanctions on Serbia
(and Montenegro), including a ban on oil sales, a prohibition of travel, and the freezing of
financial accounts. 673 Serbia, however, was in part able to circumvent the most draconian
measure, the oil ban, by means of Ukraine shipments along the Danube.674
On the military front, additional U.S. combat aircraft requested in mid-April
began to arrive on the scene. The number of combat sorties available increased just as
NATO leaders approved Phase III civilian and leadership targets (see Table 5.8).675
672 Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O'Hanlon (2000) Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo
Brookings Institute: Washington: Brookings Institute 140-141. Even so Clinton still refused to agree to a
ground invasion even under pressure from British Prime Minister Tony Blair.Blair, Tony (24 April 1999)"
A Military Alliance and More" New York Times
673 Drozdiak, William (26 October 1999) "Milosevic Foes Urge U.S. to End Sanctions; Measures Said to
Help Yugoslav President" Washington Post
674 Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets
dissertation New York: Columbia University 530
675 The number of combat aircraft increased from 300 to over 800. Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) Hitting
Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets dissertation New York: Columbia
University 512 and "Kosovo Update" (11 April 1999 and 4 May 1999) New York Times
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Day/Date Avg Strike Wx Average Average Significant Events
Missions/day Weapons Targets
expended (DMPIs)
(precision)676 attacked
677
25 Apr - 479 Partly 320 (149) 143 NATO and EU
1 May Cloudy impose oil embargo
2 May - 526 Partly 449 (70) 106 Chinese Embassy
8 May Cloudy bombing
9 May - 587 Partly 817(126) 171
15 May Cloudy
16 -22 513 Partly 354(90) 107 Russian envoy
May Cloudy presents demands to
Milosevic
23 -29 685 PtlyCldy 707(210) 227 Milosevic indicted
May - Clear war criminal
30 May - 631 Clear 533(171) 187 Milosevic concedes
5 Jun
6 - 9 Jun 544 Clear 349(86) 103 Peace agreement
reached
Table 5.9, Phase III: Operation Allied Force Airstrike Summary
As the intensity of air strikes escalated so, too, did the likelihood of mishaps.
There soon followed two incidents which diluted NATO's efforts. First, on 5 May a U.S.
Army Apache attack helicopter crashed, killing two soldiers. This was the second such
incident for the U.S. Army's Task Force Hawk during mission rehearsals in the high
mountains along the Kosovo-Albanian border.67 8 The Apache deployment turned into a
public debacle as the Pentagon intervened, blocking Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) U.S. General Wesley Clark's bid to employ Task Force Hawk in combat. 679
Second, and more importantly, on 8 May a B-2 bomber unintentionally struck the
676 First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one
unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPI. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)
677 Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is
the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.
678 Task Force Hawk consisting of some 5,000 U.S. soldiers deployed from Germany to Tirana Albania
including a squadron of Apache attack helicopters and a Battalion of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
(MLRS). Gordon, John IV, Bruce Nardulli and Walter Perry (Autumn/Winter 2001-2) "The Operational
Challenges of Task Force Hawk" Joint Forces Quarterly 52-57
679 "Kosovo Update" (6 and 16 May 1999) New York Times
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Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese personnel. This resulted in the
suspension of attacks around Belgrade for three days and sidetracked U.S. - Russian
negotiations for nearly two weeks. 680
Despite the diplomatic fallout over the Chinese Embassy bombing, NATO was
still able to increase its operations tempo as additional aircraft arrived and the weather
improved. In May, NATO nearly doubled the targets attacked, tripled the weapons
expended, and increased by half again the number of missions flown (see Table 5.10 for
summary of air strikes).68'
680 Following the embassy bombing attacks on Serbian leadership targets practically ceased, the exception
being the 25 and 26 May bombings of the Dobanovci Presidential villa command and control bunker
However, attacks on Serbian infrastructure continued with multiple strikes on petroleum facilities,
electrical power stations, bridges, railways, dual use factories and TV and radio stations. NATO HQ (8
May - 3 June 1999) Operational updates www.nato.int/Kosovo/all-frce.htm accessed 5 October 1999
"Kosovo Update" (9 and 12 May 1999) New York Times
681 These numbers can be somewhat misleading as the number of weapons employed was increased by both
bombers and fighters employing greater number of unguided bombs in strikes in Kosovo. Likewise the
increase in the number of strikes against fielded forces increased the targets attacked. Alongside the
escalation of NATO air strikes in late May, the KLA had regrouped in Albania and within Kosovo and now
launched a ground offensive near Mt. Pastrik along the western Kosovo border. Though the KLA advance
was quickly halted by Serb forces just within the border, it did flush the Serbs out into the open, exposing
them to NATO attacks General Lieutenant Agim Ceku (17 May 2010) Interview.
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Average Average
Avg Strike Average Precision Number of
Date/Phase Missions/day Weapons Weapons Targets
(% change) expended/day s2 expended (DMPIs)
/day attacked/day 8 3
Phase I 251 98 88 85
23 -27
March
Phase II 383(+53%) 173(+76%) 72(-22%) 79(-7%)
28 Mar -
24 April
Phase III 568(+48%) 519(+300%) 132(+183%) 151(+191%)
25 Apr -
9 June
Table 5.10: Comparison of Air Strikes by Phase
Impact of War on Serbian Population
While previous air strikes against bridges, railways and communication sites had
inconvenienced the Serbian population, attacks on Serbia's electric grid posed a more
serious threat. By mid-May, Serbia had up to 85% of electrical power interrupted, which
in addition to the direct impact this had on daily life, also had a ripple effect of causing
major disruptions in water supplies to cities throughout the country.
Serbs were also beginning to feel increased economic pressure as their already
weakened economy stagnated and unemployment began to rise. Indeed, the primary
motivator for Milosevic to end Bosnia's civil war in 1995 had been the lifting of UN
economic sanctions. Even more crippling to Serbia's economy in the early 1990s,
682 First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one
unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPL. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)
683 Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is
the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.
684 The U.S. employed soft attacks on the grid by dropping secret CBU-102/B cluster bombs containing
BLU-1 14B submunitions which contained aluminum coated glass fibers which shorted out electrical power
stations but did not permanently destroy them. Arkin, William (2001) "Operation Allied Force: 'The Most
Precise Application of Air Power in History,"' Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, ed. War Over Kosovo:
Politics and Strategy in a Global Age New York: Columbia University Press 18
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however, was the forfeiture of trade from the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia
following Yugoslavia's breakup. Yugoslavia had arguably been in a better position to
transition to a market-based economy than most of the European communist countries
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the combination of political
disintegration and corruption prevented an efficient shift to the private sector and, as a
result, Serbia's economy languished throughout the 1990s. In 1999, the air strikes on
factories and transportation networks and the disruption of the power supply combined
with the economic sanctions on oil production and the freezing of financial assets to
produce a 30% drop in Serbia's economic output.685 Serbia reported that the bombing of
factories alone had put more than half a million workers out of jobs and a total of two
million were out of work by June.686
Two months of war and the inconveniences of power outages, lack of water, and
shortages of imported goods began to take their toll on a weary Serbian population. Their
exuberance for war at this point had clearly waned. The daily rock concerts sponsored by
Mirjana Markovic's JUL party eventually petered out as the tens of thousands who first
demonstrated dwindled down to a few hundred. 687 In the south, women began protesting
to the Serbian Army against having their husbands and sons serve in Kosovo and, once
their men were granted leave, they protested their return to duty.688 Though there was
685 International Monetary Fund (April 2009) World Economic Outlook Dataset
www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php accessed 28 September 2009
686 Block, Robert (12 May 1999) "In Belgrade, Hardship Mounts Under Air Siege" Wall Street Journal
Hosmer, Stephen (2001) The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When he Did
Monterey CA: RAND 70
687 Block, Robert (12 May 1999) "In Belgrade, Hardship Mounts Under Air Siege" Wall Street Journal
Sell, Louis (2002) Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia Durham NC Duke University
Press 311
688 Gall, Carlotta (20 May 1999) "Crisis in the Balkans: Serbia; Women Protest Draftees' Kosovo Duty"
New York Times Gall, Carlotta (21 May 1999) "Crisis in the Balkans: Serbia; Wives Protest and General
Sends Troops Back Home" New York Times Gall, Carlotta (25 May 1999) "Crisis in the Balkans: Serbia;
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growing displeasure with the war, the Serb population for the most part blamed the U.S.
and not Milosevic for their predicament. Indeed, there were no large demonstrations
against him as there had been following the 1996 elections.
Serbian Domestic Political Discontent
The first visible signs of domestic political opposition came in late April from
Deputy Prime Minister Yuk Draskovic, the leader of the nationalist SPO party who had
joined Milosevic's coalition the previous year. Draskovic publicly accused Milosevic
and Markovic of using the war for political gain and called for a negotiated settlement
with NATO. His comments only succeeded in getting himself removed from office in
late April. 689 By mid-May, however, other Serbian officials were publicly advocating an
end to the war. In fact, the idea of allowing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo as
peacekeepers was being openly debated within Milosevic's regime.690 By the end of
May, small and sporadic anti-Milosevic protests had sprung up in some of the more
severely bombed cities and several opposition party leaders had begun to now openly
criticize Milosevic. 69 1
Russian and U.S. Diplomacy
In mid-April Boris Yeltsin, dissatisfied with Russia's foreign policy efforts to
bring about an end to Kosovo, fired his Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primokov, and selected
Protests Are Resumed by Families of Reservists Ordered Back to Duty in Kosovo" New York Times
Harden, Blaine (8 and 9 July 1999) "Reservists a Crucial Factor in Effort Against Milosevic" and "Trouble
in the Backyard" New York Times
689 Erlanger, Steven (29 April 1999) "Milosevic Abruptly Fires A High-Profile Maverick" New York Times
690 Block, Robert (14 May 1999) "Serb Official Urges Deal on Kosovo Peace Force -Close Milosevic
Associate Backs UN Contingent; U.S. Troops a Possibility" Wall Street Journal
691 Erlanger, Steven (21 May 1999) "Yugoslav Politicians Carefully Maneuver for Day Milosevic is Gone"
New York Times
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Viktor S. Chernomyrdin as his personal envoy to the Balkans.692 Following Yeltsin and
Clinton's phone call during the Washington Summit, Chernomyrdin traveled to
Washington on 4 May to deliver a letter from Yeltsin. In it, Yeltsin proposed a ceasefire
and requested a UN envoy be named to assist in Russian diplomatic efforts.693 These
efforts led to a joint endorsement of a seven-point peace plan released at a G8 Foreign
Minister meeting on 6 May. 694 The plan modified the Rambouillet Accords to allow the
UN Security Council to determine the make-up of peacekeepers and to affirm "...the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity..." for Serbia.69 5 Diplomatic efforts
stalled for nearly two weeks in the wake of the Chinese embassy bombing but by the 2 0 th
of May, Chernomyrdin was in Belgrade presenting the G8 proposal to Milosevic. 696 The
key sticking point was whether any Serbian troops would remain in Kosovo and the
composition of foreign peacekeeping troops. On 3 June Milosevic agreed to a modified
G8 proposal that substituted UN for NATO peacekeepers, thus placing the future of
697Kosovo in the hands of the Security Council. Military negotiations for implementing
the peace agreement took place along the Kosovo-Macedonian border from the 5th to the
9 th of June.698 Shortly thereafter, NATO halted its bombing while Serbian forces
withdrew. A UN Security Council Resolution passed on 10 June acknowledged an end to
692 "Kosovo Update" (15 April 1999) New York Times
693 Talbott, Strobe (2002) The Russia Hand New York: Random House 314 Albright, Madeleine (2003)
Madam Secretary New York: Miramax Books 530
694 The G8 included U.S., Britain, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Canada, and Russia. G8 Foreign
Ministers Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers on the
Petersberg 6 May 1999, <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm990506.htm> 9 May 2006, Cohen, Roger
(6 May 1999) "Allies and Russia Planning Statement on Kosovo Force" New York Times
695 G8 Foreign Ministers Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G8 Foreign
Ministers on the Petersberg 6 May 1999, <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm990506.htm> 9 May 2006
696 "Kosovo Update" (20 May 1999) New York Times
697 Broder, John M. and Jane Perlex (4 June 1999) "In Washington, Wary Reaction But Also Relief' New
York Times
698 Clark, Wesley (2001) Waging Modern War Public Affairs: New York 358-370
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the fighting and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force.699 Russian and
1h700NATO ground forces then crossed the border into Kosovo on the 12th of June.
Analysis of Coercion Outcome: Why Milosevic gave up when he did
What caused Milosevic to finally accept the G8 peace proposal after over two
months of NATO bombing is a critical question for coercion and has been the subject of
intense academic debate. 701 Four factors explain this decision: first, Milosevic's strategy
was no longer working; second, he was losing the support of the population and political
elite for the war; third, he faced a credible, imminent threat of even more costly strikes to
Serbia's infrastructure, and fourth, the G8 proposal provided him a face-saving means to
make concessions.
Milosevic's Failing Strategy
The first contributor to Milosevic's concession was the mounting evidence that
his strategy was no longer working. His strategy can be usefully disaggregated into two
military and two political components. The first military objective was to rid Kosovo of
the KLA and thus present afait accompli to the U.S. demand that Serbia curtail its
699 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999),
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement> 10 May
2006
700 Clark, Wesley (2001) Waging Modern War Public Affairs: New York 373
701 Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman (2000) "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate" International
Security 24:4 (Spring), Cordesman, Anthony H (200 1) The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile
Campaign in Kosovo Westport CT: Praeger, Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O'Hanlon (2000) Winning
Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo Brookings Institute: Washington: Brookings Institute, Lambeth,
Benjamin (200 1) NATO's Air Warfor Kosovo RAND: Santa Monica, CA, Stigler, Andrew L (2002/3) "A
Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo" International Security 27:3
(Winter), Posen, Barry (2000) "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy" International
Security 24:4 (Spring), Kurth, James (2001) "First War of the Global Era: Kosovo and U.S. Grand
Strategy" Bacevich, Andrew and Eliot Cohen ed War Over Kosovo New York: Columbia University Press,
Hosmer, Stephen (2001) The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When he Did
Monterey CA: RAND, Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and
Authoritarian Targets dissertation New York: Columbia University, Lake, Daniel R (2009) "The Limits of
Coercive Airpower: NATO'S "Victory" in Kosovo Revisited" International Security 34:1 (Summer)
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aggression in Kosovo. In the days leading up to OAF, Serbia deployed additional troops
and equipment to carry out a counterinsurgency mission. Protected by cloud cover from
NATO airstrikes, Serbian forces pressed forward to evict the Kosovar Albanians from
Kosovo and, in so doing, remove the source of KLA support. From a tactical perspective
these operations were highly effective. The KLA departed Kosovo along with all the
other refugees and, even when the KLA was able to reorganize and attempt an offensive
in late May, their forces were weak and easily repulsed.702 From a strategic standpoint,
however, it was a major blunder and a critical mistake for Milosevic. He may well have
expected the flow of refugees into neighboring countries to provide him bargaining
power to leverage against NATO for a better deal in exchange for allowing the refugees
to return home. 703 The CNN images of thousands of suffering Kosovar Albanian
refugees, however, lent credence to U.S. claims that Serbia, and not the KLA, was at fault
in Kosovo and reinforced the justification for continuing and escalating NATO air
strikes.
The second military component to Serbia's strategy was to inflict significant
combat losses on NATO aircraft and aircrew, making it either too costly for NATO to
continue air operations or, at a minimum, creating tension among NATO countries that
might cause a fissure in the alliance. The Serbian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
engaged NATO aircraft from the opening strikes until the final days of OAF, but were
largely neutralized by a combination of medium-altitude operations and the embedding of
combat air patrols (CAPs) and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) assets in strike
702 The author flew missions in support of the KLA offensive and therefore witnessed the inability of the
KLA to penetrate much more than a few miles past the Albanian-Kosovo border.
703 Greenhill, Kelly M (2003) "The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in the Kosovo
Conflict", Raju Thomas editor Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention
Lanham, Md: Lexington Books 215
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packages. Serbia succeeded in downing only two aircraft both U.S., the first being a not-
so-"stealthy" F-1 17 and the other an F-16. Even so, the U.S. was able to recover both
pilots and Serbia was never able to generate losses significant or consistent enough to
cause NATO to question the risk level of its air campaign.704
Along with its efforts to attrit NATO's forces, Serbia also employed a political
strategy of attempting to fracture the alliance by exploiting any collateral damage and
civilian deaths caused by the bombings. The U.S. was fully aware of the negative effect
errant bombs would have on NATO's fragile consensus to employ force. Collateral
damage estimates and risk calculations were therefore incorporated not only into the
selection of targets but also into the timing of attacks. The two factories selected for the
initial Phase I strikes were both inactive, significantly reducing the risk of civilian
casualties.
The first major collateral damage incident took place on 13 April when an F-15E
struck and then re-attacked a bridge as a train was crossing it, killing 10 passengers.705
This event was trumped the next day, however, by F-i 6s misidentifying tractors in a
column of Kosovar Albanian refugees as military vehicles. The ensuing attack killed
74.706 While these back-to-back blunders placed NATO on the defensive diplomatically,
704 Unable to destroy the aircraft it initially engaged and threatened by NATO SEAD aircraft, Serbian SAM
operators chose to live to fight another day by limiting their radar emissions making it difficult for NATO
to target their radars. While this greatly reduced the tactical effectiveness for Serbian radar-guided SAMs it
did force NATO initially to reduce the number of strike missions it could fly as the number of SEAD
aircraft available to support strike packages was limited. The greatest shortage initially was in the
availability of EA-6B jammers. The USAF had not replaced the EF-1 11 when it eliminated the jammer
from its inventory following Desert Storm and instead relied on the U.S. Navy and Marines. Though the
aircraft could be flown multiple times each day, given the length of missions, the aircrew could only fly
once a day which proved to be a limiting factor until additional squadrons and aircrews arrived.
705 Myers, Steven Lee (13 April 1999) "NATO Commander Says Train Was Hit Not Once, but Twice" New
York Times
706 Gordon, Michael R. (14 April 1999) "Civilians Are Slain in Military Attack on a Kosovo Road" New
York Times, Gordon, Michael R. (20 April 1999) "NATO Admits It Hit 2d Convoy in Kosovo" New York
Times
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the refugee attack eventually proved counterproductive to the Serbian media campaign.
The Serbs seized the initiative, bussing international journalists to the scene to document
the grisly event. In route, however, the reporters observed the torched homes and vacated
villages, the handiwork of Serb forces. They then interviewed survivors, who provided
first-hand accounts, not only of the aerial bombing, but also of Serb troops and police
forcing them from their homes at gunpoint. 707 After some initial faulty reports, NATO
admitted responsibility for the refugee attack and tightened its rules of engagement to
prevent a reoccurrence. In the end, the overriding message was that, while NATO's
attack on the Kosovar Albanians was an accident, the Serbian attacks clearly were not.
No further major collateral damage incident transpired until NATO began
escalating its attacks following the Washington Summit. The bombing of the Chinese
embassy on 8 May was not the most deadly, but it was by far the most politically harmful
collateral damage event of the war. Not only did it sidetrack U.S. - Russian negotiations
but it also seriously threatened U.S.- Chinese relations. 708 Nonetheless, this and
subsequent collateral damage events signaled NATO's newfound resolve to see the war
through despite the additional risk.709 In sum, Serbia was never able to fracture the
NATO alliance over the issue of collateral damage. Any window of opportunity Serbia
may have had in the early stages of the war was more than offset by images of Kosovar
Albanians driven from their homes.
The second political component to the Serbian strategy lay in Russian
intervention. At the commencement of OAF this appeared promising, as the Kremlin
707 Erlanger, Steven (16 April 1999) "Blackened Bodies and a Half-Eaten Meal" New York Times
708 Clinton was eventually able to mend relations with the Chinese government somewhat with an apology
709An excellent example is NATO bombs hitting so close as to shatter windows of the Swiss and Swedish
Ambassadors' residences "Kosovo Update" (21 May 1999) New York Times
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decried Western aggression while angry mobs demonstrated outside the U.S. embassy in
Moscow. Prime Minister Primakov, when notified of the NATO airstrikes while aboard
his Washington-bound jet, dramatically ordered the plane to turn around over the
Atlantic. 71 0 Though angered by NATO's actions, Yeltsin was dependent on economic
assistance from the U.S. and, therefore, could not afford to be drawn into the conflict
militarily. Yeltsin quickly dispatched Primakov to Belgrade with orders to bring an end
to the conflict. Despite Primakov's efforts, Milosevic refused to negotiate unless NATO
first ceased its bombing, a precondition the U.S. would not consider.7 1'
Two weeks into the war Yeltsin, who was facing fierce domestic opposition and
possible impeachment hearings in the Duma, was clearly frustrated over the hostilities
and the inability of Primakov to bring Milosevic to the table.7 12 On 14 April, the Kremlin
announced that Primakov was being replaced by Viktor Chernomyrdin as Yeltsin's
personal envoy. This marked a policy change for Russia. Yeltsin now pushed for a
ceasefire on terms much closer to those preferred by the U.S. rather than Serbia.
Evidenced by Yeltsin's phone call to Clinton on 24 April and by Chernomyrdin's
negotiations with Strobe Talbott through the end of May, this new policy removed the
final underpinning to Serbia's war strategy. Chernomyrdin traveled to Belgrade on 3
June to deliver the G8 proposal to a dejected Milosevic, who reluctantly acceded.
In sum, by June 3rd it was clear to Milosevic that his strategy of resisting NATO
was not working. He had not been able to stop the bombings by fracturing the NATO
710 Gordon, Michael (25 March 1999) "Russian Anger at U.S. Tempered by Need for Cash" New York
Times, Broder, John (24 March 1999) "A Phone Call From Gore and a U-Turn to Moscow" New York
Times
711 Bohlen, Celestine (29 March 1999) "Yeltsin Sends His Premier to Urge Serbs to Negotiate" New York
Times
712 Bohlen, Celestine (10 April 1999) " 'Don't Push Us,' Yeltsin Warns West on Balkans" New York Times
352
alliance. Attempts at downing a large number of aircraft had failed, as had his touting of
civilian casualties caused by collateral damage. Serbia's military operation had
succeeded in evicting the majority of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, but this had
not gained for Milosevic any additional bargaining power, but instead neutralized any
international sympathy Serbia may have garnered as the victim of NATO's military
action. Finally, Yeltsin's decision to work with the U.S. for a joint peace proposal
dashed Milosevic's last hope of Russian intervention.
Loss of Serbian Support for the War
The failure of Milosevic's strategy is a necessary, though not sufficient
explanation for why he chose to concede to the G8 proposal when he did. A second
reason was waning support for the war among the Serbian population and the political
elite. Indeed, general popularity and the backing of the old communist establishment had
been key to Milosevic's rise to power. While Milosevic was deft at legal and political
maneuvering and electoral fraud to remain in power, there were clearly limits to how
much he could manipulate Serbia's electoral system. This was witnessed in the 1996
election when, only after months of widespread protest, he finally relented and accepted
the election results. Serbia was clearly not a democracy, yet the vote of the Serbian
population still mattered. As Milosevic's popularity decreased throughout the 1990s so,
too, did his freedom of action. To remain in power, he was forced to bring in and
accommodate additional political actors in his coalition.
The Serbian population's eagerness to resist NATO, demonstrated by the
hundreds of thousands who protested in late March, had by May been replaced by a war
weariness. The rock concerts, once cheering on Milosevic, now devolved into a small,
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but growing number of protests against the war, as widespread power and water outages,
rising prices, and unemployment had sapped their support. A final piece of ex post
evidence of their sentiments was the general sense of relief and the lack of protests which
greeted Belgrade's announcement of a peace agreement.
The political elite had initially either supported the war or at least felt constrained
against speaking openly against the war or Milosevic. By mid-May, however, opposition
leaders, as well as those within Milosevic's own party, felt emboldened to publicly call
for concessions to stop the bombing. In sum, the popular and political defiance of NATO
had shifted to the point of accepting an agreement which would stop the war, even if this
meant U.S. ground troops in Kosovo.
Expectation of Further Damage to Serbian Infrastructure
A third explanation for Milosevic's decision on 3 June was his resigned sense that
further delay would only lead to further damage to Serbia's infrastructure and economy.
The ever improving weather for bombing, increased number of combat aircraft, and the
shift to striking targets throughout Serbia caused the expected cost for rebuilding, already
estimated in the billions, to climb even higher. 713 Despite the previous attacks on
bridges, factories, oil facilities and the power grid, NATO had still demonstrated a good
deal of restraint, given the plethora of infrastructure and economic targets which Serbia
could not defend. Economically, Serbia still stood to lose a great deal should Milosevic
713 NATO directly targeted factories owned by Milosevic's wealthy political supporters, even calling and
faxing before hand so that factory owners were aware of NATO's intentions, however there is no direct
evidence that these crony attacks were primarily responsible for Milosevic's concessions. For arguments
for Crony attack see Hosmer, Stephen (200 1) "Chapter 6: Damage to 'Dual-Use' Infrastructure Generated
Growing Pressure" in The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When he Did Monterey
CA: RAND and Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and
Authoritarian Targets dissertation New York: Columbia University
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refuse the G8 proposal. And though the Serbian people had suffered economically
through most of Milosevic's tenure in office, this did not make him immune to their
plight. Indeed, during the Bosnian Civil War he had held the lifting of economic
sanctions as his highest political objective.
A Face-saving Concession
A final reason for Milosevic's willingness to concede to the G8 proposal in June
was its inclusion of face-saving measures absent from the Rambouillet demands. This
allowed Milosevic to make the claim to the Serbian people that he had not surrendered
Kosovo to the U.S.. The deployment of both NATO and Russian peacekeeping troops
under the auspices of the United Nations was a key U.S. compromise. This provided
Russia influence both on the Security Council and on the ground over Serbia's interests
in Kosovo. Further, the G8 proposal removed all reference to a future referendum on the
question of Kosovo independence. These two measures provided the cornerstone to
Milosevic's address to the Serbian people on 10 June after the peace agreement had been,
finalized.714
Alternative Explanation: Threat of Ground Invasion
Rather than the fear of further punishing air attacks on Serbia, an alternative
explanation for Milosevic's decision to concede to the G8 proposal lay in the mounting
threat of a NATO ground invasion. Having already begun the deployment of troops to
714 Milosevic, Slobodan (10 June 1999) "Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's Address to the Nation"
Washington Post
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Albania and Macedonia, NATO was now in position to make a decision on a ground
invasion.715
Clearly the potential for a NATO ground invasion had increased following the
Washington Summit. Tony Blair pressured the White House to consider the issue and, on
19 May, Clinton relented by announcing that he would not rule out a ground option,
though he did add that the alliance "...ought to stay with the strategy that we have and
work it through to the end.'' 716 Two days later, the Clinton administration called for
NATO to deploy 50,000 troops along the border. Though the purpose given by the White
House for the deployment was preparation for a peacekeeping mission, the timing of the
move added weight to the likelihood of invasion. 17 On 2 June, one day before Milosevic
conceded, Clinton met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the first discussion of a ground
invasion. In order to have the requisite 150,000 troops in place by mid-August and avoid
a winter ground war, a decision to invade needed to be made by mid-June. 718
The shortcoming of this argument is that the key actions which would make the
threat of a ground war credible had not yet been carried out. Even though Prime Minister
Blair lobbied hard for it, President Clinton was still deliberating and a reluctant U.S.
Congress had not approved the large-scale deployment of ground troops necessary for a
ground war. The forces that were in place were not sufficient to mount any offensive
715 Pape, Robert (2004) "The True Worth of Air Power" Foreign Affairs 83:2. Pape critiques the argument
that a punishment strategy caused Milosevic to concede because NATO had stopped strategic attacks
following the Chinese embassy bombing. Though Pape is correct that attacks on Serbian leadership were
stopped, however attacks on Serbian infrastructure and dual-use factories continued.
716 Seelye, Katharine (19 May 1999) "Clinton Keeps Option For Ground Troops" New York Times
717 Perlez, Jane (21 May 1999) "Clinton is Pushing for 50,000 Troops at Kosovo Border" New York Times
718 Perlez, Jane (1 June 1999) "Clinton and the Joint Chiefs To Discuss Ground Invasion" New York Times
and Clark, Wesley (200 1) Waging Modern War Public Affairs: New York 310
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action and it would take well over two months to remedy this shortcoming.] 9 The Mt.
Pastrik operation by the KLA at the end of May failed miserably. 720 The Serbian military
remained well entrenched in the mountainsides and forests overlooking the major arteries
into western and southern Kosovo and the expected casualties to U.S. ground troops,
even with NATO's air supremacy, were significant. Overall, the threat of a ground
invasion does not explain Milosevic's willingness to accept the G8 proposal on 3 June.
The imminent threat of additional economic losses from further air strikes better explains
the timing of his actions than the threat of invasion.
ANAL YSIS OF EXPLANA TIONS FOR COERCION FAIL URE
In this section I test the two hypotheses for coercion failure, i.e. that of target
survival and challenger commitment problems (see Table 5.11). Kosovo is an interesting
case in that neither the U.S. nor Serbia initially recognized the core demand as one of
homeland territory. This realization dawned on Milosevic after he had agreed to reduce
troop levels in October of 1998, only to reverse this policy as the KLA began occupying
the posts vacated by Serbian troops. It was not until Raak in mid-January 1999 that the
U.S. began to make public what was already being asked of the Serbs: that they
relinquish control of Kosovo.
It would not be until June of 1999, however, that the U.S. could escalate military
force to the point that Milosevic was finally willing to concede. Even then, he insisted
719 The U.S. had approximately 5,000 troops associated with Task Force Hawk in Albania and NATO's
Task Force Sabre (formerly known as Task Force Able Sentry) in the FYROM (Former Yugoslavia
Republic of Macedonia) had approximately 620 soldiers along the border of Macedonia and Kosovo.
720 General Wesley Clark has alternatively argued that the KLA operations may well have convinced
Milosevic of a ground invasion. Priest, Dana (19 September 1999) "Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won
War" Washington Post
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that the U.S. include in the agreement Russian peacekeepers and remove all reference to a
future referendum, in order to lower his audience costs.
Interestingly, the survival hypothesis incorrectly expects this coercive strategy
likely to fail since demands threatened Serbian control of its homeland territory and the
audience costs for making a concession also threatened Milosevic and his regime. While
coercive diplomacy failed at Rambouillet, the U.S. eventually succeeded in increasing its
threat of force to the point of convincing Milosevic to concede. By contrast, the
commitment hypothesis correctly predicts Milosevic would eventually concede since the
U.S. air power-only strategy could not credibly back up further demands for additional
territory or for regime change. This is the single case out of the ten compellent demands
considered in the case studies presented in chapters 4-6 on Iraq, Serbia, and Libya for
which the commitment hypothesis correctly predicts the outcome while the survival
hypothesis does not.
Core Survival Commitment Actual
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Coercion
Demands Outcome
Homeland Predicts Failure Predicts Success Success
June Territory - Serbian state - U.S. air power - Milosevic agrees
1998- threatened by insufficient to to withdraw
homeland territory credibly back up Serbian troops for
- Milosevic's additional demands NATO
1999 political survival peacekeepers
dependent on keeping
Kosovo_____________________
Table 5.11: Predictions of Coercion Success/Failure
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T ESTING THE SURVIVAL HYPOTH ESIS
The survival hypothesis expects coercion to fail when the state, the regime, and
the regime leadership's survival is threatened by a concession, so long as the target has
the means to resist. The survival hypothesis presumes that when survival is not at stake
that the challenger and target act rationally. According to the asymmetric coercion
model, this entails the powerful challenger maximizing its outcome by matching demands
and threats such that the target is just willing to concede. For the case of Kosovo,
however, the survival hypothesis incorrectly predicts coercion failure since Serbian
homeland territory, Milosevic, and his regime were all at risk.
IMPACT ON SERBIA, MILOSEVIC, AND HIS REGIME'S SURVIVAL FOR
CONCEDING
Impact on Serbia for Conceding
Agreeing to the G8 peace plan required Serbia to cede control of its homeland
territory. Unlike Bosnia, which had always been a separate republic, Kosovo was an
historic part of Serbia and even considered to be its birthplace. The loss of control over
homeland territory, control over population, control over government, and economic
viability are the four issues I assess to determine if a concession threatens state survival.
While the threat to territory was significant, those of population control and economic
viability were much less so. Acquiescing meant the loss of control over 200,000 Serbs
living in Kosovo. In addition, relinquishing control of Kosovo did not seriously threaten
the Serbian economy as Kosovo was a poor region without major resources or industry
and with an economy based on subsistence agriculture. On the contrary, conceding
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Kosovo to the U.S. would likely have improved the Serbian economy by putting an end
to NATO airstrikes and UN sanctions, thus allowing Serbs to go back to work.
Impact on Milosevic and his Regime for Conceding
Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) controlled the Serbian government
and there were no domestic opposition groups within Serbia with the capacity to violently
overthrow the regime. In November of 1990, Milosevic sealed an alliance between the
SPS and the Yugoslavian Army (JNA). This successfully subjugated the military to
civilian control, thus lowering the chances not only of a military coup but also of the
formation of armed opposition groups that could revolt. 72 As a result, Milosevic's
government was never threatened by civil war.
SPS's power was more susceptible, however, at the ballot box. Following
Milosevic's rise to power, the SPS had won elections by comfortable margins. But a year
after Dayton, in the November 1996 national elections, its margin of victory was
significantly reduced. And, as the popular demonstrations following the elections made
clear, Milosevic and his SPS could no longer simply dismiss unfavorable election returns.
Though the SPS still controlled parliament, they were forced to share power by
expanding their governing coalition. After seven years of Milosevic rule, the Serbian
population had begun to express a general displeasure over the dissolution of Yugoslavia
and his mishandling of their now dysfunctional economy. By 1999 Milosevic and his
SPS were vulnerable to the point that a concession over Kosovo, with or without a fight,
721 Bennett, Christopher (1995) Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse New York: NYU Press, 1 33
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could produce sufficient audience costs to remove them from power in the next election.
And this, in fact, is what happened in 2000.722
In sum, though Milosevic and his regime were not worried about a revolt, their
hold on power was threatened by a negative outcome in future elections.
Why Milosevic conceded
The survival hypothesis predicts that Serbia, Milosevic and his SPS party would
not likely concede control of Kosovo as this threatened their survival. Yet Milosevic did
just that. In a previous section I discussed why Milosevic conceded when he did. Here, I
further measure his decision against the prediction of the survival hypothesis and discuss
four factors which help explain it. First, though Serbians considered Kosovo part of their
homeland, they had lived without controlling it from 1974 to 1989. And, given its
marginal economic output, its small land mass, the insignificance geopolitically, and the
tiny fraction of the Serbian population residing there, Serbia could, in fact, survive
without it. Though its people were willing to fight for it, the loss of Kosovo did not spell
the end of the state of Serbia.
Second, as previously discussed Milosevic's strategy had failed by late May of
1999 and further resistance would only have led to more punishment for the Serbian
population. It was clear that Serbia could not inflict sufficient costs, either militarily or
diplomatically, to deter U.S. military efforts.
Third, Milosevic, the United States, and Russia undertook three steps to reduce
the audience costs to Milosevic for conceding to demands. Initially, Milosevic resisted
722 Following the War over Kosovo Milosevic did not appear to perceive the Serbian population's
displeasure with him and the SPS. He was responsible for calling early elections in 2000 and surprised by
the results. Thompson, Mark R. and Philipp Kuntz (2004) "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian
October" Journal of Democracy 15:4 (October) 159-172
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signing the Rambouillet Accords even though this brought on NATO air strikes. This
created a "rally around the flag" effect of support by the Serbian population. Milosevic
only conceded after two months of NATO bombing and then only when the Serbians'
enthusiasm for war had waned. Under the strain of NATO airstrikes, few Serbians could
blame Milosevic for making concessions, as evidenced by their general sense of relief
and the lack of large anti-Milosevic protests following his announcement. Second, the
U.S. conceded to including Russian troops alongside NATO peacekeepers. This allowed
Milosevic to announce that he had not surrendered Kosovo to NATO but had, rather,
handed over guardianship to UN peacekeepers which included Serbia's ally. Finally, the
U.S. removed all reference to a future referendum for Kosovo's independence, enabling
Milosevic to argue that his concession would not necessarily lead to an independent
Kosovo. Two months of resistance combined with the U.S. conceding to Russian troops
and no referendum to provide a platform, albeit shaky, for Milosevic to make an
argument to the Serbs that enduring 78 days of air strikes had been justified and that he
had not, in fact, surrendered Kosovo.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, while concession to demands in June may
not have threatened Serbia's and Milosevic's survival, further resistance would have.
Milosevic stood up to the U.S. for as long as he could, but when faced with the
catastrophic economic consequences of the escalating NATO air campaign, he relented.
This crisis proves to be a critical case for explaining the limitations of the survival
hypothesis. Of all the crises studied in Chapters 4 - 6, it is the only one in which the
survival hypothesis produces a false positive, predicting failure when the actual outcome
was success. In spite of this, the case turns out to be the exception which proves the rule.
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Not only does it demonstrate that states and their leaders resist when their survival is
threatened, but they will likewise concede when further resistance is likely to prove fatal.
TESTING COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS
The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail if the United States
cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands of Serbia. A commitment
problem is more likely when there is deployed military force capable of backing up
additional demands. In June of 1999, however, the U.S. had not yet deployed sufficient
ground forces to credibly threaten an invasion of Kosovo, let alone Serbia. President
Clinton had not yet made a decision on whether to deploy more U.S. troops and, even if
he had, it would have taken until August at the earliest before such forces could have
been in a position to threaten an invasion of Kosovo. And finally, because NATO had
reluctantly agreed to go to war over Kosovo, the chances that the U.S. could have
convinced the 18 other NATO countries to further increase demands were remote. The
U.S. was therefore in no position to militarily back up demands for further Serbian
territory or for regime change. As a result, the commitment hypothesis correctly predicts
that coercion would succeed, that Milosevic would not believe his concession would only
lead to further demands.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have examined two important cases of coercion where the U.S.
adopted strategies which employed air power and sanctions but intentionally did not risk
ground forces, as vital U.S. security interests were not at stake. The Bosnian Civil War
and Kosovo are both crises for which the U.S. eventually succeeded in achieving its core
363
demands, but not before coercive diplomacy had failed and the U.S. had placed its
reputation and prestige on the line. Some critics, therefore, do not consider Bosnia and
Kosovo foreign policy successes, pointing out the lengthy duration of the conflicts, the
level of military effort expended by the U.S. for such meager returns, and the bloodshed
and economic losses endured by Bosnians, Serbians, and Kosovar Albanians. Despite
these critiques, however, coercive U.S. strategies did succeed in ending the Bosnian Civil
War while maintaining Bosnia as a state, and in wresting Kosovo from Serbian control.
For these two cases, I tested two hypotheses for coercion failure: target survival
and challenger commitment problems (see Table 5.12 below). The survival hypothesis
correctly predicted the concession by Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs to end the
Bosnian Civil War. In Kosovo, however, where the demand for homeland territory was
expected to create significant audience costs for Milosevic and his regime, the survival
hypothesis incorrectly predicted coercion failure. Milosevic, rather, conceded because
further resistance in the face of unlimited NATO air strikes threatened the economic
viability of Serbia and, by extension, his grasp on power.
By contrast, the commitment hypothesis correctly predicted Serbia's concessions
in both Bosnia and Kosovo. It did not, however, foresee the Bosnian Serb's dependence
on Milosevic and therefore did not predict a concession when the U.S. could well have
made additional territorial demands backed by credible threats from Croat-Muslim forces
and NATO air power.
364
Table 5.12; Predictions of Coercion Outcomes
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Core Survival Commitment Actual Coercion
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Outcome
Demands
Bosnian - Maintain SERBIA SERBIA SERBIA
Civil War single Predicts Success Predicts Success Coercion Success
April 1992 Bosnian - Serbian state not - Sanctions against - Milosevic agrees to
- Nov 1995 State threatened as Bosnia Serbia already at pressure Bosnian Serbs
- Ceasefire not part of Greater maximum and neither and places sanctions on
an- ec Serbia NATO air power nor them in August 1994
and- JNA loyal to roat - Muslim
agreement Milosevic regime ground forces
- Milosevic's sufficient to back up
political survival additional demands
dependent more on of Serbia
stabilizing Serbian
economy than on
future of Bosnia
BOSNIAN BOSNIAN BOSNIAN
SERBS SERBS SERBS
Predicts Success Predicts Failure Coercion Success
- Republika Srpska - NATO and Bosnian - Concede to Milosevic
survival secured with Federation had as negotiator
Contact Group peace sufficient military
plan force in late August
1995 to increase
territorial demands
on Bosnian Serbs
Kosovo Homeland Predicts Failure Predicts Success Success
June 1998- Territory - Serbian state - U.S. air power - Milosevic agrees to
June 1999 threatened by loss of insufficient to withdraw Serbianhomeland territory credibly back up troops for NATO
- Milosevic's additional demands peacekeepers
political survival
dependent on keeping
Kosovo-Milosevicagrees
Chapter 6: United States vs. Libya 1981-2003
In Chapters 4 and 5, I conducted qualitative analysis for cases of asymmetric
coercion drawn from the conflicts between the United States and Iraq from 1990 to 2003
and between the U.S. and Serbia from 1992 to 1999. In this chapter I conclude with the
case of U.S. foreign policy in regard to Libya from 1981 to 2003. This particular
conflict was chosen for two reasons. First, it is a case where economic sanctions replaced
military force as the United States' primary coercive lever. The U.S. air strikes of the
1980s gave way to UN sanctions in the 1990s and the threat of military force was
reintroduced only indirectly following September 1Ith, 2001. This heavy reliance on
sanctions provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate the asymmetric coercion model
for cases where coercive threats are non-military in nature. Thus far, the asymmetric
coercion model developed in Chapter 3 has only been evaluated in cases where coercion
entailed threatening force or the limited use offorce to induce a target to comply with
demands. The Libyan case is an intentional expansion of the scope conditions for the
asymmetric coercion model in an initial effort at generalizing the model for sanctions.
Second, this conflict differs from the other two in that, over time, the U.S.
abandoned its foreign policy objective of removing Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi from power.
With both Iraq and Serbia, as conflict extended over years, the United States came to
view their leaders, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, as the source of the
problem. As a result, the U.S. eventually adopted regime change as a formal policy
objective for both countries. The Libyan case is intriguing, however, in that while the
U.S. escalated its demands of Iraq and Serbia in the late 90s, it simultaneously abandoned
regime change as a policy objective for Libya, this even though the conflict had been
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ongoing for a decade longer. And, while Hussein and Milosevic were both eventually
driven from power as a direct or indirect result of U.S. actions, Qadhafi not only remains
the leader of Libya, but U.S. diplomatic relations with the country has been restored. The
Libyan conflict, unlike either Iraq or Serbia, therefore provides a case for evaluating the
asymmetric coercion model where U.S. objectives decrease over time.
I separate the conflict between the United States and Libya into three crises. The
first commenced with President Reagan assuming office in 1981 and his administration's
adoption of a more aggressive, adversarial policy towards Libya. A series of U.S.-
initiated naval exercises, intended to challenge Libya's claim over the Gulf of Sidra,
produced a series of military confrontations which only flamed tensions between the two
countries. Libya's involvement in terrorist attacks, its overt support of terrorist
organizations, and Qadhafi's anti-western rhetoric led the White House to adopt two
foreign policy objectives. The first was a coercive demand for Libya to change its policy
of supporting international terrorism and the second was a non-coercive, brute force
objective of Libyan regime change. (see Table 6.1 below for coercion typology of
demands, threats and outcomes).
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Period Level of Demands Type of Threat United States Foreign
(Denial or Policy
Punishment) Outcome
.January 1981 Core Demand Punishment Partial Failure of
- 1988 Policy Change - unilateral Coercion
- Stop terrorist sanctions - Libya reduced, but did
activities - airstrikes not stop, terrorist attacks
- Stop support of - Libya stopped overt
terrorist groups support of terrorist groups,but continued covert
support
Brute Force - Pan Am Flight 103
ObjectiveBombing December 1988Brute Force Failure
Regime Change No regime change
Policy Change Punishment Partial Success
- Extradite two - U.S. unilateral - Libya hands over two
Nov 1991 Libyan suspects for diplomatic and suspects for trial in
April 1999 trial economic Netherlands and
Cooperate with sanctions cooperates with
investigations - United Nations. investigation
- Acknowledge diplomatic and - Libya does not
Responsibility economic acknowledge
- Pay Compensation sanctions,, though responsibility or pay
not on Libyan oil compensation
exports
Sep 2001 Policy Change Punishment Success
- Dec - Abandon support - U.S. unilateral - Libya abandoned
2003 of terrorism sanctions support of terrorism
- Abandon WMD - Implicit threat - Libya abandoned
- Acknowledge of airstrikes WMD
responsibility for Denial - Libya acknowledged
Pan Am Flight 103 - Implicit threat responsibility for Pan
bombing of airstrikes and Am bombing
-Pay compensation invasion - Libya paid $2.7 billion
to victims' families in compensation to
victims' families
Table 6.1: Coercion Typology of U.S. - Libya, 1980 - 2003
To back up the compellent demand that Libya stop supporting terrorism, the U.S.
employed a punishment strategy of sanctions by suspending diplomatic relations and
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imposing a unilateral economic boycott. These actions were undermined, however, by
Reagan's inability to garner international support for sanctions. In 1985, a sharp spike in
the number of terrorist attacks killing Americans reinvigorated U.S. foreign policy to now
include the threat of military force. When Libya was implicated in the April 1986
bombing of a Berlin discotheque, the U.S. retaliated with a joint Air Force and Navy
airstrike codenamed El Dorado Canyon. Jets struck multiple targets including Qadhafi's
residential compound. The U.S. only partially achieved its aim of stopping Libya's
support of terrorism as Qadhafi's rhetoric subsided along with the number of terrorist
attacks with Libyan ties until the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland on 21 December, 1988. The U.S. failed, however, in its attempts to produce
regime change as Qadhafi survived several coup attempts in the months following El
Dorado Canyon.
A second crisis between the U.S. and Libya commenced with allegations linking
Libyan Arab Airline employees to the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. In 1991, the U.S.
and Britain demanded that Libya extradite the two officials implicated in the bombing,
disclose all evidence, take responsibility for their actions, and pay compensation to the
victims' families. Notably, the Bush administration refrained from pursuing Libyan
regime change. Although they refused American and British demands, Libyan officials
did recommend the case be tried by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, in
the Netherlands. The U.S., not believing Libya to be sincere in its offer rejected it out of
hand.723 Unlike President Reagan, Bush and then Clinton did not threaten military force
to back demands, relying instead on sanctions. In 1992, the UN Security Council
723 Sciolino, Elaine (19 Dec 1991) "U.S. and its Allies to move on Libya over Air Bombings" New York
Times
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approved multilateral sanctions to complement the unilateral sanctions the U.S. had
already had in place for more than a decade. The UN sanctions intentionally omitted
Libyan oil exports, however, and therefore did not have the same draconian impact as the
sanctions concurrently being imposed on Iraq and Serbia. They did, however, prevent
Libya from obtaining the requisite equipment and supplies to increase oil production and,
accompanied by the depressed global oil prices of the decade to follow, slowly eroded
Libya's petroleum-based economy.
In 1997, Britain's new Prime Minister, Tony Blair, found himself under pressure
from the families of Lockerbie victims to accept Libya's recommendation for a third
country trial and in an effort to settle the case, convinced President Clinton to reverse
U.S. policy. This eventually led to the extradition of the two Libyan suspects to stand
trial in the Netherlands. In return for the extradition, the U.S. agreed to the suspension,
though not the permanent removal, of UN sanctions. This particular crisis concluded as a
partial success for the U.S. as Libya did concede to its core demand of extradition.
Qadhafi, however, would not agree to the additional demands of taking responsibility for
the bombing and paying compensation.
Following the conclusion of this second crisis, the Clinton administration
continued secret negotiations with Libya over four issues: the two remaining demands
concerning Pan Am Flight 103 and demands for Libya to renounce terrorism and end its
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. In return, the U.S. would end sanctions
and normalize relations. Talks stalled, however, over the United States' desire to resolve
the demands sequentially, beginning with Pan Am Flight 103. Qadhafi remained
reluctant to make any such concessions until a final verdict in the trial had been rendered.
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In addition, Libyan officials would not consider conducting bilateral negotiations over
WMD, stating their preference, rather, for a multilateral forum.
The Clinton administration eventually suspended the secret talks in 2000, fearing
a leak would disrupt the upcoming presidential elections. In January 2001, a verdict in
the Lockerbie trial was finally reached convicting one of the two suspects. The new
George W. Bush administration, however, chose not to reinitiate talks until prompted by
the September 1 th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
The September 11th attacks changed the dynamics of the international security
environment and ushered in a third crisis between the U.S. and Libya. The U.S.
maintained its previous demands of Libya and, importantly, President Bush chose not to
include Libya in his "Axis of Evil" or to reintroduce Libyan regime change as an
objective as he had with Iraq. While Qadhafi publicly condemned Al Qaeda's actions,
the tripartite talks, which included Britain, recommenced but made little progress. In
September 2002, the U.S. and Britain again offered that, in exchange for Libya acceding
to its demands all sanctions would be permanently lifted and diplomatic relations with the
U.S. restored. Along with the inducement of normalized relations, the credible threat of
military force had risen with the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and preparations for the
invasion of Iraq. These actions demonstrated both the capability and the willingness of
the Bush administration to use force to remove regimes. In March of 2003, just days
before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Qadhafi finally conceded to talks over Libyan WMD. In
August, Libya acknowledged responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and agreed to
payment of $2.7 billion in compensation to the victims' families. The U.S. then publicly
agreed to the permanent lifting of UN sanctions.
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Then in October 2003, U.S. and British intelligence identified and intercepted a
shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuges bound for Libya. Caught red-handed with
irrefutable evidence of an active nuclear program, Qadhafi moved in December to
concede to demands to end his WMD programs while the offer of normalizing relations
was still on the table. This final crisis was a successful case not only of coercion, but also
of coercive diplomacy, as the U.S. achieved all of its objectives without resorting to even
a limited use of force.
This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section provides context by
reviewing the rise of Libya as a state and of Qadhafi as its dictator. It also examines how
the conflict between Libya and the U.S. originated with Libya's involvement in
international terrorism. I then summarize the key events, actions, decisions, and outcome
for the first crisis from 1981 until 1988. In the next section, I repeat this process for the
second crisis which commenced with the implication of Libya in the Pan Am Flight 103
bombing and ended with Libya extraditing the two suspects for trial in the Netherlands.
The third section considers the U.S. demands to bring a final resolution to Pan Am Flight
103 and to address Libya's terrorism and WMD policies. This third crisis commenced on
September 11 th, 2001 and ended with Qadhafi abandoning Libya's WMD programs on 19
December 2003. In the final section, I test the predictions from the two hypotheses for
coercion failure against the actual outcomes in these three crises.
A word of caution is warranted before proceeding further. Unlike the Iraq and
Serbia cases for which, as a result of Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic's removal
from power, there has emerged a variety of sources on their perceptions and motivations,
Qadhafi continues to rule Libya. Scant information is available about his beliefs or his
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intentions during these crises. My analysis therefore proceeds on my interpretation of
how Qadhafi would likely have perceived the facts presented to him. I base this on his
reactions to certain events and on previous research as to what motivates such
charismatic leaders of personalist regimes.
THE HISTORY OF LIBYA AND RISE OF QADHAFI
Modern Libya consists of the three historic tribal provinces in the Sahara Desert:
Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan (see Map 6.1). These regions form a landmass
roughly the size of Alaska. In 1951 Libya had a population of under a million with the
majority settled along the winding Mediterranean coastline 724 Italy wrested control of
the region from the Ottoman Empire in 1911 and following World War II, the colony fell
under the jurisdiction of the British and the French. With the encouragement of the
United Nations, Libya was granted its independence in 1951 with the establishment of the
monarchy of King Idris al-Sanusi.72 s At the time, Libya was one of the poorest countries
in the world.
Given their ethnic heterogeneity, along with their harsh treatment under fascist
Italian rule, the tribes were reluctant to form a strong central government. Instead they
formed a loosely federated system with each province (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and
Fezzan) each preserving a great deal of political and economic autonomy.
724 United Nations Population Division (2008) World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision
http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp accessed 19 October 2009.
725 For a Chronology of the history of Libya from 1951 see Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) "Chronology 1951-
1996" in Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building Ithaca: Cornell University Press
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King Idris chose his advisors and filled key governmental positions on the basis
of tribal and family loyalty.72 6 Incompetent and corrupt, his ministries and
administrative offices funneled what meager revenues it garnered from British and U.S.
contracts to the king and his cronies.72 7
726 Pelt, Adrian (1970) "Chapter 2" Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned
Decolonization New Haven: Yale University Press
727 Federal revenues were quite significant, given Libyan's minuscule agricultural based economy,
accounting for 35 percent of Libya's GNP in 1960. Luciani, Giacomo (1987) "Allocation versus
Production States: A Theoretical Framework" Beblawi, hazem and Giamcomo Luciani ed The Rentier
State New York: Croom Helm
374
Ethnic Groups
Arab, Arab,8erber [ Tebeu
Beber eAu Solected tribe
Touareg Uninhabited
Geographical region or area
Map 6.1: Libya7 28
U.S. Interests in Libya
During the Cold War, U.S. strategic interests in Libya were minimal, but did
include basing rights at Wheelus Air Base outside Tripoli to train NATO aircrew and, if
728 CIA (1974) "Libya Population: Map No. 501564" www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/libya.html accessed 23
October 2009
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necessary, forward deploy Strategic Air Command bombers. Still these security matters
were relatively minor compared to the significant economic interests generated by the
discovery of large deposits of high quality sweet crude oil under the Sahara in 1959 and
the rapid expansion of Libyan oil production which followed.729
The Impact of Oil on Libya: 1960 - 1969
The discovery of oil beneath the desert sands produced an economic bonanza for
Libya but it also placed a strain on its weak federal government. In 1963 King Idris
strengthened his powers through constitutional changes aimed at solving property rights
over oil fields which straddled various provinces and at constructing a national oil
pipeline. Beyond this, however, his government remained patronage based, though the
distribution of wealth was now on a much larger scale. Libya had risen rapidly to
become the world's fourth largest oil producer, its population had doubled to just over
two million, and its annual per capita income had soared from $60 in 1960 to now over
$2,000 in 1969.730
1969 Military Coup of the Revolutionary Command Council and Rise of Colonel
Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi
Though King Idris had spent nearly two decades on the throne, in 1969 his regime
remained fragile. He had been unable to monopolize the use of force within Libya and
therefore lacked a key Weberian element of sovereignty which ultimately led to his
undoing. Libya had two separate armies. Those most loyal to the king were in the
police, local militias, and the well-armed and British-trained Cyrenaican Defense Force
719 Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 47, 49
730 Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 50
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(CDF), which provided for the king's personal security. These forces totaled 14,000 and
their personnel were recruited from tribes most loyal to Idris.731 The other armed force
was the Royal Libyan Army (RLA) which numbered 6,500. The RLA had been formed
by the British during WWII and its soldiers were recruited predominantly from Libya's
lower middleclass. These soldiers had few personal or tribal ties to the monarch. The
primary function of the RLA was the employment of Libya's lower classes, not the
defense of Libya.7 32 With King Idris's newfound oil wealth, he supplied his CDF with
modern weapons and procured expensive Western air defense systems and jet fighters.
Fearing a heavily-armed RLA, however, he refused their requests for modern weapons.733
King Idris' concerns proved justified. On 1 September 1969, twelve junior
officers, the self-proclaimed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), staged a bloodless
coup. The Royal Libyan Army quickly rallied behind the RCC and, within a matter of
days Libya was under their control. King Idris, who was out of the country seeking
medical attention, drew little support from an apathetic Libyan population. The RCC
actions were largely ignored by the people and the coup was tacitly condoned by the
CDF, who chose to remain in their barracks rather than fight. On the international front,
the U.S. moved quickly to recognize the new regime and the British followed suit, once
King Idris had accepted exile in Egypt. 734
731 Metz, Helen C (1987) "Chapter 5 National Security: Origins of the Modem Armed Forces" Libya: A
Country Study Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress www.country-
data/frd/cs/lytoc.html#ly0000 accessed 21 Oct 2009
732 Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 56
733 Idris denied the RLA's requests for armored vehicles and artillery. Metz, Helen C (1987) "Chapter 5
National Security: Origins of the Modem Armed Forces" Libya: A Country Study Washington: Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress www.country-data/frd/cs/lyioc.html#lyOOOO accessed 21 Oct 2009
734 Metz, Helen C (1987) "Chapter 1 Independent Libya: The September 1969 Coup" Libya: A Country
Study Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress www.country-
data/frd/cs/lytoc.html#ly0000 accessed 21 Oct 2009
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Mu'ammar Al'Qadhafi soon emerged as the RCC's leader. The charismatic
twenty-seven-year-old army captain assumed the rank of colonel when the RCC named
him their chairman and the commander-in-chief of the Libyan Armed Forces.735
Qadhafi was born in 1942 into a Bedouin tribe near the town of Surt on the Gulf
of Sidra, midway between Libya's largest cities of Tripoli and Benghazi (see Map 6.2).
Tribal affiliation barred Qadhafi from attending university and, as with many of his
fellow RLA officers, a military career was the only option available for social
mobility. 736 Emulating Egyptian President, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Qadhafi joined a small
revolutionary group as an army cadet. This clandestine group, modeled after Nasser's
"Free Officers Movement" with its Pan Arab goals, formed the core of the RCC.737 Only
after the coup, however, did Qadhafi emerge as the RCC's leader, though he would not
exert power independent of the cabal until 1975, following a failed coup attempt by two
of its members. 738
Qadhafi's aspirations were not limited to ruling Libya but extended to a desire for
prestige and respect from the Arab world at large. After the death of Nasser in 1970,
Qadhafi proclaimed himself successor to Pan Arabism.739 This, in part, motivated
Qadhafi to adopt his anti-Western and anti-Israeli policies to support international
terrorist groups and seek nuclear weapons.740
7" Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 63
736 Metz, Helen C (1987) "Chapter 1 Independent Libya: Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command
Council" Libya: A Country Study Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
www.country-data/frd/cs/lytoc.html#lyOOOO accessed 21 Oct 2009
17 Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1960) The Philosophy of the Revolution Cairo: National Publication House Press
738 New York Times (5 August 1975) "Paper in Cairo Reports A Coup in Libya Foiled" New York Times
739 Vandewalle, Dirk ed. (2008) Libya Since 1969: Qadhafi's Revolution Revisited New York: Palgrave
MacMillan 35
740 Libya's nuclear ambitions are covered in more detail later in this chapter.
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Libya under the RCC and Qadhafi: 1969-1975
The RCC initially focused on incorporating the CDF into its ranks in order to gain
the monopoly on violence which had eluded King Idris and led to his downfall. The
741 CIA (1993) "Libya: Base 801963 (R00515) 5: 93" www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/libya pol93.jpg
accessed 23 October 2009
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RCC also ordered the removal of all foreign troops from Libyan soil and both Britain and
the U.S. complied, evacuating their forces in 1970.742 This policy, however, forfeited -
Libya its two major weapons suppliers. To fill this void, Libya entered into a long-term
arms deal with the Soviet Union.743
In 1971 Qadhafi also commenced domestic reforms aimed at restructuring Libyan
politics. He dismantled the government's tribal system and attempted to create a single
political party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Qadhafi soon grew disillusioned,
however, by the inability of the ASU either to mobilize the population or to replace the
existing bureaucracy. Consequently, he initiated his "Popular Revolution" in 1973.744
By 1975, Qadhafi had published the Green Book, which provided his blueprint for a
socialist Libya. He called for the destruction of the existing system of government, to be
replaced by Local Basic People's Conferences and Worker People's Committees, which
directly elected representatives to a national General People's Conference. 74 5 While the
Popular Revolution succeeded in destroying what remained of Libya's political structure,
Qadhafi failed to replace it with functioning institutions. The new ministries were even
more inefficient than those before, having overlapping jurisdictions and redundant
functions, and being administered by uneducated and undertrained, incompetent
bureaucrats. 746
742 New York Times (19 September 1969) "Libya Not To Renew U.S. Air Base Lease" New York Times
743 Libya also purchased arms from France. Davis, Brian (1990) Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the
US. Attack on Libya New York: Praeger 14
744 Tanner, Henry (19 April 1973) "Libyan Chief Pessimistic on Arab Cause" New York Times
741 Qaddafi, M. Al (2005) The Green Book Ithaca: Ithaca Press 19
746 Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 70
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In addition to political change, Qadhafi also envisioned dramatic economic and
socialist reform. 747 His most successful move came in 1973 when he nationalized
foreign oil companies, which had been predominantly British and American. 748 This,
combined with the spike in global crude oil prices and Libya's increased oil production,
generated an enormous revenue stream which Qadhafi at least partially diverted to such
domestic issues as health care, education, housing, agricultural and industrial reforms,
and an increase in the minimum wage. While Qadhafi made funding available to these
projects, Libya unfortunately lacked the functioning governmental institutions to
efficiently implement most of them. With Libya's growing reserves, Qadhafi also spent
liberally on modernizing Libya's military, on instituting a nuclear program, and on aid to
foreign insurgents and terrorist groups.749
By the end of 1974, the issue of how to deal with this enormous inflow of oil
revenues generated an ideological split within the RCC over the broader question of the
role of government and private property. In 1975, a drop in global crude prices and the
resulting dip in revenues exacerbated differences within the RCC. Several members
objected to Qadhafi's continued liberal spending. 750 Two RCC members responsible for
the ministries of planning and finance, orchestrated an unsuccessful coup in August of
747 Qaddafi, M. Al (2005) The Green Book Ithaca: Ithaca Press 33
748 Tanner, Henry (14 May 1973) "Libyan Predicts Oil Will Become Defense Weapon: Qaddafi, at a Long
Meeting With Press, Cites Right to Nationalize Resources" New York Times, New York Times (15 June
1973) "Bunker Hill Naitonalization Will Cause $4-Billion Loss" New York Times,
749Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 66
750 Tanner, Henry (24 May 1975) "Libyans Confirm Soviet Arms Deal; But Embassy Terms Cairo's Report
'Wrong in Details' Sale Put at $800-Million" New York Times, (14 Jan 1975) "Libya Seeks Arab Experts
To Become Nuclear Power" New York Times Qadhafi was accused of involvement in coup or terrorist plots
in Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, The Philippines, Israel (15 Jan 1974) "Tunis Backs off from Libya Union" New
York Times, (25 May 1974) "Sadat Says Qadaffi Virtually Sabotaged Egypt's War Effort: Warning by
Sudan" New York Times, Schanberg, Sydney (21 June 1974) "Moslem Rebels Remain Major Problem for
Marcos; A Conference Issue Libya Accused" New York Times,De Onis, Juan (6 Oct 1974) "Arab Guerillas
Shrug Off Split; Aid to Talks Sign of Arab Opinion Maxists' Breakaway Seen Helping Cause of Top
Palestinian Group" New York Times.
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1975.751 Qadhafi used the event to consolidate his power base, gutting the RCC of its
decision-making authority and reducing its membership to himself and four loyal
members. He was now in a position to more fully implement his revolutionary reforms
by dismantling what remained of Libya's legal and political institutions.
Over the next five years, Qadhafi carried out the Green Book reforms. The
People's Committees spread rapidly throughout Libya while the economy was
progressively nationalized. Still, the People's Committees' purview was restricted as
Qadhafi continued to control the keys to his regime's survival: the police, the army, and
the oil.752
Qadhafi's Confrontation with the West
Along with his own revolution, Qadhafi also encouraged foreign groups in their
revolutionary pursuits. His government became directly involved with the planning and
participation in various foreign insurgencies and terrorist activities. By the end of the
1970s, however, these interventionist policies had alienated not only his North African
neighbors but also the majority of Arab states in the Middle East. 753 In addition,
Qadhafi's foreign policy was perceived by the United States as increasingly hostile to
U.S. interests. Tensions escalated as the U.S. accused Qadhafi of supporting several
international terrorist organizations, attempting to annex Chad, intervening in sub-
Saharan Africa, attempting to obstruct the Middle East peace process, and attempting to
75 New York Times (5 August 1975) "Paper in Cairo Reports A Coup in Libya Foiled" New York Times
752 Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 99
753 Vandewalle, Dirk (2008) Libya Since 1969 New York: Palgrave Macmillan 35
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develop a nuclear weapons program.754 In 1978, following Qadhafi's denunciation of the
Camp David Accords, a frustrated Carter administration placed Libya on its list of state
sponsors of terrorism, imposed an arms embargo and, in February 1980, closed the U.S.
embassy in Tripoli.755
CRISIS I: 1981 - 1988: President Reagan versus Colonel Qadhafi
In January 1981, President Ronald Reagan entered the White House promising to
restore America's military power and prestige. 756 Libya provided low-hanging fruit for a
more confrontational U.S. foreign policy as Qadhafi was outspoken in his support of
international terrorist groups, Libya had also recently invaded Chad and was actively
developing nuclear and chemical weapons programs.757 Reagan demanded Libya change
its policies though, privately, the White House did not believe such changes were likely.
The administration's approach combined overt and covert military and intelligence
operations with diplomatic and economic sanctions in an attempt to coerce, contain, and
weaken Qadhafi's regime.758
Militarily, President Reagan provoked a crisis by approving U.S. Naval exercises
off the coast of Libya, exercises previously disapproved by President Carter. These were
designed to elicit a response from Qadhafi by challenging Libya's territorial claims to the
7 CIA Vandewalle, Dirk (2008) Libya Since 1969 New York: Palgrave Macmillan 35, Haley, P. Edward
(1984) Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969 New York: Praegar 224
755 New York Times (8 February 1980) "U.S. Diplomats Leave Libya" New York Times For a review of
alleged Libyan activities during this period see Haley, P. Edward (1984) "Chapter 7: Repression and Terror
at Home, Death Squads Abroad" Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969 New York: Praegar
756 The Sandinista government in Nicaragua was also targeted by the new Reagan Administration.
"' Woodward, Bob (1987) Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 London: Headline 96
758 Davis, Brian (1990) Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the US. Attack on Libya New York: Praeger
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Gulf of Sidra.759 A military confrontation ensued on 19 August 1981 when two Libyan
Su-22 attack jets fired air-to-air missiles at U.S. F-14s operating south of the 320 30"
north latitude, Qadhafi's self-proclaimed "line of death." Both Libyan fighters were
subsequently shot down by the F- 14s. 760
A month later, the Reagan administration leaked to the press that it had
intelligence on Qadhafi threatening to assassinate Reagan in retaliation for the Gulf of
Sidra incident. 761 The U.S. recalled all American citizens from Libya in December of
1981 and placed a unilateral boycott on Libyan oil. While the administration attempted
to elicit international support for sanctions against Libya, the unwillingness of the White
House to release any evidence of the alleged assassination attempt undermined these
efforts. As a result, when Reagan announced additional sanctions against Libya in
February and March of 1982, even the United States' staunchest allies refused to go
along with U.S. policy.762
A History of United States Sanctions of Libya
Since 1972, the United States had employed a series of unilateral economic and
diplomatic sanctions against Libya which had reduced formal diplomatic ties and
restricted trade to nominal levels (see Table 6.2 below for history of sanctions). While
Libyan oil accounted for $7.8 billion, or roughly 10% of U.S. crude imports, and
American exports were at $462 million per annum in 1980, President Reagan's sanctions
759 Since 1973 Libya claimed the Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters. Pasha, Aftab Kamal (1984) Libya and
the United States: Qadhafi's Response to Reagan's Challenge New Delhi, India: Ddtente Publications 8
760 Weaver, Warren (19 August 1981) "International Dispute Is Centered On Status of Mediterranean Gulf'
New York Times
761 Anderson, Jack (13 October 1981) "Qaddafi Is Said To Voice Threat Against Reagan" Washington Post
Woodward, Bob (1987) Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 London: Headline 167
762 Gwertzman, Bernard (26 Feb 1982) "U.S. Decision to Embargo Libyan Oil is Reported; Embargo
Decision Reported" New York Times
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forced U.S. imports to drop to only $9 million and exports to less than $200 million by
1985. 763
Date Diplomatic or Economic Sanction to Libya
1972 U.S. Ambassador leaves Tripoli
1973 U.S. prohibits sale of weapons
1978 U.S. Arms Embargo
1980 U.S. removes remaining diplomats and expels six Libyan
diplomats from its Washington Embassy
6 May, 1981 U.S. closes Libyan Washington Embassy
7 May, 1981 U.S. warns citizens travel to Libya is hazardous and urges
U.S. oil companies to begin orderly withdrawal from Libya
October 1981 U.S. orders all U.S. citizens from Libya
March 1982 U.S. bans all imports of Libyan oil
U.S. controls U.S. exports to Libya except food and medical
supplies
7 January 1986 U.S. banned remaining trade with Libya (except import of
news material and export of humanitarian supplies), banned
loans to Libyan govt, froze all Libyan assets, and banned
travel between U.S. and Libya (except journalistic)
21 April 1986 European Community reduces number of Libyans in official
capacities (embassy, press agencies, airlines) and makes it
more difficult to obtain non-diplomatic visas
Table 6.2: Diplomatic and Economic Sanctions of Libya, 1972-1986761
Increase in Libyan Terrorist Activities: 1983 - 1985
Despite U.S. efforts to coerce, contain, and weaken Libya through limited military
action and sanctions, Qadhafi continued to antagonize the Reagan administration. In
April of 1983, U.S. intelligence uncovered a shipment of Libyan weapons bound for the
communist Sandinista government in Nicaragua and in May of 1983, Libyan troops once
763 Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner 28-29
764 Niblock, Tim (200 1) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner 27-32
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again invaded Chad.76 s The bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon on 23
October 1983, though not directly linked to Qadhafi, produced a major shift in U.S.
foreign policy towards Libya. 766 The Marines were withdrawn and in April of 1984,
Reagan announced National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, establishing a
more aggressive response to terrorist groups and their state sponsors.767
Reagan's new foreign policy received an unexpected boost two weeks later when
Britain severed diplomatic ties with Libya following the killing of a female police officer
in front of the Libyan embassy in London.768 Yet it would not be until the end of 1985
that Reagan obtained sufficient evidence to take direct military action against Libya.
That year witnessed a series of hijackings and high profile killings linked to terrorist
organizations with Libyan ties, including Hezbollah, the Palestine Liberation
Organization, and the Tripoli-based Abu Nidal organization. In the span of seven
months, these groups carried out three airliner hijackings, one of which resulted in the
murder of a U.S. Navy sailor; the seizure of the cruise ship Achille Lauro and execution
of 69-year-old wheelchair-bound American, Leon Klinghofer; and the simultaneous
attacks on the Rome and Vienna airport two days after Christmas which killed a total of
twenty, including an eleven-year-old American girl.769
765 Libyan forces had intervened in Chad's civil war on three previous instances in 1978, 1979, and 1980-1.
Gwertzman, Bernard (21 Apr 1983) " Brazil Grounds 4 Libyan Planes Carrying Arms; U.S. Had Sought
Ban on Flights to Nicaragua Brazil to Block Libya Arms Flight" New York Times. Haley, P. Edward
(1984) Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969 New York: Praegar 3 19-21
766 Mohrs, Charles (24 October 1984) "Marines' Security Raises Questions" New York Times
767 Reagan, Ronald (26 April 1984) "National Security Council - National Security Decision Directive on
Combating Terrorism"
768 Nordheimer, Jon (18 April 1984) "Gunman in London in Libyan Embassy Fires Into Crowd: A Police
Officer is Killed" New York Times
769 15 June 1985 Hezbollah hijackers of a Trans World Airline jet kills U.S. Navy Petty Officer Robert
Stethem Tagliabue, John (2 Jul 1985) "Ex-Captives Say Gunmen Planned To Kill Military Men One by
One" New York Times, Tagliabue, John (8 Oct 1985) "Appeal by Captain: Unconfirmed Reports Say Some
on Board May Have Been Slain" New York Times, Associated Press (24 Nov 1985) "Egyptian Jet Hijacked
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On 7 January 1986 President Reagan announced "irrefutable evidence of
[Qadhafi's] role in these attacks," banned all trade with Libya, and ordered any remaining
U.S. nationals out of Libya.770 In addition, Reagan ordered a second carrier group to the
Mediterranean to conduct operations in the Gulf of Sidra.771 From January through
March, these two naval groups conducted monthly "Freedom of Navigation" exercises.
On the 2 4th of March, Libya fired SA-5, long-range, radar-guided, surface-to-air missiles
at U.S. Navy aircraft as they crossed over the "line of death." In response, and in
accordance with the White House's more aggressive rules of engagement, the U.S. Navy
not only destroyed the missile site, but also sank two Libyan patrol boats which were
approaching the fleet and severely damaged a third.772
Unlike the Gulf of Sidra incident in 1981, this time Qadhafi retaliated. On the 5th
of April, 1986 an explosion rocked a Berlin discotheque, killing two, including a U.S.
soldier. Most damning for the Libyans were encrypted messages between Libya's
embassy in East Berlin and Tripoli prior to and following the bombing. Intercepted and
deciphered by both the U.S. and British intelligence the messages implicated Qadhafi
with direct knowledge of the attack before it occurred.773 Finally, armed with this
"smoking gun," Reagan ordered air strikes on Libya.
to Malta; 3 or 4 Aboard Are Reported Slain" New York Times, Saxon, Wolfgang (28 December 1985)
"Airport Attacks Widely Deplored" New York Times
770 Reagan did not freeze Libyan financial assets and allowed humanitarian trade. Reagan, Ronald (7
January 1986) "The President's News Conference" www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=36812
accessed 1 Dec 09
771 National Security Council (8 January 1986) "National Security Decision Direction 205: Annex: Acting.
Against Libyan Support of International Terrorism" www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2712a.gif accessed I
Dec 2009
772 Weinraub, Bernard (25 March 1986) "In Disputed Area: Libya Says It Downed 3 Jets, but Washington
Reports No Losses" New York Times
773 Woodward, Bob (1987) Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 London: Headline 444
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El Dorado Canyon: 15 April 1986
In the early hours of 15 April 1986, U.S. Air Force F-1 I1s conducted night strikes
on three targets in Tripoli while U.S. Navy A-6Es simultaneously attacked two targets in -
Banghazi. The United States codenamed this joint operation El Dorado Canyon.
The targeting process for the air strikes had commenced six months prior as
intelligence and operational planners formulated military options to respond to the
increase in terrorist activities linked to Libya. Following the Berlin discotheque
bombing, the White House approved five targets. These were selected based on three
criteria: proportionality and attacking targets with direct links to Libyan terrorist
activities, limited collateral damage potential, and minimum risk to U.S. aircrew.
Despite collateral damage issues, two of the targets selected were in urban areas:
the Bad Al-Aziziyah Barracks in Tripoli and the Benghazi Military Barracks. Bad Al-
Aziziyah was by far the most lucrative target as the compound served as headquarters for
Libyan terrorist operations. It also contained Qadhafi's residence along with his personal
security detachment. The Benghazi barracks served as an alternative command center
and provided visiting quarters for representatives of various international terrorist groups.
A third target, the Murat Sidi Bilal Training Camp, specialized in training naval
commandos for terrorist attacks against naval vessels. While it fit nicely into the
targeting criteria, what made it most attractive was its location outside of Tripoli, which
reduced the potential for collateral damage, and along the coast, which reduced the threat
to U.S. jets from Libyan surface-to-air weapons. In addition, two airfields were targeted.
One in Tripoli was home to Libya's transport aircraft. These had been used to support
operations in Chad, as well as to deliver weapons to support terrorist activities abroad.
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The other airfield, near Benghazi, was the base for Libya's MiG 23 Flogger interceptors.
Though the airfield was not directly connected to terrorist activities, they were targeted to
prevent Libyan fighters from threatening the U.S. strike packages. 774
The three Tripoli targets were allocated to the USAF 48th Fighter Wing located at
RAF Lakenheath, England. The wing operated the high-tech, supersonic, terrain-
following F-1 IIFs equipped with the (then) advanced PAVE TACK infra-red targeting
system capable of delivering multiple 2,000-pound laser-guided bombs from low altitude.
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher approved the launch of the strike package from
English soil once she had been briefed on its targets. Neither France nor Spain approved
the U.S. request to transit their airspace, forcing the F- 111s to fly a much longer,
circuitous routing to Libya via the Straits of Gibraltar. 775
The results of the attacks were billed by the White House as a success although,
tactically, the battle damage assessment of the F- 111 strikes was far from stellar. Of the
eighteen F-Ills, one aircraft was shot down and its aircrew lost, and five aircraft aborted
due to either equipment failure or aircrew navigational error. This left only twelve
aircraft to deliver their bomb loads.776 The F- 111 attacks which employed freefall
77 Stanik, Joseph T. (2003) El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi Annapolis, Md:
Naval Institute Press 150
775 The impact of increasing the enroute mission length from 4 to six and a half hours by diverting around
France and Spain was twofold. First the increase in flight time increased the likelihood that the F- 1 Is
offensive and defensive systems would become inoperable. The 1960s and 70s electronic equipment was
susceptible to overheating and the longer the mission the more likely these systems would go offline.
Indeed two of the 18 F-Ills failed their systems checks just prior to entering Libya. Stanik, Joseph T.
(2003) El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press
183. Though it cannot be confirmed that the increase in flight time was responsible, it was likely a
contributing factor. Second the 6 /2 hours enroute was at night in formation on a tanker. This demanding
flying increased aircrew fatigue, which contributed to the poor aircrew performance in misidentifying
targets and improperly employing weapons.
776 One aircraft mismanaged its refueling drop off point and missed its target window. Two other aircraft
failed their systems check. One aircraft was hit by Libyan surface-to-air fire and the aircrew drowned after
ejecting over the Mediterranean. Two aircraft had systems malfunctions on their bomb runs and one
aircrew aborted when unable to identify the assigned radar offset point. For a discussion on the tactical
389
munitions on the Tripoli airfield went relatively well, destroying two and damaging three
of Libya's nine transport planes. However, of the precision attacks on the two remaining
targets only one third of the bombs hit their mark. The fewest hits came from the attacks
made on Qadhafi's headquarters. Only three of the nine designated jets actually
employed their weapons and of these three, only two acquired their targets. Although
bombs fell inside the compound, none were direct hits against the buildings they were
assigned. Damage to Qadhafi's residence, however, was visible and significant. Qadhafi
reported serious injuries to two of his six sons and the death of a one-and-a-half-year old
adopted daughter. 777 One aircrew misidentified its target offset point and released bombs
onto a nearby neighborhood, killing seventeen Libyan civilians and damaging the French
embassy.778
The U.S. Navy fared better with their twin strikes at Benghazi, with 11 out of
their 14 strike aircraft reaching their designated targets. 779 The airfield was surprised as it
still had its lights on which made it relatively easy for the six A-6Es to identify and
destroy six Libyan aircraft on the ramp, including two MiG 23s on ground alert.
Simultaneously, five A-6Es pounded the Benghazi Military Barracks each releasing a
employment of the F-I I IFs see Stanik, Joseph T. (2003) "Chapter 6: Operation El Dorado Canyon" El
Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press and Davis,
Brian L (1990) "Chapter 6: Operation El Dorado Canyon and Its Aftermath" Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the
Origins of the US. Attack on Libya New York: Praeger
777 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (17 April 1986) "Al Qadhdhafi Appears on TV" Daily
Report FBIS-SOV-86-074
778 In addition the Austrian, Iranian, and Swiss Embassies were superficially damaged. Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) (15 April 1986) "Civilians, Embassies Targeted" Daily Report FBIS-SAS-86-
072, Stanik, Joseph T. (2003) El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi Annapolis,
Md: Naval Institute Press 189, 207 Davis, Brian L (1990) Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S.
Attack on Libya New York: Praeger, 141
779 Davis, Brian L (1990) Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the US. Attack on Libya New York:
Praeger, 139
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stick of sixteen 500-pound bombs. Unfortunately, two bombs missed wide of the
barracks, damaging houses in an adjacent neighborhood and killing five civilians.780
Libyan Response to El Dorado Canyon
Libya responded to El Dorado Canyon in three ways. First, officials called for
immediate reprisal attacks against America and Britain.781 Within 24 hours of the air
raids, Libya launched two SS-1 Scud B surface-to-surface missiles. These missiles
splashed two miles offshore of a U.S. Coast Guard aid-to-navigation station in the middle
of the Mediterranean on the small Italian island of Lampedusa, two hundred miles north
of Tripoli. 782
Second, for nearly a month, there was a spike in retaliatory terrorist attacks.
Separate shootings of U.S. State Department personnel left two wounded in the Sudan
and Yemen. In Beirut, one American and three British citizens were kidnapped and
executed. In addition, two bomb plots were foiled in London and another two in
Turkey. 783
Third, although there was an initial flurry of activity in the immediate aftermath
of El Dorado Canyon, over time the number of Libyan-supported terrorist attacks
780 Bolger, Daniel P (1988) Americans at War: 1975-1986, An Era of Violent Peace Novato, CA: Presidio
Press, 423. Stanik, Joseph T. (2003) El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi
Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press 192-3, Davis, Brian L (1990) Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of
the US. Attack on Libya New York: Praeger, 140
781 Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Middle East & Africa (15 April 1986) "Foreign Liaison
Bureau Issues Statement on Raids," "Attack Everything American" Daily Report FBIS-MEA-86-072
782 Miller, Judith (April 16 1986) "Italian Island, a Libyan Target, Escapes Unscathed" New York Times
Dionne, E.J. (20 April 1986) "Italian Promises To Answer Terror" New York Times
783 BBC (17 April 1986) "1986: British Journalist McCarthy kidnapped" BBC online
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/I 7/newsid _4693000/4693188.stm accessed 14 Dec 2009,
Davis, Brian L (1990) Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the US. Attack on Libya New York:
Praeger, 158
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significantly decreased from nineteen in 1986, to seven in 1987, to only five in 1988.
This decrease is attributable to three factors. First, the El Dorado Canyon strikes had a
direct impact on Qadhafi, who was visibly shaken by the bombing. He withdrew from
Tripoli to his desert residence, where he was better insulated from potential U.S. air
strikes or coup attempts. Following the strikes, Qadhafi also proved far less adversarial,
publicly toning down his rhetoric regarding the U.S. and terrorism. Second, Libya's
policy shifted away from direct involvement in the planning and executing of terrorist
attacks and more towards the indirect support of terrorist groups.785 Finally, in the wake
of the Berlin discotheque bombing, with evidence that Libya was directly responsible for
terrorist activities in Western Europe, European states now began to enforce measures to
reduce Libya's capability to conduct terrorist attacks by limiting the number of Libyan
embassy personnel authorized to be in country and restricting student visas.786
U.S. Actions After El Dorado Canyon
U.S. foreign policy, at least in the short run, convinced Libya to reduce its direct
involvement in terrorist activities. 787 Less successful were U.S. efforts at affecting
Libyan regime change, despite reports of infighting within the Libyan military and
several coup attempts prior to and in the immediate aftermath of El Dorado Canyon.78
784 U.S. Office of Secretary of State (1988) Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987 United States Department
of State: Washington D.C. 6, U.S. Office of Secretary of State (1989) Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988
United States Department of State: Washington D.C., 44. Although overall the number of terrorist attacks
decreased the last attack of 1988 was the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing which killed 270.
785 U.S. Office of Secretary of State (1989) Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988 United States Department
of State: Washington D.C., 44
786 U.S. Office of Secretary of State (1988) "Introduction" Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987 United
States Department of State: Washington D.C., U.S. Office of Secretary of State (1989) "Introduction"
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988 United States Department of State: Washington D.C.
787Jentleson, Bruce W (1991) "The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More
than Remaking Governments," Political Science Quarterly 106:1 (Spring) 64
788 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (16 April 1986) "Fighting Reported in Tripoli Between
Factions" Daily Report FBIS-MEA-86-073
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Though hopeful Qadhafi's regime would fall, by August of 1986 the U.S. realized this
was unlikely. The CIA had supported anti-Qadhafi dissident groups for over a year but
these proved weak and disorganized, and subsequent coup attempts were thwarted by
Qadhafi's personal security force. 789 In mid-August, President Reagan approved a series
of deception and disinformation operations aimed at encouraging further Libyan domestic
opposition. 790 The Administration discontinued its involvement in October, however,
when The Washington Post made these covert operations public.791 This revelation,
combined with the easing of Qadhafi's rhetoric, the decrease in direct Libyan
involvement in terrorist attacks, and the distractions of the Iran-Contra affair to Reagan's
national security team brought this crisis to an only partially resolved stalemate.
ANALYSIS OF CRISIS I: 1981 - 1988
Though tensions between the United States and Libya had begun to rise in the
waning years of the Carter administration, it was President Reagan's aggressive foreign
policy against Libya in 1981 which initiated this crisis. The U.S. adopted two policy
objectives with regard to Libya. First was the demand for Libya to stop its terrorist
attacks and to discontinue supporting terrorist organizations. The U.S. employed a
punishment strategy to back up these demands with sanctions and limited air strikes
intended to increase the cost to Qadhafi for continuing his policies. U.S.-only sanctions
proved ineffective, however, as Reagan was unable to garner international support for a
multilateral approach.
789 Woodward, Bob (1986) "Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan" Washington Post
790 Woodward, Bob (1987) Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 London: Headline 474-5.
Reagan, Ronald (16 August 1986) "Libya Policy" National Security Decision Directives 234, contents
remain classified
791 Woodward, Bob (1986) "Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan" Washington Post
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A second objective, rather than a coercive demand, was the brute force removal of
Qadhafi from power. Though the White House did not publicly declare this aim, El
Dorado Canyon's direct targeting of Qadhafi's compound and subsequent U.S. covert
operations in Libya were designed to weakened Qadhafi's regime and encourage internal
opposition.
Though the U.S. employed force on several occasions in the early 1980s in a tit-
for-tat response to Libyan actions, it was not until the El Dorado Canyon airstrikes that
the U.S. succeeded in convincing Qadhafi to at least partially change his policies. After
an initial flurry of retaliatory attacks in the immediate aftermath of the airstrikes, the
number of terrorist events linked to Libya fell noticeably over the course of the next three
years. Libya also dropped its open assistance for international terrorist organizations
though, according to the U.S. State Department, it continued to provide a limited amount
of money, arms and training to up to 30 such groups. These included radical pro-
Palestinian organizations, as well as other national movements such as the Japanese Red
Army (JRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). 92 In addition, European
states reduced the number of Libyan officials and students allowed into Western Europe,
which further limited the ability of Libya to conduct attacks. In light of Qadhafi's half-
hearted change in Libya's terrorism policy, the absence of public concessions, and the
eventual return of Libyan attacks with the Pan Am bombing in December of 1988, I code
this coercive outcome as a partial failure (see Table 6.3).
792 U.S. Office of Secretary of State (1990) Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989 United States Department
of State: Washington D.C., 47
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Table 6.3: Typology of Coercion and Brute Force: U.S. versus Libya, 1981 - 1988
In regard to its objective of regime change, the U.S. failed in its efforts either to
kill Qadhafi or to foment a coup to remove him from power. The White House claimed
the airstrike on the Bad Al-Aziziyah Barracks was not an assassination attempt but an
attack on Libya's terrorist operations headquarters. This explanation is undermined,
however, by the fact the U.S. knew the compound contained Qadhafi's personal
residence. In addition, the U.S. assigned a large proportion of F- 1 Is, nine of 18, to
attack the compound. Whether this can be characterized as an assassination attempt or
not, the attack failed to decapitate Qadhafi's regime.
U.S. covert actions also failed either to weaken Qadhafi or to stiffen dissident
resolve enough to remove him from power. Though there were several coup attempts
and serious infighting within the Libyan military, these efforts proved ultimately
unsuccessful.
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Period Level of Demands Type of Threat United States
(Denial or Foreign Policy
Punishment) Outcome
January 1981 Core Demand Punishment Partial Failure
- 1988 Policy Change - unilateral of Coercion
- Stop terrorist sanctions - Libya reduced,
activities - airstrikes but did not stop,
- Stop support of terrorist attacks
terrorist groups - Libya stopped
overt support of
terrorist groups,
BruteForcebut continuedBrute Force
Objectivecovert supportObetiveChe - Pan Am Flight
Regie Chnge103 Bombing
December 1988
Brute Force
Failure
No regime
sanctions___ - Libychange
This crisis eventually devolved into a stalemate. While Qadhafi did not concede
to U.S. demands, he did reduce the number of terrorist attacks and shifted to covert
support of terrorist groups, albeit in an effort to avoid any more "smoking guns." In
addition, the Reagan administration's bungling the management of covert operations and
the distractions of the Iran-Contra affair weakened the White House's resolve to further
press its demands on Libya. The net effect was U.S. unilateral sanctions that were far too
weak to credibly back up U.S. demands.
ANAL YSIS OF EXPLANA TIONS FOR COERCION OUTCOME
In this section, I assess the predictions from the survival and commitment
hypotheses for coercion (see Table 6.4). For this case the United States made the
compellent demand for Libya to change its foreign policy of terrorism and the support of
terrorist groups. The actual coercion outcome was a partial failure. Libya reduced the
number of attacks it conducted and shifted from overt to covert support of terrorist groups
but Libyan terrorist activities continued, as witnessed in the December, 1988 Pan Am
Flight 103 bombing. This is an interesting case for testing the two explanations for
coercion outcomes in that the survival and commitment hypotheses make divergent
predictions, both of which at least partially fail to accurately forecast the actual coercion
outcome.
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Core Survival Commitment Actual
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Coercion
Demands Outcome
January 1981 Policy Predicts Predicts Partial Failure
- 1988 Change Success Failure of Coercion
- Stop - Conceding did - U.S. deployed U.S. - Libya reduced,
terrorist not threaten two U.S. Navy carrier but did not stop,
activities Libyan state, battle groups that terrorist attacks
-regime, or could credibly 
back - Libya stopped
sp Qadhafi's up with force, overt support of
support of leadership additional demands terrorist groups, but
terrorist for Libyan policy continued covert
groups change support
- Pan Am Flight
103 Bombing
Hypothesis Hypoth sDecember 1988
Table 6.4: Predictions of Coercion Outcome
TESTING HYPOTHESIS ON SURVIVAL
The survival hypothesis expects coercion to fail when a challenger's demand
threatens the survival of a target that has the means to resist. As in previous cases, I test
the survival hypothesis at three levels: the state, the regime, and the regime leadership.
If demands do not threaten any of these three, then the survival hypothesis predicts the
target to concede. Here, the survival hypothesis incorrectly predicts coercion success as a
Qadhafi concession was not likely to threaten the Libyan state, his regime, or his
leadership position. In point of fact, Qadhafi's grasp on power was fragile. He was
threatened by coups from within his government and military and by the further risk of
U.S. airstrikes targeting him directly.
Impact of Concession on the Libyan State
The U.S. demand for Libya to change its policy of terrorism and the support of
terrorist organizations did not threaten Libyan state survival. Compliance with this
demand would have abrogated Libyan control of neither its population nor its territory.
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Further, a concession would not have been costly. On the contrary, it could have had a
long term positive impact on Libya's oil dependent economy in the event of a repeal of
U.S. sanctions.
A concession would also likely have improved Libya's external security situation.
Its greatest threat came from the United States and Israel. Considering U.S. military
actions were a reaction to Qadhafi's terrorist policies, his repudiation of them would
likely have reduced the probability of future U.S. attacks. Israel also had the capacity to
conduct limited airstrikes against Libya as it had demonstrated against Iraq in its 1981
strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor. A change in policy which eliminated Libyan support
for the anti-Israeli organizations of Hezbollah, the PLO, and Abu Nidal would have
decreased the likelihood of a strike by easing tensions between the two countries.
In sum, the survival of the Libyan state would not have been threatened by
conceding its terrorist policies, rather such acquiescence would likely have decreased the
risk of attack by both the U.S. and Israel.
Impact of Concession on Qadhafi's Regime
As with Libyan state survival, a concession by Qadhafi was not likely to place his
regime at risk from domestic opposition groups. While a public concession would have
revealed Qadhafi's regime as weak, there were no organized groups within Libya in a
position to revolt against the government. It would be over a decade before radicalized
Islamic militants formed and gained sufficient strength to threaten the Qadhafi regime.
Also, as discussed in the previous section, a Qadhafi concession would actually have
reduced the likelihood of a U.S. or Israeli attacks against his regime.
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Impact of Concessions to Qadhafi's Leadership
In addition to analyzing state and regime survival, a final assessment is necessary
as to whether concession would have risked Qadhafi's leadership position within his
regime. Though Qadhafi held no public office, he ruled Libya as dictator of a personalist
regime. 793 Compared to military or single-party authoritarian regimes, or to democratic
states, leaders of personalist regimes are expected to suffer lower audience costs for
making concessions. 794 This audience cost argument is derived from a principal-agent
model, whereby the leader is the agent charged with carrying out the policy preferences
of the principals making up the regime. The principals can either reward or punish the
leader by keeping him in or removing him from office. The problem is that the principals
have limited information to judge the leader's performance and must extract how well the
leader adheres to their preferences on the basis of whether his policies succeed or fail. If
policies fail, the principals then punish the leader by removing him from power.
Audience cost is the leader's expectation as to whether principals will remove him from
power for making a policy concession. For a personalist regime, however, there are few -
principals likely to have the power to overthrow the leader.
According to this reasoning Qadhafi as head of his personalist regime, should not
have been overly concerned with the risk of a coup at his making a concession to the
United States. Resistance, however, did place his personal safety and that of his family at
risk, particularly if Libya continued to kill Americans. President Reagan had already
demonstrated a willingness to directly target Qadhafi himself, irrespective of U.S.
793 Geddes, Barbara (1999) Paper on authoritarianism presented at 1999 American Political Science
Association Conference www.uvm.edu/-cbeer/geddes/APSA99.htm accessed 16 Feb 2010
794 Weeks, Jessica L. (2008) "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve"
International Organization 62 (Winter) 35-64
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executive policy forbidding political assassination. If given further evidence of Libyan
terrorist actions Reagan would likely have ordered more strikes against him.795 The
expectation of low audience costs for conceding, combined with the risk of further U.S.
strikes for resisting, provided incentive for Qadhafi to acquiesce.
On a related point, a catalyst of this conflict was the anti-Western stance Qadhafi
adopted in order to increase his prestige within the Arab world. A confrontation with the
U.S. elevated his standing among Arab leaders. While he may have had little need for
concern about domestic audience costs, he did have to consider how a concession would
damage his reputation abroad.
In sum, the survival hypothesis predicts that for this crisis, concessions to U.S.
demands did not place Libya, Qadhafi, or his regime at risk. Libya, in fact, stood to gain
economic benefits at the lifting of U.S. sanctions. In addition, there were no domestic
opposition groups capable of threatening Qadhafi's regime and, as leader of a personalist
regime, the audience costs for conceding were likely to be low. Finally, while
acquiescing stood to damage Qadhafi's reputation in the Middle East, it would likely
have reduced the threat posed to Libya by the U.S. and Israel.
Though the survival hypothesis predicts coercion would succeed, the actual
outcome was a partial failure. What explains Qadhafi's unwillingness to publicly
concede to U.S. demands and his determination to maintain a terrorist network that would
later go on to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 in December of 1988?
795 CNN (4 November 2002) "U.S. Policy on Assassinations" CNN.COM Law Center
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LA W/ I 1/04/us.assasssinatiqn.policy/ accessed 9 March 2010
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A Weak Qadhafi and Reagan's Weakening Resolve
The explanation for the partial failure of U.S. coercive demands is linked to two
factors: the weakness of Qadhafi's leadership and the weakening resolve of Reagan to
make further threats of military force. First, Qadhafi's hold on power proved more
fragile than that expected for a ruler of a personalist regime. Following El Dorado
Canyon, Qadhafi was visibly shaken and retreated from Tripoli to his desert residence.
While this action made further U.S. airstrikes more difficult, it also enhanced Qadhafi's
personal security from coups. Discontent among sections of the Libyan Army and
several serious coup attempts in the days just prior to and after El Dorado Canyon
threatened Qadhafi's regime leadership. Given his tenuous position, the additional
humiliation of conceding to U.S. demands would have generated audience costs and thus,
provided an incentive for Qadhafi to resist. Instead, Qadhafi chose the mixed response of
only reducing the number of terrorist attacks which could be traced back to Libya,
thereby removing the casus bellum for further U.S. attacks. He accomplished this
without publicly conceding, sparing himself the domestic audience costs for revealing a
failed policy.
Second, President Reagan contributed to the partial failure of his coercive strategy
by making U.S. military action contingent on "smoking gun" evidence of Libyan
involvement in terrorist attacks. This decision is understandable in light of the
international blowback for taking military action without hard evidence. The cost of this
policy, however, was a reduction in the credibility of U.S. threats so long as Libya was
not overtly conducting terrorist operations. The subsequent exposure of U.S. covert
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operations in Libya, along with the fallout over the Iran-Contra affair, further reduced the
Reagan administration's latitude in threatening force.
In sum, Qadhafi was initially much more vulnerable to the threat of a coup than
that expected of a leader of a personalist regime. While he successfully avoided audience
costs by increasing his personal security and by not publicly conceding to the U.S., he
still reduced the level of Libyan terrorist operations to forestall further U.S. attacks. In
addition, U.S. threats of force were undermined by the unwillingness of the Reagan
administration to undertake further strikes without the hard evidence to quell
international and domestic opposition. It was the combination of these two factors which
produced a stalemate and the partial failure of U.S. foreign policy which sowed the seeds
for future conflict.
TESTING COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS
The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when the challenger
(U.S.) cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands once the target
(Libya) concedes. This commitment problem is also more likely to arise when the
challenger has sufficient military force deployed to back up additional demands. In this
crisis, the commitment problem for the U.S. appeared significant as it maintained naval
air power in the Mediterranean. Though this force was not enough to credibly back up
demands for territory or regime change, it likely would have been enough to back up
demands for additional Libyan policy changes. Policy disputes included Libya's claims
over the Gulf of Sidra, its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, its anti-Israeli stance,
and its intervention in Chad. The U.S. maintained a military presence in the region with
two carrier battle groups assigned to the U.S. Navy 6th fleet, which could be used to
402
enforce sanctions, to contest Libya's claims to the Gulf of Sidra, and to conduct airstrikes
against Libyan WMD facilities. The credible commitment hypothesis therefore predicts
that coercion would likely fail as Qadhafi would expect his cooperation only to lead to
more U.S. demands rather than to an end to the crisis.
While the commitment hypothesis correctly predicted Qadhafi would not publicly
concede, it did not anticipate the reduction in the level of Libya's terrorist operations.
Yet this decrease in activity was readily observed by the U.S. and signaled a weakening
resolve by Libya. This information introduced an incentive for the U.S. to make still
further demands, though it was, in fact, never acted upon.
In sum, the commitment hypothesis correctly predicted Qadhafi's public
resistance to U.S. demands. It did not, however, predict that Libya would reduce its level
of terrorist attacks and furthermore would incorrectly expect the U.S. to increase its
demands once a reduction in attacks was observed. What explains this partial divergence
in the commitment hypothesis expectations and the actual coercive outcome?
Explaining why Libya reduced its terrorist activities and why the U.S. did not increase
its demands
Why did Qadhafi reveal himself as weak to the U.S. by reducing the level of
Libyan terrorist activities? As I previously argued in testing the survival hypothesis,
Qadhafi's personal survival and that of his family was at risk of further U.S. airstrikes if
terrorist operations were linked directly back to Libya. Along with this threat the El
Dorado Canyon raid had encouraged several coup attempts and created dissent within the
Libyan Army. Qadhafi likely wanted to avoid a recurrence of such unrest.
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A closely related argument asserts that Qadhafi also learned from the El Dorado
Canyon raid that the U.S. would not hesitate to use force if Libya were caught red-handed
in direct involvement in terrorist attacks. This would explain why Qadhafi shifted from
overt to more covert support of terrorism. It also explains his willingness to reveal
himself publicly as weakly resolved, as he expected the U.S. to make no further attacks,
so long as Libya gave them no cause to do so.
An alternative explanation is that the decrease in Libyan attacks was a result of
the restrictions placed on student visas and personnel in Libya's Western European
embassies. These actions did decrease Libya's intelligence capacity in Europe and may
have reduced its ability to conduct operations such as it had in the Berlin discotheque
bombing. It did not, however, restrict Libyan operations outside of Europe, nor did it
prevent terrorist attacks such as that on Pan Am Flight 103, the bomb for which was
placed in checked luggage originating in Malta. This argument also does not explain
Qadhafi's shift from overt to covert support of foreign terrorist groups.
A second question is why the U.S. did not increase its demands when it observed
that Qadhafi had, in fact, modified his terrorist policies. The U.S. simply was not willing
to back up additional demands with the threat of force. As previously argued, U.S.
reluctance to conduct airstrikes without hard evidence, the leak of its covert operations in
Libya, and fallout over the Iran-Contra affair restrained the Reagan Administration from
exploiting the situation.
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U.S. VERSUS LIBYA CRISIS II: 1991- 1999, The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
By the end of Reagan's second term in office, relations between the U.S. and
Libya had stalemated. The election of George Bush in November 1988 was welcomed
by Qadhafi, who expressed his desire for a positive change in the relations with the
United States.796 Hopes of a rapprochement evaporated, however, along with two
hundred and seventy lives in the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland on 21 December 1988.
Accusations tying Libya to the bombing surfaced in the ensuing investigation. By
October 1990, the detonator for the Pan Am Flight 103 bomb was determined to be the
same design as that employed in the later bombing of French Union des Transports
Aeriens (UTA) Flight 772 over Niger on 19 September 1989. Both devices were traced
to a shipment of twenty detonators purchased from Syria by Libyan intelligence. In
addition, fragments of clothing in which the Pan Am bomb had been wrapped were
traced to a shop in Malta. The shopkeeper identified two men as having purchased the
clothing, Lamen Fhimah, station chief for Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta, and Abdel
Basset, the chief of Libyan Arab Airline security. Investigators could not, however,
establish a chain of responsibility for the bombing within the Libyan government and,
unlike the Berlin discotheque, were never able to show that Qadhafi had prior knowledge
of or had approved the attack.797
Upon completion of a lengthy investigation, the United States and Great Britain
issued indictments on 14 November 1991 against the two Libyans accusing them of
796 Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner 24
797 Horovitz, David (4 Sep 20009) "Gaddafi personally okayed Lockerbie bombing" The Jerusalem Post
www.jpost.com/home/article.aspx?id= 153846 accessed 27 June 2010
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placing the bomb in a suitcase aboard Malta flight KM18 bound for Frankfurt, where the
luggage was then transferred to Pan Am Flight 103 bound for New York via London. 798
U.S. and British Demands and Libya's Response: November 1991 - March 1992
On 27 November 1991, the United States and Britain released a joint declaration
demanding Libya:
-- surrender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept
responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials;
-- disclose all it knows of this crime, including the names of all those
responsible, and allow full access to all witnesses, documents and other
material evidence, including all the remaining timers;
-- pay appropriate compensation 799
Qadhafi refused, declaring there was no evidence of Libyan involvement in the
bombing and that he would not hand over the two suspects to stand trial in the U.S. or in
Britain.800 Libya's foreign minister instead suggested an international trial in a statement
he issued denying "...any Libyan connection with the aforementioned incident or any
knowledge of it by the Libyan authorities..." and calling "...on the United States and
Britain to apply the logic of law, wisdom, and reason by resorting to neutral international
investigation committees or to the International Court of Justice." 01 The U.S. quickly
rejected the offer as a disingenuous stalling tactic.802
798 United States Representative to the United Nations (23 December 1991) "United States District Court
for the District of Columbia Indictment for Abdel Basset and Lamen Fhimah" United Nations General
Assembly Security Council A/46/831 S/23317
www.daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N91/422/49/IMG/N9142259.pdf?Open element accessed
29 Dec 2009
799 Office of Press Secretary (27 Nov 1991) "Statement Announcing Joint Declarations on the Libyan
Indictments" American Presidency Project www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=20281 &st=&st I
accessed 29 Dec 2009
800 New York Times (29 Nov 1991) "Qaddafi Scoffs at Demands for Bombing Suspects"
801 Tripoli JANA (Jamahaniyyah News Agency) (15 November 1991) "People's Bureau Denies Lockerbie
Involvement" Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports FBIS-NES-91-221
802 Associated Press (16 November 1991) "Libya Denies Involvement in Pan Am Bombing" Washington
Post
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Libya went on to characterize the U.S. and British demands as political rather
than judicial since they required Libya to agree to compensation prior to a verdict and
without any evidence of Libyan state involvement. 803 On 18 January 1992 Libyan
officials informed the UN Security Council that it was invoking Article 14 of the 1971
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation and that Libya would be conducting its own judicial proceedings in lieu of
extradition.804
Libya's response satisfied neither the U.S. nor Britain and three days later, aided
by the support of France, they succeeded in pushing Resolution 731 through the UN
Security Council. This measure denounced the Libyan government for not effectively
cooperating with establishing those responsible for Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA flight
772. It also urged the Libyan government to provide a full and effective response to
contribute to the elimination of international terrorism. 805
In response, Qadhafi met with United Nations Secretary General Envoy Vasiliy
Safronchuk on 26 January 1992. Following the meeting Safronchuk announced that
Libya had agreed to cooperate with the UN, but that it had already begun its own legal
proceedings and would not extradite the two suspects. On 11 February the Libyan
representative to the UN informed the Secretary General that Libya would accede to
French demands regarding UTA Flight 722 and allow a French judge to travel to Tripoli
803 Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner 37
804 Koechler, Hans (6 February 1992) "Memorandum dated 6 February 1992 from the President of the
International Progress Organization addressed to the President of the Security Council of the United
Nations Concerning the dispute between Libya and members of the Seucrity Council over the inquiries into
the bombings of civilian airliners" United Nations Security Council A/46/886 S/23641 25 February 1992
805 United Nations Security Council (21 Jan 1992) "Resolution 731 (1992)" http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/0 10/90/IMG/NROO I 090.pdf?OpenElement accessed 29 Dec
2009
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to investigate the case. It would not, however, concede to U.S. and British demands for
extradition which Qadhafi claimed infringed on Libyan sovereignty. 806 In later talks with
the UN Envoy, Qadhafi cited a lack of trust as the primary reason for not allowing a trial
to take place on'either U.S. or British soil.807
Despite Qadhafi's efforts to avoid sanctions, the Security Council passed
Resolution 748 on 31 March 1992, which forbade the takeoff and landing of aircraft in
Libya, prohibited the supply of aircraft maintenance services and parts, prohibited the
sale or transfer of arms and military equipment as well as military technical advice or
training, and reduced the number of staff at Libyan diplomatic missions.8 08 Importantly,
however, the sanctions did not forbid the sale of Libyan oil, as Italy, Spain and Germany
were dependent on a continual flow of Libyan crude. 809 On 11 November 1993, with no
change in Qadhafi's position, the Security Council went on to pass Resolution 883, which
froze Libyan foreign financial assets, though not the funds from oil sales, and banned the
810
export of selected parts and equipment to supply Libya's oil production infrastructure.
Impact of Sanctions on Libya
The Libyan economy, almost entirely dependent on its oil exports, had stagnated
in the late 1980s as the global price of crude fell precipitously. Oil prices would remain
806 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (11 February 1992) "Report by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 4
of Security Council Resolution 731 (1992)" United Nations Security Council S/23574 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/062/33/PDF/N9206233.pdfOpenElement accessed 29 Dec 2009
807 Niblock, Tim (200 1) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner 39
808 United Nations Security Council (31 March 2009) "Resolution 748 (1992)" http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/O 11 /07/IMG/NR00 1107.pdf?OpenElement accessed 29 Dec
2009
809 Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner 41
810 United Nations Security Council (11 November 1993) "Resolution 883 (1993)" http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.or/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/626/78/PDF/N9362678.pdf?OpenElement accessed 29 Dec 2009
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depressed at between $16 and $24 a barrel (2000 dollars) from 1986 until 2003, while
Libya's oil production remained relatively fixed at 1.4 to 1.5 million barrels per day from
1991 to 2003, even after OPEC raised Libya's quota.8 1' As a result, Libya's per capita
GDP slowly eroded from $11,200 in 1991 to $9,200 in 2002 (see Chart 6.1 below).
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Chart 6.1: Comparison of Libyan Oil Production to GDP/capita 1991 - 2003812
The major economic impact of sanctions fell on Libya's ability to import goods, a
strain which placed inflationary pressure on Libya's markets. 813 In the long run, the
sanctions made it difficult for its oil industry to procure equipment and spare parts to
maintain its infrastructure and impossible to increase production. This inability to
increase its oil exports to offset low oil prices made Libya's economy even more
susceptible to price fluctuations in the global market. The depressed price of global
811 West Texas Research Group (2008) "Oil Price History and Analysis" WTRG Economics
www.wtrg.com/prices.htm accessed 6 Jan 2010, Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the
Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 65
812 Oil production is in 100,000 barrels/day and GDP/capita is in 2000 U.S. dollars. U.S. Energy
Information Administration (2009) "Libyan Total Oil Production 1980-2008"
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country/ energy data.cfi?fips=LY accessed 6 Jan 2010, International
Monetary Fund (Oct 2009) "World Economic Outlook Database"
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx accessed 6 Jan 2010
813 Inflation rates which had hovered at 3-4% in the late 80s rose to between 8-11% from 1991-1995 before
falling again. International Monetary Fund (2009) "Report for Libya" World Economic Outlook Database,
October 2009 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx accessed 6 Jan 2010.
These IMF inflation rates are significantly lower than the 35-47 % inflation rates for 1993-1997 from
Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner 68
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crude then delivered a harsh blow to Libya's GDP. Even so, Libya was fortunate relative'
to Iraq since the sanctions against it did not boycott oil exports altogether, thus sparing
Libya the economic meltdown suffered by Iraq.
An indirect impact of the sanctions was the threat posed to Qadhafi's regime by
the rise of radicalized Islamist groups within Libya. Unemployment hovering at 20%,
double digit inflation, and a youth bulge with 70% of the population under the age of 20
contributed to a growing disillusionment amongst Libyans over Qadhafi's regime. This,
in turn, sparked Libya's youth to join the militant opposition groups spreading throughout
Arab states. 814 The groups which formed within Libya included the Muslim
Brotherhood, Islamic Liberation Party, National Salvation Front, Islamic Martyrdom
Movement, Libyan Islamic Group, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Force (with ties to
Al-Qaeda).sis
In June 1995, violence erupted in the form of attacks on government security
forces in Benghazi and the central region of Libya. In August, an assassination attempt
on Qadhafi failed, though sporadic violence continued to be reported and eventually led
to another attempt made on him in 1996 near his home town of Sirte.116 In 1998, Qadhafi
finally responded to the insurgency, sending a thousand troops into Benghazi. These
forces ultimately succeeded in crushing the uprising. 817 The serious threat to his regime
from these radicalized groups appear to have had a sobering affect on Qadhafi who
reversed his previous policy of supporting terrorism and now called for action against
814 Takey, Ray (1998) "Qadhafi and the Challenge of Militant Islam" Washington Quarterly 21:3 (Summer)
164
815 Wyn Bowen (2006) "Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink" Adelphi Papers
46:55
816 Takey, Ray (1998) "Qadhafi and the Challenge of Militant Islam" Washington Quarterly 21:3 (Summer)
168
817 Jentleson, Bruce W. and Christopher A Whytock (2005/6) "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy
Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy" International Security 30:3, 66
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international terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda. Despite his shifting position with
regard to terrorism, however, he did not change his position on extraditing the two Pan
Am Flight 103 suspects to either the United States or Great Britain.
United States' Reaction to Qadhafi's Intransigence
By the fall of 1995, economic sanctions had proven decisive in convincing
Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into signing the
Dayton Peace Accords. By then it was equally apparent that the weaker sanctions
imposed on Libya would not have the same effect on Qadhafi. On 20 December 1995,
the U.S. Senate passed the "Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act of 1995" with a last-minute
amendment added to extend the provisions of the bill to Libya. This bill imposed
sanctions on foreign companies which invested more than $40 million per annum in
Libya's petroleum industries. 8 18 This angered the European Union since the sanctions
were aimed primarily at their corporations. Though the E.U. promised reprisals and the
Clinton administration initially did not support it, once the bill also passed the House of
Representatives, President Clinton signed it into law on 5 August, 1996.819
Another relevant piece of U.S. legislation was the "Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996." This law modified federal statutes, allowing the relatives of'
the 105 U.S. victims of Pan Am Flight 103 to bring a $4 billion civil suit against the
Libyan government. 820
818 Katzman, Kenneth (26 April 2006) "The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)" CRS Reportfor Congress
Order Code RS20871 http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-9016:1 accessed 8 Jan
2010
819 Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism "Case 78-8 United States v. Libya (1978-: Gadhafi,
Terrorism)" and "Case 92-12 United nations v. Libya (1992-1999: PAN AM 103)"
www.petersoninstitute.org/research/topics/sanctions/libya.cfm accessed 7 Jan 2010
820 Doyle, Charles (3 June 1996) "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary"
Congressional Research Service http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm accessed 8 Jan 2010
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Libya's Diplomatic Success 1997-1998
Though the UN resolution had not broken Libya's economy, nearly five years of
economic and diplomatic sanctions had weakened Libya and isolated it from the world
community. The tides, however, were finally beginning to turn in Qadhafi's favor in
1997 and 1998, when Libya achieved a series of diplomatic successes. In August 1997,
Qadhafi traveled to Niger and met with the presidents of Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and
Mali, who then issued a joint statement announcing closer economic cooperation among
their countries and calling on the UN to evaluate the impact of its sanctions on Libya.8 2 1
Qadhafi made further progress on 21 September 1997 when the Arab League passed a
resolution allowing both diplomatic and humanitarian flights to and from Libya and
releasing Libyan funds being held in Arab banks.822 One of the most significant
diplomatic gains for Qadhafi came on 27 February 1998 when the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) ruled against the U.S. and Britain and declared that it alone had jurisdiction
to decide whether Libya must surrender the two accused.82 3
Two factors account for Qadhafi's diplomatic successes. First, by the late 1990s
Qadhafi had reversed his aggressive foreign policy, no longer intervening in neighboring
countries and withdrawing his support for international terrorist groups. Libya was now
less of a threat to African and the Middle Eastern countries. Second, there was an
international reaction to the imposition of sanctions following UN reports of a steep rise
821 Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism "Case 78-8 United States v. Libya (1978-: Gadhafi,
Terrorism)" and "Case 92-12 United nations v. Libya (1992-1999: PAN AM 103)"
www.petersoninstitute.org/research/topics/sanctions/Iibya.cfm accessed 7 Jan 2010
822 Jehl, Douglas (22 September 1997) "Arab Countries Vote to Defy U.N. Sanctions Against Libya" New
York Times
823 New York Times (28 Feb 1998) "World Court Claims Jurisdiction in pan Am Flight 103 Bombing"
New York Times
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in Iraq's infant mortality rates and a subsequent gaffe by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN,
Madeleine Albright, who when questioned about the high death figures responded that
"...the price is worth it." 8 2 4 As a result, many countries were now less willing to support
the sanctions against Libya.
United States' and Britain's Changing Position
Nearly seven years after rejecting Libya's proposal for a trial by the International
Court of Justice, both the United States and Britain reversed their position and on 24
August 1998, issued a joint letter to the UN Security Council with an initiative to try the
two Libyan suspects in the Netherlands. Upon Libya's delivery of the two accused men,
the UN sanctions would be suspended, though not permanently lifted. 825
Four reasons explain this reversal in policy. First, it was clear to both the U.S.
and Britain that the sanctions would not convince Qadhafi to extradite the Libyan
suspects to either country. In addition, U.S. efforts to strengthen the sanctions on Libyan
oil exports had failed and future attempts were not likely to succeed. Second, current
sanctions on Libya were unraveling as a result of the international backlash against Iraqi
sanctions, with African and Arab countries openly defying the existing Security Council
resolutions. Third, the Labour Party now held the majority party in Parliament with Tony
Blair as their new Prime Minister. Unlike John Major, Blair had not been personally
involved with Lockerbie and proved more willing to consider a compromise. Finally, the
82 Zaidi. S. and M. Fawzi (2 Dec 1995) "Health of Baghdad's Children" The Lancet, World Health
Organization (March 1996) The Health Condition of the Population in Iraq since the Gulf Crisis World
Health Organization WHO/EHA/96.1 www.who.int/disasters/repo/5249.html accessed 27 Jun 2010, and
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright in 12 May 1996 interview with Lesley Stahl on
CBS news show 60 Minutes. Stahl asked "We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean,
that's more children than died at Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it? Albright responded, "I
think this is a very hard choice, but the price-we think the price is worth it."
825 United Nations Security Council (27 August 1998) "Resolution 1192 (1998) S/RES/i 192 (1998)
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98?25 1?64?PDF/N9825164.pdf?OpenElement
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British families of the victims, some of whom had met personally with Qadhafi,
supported the third-country legal framework. In the summer of 1998 they placed
domestic political pressure on Prime Minister Blair, who, in turn, convinced President
Clinton to support a trial in the Netherlands. 82 6
Conclusion of Crisis
Though all parties were now in agreement with a trial in the Netherlands, there
was no formal diplomatic ties between Libya and the U.S. or Britain to commence
negotiations. After mediation by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and South African
President Nelson Mandela, however, Qadhafi finally handed the two suspects over to The
Hague on 5 April 1999.827 As promised, UN sanctions were then suspended, though they
would not be formally lifted until August of 2003. The U.S. continued to maintain its
unilateral sanctions until Libya agreed to take responsibility and pay compensation for
the bombing and also added demands that Libya renounce its support of international
terrorism and abandon its WMD programs.828
Analysis of Coercion: 1991 - 1999
The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the subsequent implication of Libyan
Arab Airline officials in the bombing initiated a second crisis between the United States
826 The U.S. victim's families did not support the third-country framework. Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah
States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 51
827 On 27 August 1998 Qadhafi agreed in principle to U.S.-British demands but sought guarantees. On 29
September 1998 Qadhafi demanded guarantees the two suspects would not be extradited to the U.S. or
Britain and if convicted would not serve sentences in either country. On 21 December 1998 Kofi Annan
met with Qadhafi in an attempt to break the deadlock. On 26 Feb, 1999 the U.S-Britain issued a 30 day
ultimatum, if the two accused were not handed over the U.S.-Britain would seek tougher sanctions. During
a visit by Nelson Mandela on 19 March 1999 Qadhafi announced he would hand over the suspects. Case
Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism "Case 78-8 United States v. Libya (1978-: Gadhafi, Terrorism)" and
"Case 92-12 United nations v. Libya (1992-1999: PAN AM 103)"
www.petersoninstitute.org/research/topics/sanctions/libya.cfm accessed 11 Jan 2010
828 Miller, Judith (12 June 1999) "In Rare Talks With Libyans, U.S. Airs Views On Sanctions" New York
Times
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and Libya. The United States demanded that Libya extradite the two suspects to stand
trial, to cooperate fully with the investigation, to acknowledge responsibility for the
involvement of its officials in the bombing, and to pay compensation to the victims'
families. Unlike the first crisis of the 1980s, however, regime change was no longer a
U.S. objective.
This omission makes this an important case of asymmetric coercion. With Iraq
and Serbia the United States increased its aims over time to include regime change as an
objective for both countries. The U.S. came to view both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan
Milosevic as the source of conflict in each case, respectively. In order to back up the
demands for regime change the U.S. ratcheted up its threats of military force. With the
Libyan case the U.S. instead chose to reduce its objectives and exclude regime change.
The U.S. further curtailed its demand for extradition to either the United States or Britain
when it accepted Libya's compromise offer of a third country trial in the Netherlands.
This decrease in demands was particularly instrumental in the partial success of coercion,
as the credibility of the U.S. in threatening force had evaporated since the Reagan years.
This crisis also differs in that it is not a case of military coercion at all since the
U.S. did not threaten military force. In lieu of the threat of force, the U.S. instead
employed a two-tiered punishment strategy of unilateral and multilateral sanctions.
Long-term sanctions limited Libyan oil production, which combined with depressed
global crude prices to stagnate its economy. The removal of these sanctions then allowed
Libya to import U.S. and Western European crude oil technologies to increase its exports,
a measure which proved a key motivating factor for Qadhafi's concessions.
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In April of 1999, Libya conceded to the U.S. demand for extradition of the two
Libyan suspects to stand trial for the Pan Am Flight 103. Qadhafi did not, however,
concede to the entirety of this demand as he refused to extradite them to the U.S. or
Britain. Libya went on to cooperate with the investigation but would not take
responsibility for the bombing or to pay compensation prior to
code this case as a partial success (see Table 6.5).
a final verdict. I therefore
Type of Threat United States
Period Compellent (Denial or Foreign Policy
Demands Punishment) Outcome
Policy Change Punishment Core Demand
- Extradite two - U.S. unilateral Partial Success
Nov 1991 - Libyan suspects for diplomatic and - Libya hands
April 1999 trial economic sanctions over two suspects
- Cooperate with - United Nations. for trial in
investigations diplomatic and Netherlands and
-Acknowledge economic cooperates with
responsibility sanctions, though investigation
- Pay compensation not on Libyan oil - Libya does not
exports acknowledge
responsibility or
cpay compensation
Table 6.5: Typology of Sanctions: U.S. versus Libya, 1991 - 1999
Analysis of Explanations-for Coercion Outcome
Here I assess predictions from the survival and commitment hypotheses (see Table
6.6). In this case, the United States demanded Libya extradite two Libyan officials,
cooperate with the investigation, acknowledge responsibility, and pay compensation to
the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103. Both hypotheses predict a successful
outcome, as there were neither target survival issues nor challenger commitment
problems likely to cause coercion failure. Libya did eventually cooperate and surrender
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the two suspects to stand trial but only in a country of its own choosing rather than in the
U.S. or Britain. As I will show, the outcome proved to be only partially successful as
Qadhafi would not concede to taking responsibility for the bombing or paying
compensation. Sanctions alone were not sufficient to convince Qadhafi to concede to all,
demands.
Core Survival Commitment Actual Foreign
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Policy Outcome
Demands
Policy Change Predicts Predicts Core Demand
- Extradite two Success Success Partial Success
Nov 1991 - Libyan suspects - Conceding - U.S. could - Libya hands over
April 1999 for trial did not not increase two suspects for
- Cooperate with threaten sanctions trial in
investigations Libyan state, Netherlands and
- Acknowledge regime, or cooperates with
Responsibility Qadhafi's investigation
- Pay leadership - Libya does not
Compensation acknowledge
responsibility or
________________________________ 
_________pay compensation
Table 6.6: Predictions of Coercion Success/Failure
TESTING HYPOTHESIS OF SURVIVAL
The survival hypothesis expects coercion to fail when the state, the regime, and
the regime leadership's survival is threatened by a concession, so long as the target has
the means to resist. Here the survival hypothesis predicts coercion success.
Impact on the Libyan State
Compliance with the U.S. demands to extradite, cooperate, acknowledge
responsibility, and compensate for the bombing did not threaten Libya's state survival.
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Concessions would have no impact on Libya's control of its territory or its population. 829
Economically, concession would benefit Libya by avoiding UN sanctions.
Still, Qadhafi rightly viewed these demands as an infringement upon Libyan
sovereignty and, throughout the crisis, he refused extradition of Libyan citizens to the
countries of their accusers. He did not, however, reject the notion of extradition
altogether and in response to the U.S. and British joint declaration in November of 1991,
Libyan officials set their conditions for a third-country trial.
In sum, though Libya's sovereignty was infringed by the U.S. demands, the
survival of the state was not at risk and, if Qadhafi had initially agreed to them, he would
have likely avoided UN sanctions.
Impact on Qadhafi's Regime
A concession by Qadhafi would not have placed his regime at risk from domestic
opposition groups. While a public concession would have revealed Qadhafi's regime as
weak, there were still no militant organizations within Libya poised to revolt against his
government. This had changed by 1995, however, as a weakened Libyan economy
generated a large number of unemployed and discontented youth susceptible to
radicalization. The window of opportunity for rebellion was short-lived, however, and in'
1998 loyal troops crushed the opposition and removed the threat to Qadhafi's regime.
Impact of Concessions to Qadhafi's Leadership
Along with state and regime survival, an assessment is also required as to whether
concessions would have risked Qadhafi's leadership of his regime. As ruler of a
personalist regime Qadhafi should have been less likely to incur significant audience
829 The impact was only on 2 of Libya's 4.4 million citizens.
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costs for conceding policy failure. However, as demonstrated in the previous case,
Qadhafi had proven vulnerable to coup attempts arising from internal machinations.
Aside from the fact that he continued to rule, there is scant evidence to determine the
degree to which Qadhafi controlled his regime. I therefore do not assume audience costs
were insignificant in this case.
Interestingly, Qadhafi took measures which avoided audience costs in two ways.
First was the manner in which Libya rejected the U.S. and British demands. While
Qadhafi publicly rejected the joint proposal in November 1991, Libya's foreign minister
set conditions for extradition to a third country for trial. Qadhafi had not rejected the
U.S. demand of extradition, only where the trial would take place. By stipulating these
conditions from the outset of the crisis, it would be the U.S. and not Libya that would
later be seen as making concessions, despite the fact that the U.S. still gained a core
objective. Qadhafi also avoided audience costs by rejecting the demands for the
acknowledgement of responsibility for the Pan Am bombing and payment of
compensation.
A second way Qadhafi offset audience costs was by deferment of the extradition
until a time when his power and prestige were ascending. Qadhafi agreed to demands in
1999, once the militarized Islamic opposition had been crushed and his regime was again-
firmly in control of the country. His recent diplomatic victories in Africa and the Middle
East had also bolstered his stature, making it easier for him to absorb criticism from
within the regime for allowing the two officials to be extradited.
In conclusion, neither the survival of the Libyan state nor that of Qadhafi's regime
was at stake by conceding to demands. There is insufficient ex ante evidence, however,
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to conclude whether or not Qadhafi's survival was threatened. Ex post evidence from his
refusal to extradite the two suspects to the U.S. or Britain, to acknowledge responsibility
for the bombing, or to pay compensation indicate that the punishment from sanctions was
likely too low and/or the audience costs of making such concessions was likely too high.
As a result, the survival hypothesis proved only partially correct in predicting coercion
success.
TESTING THE COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS
The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when the challenger
cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands. This commitment problem
is more likely to occur when the challenger has sufficient military force deployed to back
up additional demands. For this crisis, however, the U.S. had abandoned the threat of
military force and instead adopted a strategy of sanctions. Adapting this hypothesis to
sanctions, a commitment problem is more likely to arise when the challenger has the
credible threat of additional sanctions to back up further demands.
In this case, however, the U.S. could no longer threaten to increase sanctions.
This was, at least in part, due to the international sentiment against sanctions in reaction
to UN reports of the high infant mortality rates in Iraq.8 30 In fact, the sanctions the U.S.
and Britain had been able to pass through the Security Council in 1992 had been
weakened by the actions of neighboring African countries and the Arab League in 1997.
The U.S. had already garnered the maximum unilateral sanctions it could levy with little
chance of placing additional economic or diplomatic pressure against Libya. As a result,
830 Zaidi. S. and M. Fawzi (2 Dec 1995) "Health of Baghdad's Children" The Lancet, World Health
Organization (March 1996) The Health Condition of the Population in Iraq since the Gulf Crisis World
Health Organization WHO/EHA/96.1 www.who.int/disasters/repo/5249.html accessed 27 Jun 2010
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the U.S. did not have a credible threat to back up the additional demands it was
considering, confronting the lingering issues of Libya's terrorist policies and its WMD
programs.
Unlike the survival hypothesis, for which I posited an ex post explanation for the
partial success of coercion based on Qadhafi's avoidance of audience costs, I can offer no
similar ex post explanation per the commitment hypothesis for why sanctions did not
convince Qadhafi to concede to all demands.
LIBYA AND UNITED STATES RELATIONS FROM 1999 TO 2001
The second crisis between the U.S. and Libya abated with the extradition of the
two suspects of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. For its part, Britain reinstated
diplomatic ties with Libya in July of 1999, but the U.S. would not consider such a move
831
or lift its unilateral sanctions until additional concerns were addressed. In regard to
Pan Am Flight 103, Qadhafi had yet to accept responsibility for the bombing or to pay
compensation. In addition, there was the lingering issue of Libya's foreign policy on
terrorism. Finally, the U.S. raised concerns over Libya's WMD as evidence began to
surface during the 1990s that Libya had reenergized its nuclear program. 832
Though diplomatically Libya had shed much of its pariah status to the rest of the
world, this did not translate into a significant increase in the level of trade or growth in
Libya's still stagnant economy. In the face of low global oil prices economic recovery
was dependent on a boost in oil production, an option limited by Libya's undercapitalized
831 Corera, Gordon (2006) Shopping For Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and
Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network Oxford: Oxford University Press 180
83 2Zoubir, Yahia H. (2006) "The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to Normalization" Middle East Policy
Vol XIII:2 (Summer) 50. IAEA Board of Governors (20 Feb 2004) "Implementation of the NPF Safeguards
Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Aram Jamahiriya" International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2004/12, 5
www.iaea.org/publications/documents/board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf accessed 2 Feb 2010
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oil industry which had fallen into neglect under years of sanctions. Its oil production and
transportation network had originally been constructed by American companies in the
1960s and 70s. An increase in the flow of crude now required the injection of U.S.
equipment and technology. Though Qadhafi had succeeded in having UN sanctions
suspended, the resolution had not been rescinded. This, along with unilateral U.S.
sanctions, had to be lifted before Libya could hope to lure still leery western investors.
With this objective in mind, Libya commenced negotiations with the U.S. in May of
1999.
The U.S. agreed to the talks with Libya contingent on their remaining secret. 833
In a November 30, 1999 speech by former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near East and South Asian Affairs Ronald Neumann, articulated U.S. foreign policy
towards Libya. Prior to the removal of unilateral sanctions the Clinton administration
expected a final settlement of the Pan Am bombing, that Qadhafi take steps to publicly
disavow himself of terrorism, and that Libya cease the pursuit of WMD and missile
programs. Importantly, Neumann maintained that Libyan regime change was not a U.S.
objective. 834 While the private talks made some progress, the Clinton administration
suspended them in early 2000 over concerns that knowledge of the talks would be leaked
and disrupt the upcoming presidential election. 835
833 St John, Ronald Bruce (2004) "'Libya Is Not Iraq': Preemptive Strikes. WMD and Diplomacy" The Middle East
Journal 58:3 399
1" Neumann, Ronald E. (2000) "Libya" A U.S. Policy Perspective" Middle East Policy 7:2 (February)
143-145
835 Slavin, Barbara (26 April 2004) "Libya's Rehabilitation in the Works Since Early '90s" USA Today
www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-04-26-libya x.htm accessed 8 Feb 2010
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History and Motivations for Libya's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program
Libya's quest for WMD commenced with Qadhafi's rise to power in 1969 and his
efforts to obtain them continued for over three decades. Here I detail the varying degrees"
of progress Libya achieved in attaining nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. I also
examine the two reasons Qadhafi desired to obtain these non-conventional weapons:
security and prestige.
1970s: Qadhafi's Nuclear Ambitions
From the outset, Qadhafi placed high priority on obtaining nuclear weapons.
Given the great wealth generated from the influx of oil revenues in the 1970s, Libya's
initial efforts were directed at purchasing weapons from nuclear states and thereby
circumvent the arduous process of developing an indigenous nuclear program.836 Libya
first approached China in 1969 and, in the late 1970s made overtures to the Soviet Union,
France, and India. 17 In 1973, when early efforts had failed to procure weapons,
Qadhafi instituted Libya's Nuclear Energy Commission with the mandate of developing
the scientific and technical capacity for a domestic nuclear program. 838 Libya took a
large step forward in 1975 with the purchase of a nuclear research reactor from the Soviet
Union, which went on to achieve operational status in 1981.839
836 For details on Libya's nuclear weapons programs see the excellent work by Wyn Bowen (2006) "Libya
& Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink" Adelphi Papers 46:380
837 Bowen, Wyn Q (2006) "Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink" Adelphi Papers
46:380 8
838 Braut-Hegghamer, Maalfried (2009) "Libya's Nuclear Intentions: Ambition and Ambivalence"
Strategic Insights Vol VIII: 2 (April) 62
839 A precondition to this sale was for Qadhafi to endorse the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. St John,
Ronald Bruce (1982) "The Soviet Penetration of Libya" The World Today" 38:4, 135, IAEA (1999)
"Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Socialist People's: IRT-I" Nuclear Research Reactors in the World
www.iaea.oru/worldatom/rrdb/ accessed 4 Feb 2010
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An initial motivator for Libya to acquire nuclear status was Qadhafi's desire to
gain prestige and respect within the Arab world. After the death of Egyptian President
Nasser in 1970, Qadhafi proclaimed himself successor to Pan Arabism, much to the
dismay and derision of leaders of other Arab states.840 Libya's nuclear weapons program
and large-scale procurement of modem conventional weapons, including Soviet tanks,
jets, and air defenses was, in part, an effort by Qadhafi to bolster his credibility within the
Middle East and in Northern Africa.
A second motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons lay in Libya's growing
security concerns over Israeli conventional air power and nuclear weapons capabilities.
Relations with Israel deteriorated rapidly following the 1969 coup in Libya and remained
strained throughout the 1970s.8 41
1980s: Libya's Stagnating Nuclear Program, Chemical Weapons Production and
Employment, and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
In the 1980s, Libya's nuclear program stagnated in the face of growing
international concern over Qadhafi's nuclear intentions. By the mid-80s, the Soviets
were no longer willing to offer scientific and technical training or equipment and parts.
Other countries were likewise discouraged in providing Libya support. In addition, in the
decade following the formation of its Nuclear Energy Commission, Libya had been
840 Vandewalle, Dirk ed. (2008) Libya Since 1969: Qadhafi's Revolution Revisited New York: Palgrave
MacMillan 35
841 Evidence of this strained relations include the Israeli shoot down of an Libyan airliner in February
1973, the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, anti-Israeli rhetoric by Qadhafi, threats on Libya by right wing
Israeli politicians, and Qadhafi's condemnation of the Camp David Peace Accords. Abadi, Jacob (2000)
"Pragmatism and Rhetoric in Libya's Policy Toward Israel" The Journal of Conflict Studies 20:1 (Fall)
www.lib.unb.ca/Tests/JCS/FallOO/Abadi.htm accessed 4 Feb 2010
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unable to form a cadre of scientists and other skilled technicians to develop an indigenous
program. This left Libya highly dependent on foreign expertise. 842
With the arrival of the Reagan Administration, the strained relations between
Libya and the U.S. only worsened. Qadhafi began to view nuclear weapons as a potential
deterrent to U.S. aggression. In a televised speech Qadhafi pointed to the 1986 El
Dorado Canyon air strikes in lament: "[i]f we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that
could reach New York--we would have hit it at the same moment." 843
In contrast to a stagnant nuclear program, Libya's chemical weapons program
advanced rapidly during the 1980s in large part with the technical support of West
German companies, as well as other European, Asian and American firms. Libya
constructed three chemical factories in this period, with the best known being its Rabta
facility, 75 miles south of Tripoli.844 This plant produced blister and nerve agents, some
of which were employed against Chad troops in 1987.845
Unlike its active chemical weapons program, however, Libya disavowed
biological weapons and signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC)
in 1982. Although accusations surfaced in the 1990s that Libya had attempted to acquire
biological weapons, no evidence was ever uncovered that such a program existed.8 46
842 Bowen, Wyn Q (2006) "Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink" Adelphi Papers
46:380 31-2
843 FBIS Daily Report (23 April 1990) "Al-Qadhdhafi Wants Long-Range Arab 'Missile"' Tripoli
Television Service FBIS-NES-90-078
844 Cohen, William S. (25 November 1997) "Proliferation: Threat and response 1997" Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publications www.ciaonet.org/book/cohenO2/meastnaf.html accessed
5 Feb 2010
845 Nuclear Threat Initiative (September 2009) "Libya Profile" Chemical Overview" NTI Country Profiles
www.nti.org/e research/profiles/Libya/Chemical/index.html accessed 5 Feb 2010
846 Nuclear Threat Initiative (September 2009) "Libya Profile" Biological Overview" NTI Country Profiles
www.nti.org/e research/profiles/Libya/Biological/index.html accessed 5 Feb 2010
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1990s: Libya's Reinvigorated Nuclear Program, Concealment and Deception of
Chemical Facilities, and Allegations of Biological Weapons
In the late 1990s, Libya's dormant nuclear program was reinvigorated with the
influx of weapon designs and centrifuge equipment, courtesy of the A.Q. Khan
network.847 Libya spent as much as half a billion dollars over six years to acquire the
technical knowledge and equipment to design and build a nuclear device. 84 8 But despite
this direct injection of technology, a combination of poor management and a lack of
domestic scientific and technical expertise caused Libya to fail at maturing the key
capabilities of uranium enrichment and weapons design and at developing the long-range
missiles needed to deliver such weapons.849
El Dorado Canyon demonstrated to Qadhafi that the U.S. had the capability to
also strike his WMD facilities, much as the Israeli airstrike had destroyed Iraq's Osirak
nuclear reactor in 1981. Libya then moved to construct its next two chemical facilities
underground in hardened tunnels.850 In 1990 the Libyans even set fire to tires set on top
of the exposed Rabta plant in an effort to deceive U.S. intelligence into assessing the
851plant as non-operational. In addition, unlike signing on to the BTWC, Libya refused to
join the Chemical Weapons Convention which took effect in 1997.852
847 For a detailed analysis of nuclear proliferation and the A.Q. Khan network see Corera, Gordon (2006)
Shopping For Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan
Network Oxford: Oxford University Press
848 Bowen, Wyn Q (2006) "Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink" Adelphi Papers
46:380 37
849 Bowen, Wyn Q (2006) "Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink" Adelphi Papers
46:380 44
850 Nuclear Threat Initiative (September 2009) "Libya Profile" Chemical Overview" NTI Country Profiles
www.nti.org/e research/profiles/Libya/Chemical/index.html accessed 5 Feb 2010
851 Spector, Leonard S. and Jacqueline R. Smith (1990) Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons 1989-1990 Boulder CO: Westview Press 179
852 Libya would not formally ratify the CWC until 1 June 2004, Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (2010) "OPCW Member States" www.opcw.org/about-opcs/member-states accessed 5
Feb 2010
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Even the fact that Libya had signed the BTWC did not assuage U.S. concern. In
the mid 1990s the Clinton Administration alleged that Libya had made efforts to acquire
biological weapons technology, though it conceded that Libya's scientific and
technological constraints hindered any further development of a biological weapons
program or weapons delivery system.853
U.S. VERSUS LIBYA CASE III: 2001- 2003 SETTLEMENT OF PANAM FLIGHT
103, TERRORISMAND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
In January 2001 President George W. Bush entered the White House. When
briefed on the status of the suspended secret talks with Libya, the surprised Bush officials
were reluctant to reinitiate the talks. They feared the political fallout should it become
known that the U.S. was negotiating to reestablish diplomatic ties with Libya prior to a
final settlement on the Pan Am bombing. 854 As a result, the new administration passed
on the opportunity afforded by the 31 January conviction of one of the two Libyan
officials and acquittal of other, which removed a major obstacle to Qadhafi's cooperation.
The September 1 1th, 2001 attacks escalated U.S. security concerns towards not
only international terrorism but also Weapons of Mass Destruction, both of which
combined to produce a third crisis for the U.S. and Libya. This fundamental alteration of
the international security environment was not lost on Qadhafi who immediately
undertook efforts at rapprochement with the United States. Qadhafi's position towards
terrorism had shifted markedly in the late 1990s apparently as a result of his experience
with radicalized Islamic groups, some of which had been supported by Al Qaeda. Libyan
853 Perry, William S. (April 1996) "Proliferation: Threat and Response" Secretary of Defense Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Publications http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA314341 accessed 5 Feb 2010.
Libya's disclosures to the IAEA in 2004 showed no evidence of any biological weapons program.
854 Slavin, Barbara (26 April 2004) "Libya's Rehabilitation in the Works Since Early '90s" USA Today
www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-04-26-libya x.htm accessed 8 Feb 2010
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interests with regard to terrorism were more closely aligned to that of the U.S. even
before the September attacks. This change in the international security environment
taken with Qadhafi's own animosity towards radical Islamic groups may explain why
Libya was one of the first and most vocal of Arab states to condemn Al Qaeda and offer
intelligence to assist the United States.855
In October 2001, the U.S. recommenced talks with Libya, though the Bush
administration's attention was clearly more focused on Afghanistan at the time. 856 In
May of 2002, Libya offered to pay $2.7 billion to the families of Lockerbie victim's with
a partial payment to be made after the permanent lifting of UN sanctions, another
payment contingent on the suspension of unilateral U.S. sanctions, and a final payment
once the U.S. State Department removed Libya from its list of state sponsors of
terrorism.857 The U.S. rejected this offer, however, as it did not address Qadhafi's
responsibility for the bombing or Libya's WMD programs.
In September of 2002, President Bush spoke before the United Nations General
Assembly and demanded that Iraq abandon its WMD or face regime change. British
Prime Minister Tony Blair took the opportunity to approach Qadhafi with an offer that
would normalize relations between the U.S. and Libya, if Libya would end its WMD
programs.858 By this time Libya had reversed its policies such that the support of
terrorism was no longer an issue. For six months, Libya remained silent and did not
855 Even prior to September 116, 2001 Libya had cooperated with the U.S. against Al-Qaeda over a hostage
crisis in the Philippines in 2000. Zoubir, Yahia H. (2006) "The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to
Normalization" Middle East Policy Vol XIII:2 (Summer) 57
856 Slavin, Barbara (26 April 2004) "Libya's Rehabilitation in the Works Since Early '90s" USA Today
www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-04-26-libya x.htm accessed 8 Feb 2010
8 Zoubir, Yahia H. (2006) "The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to Normalization" Middle East Policy
Vol XIII:2 (Summer) 59
858 This letter was sent after Blair met with Bush at Camp David in September. Fidler, Stephen, Mark
Huband and Roula Khalaf (27 January 2004) "Return to the fold: how Gadaffi was persuaded to give up
his nuclear goals" Financial Times
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respond to Blair's offer until mid-March 2003 on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Libya then contacted Britain agreeing to abandon its WMD in exchange for the removal
of sanctions and the reestablishment of diplomatic and economic ties with the United
States.859
Tripartite negotiations between the United States, Britain, and Libya
recommenced in the spring of 2003 with the objective of reaching a final resolution on
Pan Am Flight 103 and WMD. 86 In August, Libya delivered a letter to the UN Security
Council agreeing to take responsibility for the Pan Am bombing and to pay
compensation. 86 In return, the U.S. announced it would not oppose ending UN sanctions
on Libya and, on 12 September, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1506,
permanently lifting the 1992 sanctions.862 Still, the U.S. kept unilateral sanctions in place
until a final resolution was reached over Libya's WMD.
In October 2003, British and U.S. intelligence sources identified, tracked, and
intercepted an A.Q. Khan shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuges aboard a ship
bound from the UAE to Libya. This action accelerated the trilateral negotiations, ending
with Libya providing U.S. and British intelligence access to Libyan chemical and nuclear
sites. In mid-December 2003, Libya offered to renounce its WMD programs and on the
859 Bowen, Wyn Q (2006) "Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink" Adelphi Papers
46:380, 62
860After Qadhafi's vocal opposition to Al Qaeda and Libyan intelligence support to the U.S. the issue of
Qadhafi's policy of supporting terrorism was no longer an issue. Also Britain persuaded the White House
to exclude neoconservatives from the Pentagon and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton
from the negotiations. Hirsch, Michael (2 May 2005) "Bolton's British Problem" Newsweek 145:18 30
861 White House (15 August 2003) "Statement by the Press Secretary"
www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030815-usia04.htm accessed 10 Feb 2010
862 United Nations Security Council (12 Sep 2003) "Resolution 1506 (2003)" http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOCRESOLUTION/GEN/N03/498/81/PDF/N0349881.pdfOpenElement accessed 10
Feb 2010
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19 th, Qadhafi made his decision public. 863 The crisis concluded in the ensuing days when
Libya, as Qadhafi promised, opened its chemical and nuclear facilities to IAEA
inspectors. By June 2004, the U.S. had resumed diplomatic relations with Libya.
Analysis of Coercion: September 2001 - December 2003
The reluctance of the Bush administration to continue negotiations with Libya
was replaced by an urgency in the aftermath of the September 11 h, 2001 attacks which
initiated a third crisis between the U.S. and Libya. The four compellent demands were
unchanged from those articulated by the Clinton Administration in 1999: to acknowledge
responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, to pay $2.7 billion in compensation to the
families of the victims, to publicly renounce its support of terrorism, and to abandon its
WMD programs. It was the latter two which comprised the core U.S. demands and were.
the catalyst for the crisis.
While the demand remained unchanged, the U.S. threat behind these demands had
increased substantially. Sanctions had actually decreased with the suspension of UN
sanctions in 1999 and only U.S. unilateral sanctions remained in place. The real increase.
was in the credibility of U.S. military action. Though the U.S. did not directly threaten
Libya with air strikes or invasion, the battles waged in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in
2003 demonstrated a credible threat of U.S. military force should Libya not end its
support of terrorism and abandon its WMD.
Qadhafi's concessions came in three stages. First, in the immediate aftermath of
the September 11th 2001 attacks, Qadhafi publicly condemned Al Qaeda and provided
863 BBC News (19 December 2003) "Libya Gives Up Chemical Weapons" BBC News
http://news.bbc.co.uk/on thisday/hi/dates/stories/december/1 9/newid 4002000/4002441.stm accessed 8 Feb
2010
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intelligence to the United States. Such cooperation, which Libya had demonstrated even
before September of 2001, continued until, by the fall of 2002, it was apparent to the U.S.
and the world that Qadhafi no longer supported international terrorism. In fact, his
regime had been actively fighting radicalized Islamic groups within Libya since the late
1990s. In August 2003 the two demands remaining from the Pan Am bombing were
finally resolved; the Libyan government issued a statement taking responsibility and paid
the $2.7 billion settlement to the families involved.
On the heels of the interception of the A.Q. Khan shipment of centrifuges in
October of 2003, Qadhafi was brought to meet the final concession in December of 2003.
He agreed to abandon WMD in exchange for the lifting of unilateral U.S. sanctions and
the normalization of relations. I therefore code this case as successful in obtaining all
four compellent demands (see Table 6.7 below).
Period Compellent Type of Threat United States Foreign
Demands (Denial or Policy and Coercion
Punishment) Outcome
Sep 2001 - Core Demands Punishment Success
Dec 2003 Policy Change - U.S. unilateral Libya:
- Abandon support of sanctions - Abandoned support
terrorism - Implicit threat of terrorism
- Abandon WMD of airstrikes - Abandoned WMD
- Acknowledge Denial - Acknowledged
responsibility for Pan - Implicit threat responsibility for Pan
Am Flight 103 of airstrikes and Am bombing
bombing invasion - Paid $2.7 billion in
- Pay compensation compensation to
to victims' families victims' families
Table 6.7: Typology of Coercion: U.S. versus Libya Jan 2001 - Dec 2003
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Alternative Explanations for why Libya gave up WMD
Libya's abandonment of WMD has rightly been viewed as a successful case of .
coercive diplomacy, particularly over the issue of nuclear roll-back. What remains
contentious is why Qadhafi chose to abandon his long-standing nuclear ambitions. Four
general arguments have emerged as to what caused him to concede when he did. The
first was articulated by George W. Bush and Dick Cheney in their bid for re-election in
2004. They both reaffirmed the value of their preventive war doctrine by crediting the
2003 invasion of Iraqi for Qadhafi's concessions. 864 A second argument contends that
the diplomatic channels forged by the Clinton administration during the late 1990s in its
negotiations over the extradition of the two Libyan suspects set the stage for Qadhafi to
concede WMD.s6 s A third argument focuses instead on the change in Libyan interests,
which were spurred on by sanctions and translated into a desire by Qadhafi to shed
Libya's pariah status and normalize relations with the U.S.. 866 A final argument, which I
support, acknowledges that the threat of U.S. military force, diplomatic efforts, and
sanctions all played a role in Qadhafi's decision, but no single factor was sufficient to
coerce him into abandoning his nuclear program. These three factors plus the key
decisions not to seek regime change and to conduct negotiations in a manner as to allow
864 Bush, George W. (30 September 2004) "Transcript: First Presidential Debate" Washington Post
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate 0930.html accessed 10 Feb 2010, Cheney,
Richard (5 October 22004) "Transcript: Vice Presidential Debate" Washington Post
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate 0930.htnil accessed 10 Feb 2010
865 St John, Ronald Bruce (2004) "'Libya Is Not Iraq': Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy" The
Middle East Journal 58:3 386-402
866 Joffe, George (2004) "Libya: Who Blinked, and Why" Current History 103:673 221-225, St John,
Ronald Bruce (2004) "'Libya Is Not Iraq': Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy" The Middle East
Journal 58:3 386-402
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Qadhafi to save face and avoid domestic audience costs led to Libyan concessions to all
demands.867
Argument I: Bush's Aggressive Foreign Policy
The argument that Bush's aggressive policies following the September 1 1th
attacks caused Qadhafi to concede his WMD rests heavily on the timing of key Libyan
decisions. Immediately following 9/11, talks between the U.S. and Libya recommenced
after a hiatus of a year and a half. Libya, however, was unwilling to link the issue of
WMD with a final settlement of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing and talks stalled until
mid-March 2003, as the U.S. was making its final preparations for an invasion of Iraq.
This timing suggests Qadhafi may have agreed to return to the negotiation table out of
fear that a similar fate would befall Libya. 868 In addition, Qadhafi's 19 December 2003
announcement to abandon WMD came just four days after the U.S. military had captured
Saddam Hussein.
Qadhafi's decision in mid-March 2003 to enter trilateral negotiations over WMD
coincided with the U.S. demonstrating its military capabilities. The U.S. had recently
toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for supporting Al Qaeda and had just deployed
over a hundred thousand troops to the Middle East in preparation for removing Saddam
Hussein from power for Iraq's alleged possession of WMD. 869 Bush's actions against
Iraq had been preapproved by the U.S. Congress. In addition, French and Russian
diplomatic efforts in the UN Security Council had failed to derail the planned U.S.
867 Jentleson, Bruce W. and Christopher A Whytock (2005/6) "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy
Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy" International Security 30:3, 47-86
868 In a September 2003 interview Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi said Qadhafi told him in a phone
conversation that "I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was
afraid." Hume, Brit (26 December 2003) "Muammar Qaddafi: 'I Saw Iraq and I Was Afraid' Fox News
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,106721,00.html accessed 10 Feb 2010
869 See Chapter 4 for further discussion on Bush administration motivations for Iraq invasion.
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invasion. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that U.S. military and diplomatic actions
in regard to Iraq were a motivating factor for Qadhafi to finally agree to negotiate with
the U.S. and Britain over WMD.
However, it is also important to understand the terms for these new negotiations.
Six months prior, Britain had extended an offer to Qadhafi from the U.S. to normalize
relations in exchange for Libya ending its WMD program. This offer by Prime Minister
Blair was made after consultations with President Bush at Camp David and coordinated
to be delivered in conjunction with Bush's September 12th, 2002 speech at the UN
demanding Iraq abandon its WMD. Accepting the British offer could have solved two of
Qadhafi's problems. First, the lifting of economic sanctions and reestablishment of
diplomatic relations with the U.S. was expected to improve Libya's economy and had
been a foreign policy objective of Qadhafi's for over a decade. Second, the abandonment
of WMD would remove a casus bellum for U.S. military action against Libya. Accepting
this offer would effectively improve both Libya's security and economic outlook.
The second point made by Vice President Cheney, i.e. that Qadhafi's decision to
abandon WMD was the result of the capture of Saddam Hussein, is unlikely. Serious -
negotiations between the Libya and the U.S. over WMD followed Libya's August 2003
letter to the UN Security Council, in which Libya accepted responsibility and agreed to
pay compensation for the Pan Am bombing. The September 2003 permanent lifting of
UN sanctions brought the Pan Am affair to a close and presented an opportunity for a
resolution on Libya's WMD. The October interception of an A.Q. Khan shipment bound
for Tripoli provided concrete proof of an active Libyan nuclear program and concluding
negotiations quickly progressed from there. By mid-December 2003, prior to Saddam's
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capture, Libya had already agreed to abandon its WMD in exchange for normalized U.S.
relations, though the public announcement by Qadhafi did not take place until the 1 9 th of
December. There is no evidence that the capture of Saddam Hussein played a role in
Qadhafi's decision.
In sum, prior to March 2003 Qadhafi had been unwilling to conduct negotiations
over WMD. The U.S. invasion of Iraq motivated Libya to abandon this position and
agree to the next round of negotiations, which led to a final resolution of the Pan Am
bombing. This settlement removed the final barrier to negotiations over WMD and the
interception of the centrifuges provided an incentive for Qadhafi to accept what now
appeared to be an attractive deal while it was still on the table. Qadhafi would trade a
three-decades-old nuclear program that had yet to make any real progress in developing
weapons, a non-existent biological weapons program, and a chemical weapons program
in exchange for normalized U.S. relations and the prospect of recapitalizing Libya's oil
industry.
By contrast, those who discount the role of Bush's preemptive doctrine argue that
Qadhafi was willing to concede his WMD programs prior to 2003, but that it was U.S.
policies which delayed an earlier settlement. Next, I present two separate arguments
based on this premise.
Argument II: U.S. and British Diplomacy
A second argument is that the diplomatic channels and trust forged during secret
negotiations in the late 1990s provided an earlier opportunity to resolve issues between
the U.S. and Libya. Qadhafi indicated a willingness to concede his WMD programs as
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early as 1999 but the U.S. delayed in settling.870 The primary evidence for this is the
willingness of Libya to extradite its two officials to the Netherlands in April of 1999
before entering secret negotiations with Britain and the U.S. in May. According to
Martin Indyk, who served as a senior director on Clinton's National Security Council and
participated in the secret talks, Libya was willing to discuss any issue with the U.S.. It
was the Clinton administration that set the agenda to first settle the Pan Am affair before
broaching the broader issue of Libyan support of terrorism and its WMD. According to
Indyk, this process was derailed by the Bush administration's refusal to reconvene
talks.87'
Still, while Qadhafi was clearly eager to have the remaining sanctions removed,
he had not indicated a willingness to concede to all U.S. demands. Qadhafi was unwilling
to consider paying any compensation until after a verdict in the Lockerbie trial had been
rendered. Also, Libya refused to negotiate directly with the U.S. over WMD, offering
instead to participate in a multilateral forum. In May of 2002, Libya finally offered to
pay compensation in exchange for lifting sanctions and removing Libya from the U.S. list
of state sponsors of terrorism. The offer, however, did not include an acknowledgment of
Libyan responsibility and made no mention of WMD. Furthermore, Libya never
indicated a willingness to directly negotiate with the U.S. over WMD until mid-March of
2003.
Though Libya was willing to continue negotiations after 1999, it was the Clinton
administration which further slowed the process. The U.S. established a sequential
strategy which then delayed talks. For the extradition of the two Libyan suspects, the
870 Indyk, Martin (9 March 2004) "The Iraq War did not force Gadaffi's hand" Financial Times
871 Indyk, Martin (9 March 2004) "The Iraq War did not force Gadaffi's hand" Financial Times
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U.S. agreed to the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999. The U.S. then planned to allow
the permanent lifting of UN sanctions in exchange for a final resolution on the Pan Am
bombing. Only once the Pan Am case was already settled would the U.S. lift its
sanctions and normalize its relations in exchange for Libya abandoning WMD and
support of terrorism. It was also the Clinton administration that suspended the talks in
2000 during the presidential election. By contrast, the Bush administration delayed
reinitiation of talks with Libya by only nine months from the time of taking office until
just after the September 11th attacks. Then negotiations floundered as Libya remained
reluctant to take responsibility for the Pan Am bombing or to negotiate over WMD.
In sum, the diplomatic progress in the late 1990s clearly established negotiating
channels and a certain level of trust between the U.S. and Libya to continue talks.
However, Qadhafi was unwilling to concede to three U.S. demands, i.e. acknowledging
responsibility paying compensation for the Pan Am bombing and abandoning Libya's
WMD programs, until the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The diplomatic channels
forged through British efforts therefore proved necessary, but not sufficient for Qadhafi
to concede to the U.S. core demand of abandoning WMD.
Argument III: A Change in Libyan Interests
A third argument points to a much earlier change in Qadhafi's confrontational
foreign policy towards the West which followed President Reagan's departure from
office in 1988. Qadhafi desired rapprochement with the United States but the bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland proved a major stumbling block to this
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effort.872 In addition, the impact of sanctions on Libya's stagnating economy during the
1990s and the rise of radicalized Islamic terrorist groups further convinced Qadhafi that it
was in his own interest to resolve conflict with the U.S..
A shortcoming of the view that Qadhafi had changed his anti-western stance by
the late 1980s is that it ignores the fact that the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing in December
of 1988 and UTA Flight 772 bombing in September of 1989 were a product of Libya's
terrorism policies. It was not until after being confronted with evidence of Libyan
involvement in the bombings that Qadhafi began to take steps to reverse these policies. It
was, rather, the rise of radicalized Islamic groups which threatened Qadhafi and likely
contributed most to his reversal of Libyan terrorist policies.
A second weakness in this line of reasoning is that, although Qadhafi may have
desired rapprochement, he was unwilling to meet demands to extradite the two suspects
to the U.S. or Britain. It would be the U.S. and Britain who eventually made concessions
for a third-country trial at the insistence of Libya. If rapprochement had been truly that
important to Qadhafi, he could have acted to reverse his decision and meet the U.S. and
British joint demands at any point in the seven years since their introduction in 1991.
A final critique questions why, if Qadhafi's interests in WMD had changed, Libya
went on to secretly procure upwards of a half a billion dollars worth of nuclear
technology from the A.Q Khan network after 1997. One speculation is that Qadhafi
continued with his nuclear program to provide a bargaining chip for future
872 St John, Ronald Bruce (2004) "'Libya Is Not Iraq': Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy" The Middle East
Journal 58:3 387
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negotiations. 873 This seems unlikely. To be used as a bargaining leverage would require
Libya to eventually make known its nuclear acquisitions, something Libya never made an
effort to do. More puzzling is the fact that Libya continued to make purchases from the
A.Q. Khan network even after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Qadhafi would likely have
realized the discovery of such transactions would, if anything, reduce Libya's bargaining
leverage rather than enhance it. Indeed, that is precisely what happened upon its
discovery in October of 2003.
In sum, sanctions and the rise of radical Islamic groups placed significant pressure
on Qadhafi to change his position with regard to terrorism, but not to the extent that he
would agree to the extradition of the two Lockerbie suspects on U.S. terms. In addition,
though Qadhafi may have eventually doubted the deterrent value of WMD in a post-911
world, such doubts were not sufficient for him to unilaterally abandon his programs or
even to halt the procurement of additional nuclear technology from the A.Q. Khan
network when the opportunity presented itself.
Argument IV: A combination of threat of force, diplomacy, sanctions and limited
demands
A final argument, which I make, concludes that the three previous arguments
provided necessary, but insufficient reasons for a final agreement being reached in
December of 2003.874 By the end of the 1990s, sanctions and the rise of militant Islamic
groups within Libya had apparently persuaded Qadhafi to abandon his support of
terrorism. This had not, however, been sufficient to cause Qadhafi to concede to
873 Wyn Bowen (2006) "Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink" Adelphi Papers
46:67
874 Jentleson, Bruce W. and Christopher A Whytock (2005/6) "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy
Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy" International Security 30:3, 47-86
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extradite the two Pan Am suspects to either the U.S. or Britain. When the U.S. agreed to
a trial in the Netherlands, this did produce further negotiations with Libya. But it, in turn,
did not convince Qadhafi to acknowledge responsibility for Lockerbie or to negotiate
over WMD. Finally, the U.S. invasion of Iraq likely motivated Qadhafi to agree to
negotiations over both issues. But it was the intercept of uranium enrichment centrifuges
bound for Libya in October 2003 which provided "smoking gun" evidence, which the
U.S. could well have used to make unconditional demands of Libya to abandon WMD.
This appears to have convinced Qadhafi to quickly take the deal on the table in exchange
for normalized relations before the U.S. changed its position.
A point not discussed in the three previous arguments is the importance of the
U.S. decision not to make regime change an objective for Libya as it had with Iraq. This -
decision was critical to a successful coercion outcome. The willingness of President
Bush to agree to Blair's request to cut the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, John
Bolton, out of negotiations relieved the pressure from neoconservatives within the
administration to increase the level of demands on Libya.875 The willingness of all
parties to coordinate and abide by the timing and wording of public announcements
concerning Libyan concessions further provided Qadhafi a means to save face and
thereby reduce audience costs.
ANAL YSIS OF EXPLANA TIONS FOR COERCION FAIL URE
In this final section I again assess the predictions from the survival and
commitment hypotheses (see Table 6.8). The crisis between the United States and Libya
following the September 1 1 th Al Qaeda attacks generated two core compellent demands:
875 Hirsch, Michael (2 May 2005) "Bolton's British Problem" Newsweek 145:18 30
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that Libya stop all support of international terrorist organizations and abandon all WMD
programs. The survival hypothesis correctly predicts that coercion would succeed, as
neither Libya's, nor Qadhafi's, nor his regime's survival was threatened by this
concession. The commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicts coercion failure as the U.S.
had more than sufficient combined military force in the Mediterranean and Middle East
to credibly back up additional demands.
Core Survival Commitment Actual
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Coercion
Demands Outcome
Sep 2001 - Core Demands Predicts Predicts Core Demand
Dec 2003 Policy Change Success Failure Success
- Abandon - Conceding - U.S. military - Libya
terrorism did not with sufficient abandoned
- Abandon WMD threaten force to back support of
Libyan state, up additional terrorism
regime, or demands - Libya
Qadhafi's abandoned
leadership WMD
Table 6.8: Predictions of Coercion Outcome
TESTING THE SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS
The expectation of the target survival hypothesis is that coercion will likely
succeed as long as the state, the regime, and the regime leadership's survival is not
threatened by acquiescing to a challenger's demands. For this case, the survival
hypothesis correctly predicts coercion success.
Impact on the Libyan State
Complying with the demands to abandon its support of terrorism and WMD
programs did not threaten Libyan survival. Such concessions would clearly have no
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impact on Libya's control of its population. Abandoning terrorist and WMD policies did
infringe upon Libyan sovereignty but, in and of itself, change to these policies did not
risk survival of the state, as I discuss below. Finally, agreeing to these demands would
lead to a normalization of relations with the U.S., an outcome which would improve both
Libya's security and economic outlook.
The question remains as to what impact stopping its support of terrorism and
abandoning its WMD programs would have on Libya's security. As I previously
discussed at length in the first Libyan crisis, abandoning support for terrorist groups did
not threaten Libya's survival and, in fact, now added the benefit of reducing the potential
threat of a U.S. attack i la Afghanistan. With regard to nuclear weapons, Qadhafi had
originally desired a nuclear program for the prestige and security. Libya would gain in
prestige as the only Arab country with the same nuclear capabilities as Israel. Qadhafi
also presumed that nuclear weapons would provide a deterrent to U.S. strikes, such as El
Dorado Canyon. This calculus reversed itself abruptly, however, on 11 September 2001.
Rather than dissuading, Libya's nuclear program now encouraged U.S. aggression as had
Saddam's alleged WMD program. Likewise, chemical weapons had little, if any
deterrent value against a U.S. military prepared to fight in a chemical environment, as
demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In sum, while abandoning its policies on terrorism and WMD impinged on
Libya's sovereignty, it was not likely to threaten the survival of the state and reduced the
threat of a U.S. attack and brightened Libya's economic outlook.
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Impact on Qadhafi's Regime
In 2001, at the commencement of this crisis, Qadhafi's regime was not threatened
by domestic opposition groups as it had been in the mid-1990s. While conceding to U.S.
demands would reveal the regime as weak, there was no militarized opposition to revolt
against Qadhafi's government. On the contrary, conceding to U.S. demands decreased
the likelihood that the U.S. would make regime change an objective as it had with Iraq.
Impact on Qadhafi's Leadership
The final assessment questions whether Qadhafi would suffer significant audience
costs for conceding. As leader of a personalist regime Qadhafi was less likely to be
punished by principals from within his regime replacing him for policy failure. In this
case, it is unlikely Qadhafi was overly concerned for his leadership survival for three
reasons. First, Qadhafi's hold on power had improved since the 1990s. Though there is
not much evidence as to the degree of control he maintained, he was still in power and
there were no longer reports of coup attempts made from within the government or
military.
Second, Qadhafi had already abandoned his support of terrorist groups. The
militant Islamic organizations which threatened his regime in the late 1990s had already
turned him against international terrorist groups. Meeting the U.S. demand to abandon
support of terrorism was merely a matter of Qadhafi publicly acknowledging the change
in policy his regime had already adopted. This was not an acknowledgement of policy
failure and, as such, did not likely generate audience costs in areas he cared about.
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Third, Libya's WMD programs had decreased in importance for the regime. For
three decades, Libya had been unsuccessful in its efforts to produce nuclear weapons.
Even the recent injections of nuclear enrichment and weapons technology from the A.Q.
Khan network had not translated into an improvement in the scientific and technical
expertise required for Libya to develop a viable nuclear program.
In addition, the high cost of WMD had been a source of tension within the regime
since the mid-70s. Since 1990, with the exception of acquisitions from A.Q. Khan,
Libyan efforts at improving its nuclear capabilities had failed. Given the high costs and
minimum progress, it is likely that there remained within the regime those who viewed
WMD as an economic albatross to Libya's weak economy.
The combination of Qadhafi being more in control of his regime, Libya already
having abandoned its support of terrorism, and the failure and high costs of WMD
programs reduced the audience costs Qadhafi was likely to suffer.
In conclusion, the survival of neither the Libyan state, nor Qadhafi nor his regime
was likely to be at risk by Libya abandoning its support of terrorism and its WMD
programs. The survival hypothesis therefore correctly predicts coercion success for these
core demands.
TESTING THE COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS
The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when the challenger
cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands. The commitment problem
is thus likely to be more pronounced when the challenger has military forces deployed to
back up additional demands. In this case the U.S. had adequate forces in the Middle East
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and Mediterranean to have employed them against Libya. In addition, the impending
invasion of Iraq demonstrated the willingness of the U.S. to make demands for regime
change even after Saddam had conceded that Iraq no longer had any WMD. According
to the commitment hypothesis, the credibility of both U.S. military capability and the
resolve to use them would lead Libya to expect the U.S. to make additional demands, as
it'had with Iraq, and this would cause coercion to fail.
By 20 March, 2003 the U.S. had deployed 115,000 American ground troops in
Kuwait.876 There were also 20,000 soldiers from the U.S. 4 Infantry Division that had
prepared for a northern invasion, until the Turkish Parliament disapproved their plans.
Their equipment was afloat in the Mediterranean along with the two carrier battle groups
of the 6th Fleet. I am not suggesting the U.S. actually had plans to employ these or
others of its forces against Libya, but wish to demonstrate that the U.S. forces in the
Mediterranean alone had a substantial number of troops, ships, and aircraft that were not
tied down in Iraq and available to the U.S. to credibly threaten Libya.
In addition, the Bush administration was in the process of demonstrating how a
powerful challenger would, in fact, increase its demands even if the weak target has
already conceded, just as the commitment problem logic expects. With Iraq, President
Bush's stated demand in September of 2002 was for Iraq to verifiably abandon its WMD.
When, however, Iraq did indeed cooperate, the Bush administration refused to accept
Saddam's concession and instead upped the U.S. objective to that of regime change.
876 Cordesman, Anthony H. (2003) The Iraq War Praeger: Westport, CT 36-37
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Avoiding Commitment Problems
Given the fact that the U.S. had the deployed military capability to make
additional demands and had already demonstrated its willingness to do so in Iraq, how
did the U.S. avoid credible commitment problems with Libya? Three reasons help
explain this. First, the U.S. publicly acknowledged that Libyan regime change was not a
policy objective. In the 1990s, while Iraqi regime change had become a U.S. policy
objective, the Clinton administration made it clear that this was not the case for Libya.
Further, President Bush intentionally excluded Libya from the "axis of evil." This was
done in large part because of previous negotiations over the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing
and out of deference to Great Britain.
Second, the order in which the U.S. sequenced the negotiations built trust between
Libya and the U.S.. In August 2003, Libya agreed to settle the Pan Am bombing issue by
acknowledging responsibility and paying compensation. In return, the U.S. and Britain
allowed the permanent lifting of the suspended UN sanctions, as promised. This
established a pattern of trust which led Qadhafi to agree to abandon WMD in December
of 2003 and the U.S. to normalize relations fully by June of 2004.
Third, the credibility of the threat of U.S. military action against Libya eroded as
the Iraqi insurgency mounted. By December of 2003, the average number of daily
attacks against coalition forces had risen nearly ten-fold since Bush's May declaration of
the end of major combat operations. 877 As the U.S. military was becoming increasingly
enmeshed in its counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, it appeared less and less likely that
877 United States Government Accountability Office (September 2007) "Figure 3: Average Number of
Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coaltion, Iraq Security Forces, and Civilians" in Securing,
Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq GAO-07-1195 11 www.gao.gov/new.items/d071195.pdf accessed 27 Jun
2010
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it would be able to open up a third front in Libya, thus decreasing the likelihood of a
commitment problem.
In conclusion, the survival hypothesis correctly predicted a successful outcome of
this crisis. Concessions were not likely to threaten the Libyan state, Qadhafi or his
regime. On the contrary, resistance would have significantly increased the risk to the
Libyan state and Qadhafi's regime from an attack the U.S. could now credibly threaten.
By contrast, the commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicted coercion failure for
this crisis. The U.S. had deployed in the Mediterranean a significant military force. In
addition, the Bush administration had demonstrated its resolve to use force in
Afghanistan and Iraq. It had also shown a willingness, as in the case of Iraq, to continue
to increase the demands it made of its targets regardless of whether they conceded or not.
Still Qadhafi conceded. This was, in part, due to experience with previous
administrations, who had disavowed Libyan regime change as a U.S. foreign policy
objective and alleviated Qadhafi's concern that the U.S. would make further demands.
So, too, did President Bush's exclusion of Libya from the "axis of evil" and in the
sequential pattern in which Libya would concede to a demand and the U.S. would follow
with a concession of its own, until all demands had been met.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I assessed interstate asymmetric conflict between the United States
and Libya from President Ronald Reagan entering the White House in January of 1981 to
Colonel Mu'ammar Al'Qadhafi agreeing to abandon Libya's Weapons of Mass
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Destruction in December of 2003. 1 analyzed three crises from this conflict: the crisis
over Libyan terrorism from 1981 to 1988, the U.S. demand for a trial of two Libyan
officials for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the crisis over Libya's terrorist
policies and WMD programs following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon. In these three crises, the U.S. made compellent demands for
which coercion partially failed in the first case, partially succeeded in the second, and
fully succeeded in the third case (see Table 6.9, below). As in the previous two chapters I
then assessed the survival and commitment hypotheses for coercion success or failure and
conclude that the survival hypothesis is a more accurate predictor for the coercive
outcomes of these three crises.
The survival hypothesis predicted coercion success for all three crises, which
proved correct for one of the cases and partially correct for a second. Overall, Qadhafi
proved willing to concede to U.S. demands as long as the Libyan state, his regime, and
his survival were not at stake. The single case where Qadhafi did not concede to U.S.
demands followed the El Dorado Canyon airstrikes when he reduced, but did not
abandon, terrorist attacks and stopped overt support while still providing covert
assistance to terrorist groups.
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Core Survival Commitment Actual Coercion
Crisis Compellent Hypothesis Hypothesis Outcome
Demands
Jan1981 - Policy Change Predicts Predicts Partial Failure of
1988 - Stop terrorist Success Failure Coercion
activities - Conceding - U.S. deployed - Libya reduced, but did
- Stop support of did not military force not stop, terrorist attacks
terrorist groups threaten sufficient to - Libya stopped overt
Libyan state, credibly back support of terrorist groups,
regime,but continued covert
Qadhafi's up additional support
leadership demands for - Pan Am Flight 
103
leaersip Libyan policy Bombing December 1988
change
Policy Change Predicts Predicts Partial Success
- Extradite two Success Success - Libya hands over
Nov 1991 Libyan suspects - Conceding - U.S. could not two suspects for trial
- April for trial did not increase in Netherlands and
1999 - Cooperate with threaten sanctions cooperates with
investigations Libyan state, investigation
- Acknowledge regime, or - Libya does not
Responsibility Qadhafi's Acknowledge
- Pay leadership Responsibility or Pay
Compensation Compensation
Sep 2001 - Core Demands Predicts Predicts Success
Dec 2003 Policy Change Success Failure -Libya abandoned
- Abandon - Conceding - U.S. military support of terrorism
terrorism did not with sufficient - Libya abandoned
- Abandon WMD threaten force to back up WMD
Libyan state, additional U.S.
regime, or demands
Qadhafi's
leadership Commitment AtualCo
Table 6.9: Explanations Predictions of Coercion Success/Failure
As it turned out, Qadhafi's grasp on power was relatively weak in 1986, exposing
him to several serious coup attempts in the wake of the U.S. airstrikes. He thus proved
more susceptible to domestic audience costs than expected as the leader of an
authoritarian, personalist regime. Qadhafi, however, limited audience costs by refusing
to concede to U.S. demands. He likewise ameliorated the threat of further U.S. airstrikes
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by reducing Libyan terrorist attacks and thus eliminating the casus bellum. Qadhafi's
strategy worked, as the credibility of U.S. military threats was reduced by the Reagan
administration's unwillingness to take further action without "smoking gun" proof of
Libyan involvement.
The commitment hypothesis partially predicted the outcome of the first and
second crises, but incorrectly predicted the third. In the first crisis, though Qadhafi did
not concede to U.S. demands following El Dorado Canyon, he did reduce the number of
Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks. This revealed him as weakly resolved which,
according to the commitment hypothesis, would likely have led to further U.S. demands,
which never actually materialized.
In the second crisis concerning the extradition of the two Libyan officials, the
U.S. did not have the ability to back up additional demands with the credible threat of
increasing sanctions. Further, the U.S. overcame potential commitment issues by
involving UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and South African President Nelson
Mandela in the final talks. This success was only partial, though, as Qadhafi never
agreed to a trial in the U.S. or Britain, and did not acknowledge responsibility or pay
compensation for the bombing until August of 2003.
In the third crisis, the U.S. had sufficient military forces in the Mediterranean to
increase its demands of Libya, from abandoning WMD to regime change. This, in fact,
was what the Bush administration was in the process of doing at that time in Iraq. Of the
three cases, this is the one most likely to fail. Yet not only did Qadhafi concede to U.S.
demands, but President Bush also did not then raise demands. Commitment issues were
overcome by U.S. restraint from threatening regime change, the sequential and
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incremental way in which each demand was resolved, and the diminished military threat
to Libya resulting from the entanglement of the U.S. military with the Iraqi insurgency.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
I began this research project with the observation that Great Powers frequently
target weak states and often adopt coercive strategies in the asymmetric crises that
follow. Though outmatched militarily, weak states frequently resist, leaving the powerful
challenger to either accept the situation as a foreign policy failure or choose a costly brute
force strategy, which often leads to invasion and occupation. My purpose has been to
explain this recurrence of weak target states resisting the coercive demands of powerful
challengers.
In Chapter 2, I developed a framework to explain this puzzle. First, I created a
game theoretic model of asymmetric coercion to educe circumstances, whereby a
powerful challenger would choose coercion over other available foreign policy options. I
then calculated equilibrium conditions to illustrate under what situations a challenger
optimizes its expected outcome in limiting both the demands and the threats that it makes
on targets. To maximize this outcome, I concluded that a rational challenger only
chooses coercion when the target is likely to concede.878 Second, I employed the
asymmetric coercion model to evaluate the existing non-rational and rationalist
explanations for why coercive bargaining fails. I then introduced a new rationalist
explanation for target resistance in the face of threats to its survival. From two of these
explanations, I derived testable hypotheses for coercion failure, one based on target
survival and the other on challenger's commitment problems. I concluded Chapter 2 with
an introduction of two explanations for why a powerful challenger might rationally
choose coercion even though it believes the target is likely to resist, during a lengthy
878 The equilibrium condition had the challenger maximizing demands and minimizing threats such that the
target was indifferent between conceding or resisting.
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military buildup prior to an invasion, during which the costs of coercion are low, and
cases in which there are high external costs for a challenger to adopt a brute force
strategy without first attempting coercion.
In Chapter 3, I examined the empirical evidence of asymmetric conflicts. This
quantitative analysis served two purposes. First, I generated descriptive statistics to
assess the relevance of this project for real world cases of asymmetric coercion. To do
so, I developed a dataset containing 116 asymmetric cases having arisen since the end of
World War I. I then coded each according to the strategy the Great Power adopted and
the degree to which it achieved its foreign policy objectives. I then compared my
findings with those of other researchers on coercion.
Second, I utilized the survival and commitment hypotheses to make predictions as
to whether coercion would likely succeed or fail for cases of coercion with compellent
demands and compared these predictions to the actual outcomes of the cases. To control
for other factors that might have affected these outcomes, I further operationalized
explanatory and control variables and then ran a series of ordered probit regressions.
Overall, I found that the quantitative evidence supported the survival hypothesis but not
the commitment hypothesis.
To evaluate how well the asymmetric coercion model captures the dynamics of
coercion in real world conflicts and to conduct in-depth testing of the survival and
commitment hypotheses on individual cases, I carried out a series of qualitative studies.
Chapters 4 through 6 address cases involving the extended conflicts between the United
States and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, respectively. I draw four broad based findings from
these cases. First, they validate the overall utility of the asymmetric coercion model as a
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framework for evaluating the decision making of both powerful challengers and weak
targets in asymmetric conflicts. Second, consistent with my quantitative findings, these
cases support the survival hypothesis that targets are likely to resist making concessions
which place their survival at risk. Further, states, regimes and their leaders are also likely
to concede when further resistance threatens their survival. Third, there is scant evidence
that commitment problems are a significant obstacle to Great Powers seeking to coerce
weak states. Again and again the United States avoided potential commitment issues
through the formation of coalitions, the engagement of international organizations such as
the United Nations, the involvement of other Great Powers, such as the USSR/Russia in
the Iraqi and the Serbian crises or Great Britain in two of the Libyan crises, or by
implementing incremental tit-for-tat concessions in order to build trust and reduce the
audience costs of the target leader. Fourth, some crises which may be coded as coercion
failures are in fact foreign policy successes. In these cases coercive strategies were never
meant to succeed, but merely to provide justification for brute force war. This was
clearly the case with the lead-up to the Gulf War in 1991 and to the invasion of Iraq in
2003. 879
For the remainder of this chapter, I summarize these findings in four sections.
First, I reexamine and draw insights from the quantitative and qualitative studies.
Second, I reevaluate these findings against the competing hypotheses of survival and
commitment. Third, I identify limitations to the formal modeling, quantitative methods,
and qualitative methods I employed in this study and provide recommendations for future
879 In the case of Kosovo, Rambouillet can also be considered a case in which the U.S. wanted coercive
diplomacy to fail in order to provide justification for the NATO air campaign.
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research. Finally, I address important foreign policy implications on the basis of my
findings.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: SUMMARY OF QUANTITA TIVE AND QUALITA TIVE
FINDINGS
Summary of Quantitative Findings
In Chapter 3, I identified 116 cases of asymmetric crises between Great Powers
and weak states from 1918 to 2003. Of the Great Powers, the United States was by far
the most frequent initiator of these lopsided crises, responsible for a third of cases overall
and 86% of cases since the end of the Cold War. Great Powers usually achieved their
foreign policy objectives, succeeding in 72% of the cases. During the Cold War,
however, Great Powers achieved their foreign policy outcomes in only 50% of the cases,
a success rate much lower than for other periods.
Great Powers chose coercion much more frequently than brute force, with the
U.S. being the country most likely to coerce, in 80% of its cases, as compared to other
Great Powers at 72%. In these coercion cases, Great Powers were also seven times more
likely to make compellent demands rather than deterrent demands.
To increase confidence in these findings, I compared my results with previous
research. This required coding coercion cases for two additional dependent variables:
coercion and coercive diplomacy outcomes. For the 77 compellent cases, coercion
succeeded 56% of the time, while coercive diplomacy, with only the threat of force
employed, succeeded in 43% of the cases. Both results compared reasonably with
previous findings.
455
Finally, I tested the survival and commitment hypotheses and their predictions as
to the likely outcome for each case of compellence. The survival hypothesis accurately
predicted 66% of the crises outcomes, while the commitment hypothesis correctly
predicted 43%. To ensure other factors were not the cause, I controlled for other
variables likely to affect crises outcomes. I operationalized key explanatory and control
variables and then ran a series of ordered probit regressions. My findings supported the
survival hypothesis, as the state survival estimator was consistently significant and
negatively correlated with the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome. As the
survival hypothesis predicted, an increase in the threat to target survival decreased the
likelihood of coercion success.
By contrast, the estimator for commitment was positively correlated with foreign
policy outcome, which ran counter to the expectations of the commitment hypothesis. In
the abstract, commitment problems are present in all asymmetric conflicts. With the
large imbalance of power tilted in its favor, a Great Power has the military capacity to
credibly back up any further demands. Uncorrected, a commitment hypothesis based on
the overall balance of power is deterministic, as it predicts coercion as likely to fail for all
asymmetric conflicts. Yet in Chapter 3, I found that coercion failed in only 44% of
asymmetric crises. In an attempt to provide a better proxy for commitment problems, I
introduced the idea first proposed by Julian Corbett, that the deployed military power of a
Great Power is a better measure of the capability and will of a Great Power to employ
force. Unfortunately, this alternative proxy for commitment ultimately fared no better,
correctly predicting only 43% of the actual outcomes.
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A limitation of this, as with all statistical analysis, is the fact that quantitative
studies cannot directly evaluate the causes of crises outcomes, i.e. whether the target
based its decision on concerns for its survival, on the challenger's commitment problems,
or on some other factor. To address this methodological shortcoming, I turned to
qualitative methods and conducted in-depth case studies.
Summary of Qualitative Findings
In Chapters 4 through 6, I examined crises for which the United States issued a
total of 10 compellent demands. These cases were all drawn from the extended conflicts
between the U.S. and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya.880 I chose these cases based on the
variation in crises outcomes, in the level of demands made by the U.S., and in the amount
of military force threatened or employed. Below, I briefly highlight the insights each
case brings to the study of asymmetric coercion.
United States vs. Iraq: The Gulf War, August 1990 - February 1991
The Gulf War is an excellent case for assessing three attributes of asymmetric
coercion. First, the case tests the upper limits of compellent demands a Great Power can
successfully pursue through coercion. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
of 1990, the U.S. initially adopted a punishment strategy of sanctions. When this had
little effect, the U.S. shifted its policy towards a brute force strategy. President Bush
made the decision in October to forcibly remove the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and to
880 U.S. only cases were purposely chosen in order to hold constant for the powerful challenger. Also I
included multiple cases for each target state which allowed cross-case comparisons where both challenger
and target are held constant. Finally, the time period for the crises, with the exception of the first Libyan
case, were all following the Cold War. Holding constant for the Great Power and time period makes it
problematic to generalize the qualitative findings, but it has the advantage that I examine the causes and
outcomes of cases with less concern that it is a change in either the powerful challenger or the international
environment which is responsible for variation in the outcomes. Since the quantitative analysis includes all
the Great Powers this mitigates the problem of generalizing from only U.S. cases.
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destroy the armored divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard. By the time the U.S.-led
coalition commenced airstrikes on 17 January 1991, coercive diplomacy had failed to
convince Saddam to concede to the demands set out by numerous U.N. Security Council
resolutions calling for an unconditional withdrawal. This failure was due, in part, to
uncertainty over the likely outcome of the impending war, along with miscalculation by
Saddam Hussein over the true balance of military power. It was also the result of the
audience costs Saddam anticipated suffering, had he ordered a humiliating retreat of the
Iraqi Army from Kuwait without a fight. Coercive diplomacy also failed as, once U.S.
forces had fully deployed by January of 1991, President Bush was no longer to be
satisfied with an Iraqi withdrawal. At this juncture, he was determined to prevent a
reoccurrence of Iraqi aggression by destroying the Republican Guard.
Saddam's position softened, however, after five weeks of air strikes. The
"stinging ice of reality" convinced Saddam by the eve of the ground invasion to agree to
the Soviet Union-brokered peace proposal, which called for an orderly withdrawal of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait.881 Coercive airpower and the credible threat of an impending
ground invasion succeeded in gaining extra-territorial concessions from Iraq.
Preempting Saddam's concession, President Bush announced a 48-hour
ultimatum for the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. An effort to meet
this new deadline would have forced a hasty retreat, forcing the Iraqi Army to abandon a
large portion of its heavy weapons, along with their dug-in defensive fighting positions,
rendering Iraq's already weakened army even less capable of defending itself and the
Iraqi homeland. Though Saddam could be coerced into giving up Kuwait, he was
881 Blainey, Geoffrey (1973) The Causes of War New York: Free Press 56
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unwilling to concede an army which was the only obstacle standing between U.S. forces
and Baghdad.
Second, the Gulf War is a good case to demonstrate why a Great Power may
choose coercion even when it believes such a strategy is not likely to work. In October of
1990, doubts over its ability to coerce Saddam Hussein led the Bush administration to
plan for a brute force invasion of Kuwait. Prior to combat operations, however, Bush still
felt obliged by international norms to justify the use of force by first seeking approval
from the UN Security Council. The resulting casus belli required the U.S. abide by the
coercive strategy dictated by the 29 November 1990 UNSC resolution. The resolution
contained the compellent demand for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait,
along with the denial threat that, should Iraq refuse, then the U.S.-led coalition was
authorized to take measures necessary to enforce compliance. 882 The diplomatic and
domestic political costs for abrogating international norms were sufficient to prompt
President Bush to accept this strategy, despite the fact that coercive diplomacy was not
likely to succeed. Further, once the U.S. had deployed its forces to the region, President
Bush no longer even wanted coercive diplomacy to work, as this would leave hundreds of
thousands of U.S. forces in the Middle East for an undetermined period of time and
sacrifice his objective of destroying the Iraqi Republican Guard.
In addition to the need to obtain a casus belli, once President Bush decided upon a
brute force strategy in October, a good deal of time was required to deploy the additional
men and equipment needed to simultaneously invade Kuwait and attack the Republican
882 United Nations Security Council "Resolution 678 (1990), 29 November 1990"
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdfOpenElement
accessed 3 February 2009, Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft (1998) A World Transformed Alfred A.
Knopf: New York 394, Woodward, Bob (1991) The Commanders Simon and Schuster: New York 320
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Guard in southern Iraq. Since the U.S. was already paying the costs to deploy these
troops, it could afford, in the interim, to adopt the coercive denial strategy mandated by
the UNSC resolution.883
Third, the Gulf War provides a strong test for the commitment hypothesis, which
it fails.8 84 Of all the cases, the Gulf War presents the most likely conditions for a credible
commitment problem to cause target resistance. The U.S. had more than sufficient
military force deployed to the region to further threaten an invasion of Iraq, had Saddam
Hussein conceded to a hasty withdrawal from Kuwait. At the time, Saddam was well
aware of the U.S. capability to threaten the Iraqi homeland and his regime, and he would
later claim victory on the basis that the U.S. had not deposed him.885 It is also a strong
test in that, once Saddam conceded to the Soviet proposal, Bush indeed did go on to
increase demands on Iraq, just as the logic of commitment problems dictates. Yet,
despite these optimal conditions for a credible commitment problem, Saddam attempted
to concede.
Two related factors help explain why commitment problems did not play a
prominent role in Saddam's decision to accept the Soviet proposal on the eve of the
ground invasion. First, the involvement of the Soviet Union in negotiations lessened
Saddam's concern that the U.S. would make future demands of Iraq. The reputation of
883 The denial strategy required little in the way of additional direct costs since the Bush administration had
already determined to deploy forces for a brute force invasion. There were, however, two potential costs
for adopting this strategy. First the U.S. forfeited opportunities for a surprise attack as a deadline was set in
the UNSC resolution. The U.S. somewhat overcame this constraint by keeping secret the start of the
ground invasion. The second potential cost, previously discussed, was that Saddam might concede to the
coercive demands that would require President Bush to either accept the concession and thus forfeit the
opportunity to destroy the Republican Guard, or attack anyway and incur the costs from disapproving
international and domestic audiences.
884 Van Evera, Stephen (1997) Guide to Methodsfor Students of Political Science Ithaca NY: Cornell
University Press 31
885 Woods, Kevin and Mark E. Stout (2010) "Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of
'Desert Storm"' Journal of Strategic Studies 33:1 (February) 12
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Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union were on the line in negotiating a peace deal.
The U.S. would likely have suffered significant diplomatic costs resulting in the form of a
deterioration in its relationship with the Soviet Union had Bush first agreed to accept the
Soviet proposal then reneged once the Iraqi Army had withdrawn from Kuwait. The U.S.
had vital national security interests at stake with the Soviet Union and wished to maintain
a cooperative relationship over specific issues, such as securing the vast Soviet nuclear
arsenal, along with the more general concern of continuing the peaceful transition out of
the Cold War. Second, the U.S. had intentionally formed a coalition which included
Arab states. This coalition would likely have been fractured had the U.S. agreed to the
Soviet proposal and then abrogated that agreement by later threatening to invade Iraq.
This combination of Soviet involvement in negotiations and Arab participation in the
U.S.-led coalition ameliorated the commitment concerns Saddam may have had about
agreeing to a peace proposal.
United States vs. Iraq: The Kuwaiti Border, October 1994
Unlike the Gulf War, the deployment of two armored Iraqi Republican Guard
units to the Kuwaiti border resulted in only a minor crisis for the U.S.. It is a useful case
for this research, however, for it provides three insights into the use of asymmetric
coercion when relatively low-level demands for policy change are at stake.
First, Iraq's deployment of forces to the Kuwaiti border in October of 1994 was in
response to the dire economic conditions in Iraq, a direct result of the UN sanctions in
place since 1990. The extension of sanctions by the Security Council and the exhaustion
of Iraqi foreign currency reserves used to purchase foodstuffs generated a crisis for Iraq.
The first insight is that a target's options may not be limited to only conceding or
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resisting a challenger's demands. Leading up to this case, Iraq had been cooperating with
UN inspectors, but when Iraq's actions did not result in a recommendation to lift
sanctions, Iraq then chose a military response which sparked a new crisis for the U.S..
Second, this is a case in which coercive diplomacy succeeded quickly. Only the
minor policy change of redeploying its Republican Guard units back to garrison was
demanded of Iraq, backed by only the punishing threat of U.S. airstrikes on Baghdad.
This case demonstrates punishment strategies can succeed in gaining modest objectives.
Third, this is an example of a powerful challenger taking measures to lower the
target's audience costs for conceding. The Clinton administration delayed a public
announcement of its demand for Iraq to redeploy its forces. This provided the Iraqi
government a window of opportunity to claim that the deployment had been a mere
exercise rather than a failed attempt to again invade Kuwait. This gave Saddam Hussein
plausible denial that, rather than having been coerced to withdraw from the border, he
was simply following through with his original intention to redeploy the troops.
Regardless of the validity of this claim, had the U.S. preempted Iraq with an ultimatum,
Saddam's audience costs would likely have risen considerably. In this case, the timing of
the U.S. signals had an impact on Iraq's decision making. Whether this was the intention
of the Clinton administration or not, the delay minimized the humiliation Saddam
suffered for redeploying his troops, which made such a concession more likely.
United States vs. Iraq: Lead-up to the Invasion of Iraq, September 2002 - March 2003
The crisis leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq provides yet two more insights
into asymmetric conflict. First, just as his father had prior to the Gulf War, President
George W. Bush felt obliged to go to the United Nations to obtain a casus belli before
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invading Iraq. Unlike the Gulf War, however, this time Saddam Hussein cooperated with
the UN, allowing in weapons inspectors and thereby depriving the younger Bush of the
UNSC resolution he sought to authorize the use of force against Iraq. This unintended
coercive diplomacy success increased subsequent U.S. diplomatic costs for the war. The
fact that the U.S. went on to invade regardless demonstrates the limits to which
international norms can constrain a determined Great Power. Ultimately, in order to
remove Saddam Hussein from power, George W. Bush was willing to pay the
international and domestic political costs of invading a sovereign state without the
blessing of the United Nations.
Second, this crisis is an example of selection effects in action. The U.S.
intentionally did not adopt a coercive strategy demanding Iraqi regime change, as Bush
calculated that he could not coerce Saddam Hussein into relinquishing power. This
provides evidence to support the selection effects argument made in Chapter 3. One
reason there are so few observed cases of Great Powers failing to coerce weak states into
regime change is that a powerful challenger anticipates failure and instead either
accommodates or chooses brute force.886
United States vs. Serbia: Bosnian Civil War, 1992 - 1995
The Bosnian Civil War is the most complex crisis analyzed, as it involved two
target states: Serbia and the Republica Srpska. Two insights are worth noting in this
case. First, this crisis demonstrates the limits to the credibility of the threat of force when
a Great Power's vital interests are not at stake. The U.S. was not willing to risk
886 When Great Powers do demand regime change it is either because the weak state does not have the
means to resist or because the Great Power is obliged by international norms to provide the weak state an
opportunity to concede even though it is not likely to do so.
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deploying ground troops for combat operations, a refusal which restricted the coercive
leverage the U.S. could muster. Not until Croat and Muslim ground forces, supported by
NATO airpower, threatened to overrun western Bosnia did President Karadzic and
General Mladic concede negotiating power to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.
Second, this is a case for which sanctions succeeded in changing target behavior,
convincing Milosevic to withdraw Serbia's support for the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic
calculated that the negative impact of Serbia's decimated economy outweighed the
benefits he garnered from supporting the Bosnian Serbs. Here sanctions were effective in
changing Serbia's policy toward Bosnia, a critical factor in bringing the Bosnian Civil
War to an end.
United States vs. Serbia: Kosovo, 1998 - 1999
The Kosovo crisis provides four additional insights for asymmetric coercion.
First, it is the sole case for which the survival hypothesis produced a false positive,
predicting failure when the actual outcome was a success. The criteria I developed for
state survival evaluates whether a target's government, homeland territory, population, or
the viability of its economy is at risk. Since Serbia considers Kosovo as part of its
homeland, the expectation was for it to resist U.S. demands. Serbia withstood 78 days
and nights of NATO bombing, yet Slobodan Milosevic eventually conceded Kosovo,
even though Serbia still retained military forces capable of further resistance. Though
Milosevic was unwilling to give up Kosovo without a fight, once his strategy to fragment
the NATO alliance failed, he was no longer willing to endure the costs of continued
resistance. Over a decade later, it is evident that, with its tiny Serbian population, limited
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economy and material resources, and its inconsequential geostrategic position, Kosovo
was not critical to the survival of the Serbian state.
Second, this crisis demonstrates that, in certain cases, punishment strategies can
succeed in obtaining higher level objectives. The U.S. airpower-only strategy, once air
strikes were escalated from limited military targets to broader civilian targets, eventually
convinced Milosevic to concede a portion of Serbia's historic homeland.887
Third, Kosovo is a case in which the United States did not behave as a unitary
actor. Coercive diplomacy failed and the conflict escalated to violence, in large part
because the Clinton administration did not coordinate its demands and threats. Following
the Raeak massacre in mid-January of 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
convinced the administration to codify its demands for Serb forces to withdraw, along
with a thinly veiled promise of a referendum for Kosovo independence, at Rambouillet
and, once the Kosovar Albanians finally signed on, to set a deadline for Serbia to either
concede or face airstrikes. Meanwhile, Defense Secretary William Cohen and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton stood fast in refusing to consider the
use of ground troops over non-vital U.S. security interests. Coercive diplomacy failed
when, in late March of 1999 NATO commenced airstrikes, which continued for two and
a half months longer than the three days for which they were originally intended. The
threat from limited NATO airstrikes was not commensurate with demands for Serbian
887 Even though ultimately successful, I do not suggest Kosovo be adopted as a template for future coercive
strategies. The Clinton administration either intentionally or inadvertently made high level demands of
Serbia without the initial credible threat of force to back up those demands. After a month of ineffective air
strikes and after hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians had been forced from their homes and only
after the credibility of the NATO alliance was at stake along with the reputation of the Clinton
administration did the resolve of NATO and the U.S,. finally stiffen to the point of making its threats of
force credible to Milosevic.
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homeland territory until the Washington summit in late April, when NATO's newfound
resolve led to an escalation in the severity of airstrikes against Serbia.
Finally, Kosovo demonstrates that, at times, a leader may prefer to resist a Great
Power and absorb some punishment in order to establish a reputation for being tough and
to deflect domestic audience costs. Milosevic demonstrated his resolve by standing up to
the U.S. and NATO for 78 days. In so doing, he could then turn to the Serbian people
and argue that he had done all he could to retain Kosovo and that further resistance would
be futile and only cause further suffering.8 8 8
United States vs. Libya: Terrorism, 1981 - 1988
The crisis between the U.S. and Libya in the 1980s provides two insights into
asymmetric conflict. First, this is a case for which the U.S. combined both coercive and
brute force strategies. The Reagan Administration made coercive demands of Libya to
reverse its terrorism policies. The U.S. also bombed Qadhafi's compound and conducted
covert operations in an anemic effort to topple his regime. Just as with the U.S. invasion
of Iraq, the fact that the U.S. chose not to attempt to coerce regime change in Libya
supports the asymmetric coercion model's finding that a powerful challenger does not
choose coercion when a target state is likely to resist.
Second, this case demonstrates the limits to coercion when a Great Power places
constraints on the level of force it is willing to employ. Given the domestic and
international pressure on President Reagan to abstain from using force, he only
authorized strikes in retaliation for Libyan attacks against the U.S. Navy and in response
to terrorist attacks when there was undisputable, "smoking gun" evidence of Libyan
888 I credit Barry Posen with this insight.
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involvement. Following El Dorado Canyon, Qadhafi undercut the United States'
justification for further military action by reducing Libya's direct involvement in terrorist
attacks, by shifting to covert support of terrorist groups, and by suppressing anti-western
rhetoric. As a result, the crisis stalemated and, while terrorist attacks by Libya decreased
over the next two years, the raid proved a short-term solution to a long-term problem, as
evidenced by the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December of 1988.
United States vs. Libya: Pan Am Flight 103, 1991 - 1999
The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 created a second crisis for the U.S. and Libya
which lasted for nearly a decade and generated three insights into asymmetric conflict.
First, this is the only case which did not involve some threat of military force. Instead,
the U.S. used only sanctions in a punishment strategy aimed at convincing Qadhafi to
extradite the two Libyan officials suspected of the bombing. This case therefore provides
an opportunity to expand the asymmetric coercion model to include sanctions. Economic
sanctions eventually did influence Qadhafi in his decision to extradite, a demand he
conceded as part of his broader objective of normalizing relations with the U.S. and
Western Europe.
Second, while sanctions produced a positive externality for the U.S., they also had
the potential to be very negative. Sanctions, coupled with depressed global crude prices,
stagnated Libya's oil dependent economy. This dismal economic environment proved
conducive to the recruitment of Libya's disillusioned and unemployed youth into the
radicalizing Islamic militant groups that sprang up across Libya. In one respect, this
benefited the U.S., as the threat these groups posed to his regime caused Qadhafi to
reverse his pro-terrorist policies. Had the militants succeeded in overthrowing Qadhafi,
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however, they could have presented a greater threat to US. security interests. The U.S.
would have belatedly achieved Reagan's objective for Libyan regime change only to now
find itself dealing with a country ruled by a radicalized Islamic regime with Al-Qaeda
ties.
Third, a key step in resolving this crisis was the 1998 Clinton administration
renouncement of Libyan regime change as a U.S. foreign policy objective. For nearly
two decades, Qadhafi had refused to make any concessions to the United States, a stance.,
which changed after the lifting of the threat of regime change. Subsequent Libyan
concessions support the survival hypothesis, in that once survival was no longer at stake,
the U.S. was able to convince Qadhafi to make policy changes, even when demands were
backed by sanctions alone.
United States vs. Libya: WMD, 2001 - 2003
The final crisis over Libya's Weapons of Mass Destruction is useful for
examining two final aspects of coercion. First, the credibility of any threat of force
which the U.S. could leverage against Libya was enhanced by the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Following September 11h , 2001 Qadhafi cooperated with U.S. intelligence against Al
Qaeda. He also agreed to negotiations to settle Pan Am Flight 103. It was not until
March of 2003, however, that Qadhafi finally agreed to negotiate over his WMD. U.S.
military action in Iraq demonstrated to Qadhafi that WMD programs or even maintaining
ambiguity over the existence of such programs did not increase Libya's security. On the
contrary, not only did WMD fail to deter, but they also provided the U.S. with a casus
belli and increased the likelihood of U.S. military action.
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- Second, the U.S. overcame a potential commitment problem caused by a lack of
trust between the two countries. The building of trust was accomplished through a series
of orchestrated diplomatic actions. Libya agreed to first announce the final settlement of
Pan Am Flight 103, in return for which the U.S. publicly supported the permanent lifting
of UN sanctions. The byproduct of both parties fulfilling their promises over this
relatively minor issue not only increased the credibility of both states, but also instilled a
belief that further negotiations could be mutually beneficial. This set conditions for
bringing this two-decade conflict to a conclusion, as seen when Libya agreed to abandon
its WMD in exchange for a normalization of relations with the United States.
THE SURVIVAL AND COMMITMENT HYPOTHESES
In Chapter 3, I tested the survival and commitment hypotheses by making
predictions with each as to the likely outcomes for cases of asymmetric coercion. The
survival hypothesis predicted that coercion failure was likely when concession threatened
the target state, its regime, or its regime leader. The commitment hypothesis, by contrast,
predicted coercion failure as likely when the Great Power had deployed sufficient
military forces to back up further demands.
In the qualitative cases of Chapters 4 through 6, I continued with a more thorough
evaluation of the survival and commitment hypotheses. The compellent demands,
hypotheses predictions, and coercion outcomes for the ten cases I examined are presented
in Table 7.1, below. 889 I also provide explanations for the actual cause of the coercion
outcome. Overall, these qualitative results corroborate the quantitative finding that the
889 For these qualitative cases the outcome considered is whether coercion succeeded, which is slightly
different than the dependent variable for the quantitative cases of foreign policy outcome. See chapter 3 for
a detailed explanation.
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survival hypothesis is a better predictor of coercion outcomes. The survival hypothesis
predicted correctly in 80% of the cases (8 of the 10), compared to 60% (6 of the 10) for
the commitment hypothesis.8 90 In the text following Table 7.11 examine each case where
the survival or commitment hypothesis made the incorrect prediction.
890 Note that the proxy for commitment problems based on a Great Power's deployed military forces fares
much better than the alternative of a more abstract interpretation of the commitment problem based on the
overall balance of power. In this latter case the commitment hypothesis always predicts coercion failure in
asymmetric crises and therefore is correct in only 20% of the cases (2 out of 10). Since the hypotheses only
predict binary outcomes of either of success or failure, I count as correct predictions of success when the
outcome is partial success or failure when the outcome is partial failure.
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Commitment
Hypothesis
Prediction
Actual
Coercion
Outcome
Actual Cause of
Coercion Outcome
Iraq 1990- 1991 Extra Success Failure Success Saddam's fear of losing
Gulf War Territorial Iraqi Army and threat of
U.S. invasion
Iraq 1991 Abandon Iraqi Failure Failure Failure Saddam's unwillingness to
48-Hour Army suffer humiliation and
Ultimatum sacrifice Iraqi Army's
heavy weapons
Iraq 1994 Policy Change Success Success Success U.S. delayed making
Kuwaiti Border public its coercive
demands for a withdravyal
which reduced Saddam's
audience costs
Iraq 2002-2003 Policy Success Failure89 1 Success Saddam's fear that
WMD Change resisting on the issue of
WMD would lead to U.S.
invasion
Serbia 1992-1995 Policy Change Success Success Success Milosevic's concern over
Bosnian Civil War Serbian economy
Bosnian Serbs Policy Success Failure Success Bosnian Serb fear of fall
1992-1995 Change of Western Bosnia to
Bosnian Civil War Croat-Muslim offensive
Serbia 1998-1999 Homeland Failure Success Success Milosevic's failed strategy
Kosovo Territory and concern over costs
from continued NATO
airstrikes
Libya 1981-1988 Policy Change Success Failure Partial Lack of credible threat of
Terrorism Failure U.S. force after Qadhafi
modified terrorist policy
Libya 1991-1999 Policy Change Success Success Partial U.S. removed demand for
Pan Am Bombing Success regime change, agreed to
3r country trial
Libya 2001-2003 Policy Change Success Failure Success Libya not included in
WMD "Axis of Evil", credibility
of U.S. force during
buildup to Iraq invasion,
tit-for-tat concessions
Table 7.1: Summary of Predictions and Outcomes for Qualitative Case Studies
To better understand the limitations of the survival and commitment hypotheses, I
now consider why the hypotheses made incorrect predictions. I begin with the two
891 Initially, from September to December 2002, commitment hypothesis predicts coercion success as U.S. -
had limited forces to back up threat of invasion of Iraq. Later, by late February 2003, U.S. had increased
deployed forces to Persian Gulf in preparation for invasion. Commitment hypothesis predicts coercion
failure at this point as U.S. had sufficient force to credibly back up additional demands of Iraq, yet Saddam
continued to cooperate with UN.
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Crisis
Core
Compellent
Demands
Survival
Hypothesis
Prediction
''
inaccurate predictions by the survival hypothesis. First, in the Kosovo case, the survival
hypothesis predicted failure when the actual outcome was a coercion success. Serbia's
survival proved not to be threatened by concession of Kosovo. As discussed in Chapter
1, a limitation of the survival hypothesis is that it predicts coercion failure for demands
for population, homeland territory, regime change, or major economic concessions. In
the case of Kosovo, however, territorial demands did not, in fact, threaten Serbia's
survival, an inaccurate assessment which produced a false positive for the survival
hypothesis.
Second, in the crisis over Libya's terrorism policies of the 1980s, the survival
hypothesis correctly assessed that U.S. demands did not threaten Libya's survival, but its
prediction of a successful outcome proved wrong. Coercion partially failed, not because
demands threatened survival, but because the Reagan administration was unable to
maintain a credible threat of force to back up its demands and the crisis ended in a
stalemate. In this case, coercion failed because the U.S. mismatched its demands and
threats. The survival hypothesis, however, assumes that challengers and targets behave
rationally, that a challenger will correctly match its demands and threats, and that the
target will likely concede, so long as these demands do not threaten survival.
Turning now to examine the commitment hypothesis, it predicted the wrong
outcome in four of the ten cases. In addition, in all four cases, the commitment
hypothesis predicted failure where the actual outcome was either a coercion success or
partial success. First, during the Gulf War Saddam Hussein attempted to concede to the
Soviet peace proposal in an effort to forestall the U.S.-led coalition's invasion of Kuwait.
As discussed earlier, the involvement of the Soviet's in the peace process along with the
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inclusion of Arab states in the U.S.-led coalition reduced potential commitment problems,
for the United States. Second, in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003,
Saddam conceded to the Security Council's resolution over Iraqi WMD in another ill-
fated attempt to prevent a war with the United States. Saddam recognized that George
W. Bush's real strategy was that of brute force, and that the younger Bush's desire was
for Saddam to reject the UN resolution to provide Bush a casus belli for the planned
invasion. Saddam was therefore not concerned about commitment issues as he realized
Bush's real aim was regime change. Third, during the Bosnian Civil War, the Bosnian
Serbs eventually conceded negotiating power to Slobodan Milosevic. The inclusion of
the Russians in the Contact Group and Milosevic in the negotiation process lessened the
Bosnian Serbs concerns that the U.S. would make further demands. And fourth, Qadhafi
agreed to abandon his WMD programs only after the U.S. had fulfilled its promise to
allow the lifting of UN sanctions after Libya agreed to a settlement with the families of
the victims of PAN AM Flight 103. This incremental fulfillment of promises by both the
U.S. and Libya over the relatively minor issue of the PAN AM bombing developed trust
and provided a diplomatic template for further negotiations over Libya's WMD. In sum
the failed predictions of the commitment hypothesis demonstrate that a Great Power can
ameliorate the weak states concerns over the credibility of its commitments by forming
coalitions, involving third party states, and by the building of trust through incremental
concessions. The cases of U.S. and Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003 also highlight that the
credibility of a Great Power's commitment is not the primary concern for a weak state
when the Great Power's true strategy is that of a brute force war.
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LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
For this research project, I utilized a multi-method approach, employing formal
modeling for theory and hypothesis development, along with quantitative and qualitative
analysis to test hypotheses. In this section, I address the limitations for each of these
methods.
Limitations and Recommendations for Formal Modeling
Developing a model for asymmetric coercion required making assumptions as to
the rational behavior of actors in the international system. In order to include the
domestic factors which impact the decision making of leaders and regimes, however, I
relaxed the unitary actor assumption for weak target states. The introduction of audience.
costs incorporated these domestic political concerns, considerations which may alter a
target's decision as to whether it will make concessions. Audience cost similarly affects
a powerful challenger. While it is the Great Power in asymmetric coercion that
determines whether a conflict will escalate to a crisis, it is the target's decision to concede
or resist which determines the crisis outcome. Since the dependent variable for this study
is foreign policy outcome, I deemed the non-unitary behavior of the target as more
pertinent to the crisis outcome. Therefore, to keep the focus on the target's decision
making and to keep the model both parsimonious and tractable, I did not relax the unitary-
assumption for the challenger. 892
892 Non-unitary action by the challenger may lead to a mismatch of demands and threats which may cause
coercive diplomacy to fail and lengthen the duration of a crisis. However, due to the iterative stages of the
asymmetric coercion model the challenger has the opportunity to learn from these failures and adjust its
demands and threats in its subsequent offers.
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A second limitation of the asymmetric coercion model is that it excludes
inducements and sanctions as available foreign policy options. Inducements, however,
are frequently used alongside coercion as part of a mixed "carrot and stick" strategy.
Sanctions, likewise, are commonly employed as either a complement to or substitute for
coercion, as was the case in all the crises examined in Chapters 4-6. While the model
could be expanded to include sanctions as another foreign policy option, the introduction
of mixed strategies would greatly complicate the model.
A recommendation for future research is to adapt the asymmetric coercion model
to the study of sanctions. This seems promising, as sanctions work by increasing the
costs of resistance in order to convince a target to concede to demands, which is a causal
mechanism very similar as that of coercive punishment strategies. A word of caution is
warranted, however, since the equilibrium conditions derived from the asymmetric
coercion model are based on the balance of military power, expressed as the probability
of victory in war. Sanctions, on the other hand, are sometimes employed in cases, such
as against an ally, in which it makes little sense to discuss the possibility of war. Here,
the asymmetric coercion model may be inappropriate, as neither brute force nor coercive
strategies are available as foreign policy options.
Limitations and Recommendations for Quantitative Methods
The quantitative research in Chapter 3 was based on cases originating from the
International Crisis Behavior data set. Three issues limit confidence in regression results;
two concerns have to do with known selection effects determining the size and
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distribution of cases, and a third concern stems from problems which remain over
operationalizing variables for regime and leadership survival.
The first selection effect is the omission of cases of accommodation. The 116
cases in the asymmetric dataset do not include cases in which Great Powers chose to
accommodate the target. Accommodation, along with coercion and brute force, are the
three strategy choices available to the powerful challenger in the asymmetric coercion
model. The cases in the data set, however, are conflicts that have already escalated to
the point of crisis after a Great Power has chosen a coercive or brute force strategy over
accommodation. Omitting accommodation cases reduces the size of the data set and
introduces a potential selection bias as the powerful challenger chose not to escalate those
conflicts in which it did not expect the outcome of a coercive or brute force strategy to
outweigh the costs of accommodation. Unfortunately, a truncation of the database is
unavoidable, given the nature of the dependent variable, which measures the success or
failure of foreign policy outcomes. Even if these cases could be identified and the
problems associated with the dependent variable resolved, there is little data available to
code explanatory variables for the potential crises which never actually occurred. An
alternative approach, to include time series data on all the potential asymmetric conflict
dyads, could well capture these omitted accommodation cases, but would do little to
solve their inherent coding problems.
A second selection effect also not incorporated into the regression analysis stems
from cases in which the challenger moves directly to a brute force strategy because the
target is not likely to concede to coercive demands. Such cases are not coded as failure
since the challenger anticipated coercion failure and therefore never adopted a coercive
476
strategy in the first place. Evidence of this selection effect at work is most pronounced in
the cases of regime change. Demands for regime change are found in 10 of the 77 cases
of compellence but, of these 10 cases, coercion succeeds in 9, creating a far higher
success rate than the overall coercion success rate of 56%. A critical piece of data which
explains this result is the fact that, in 6 of the 9 successful cases, the target state did not
have the means to resist the demands of the Great Power. This supports the theoretical
finding of the asymmetric coercion model that an optimizing challenger only chooses
coercive strategies likely to succeed. The limitation of the regression analysis, however,
is that it has not been corrected for this selection effect. As a result, the demand
estimator from the ordered probit regressions does not reflect the significant role
demands play in determining foreign policy outcomes.
A third limitation of this quantitative analysis is that I was unable to
operationalize suitable variables for commitment, target regime, or leadership survival.
The commitment proxy which measured the Great Power's force deployment performed
poorly. For regime survival, there was little data on domestic opposition groups for many
of the 77 cases. For regime leader survival, my attempts failed at employing either
regime type or size of winning coalition (W score) as acceptable proxy variables for a
target leader's audience costs.
Future quantitative international relations research could benefit from an effort to
generate a variable which codes for domestic opposition groups. Such data could prove
useful for a variety of research projects which seek to incorporate this domestic
competition. In addition, future research on audience costs should not be limited to
examining the challenger's audience costs for backing down from its demands. The
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scope of this research, rather, should be expanded to include the audience costs for a
target in making concessions.
Limitations of and Recommendations for Qualitative Methods
Finally, a limitation of this qualitative research is the number and type of cases I
have examined. The cases in Chapters 4 through 6 cases were drawn primarily from the
Post-Cold War period and, in all of them, the U.S. was the powerful challenger. The
advantage of this approach is that it holds constant both the challenger and the time
period. The disadvantage is that there are no qualitative cases for other time periods or
involving other Great Powers. While this is mitigated by the inclusion of such cases in
the quantitative analysis, an expansion of the qualitative cases would increase confidence.
in how broadly these research findings can be generalized. It could also provide insights
into the question of why coercion succeeded so rarely during the Cold War. A final
advantage of additional qualitative research is that it would likely unearth fresh cases
currently omitted from the ICB database. 893
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this final section, I address foreign policy implications of this research for
asymmetric coercion. By far the most important application identifies the limits to which
a Great Power's foreign policy objectives can be achieved through coercion. A primary
finding affirms that coercive strategies are likely to fail, as a target will not make
concessions which threaten its survival, so long as it has the means to resist. In their
893 The qualitative cases in this research project identified 5 additional cases not captured in the ICB
database.
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decision calculus, a Great Power's policy makers should carefully weigh how their
demands will be perceived by the target. Not only should they consider whether their
demands threaten the survival of the target state, but also whether the act of conceding
alone might generate audience costs for the target which threaten the power of its regime
or its leader. As a result, policy makers need to carefully consider how the timing and
content of signals impact a target's audience costs.
At the lower range of foreign policy objectives, coercion may also fail or only
partially succeed when a Great Power does not have vital security interests at stake. As
demonstrated in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the ability of the U.S. to credibly threaten
military force can be significantly degraded, at least in the initial stages of a conflict, by
its unwillingness to risk its troops over non-vital interests. A danger in escalating a
conflict into crisis over limited objectives is that, once an ultimatum has been issued the
prestige of a Great Power lies in the balance. While the original issue may have been
minor, a Great Power is likely to view its reputation as vital.894 This can then precipitate
a vast expenditure of its blood and treasure to avoid losing the conflict, even if the costs
far outweigh the benefits of such a hollow victory.
A second implication of this research is that Great Powers can take steps to
ameliorate commitment problems. Trust will always be an issue in an anarchic
international environment, particularly for weak states who fear Great Powers.
Fortunately, Great Powers can take measures throughout a conflict to lessen a weak
state's concern that concession to today's demands will only lead to further demands
tomorrow. The formation of broad international coalitions, such as the U.S.-led coalition
894 Press, Daryl G. (2005) Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats Ithica NY:
Cornell University Press 2
479
during the Gulf War, as well as the involvement of ally or non-ally Great Powers, such as
the USSR/Russia with Iraq and Serbia and Britain with Libya, increases the costs a
powerful challenger suffers for abrogating an agreement. The implementation of
incremental tit-for-tat concessions, and taking measures to reduce the audience costs born
by the weak state's leadership for conceding are further measures a Great Power can
employ if it wants to overcome commitment issues.
Third, statesmen and policy analysts should be alert as to a Great Power's true
intentions when it issues coercive demands. Overreaching demands may merely be an
attempt to mask preparations for a brute force war, as was the case of the elder Bush
administration in the Gulf War, or it may be an effort to create a casus belli as with the
claim of Iraqi WMD by the younger Bush administration before the invasion of Iraq in
2003. In cases such as these, coercion failure may well be the desired outcome in an
effort to avoid the costs of abrogating international norms against the invasion of
sovereign states.
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